Your search within this document for 'Reconstruction' resulted in twelve matching pages.
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“...we describe the reconstruction progress, followed by a critique of why the reconstruction progress has been so slow. We conclude with reflections on reconstruction challenges interwoven into the context of our NGO experience. During our trips to the region, we have observed and experienced the difficulties people and organizations are facing in the reconstruction process. We interviewed government officials and NGOs that have been involved in reconstruction, which helped us to gain insight into broader perspectives on the community or family-level realities that hinder rebuilding and community revitalization. We conclude that by mobilizing earthquake victims, it is possible to rebuild houses and revitalize communities. Conversely, little progress can be expected in Nepal's rebuilding as long as poor governance and poor coordination between major reconstruction actors prevails. Keywords: Nepal earthquake, post-disaster relief and recovery, governance, NGOs, reconstruction. HIMALAYA Volume37...”
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“...struction progress has been impeded. This paper has been written based on the observations we made during our several trips, the discussions we had (as represen- tatives of reconstruction projects) with government officials and representatives of other NGOs, and our first-hand experiences as members of an NGO involved in reconstruction projects. This article consists of three parts. First, we describe the reconstruction progress. Second, we critically analyze why the progress has been so slow. Third, we provide reflec- tions on reconstruction challenges using our experience working with NGOs. Aspirations and Realities of Reconstruction The descriptions of Katunge village provided earlier in this paper do not differ much from post-earthquake situations in the rest of affected areas in Nepal. In most places the reconstruction progress has been slow. By the time the earthquake marked its first anniversary, and media atten- tion surrounding the rebuilding progress peaked, none of the more than...”
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“...national reconstruction authority that would centrally organize all the reconstruction efforts and ensure they are carried out expeditiously and fairly. Indeed, the government was able to rapidly map the needs and damage in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake and communicate those needs to international donors, which was promising. This makes it even more disappointing that the reconstruction prog- ress has been slow, despite the availability of extensive resources (Nikhil 2016). What's Wrong with Rebuilding Nepal? The slow progress of post-earthquake reconstruction is in part the result of deeper socio-political conflicts in the Nepali society. First, political dysfunction has worsened in the post-earthquake time, and second, the lack of trust between the State and NGOs has led to many potential reconstruction projects being turned down or being ineffective in responding to local needs. In other words, post-disaster governance has played a crucial role in the reconstruction performance...”
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“...flexible enough to respond to district-level real- ities, and it was difficult to adjust these guidelines and to develop local reconstruction policies (The Asia Foundation 2016b). This top-down approach, along with the govern- ment’s inability to function properly, resulted in only a few houses being rebuilt the year after the earthquake. Apart from the delayed reconstruction policy, this recon- struction strategy fails to respond to local complexities. Equality is the most important reconstruction principle for the Nepali government’s post-earthquake response. An unjust reconstruction policy could further escalate the tense ethnic divisions and anxieties following the earth- quake, therefore the Nepali government has enforced a limit on housing grants, and to avoid duplication of relief and reconstruction efforts it has retained all decision-mak- ing power for reconstruction projects. Influenced by the approaches used by the State Government of Gujarat to rebuild following the 2001 earthquake...”
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“...recent report Building Inequality by Amnesty International (2017), the ‘owner-driven’ housing reconstruction program, which requires proof of land ownership as a condition for house owners to qualify to receive housing grants, did not address Nepal’s history of feudal land tenure systems and local informal tenure relationships. As a result, the most disadvantaged groups, including the landless, were excluded from this housing scheme. In addition, the Nepali government enforced a housing grant policy that capped grants at a certain amount and did not allow additional top-up grants for marginalized communities. All eligible households in rural areas could receive NRs. 300,000 ($3,000 USD) in three installments if their rebuilt houses complied with the building require- ments. A staff member from one Taiwan-based NGO explained to us why their organization finally gave up on their housing reconstruction project, “It is hard for us to work because villagers have to choose to get help from the ...”
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“...The NRA has encouraged NGOs and INGOs to deposit funds for private house reconstruction in the NRA’s Reconstruction Fund. During interviews, high-ranking gov- ernment officials pointed out that the one-door system is necessary to avoid poor NGO governance in the post-earth- quake context. While the number of NGOs and INGOs in Nepal has increased dramatically in the past three decades, their governance has long been questioned due to their lack of transparency in the monitoring and evaluation of project expenses and of their general activities (Dhakal 2007). This explains why the guideline requires at least 80% of an organization’s total project budget to be allocated to project activities, not staff salaries and traveling expenses, which is fair. However, this attempt to avoid corruption and mismanagement in NGOs has resulted in many NGOs simply giving up on their house rebuilding plans, or allo- cating funds to other recovery activities. It is estimated that less than 2% of the rebuilding...”
