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“...we describe the reconstruction
progress, followed by a critique of why the
reconstruction progress has been so slow. We
conclude with reflections on reconstruction
challenges interwoven into the context of
our NGO experience. During our trips to the
region, we have observed and experienced the
difficulties people and organizations are facing
in the reconstruction process. We interviewed
government officials and NGOs that have been
involved in reconstruction, which helped us to
gain insight into broader perspectives on the
community or family-level realities that hinder
rebuilding and community revitalization. We
conclude that by mobilizing earthquake victims,
it is possible to rebuild houses and revitalize
communities. Conversely, little progress can be
expected in Nepal's rebuilding as long as poor
governance and poor coordination between
major reconstruction actors prevails.
Keywords: Nepal earthquake, post-disaster relief and recovery,
governance, NGOs, reconstruction.
HIMALAYA Volume37...”
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“...struction progress has been impeded. This paper has
been written based on the observations we made during
our several trips, the discussions we had (as represen-
tatives of reconstruction projects) with government
officials and representatives of other NGOs, and our
first-hand experiences as members of an NGO involved
in reconstruction projects.
This article consists of three parts. First, we describe the
reconstruction progress. Second, we critically analyze why
the progress has been so slow. Third, we provide reflec-
tions on reconstruction challenges using our experience
working with NGOs.
Aspirations and Realities of Reconstruction
The descriptions of Katunge village provided earlier in this
paper do not differ much from post-earthquake situations
in the rest of affected areas in Nepal. In most places the
reconstruction progress has been slow. By the time the
earthquake marked its first anniversary, and media atten-
tion surrounding the rebuilding progress peaked, none
of the more than...”
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“...progress as much reconstruction work had to be
suspended. Facing the increasing social turmoil and politi-
cal uncertainty, many NGOs decided to finish their disaster
relief work in Nepal earlier by December 2015 and gave up
the long-term recovery and reconstruction projects.
Little Gets Done Without a Reconstruction Policy
Effective reconstruction policy must go hand in hand with
good governance, which has been clearly discussed in the
literature on disaster governance. Empirical examples
indicate that effective coordination between the State and
NGOs helps to overcome the relief and recovery challenges
to those resource-poor countries (e.g. the earthquake in
Turkey on August 17,1999). Civil society’s involvement
strengthens the community’s resilience to future disasters
(e.g. the earthquakes in Sichuan on May 12, 2008 and on
April 20, 2013). Disasters can also transform the society on
multiple levels. For instance, the 1995 Kobe earthquake
directly caused the development of civil society...”
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“...flexible enough to respond to district-level real-
ities, and it was difficult to adjust these guidelines and to
develop local reconstruction policies (The Asia Foundation
2016b). This top-down approach, along with the govern-
ment’s inability to function properly, resulted in only a few
houses being rebuilt the year after the earthquake.
Apart from the delayed reconstruction policy, this recon-
struction strategy fails to respond to local complexities.
Equality is the most important reconstruction principle
for the Nepali government’s post-earthquake response.
An unjust reconstruction policy could further escalate the
tense ethnic divisions and anxieties following the earth-
quake, therefore the Nepali government has enforced a
limit on housing grants, and to avoid duplication of relief
and reconstruction efforts it has retained all decision-mak-
ing power for reconstruction projects. Influenced by the
approaches used by the State Government of Gujarat to
rebuild following the 2001 earthquake...”
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“...recent report
Building Inequality by Amnesty International (2017), the
‘owner-driven’ housing reconstruction program, which
requires proof of land ownership as a condition for house
owners to qualify to receive housing grants, did not
address Nepal’s history of feudal land tenure systems
and local informal tenure relationships. As a result, the
most disadvantaged groups, including the landless, were
excluded from this housing scheme.
In addition, the Nepali government enforced a housing
grant policy that capped grants at a certain amount and
did not allow additional top-up grants for marginalized
communities. All eligible households in rural areas could
receive NRs. 300,000 ($3,000 USD) in three installments if
their rebuilt houses complied with the building require-
ments. A staff member from one Taiwan-based NGO
explained to us why their organization finally gave up on
their housing reconstruction project, “It is hard for us to
work because villagers have to choose to get help from the
...”
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“...pendence to implement more holistic social development
projects, but after the earthquake, they lost this power.
For example, they felt the housing grant was inadequate
for villagers to rebuild their houses, and thus proposed
giving an extra grant to cover the costs of transportation;
however, the government rejected this proposal based on
the principle of equality for all.
Lack of Long-term NGO Commitment and Coordination
Based on our year-long observation, we noticed that the
poor performance of some NGOs (both local and interna-
tional) also led to the slow reconstruction progress. Most
NGOs are involved in masonry training programs, however
the quality and effectiveness of these programs is a serious
concern. Some NGOs offered only three-day masonry
training programs, and the instructors did not even have
any knowledge on how to build better and safe houses. We
discussed this issue with a Japan-funded NGO that carried
out several housing reconstruction training programs in
rural areas. The...”
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“...beneficial school. This story illustrates that if better
coordination existed among NGOs, we could distribute
resources wisely and widely so that more schools could be
benefited faster.
The sustainability of the top-down reconstruction
approach has been a serious concern. In our two-year
observation, the coordination between the State, the NGOs
and INGOs, as well as local communities, has been very
limited. Instead of simply offering financial resources in
an efficient way, we believe that good governance and
effective coordination will determine whether Nepal can
be rebuild. Our NGO experience in post-disaster recon-
struction clearly demonstrates that there is reason hope
for revitalization as well as immense hopelessness.
Hope and Hopelessness: Future Village Housing
Reconstruction Experiences
The earthquake caused extensive damage in the rural vil-
lages outside of Kathmandu, and the Future Village project
area was no exception. All the houses had collapsed, and
some people were killed. Most...”
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“...wanted to use in addition to the steel
frame.
In August 2015, we first presented our plan to the local
community. At that time, our plan was met with great
enthusiasm and support from the villagers. A local recon-
struction committee was also formed to coordinate this
rebuilding work.
Implementing Reconstruction
As the community agreed with the implementation of our
reconstruction project, we decided to ship the first batch
of steel frames from China (the only country close to Nepal
where such frames are currently made) to Katunge in
December 2015. During this period, we first encountered
the political dysfunction in the post-earthquake period: as
there was no policy established for reconstruction projects,
the authorities were not willing to allow our frames to enter
Nepal at the border. In the days that followed, it was difficult
to talk to the authorities, and the responses they gave us
were contradictory. In the end, we finally gained approval to
transport the frames into Nepal, however...”
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“...emphasized
that without such approval, helping villagers to rebuild
houses would be “illegal.” When asked how to make the
project legal, he failed to provide useful guidance. During
the meeting, he did not even look at our proposal. Later, we
were told that any reconstruction project must first get the
district government’s support before contacting the NRA.
Despite continued efforts to obtain government support,
we have neither heard anything back from local govern-
ment officials nor from the NRA. This has made it difficult
for our organization to make long-term plans. Indeed, their
bureaucratic-bureaucracy, which included inconsistent
information, as well as unclear systems, procedures, delays,
and negative responses from reconstruction authorities,
discouraged many NGOs like ours from continuing to con-
tribute to the post-earthquake revitalization effort.
Two years have now passed since the earthquake hit Nepal
and since we first started to contribute to its revitalization,
we have helped...”
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“...possible to rebuild houses and revitalize communities;
conversely, little progress to rebuild Nepal can be made so
long as both poor governance, and poor or no coordination
between major reconstruction actors, prevail.
Postscript
After two years, the reconstruction process remains
onerous. Out of the 750 affected national heritage sites,
the NRA has completed the reconstruction of 20, while
132 are still under construction. In the private housing
sector, 554,996 households (86% of eligible households)
have received their first reconstruction installment, 14,466
households have been verified for their second install-
ment, and 595 households for their third installment. As
of April 21, 2017, only 22,234 houses have been completed,
which accounts for only 3.5% of the total rebuild target
(National Reconstruction Authority 2017). To tackle the
extremely low housing rebuild rate, the NRA has deployed
more than 2,000 engineers and assistant sub-engineers to
the villages to provide technical assistance...”
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“...has been carrying
out research on the welfare impact of conservation-led
displacement on local communities, particularly in Nepal,
since 2002. Over the past 11 years she had dedicated her
life to improving the livelihoods of rural populations, and
she is the founder of Future Village Nepal. When the 2015
earthquake hit rural Nepal, her NGO not only provided
emergency relief, but also implemented long-term disaster
recovery and reconstruction projects.
Varun Khanna is a scholar with interests in Education,
Globalization and Development at the School of Human
Sciences at Osaka University, and a European Commission
fellow with a concurrent position at the Universitat
Autonoma de Barcelona, University of Amsterdam, and
University of Oslo. He is also part of the project panel for The
Chance Initiative and Future Village, NGOs in Nepal. He has
previously held other nonprofit positions such as National
Vice President of Stonewall Japan, Vice Chair of Foreign
Citizens'City...”
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“...Tek. Nath. 2007. Challenges of Civil Society
Governance in Nepal. Journal of Administration and Governance
2(1): 61-73
(Accessed on November 2, 2016).
Jaiswal, Pramod. ed. 2016. Constitution of Nepal: Evolution,
Development and Debates. New Delhi: G.B. Books.
Jalai, Rita. 2002. Civil Society and the State: Turkey After the
Earthquake. Disasters 26 (3): 120-139.
HRRP. 2017. Nepal Earthquake 2015: Housing Reconstruction
Two Years On. Housing Recovery and Reconstruction
Platform. Version 1.
National Planning Commission. 2015. Post Disaster Needs
Assessment. Government of Nepal. (Accessed on January 3, 2017).
National Reconstruction Authority. 2016. Rebuilding
Nepal, (Accessed on October
26, 2016).
------. 2017. Rebuilding Nepal, (Accessed on May 15,
2017)...”
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