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“...beneficial school. This story illustrates that if better coordination existed among NGOs, we could distribute resources wisely and widely so that more schools could be benefited faster. The sustainability of the top-down reconstruction approach has been a serious concern. In our two-year observation, the coordination between the State, the NGOs and INGOs, as well as local communities, has been very limited. Instead of simply offering financial resources in an efficient way, we believe that good governance and effective coordination will determine whether Nepal can be rebuild. Our NGO experience in post-disaster recon- struction clearly demonstrates that there is reason hope for revitalization as well as immense hopelessness. Hope and Hopelessness: Future Village Housing Reconstruction Experiences The earthquake caused extensive damage in the rural vil- lages outside of Kathmandu, and the Future Village project area was no exception. All the houses had collapsed, and some people were killed. Most...”
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“...wanted to use in addition to the steel frame. In August 2015, we first presented our plan to the local community. At that time, our plan was met with great enthusiasm and support from the villagers. A local recon- struction committee was also formed to coordinate this rebuilding work. Implementing Reconstruction As the community agreed with the implementation of our reconstruction project, we decided to ship the first batch of steel frames from China (the only country close to Nepal where such frames are currently made) to Katunge in December 2015. During this period, we first encountered the political dysfunction in the post-earthquake period: as there was no policy established for reconstruction projects, the authorities were not willing to allow our frames to enter Nepal at the border. In the days that followed, it was difficult to talk to the authorities, and the responses they gave us were contradictory. In the end, we finally gained approval to transport the frames into Nepal, however...”
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“...emphasized that without such approval, helping villagers to rebuild houses would be “illegal.” When asked how to make the project legal, he failed to provide useful guidance. During the meeting, he did not even look at our proposal. Later, we were told that any reconstruction project must first get the district government’s support before contacting the NRA. Despite continued efforts to obtain government support, we have neither heard anything back from local govern- ment officials nor from the NRA. This has made it difficult for our organization to make long-term plans. Indeed, their bureaucratic-bureaucracy, which included inconsistent information, as well as unclear systems, procedures, delays, and negative responses from reconstruction authorities, discouraged many NGOs like ours from continuing to con- tribute to the post-earthquake revitalization effort. Two years have now passed since the earthquake hit Nepal and since we first started to contribute to its revitalization, we have helped...”
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“...possible to rebuild houses and revitalize communities; conversely, little progress to rebuild Nepal can be made so long as both poor governance, and poor or no coordination between major reconstruction actors, prevail. Postscript After two years, the reconstruction process remains onerous. Out of the 750 affected national heritage sites, the NRA has completed the reconstruction of 20, while 132 are still under construction. In the private housing sector, 554,996 households (86% of eligible households) have received their first reconstruction installment, 14,466 households have been verified for their second install- ment, and 595 households for their third installment. As of April 21, 2017, only 22,234 houses have been completed, which accounts for only 3.5% of the total rebuild target (National Reconstruction Authority 2017). To tackle the extremely low housing rebuild rate, the NRA has deployed more than 2,000 engineers and assistant sub-engineers to the villages to provide technical assistance...”
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“...in Anthropology from the University of Adelaide, Australia. She has been carrying out research on the welfare impact of conservation-led displacement on local communities, particularly in Nepal, since 2002. Over the past 11 years she had dedicated her life to improving the livelihoods of rural populations, and she is the founder of Future Village Nepal. When the 2015 earthquake hit rural Nepal, her NGO not only provided emergency relief, but also implemented long-term disaster recovery and reconstruction projects. Varun Khanna is a scholar with interests in Education, Globalization and Development at the School of Human Sciences at Osaka University, and a European Commission fellow with a concurrent position at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, University of Amsterdam, and University of Oslo. He is also part of the project panel for The Chance Initiative and Future Village, NGOs in Nepal. He has previously held other nonprofit positions such as National...”
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“...Governance 2(1): 61-73 (Accessed on November 2, 2016). Jaiswal, Pramod. ed. 2016. Constitution of Nepal: Evolution, Development and Debates. New Delhi: G.B. Books. Jalai, Rita. 2002. Civil Society and the State: Turkey After the Earthquake. Disasters 26 (3): 120-139. HRRP. 2017. Nepal Earthquake 2015: Housing Reconstruction Two Years On. Housing Recovery and Reconstruction Platform. Version 1. National Planning Commission. 2015. Post Disaster Needs Assessment. Government of Nepal. (Accessed on January 3, 2017). National Reconstruction Authority. 2016. Rebuilding Nepal, (Accessed on October 26, 2016). ------. 2017. Rebuilding Nepal, (Accessed on May 15, 2017). Nepal Economic Forum. 2016. Economic Impact of Earthquake-Tourism.