Your search within this document for 'Government' resulted in eight matching pages.
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“...I draw on observations from Kutang and Nubri in the mountains of northern Gorkha District to argue that neither of these descriptions is fully accurate. Even in this remote and inaccessible area, much was being done in the aftermath of disaster, and a great deal of this activity diverges, in multiple ways, from the notions of spontaneous egalitarianism that are often associated with 'resilience' I describe the fraught politics involved in distributing relief aid in a village where the local government has been non-existent for years; the active positioning of new political players on the local scene; and the economic inequalities that can arise from unlucky positioning along geological fault-lines, a recently booming tourist economy, and the specificities of the Nepali government's post-disaster compensation schemes. This article sketches out the anatomy of disaster 'aftershock' as a political environment rife with opportunity, bias, and unintended consequences. As scholars and interested...”
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“...quake was followed by a range of aftershocks that seemed never-ending, and which kept many inhabitants of the region in a drawn-out state of terror. Soon after the initial quake, international donors pledged over $4 billion to be used for post-earthquake reconstruction to the Nepalese government. Nonetheless, ‘reconstruction’ in the aftermath of this disaster has extensively been characterized by notions of slowness and inactivity. It took the government almost a year to begin disbursing reconstruction funds in earnest; in fact, the dis- tribution is still ongoing at the time of writing this article (June 2017)—two years after the funds were pledged. In the absence of swift action on the side of the government, many commentators—journalists and academics alike— describe the aftermath of the earthquake as either a state of inactivity or a stage for grassroots resilience in the face of disaster and state neglect. In this article, I draw on observations from Kutang and Nubri, located in the moun-...”
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“...and reconstruction outside the ambit of formal initiatives led by government and international relief organizations. Here, the reconstruction of houses was well underway within weeks of the first quake. The tendency to describe places like northern Gorkha in terms of their inactivity—despite such reconstruction initiatives—is telling. First, the diagnosis resonates eerily with prevalent narratives that characterize the high Himalaya in terms of its remoteness and developmental backwardness (Hussain 2015; Pigg 1992). Second, it fits well with mainstream approaches to post-disaster reconstruc- tion that tend to operate on the basis of a simple cause and effect relationship.2 This approach is clearly reflected in the now globally standardized formats of the Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) framework.3 Here, the earthquake is the cause and its effects are summarized in terms of‘damages’ and ‘economic losses’ (GoN 2015). With this simple formula, the effects of the 2015 Himalayan earthquake...”
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“...saster relief—held the potential for massive unintended consequences in relation to the local economy. As an up-and-coming tourist area, the Budhi Gandaki river valley has seen rapid investment in tourism infrastructure over the past 6-7 years. The realignment of the trail would mean that a great deal of people who had spent all their savings and taken loans to build tourist lodges on the western side of the river in anticipation of a future rise in tourism would now be by-passed. And with a government compensation scheme purely focused on damaged houses, the economic loss of these people was not accounted for. For a while, it looked like this would be the consequence, but by November 2016, the old trail was back in use. To the relief of local small-scale tourism businesses, trekkers and locals alike seemed to have deemed the safe, high trail too cumbersome to use. Reconstruction: Opportunities for Good Work The emotive language of suffering, aid, and rehabil- itation is generally difficult...”
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“...the river valley was also, now, connected to the outside world via cheap and accessible mobile phones. Many of these development projects had been planned well before the earthquake, but had suddenly been accomplished in the rush of reconstruction work after the earthquake. Furthermore, villagers themselves had pri- vately chosen to utilize some of the cash distributed after the earthquake to fly CGI sheets for roofing and toilets in by helicopter and some were planning to spend the expected government reconstruction funds to build small ‘home-stay’ houses for future tourist. The aftershock also reverberated in local politics. One villager, rumored to have been associated with the heavy- handed rule of the past, had emerged as the de-facto leader of development initiatives in the village. He told me how Bihi used to be regarded as a bad, less developed place compared to most other villages in the area. Now, it was going to be different. Things were changing in Bihi, and he wanted it to be...”
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“...schools and health posts northern Gorkha—some with full responsibility, others on a consultancy basis. By November 2016, several additional projects had been included in the portfolio. Sonam is now renting the office across the hall from his trekking agency in Boudha for the NGO, and overhead funds from the various projects have allowed him to employ several friends as well as a few volunteer interns. Throughout his work, Sonam has been struggling against a persistent bias on the side of the government to think of reconstruction solely in terms of reinforced concrete buildings, (much like in post-earthquake Gujarat, see Simpson and Serafini 2015). His design for the school in Bihi is now presented as a model for earthquake resistant reconstruction with local materials, but there were many bureaucratic hassles to get there. Reverberations The small fragments of post-disaster experience described in this article provide a glimpse into ‘aftershock’ as a continuously evolving scenario. Far from...”
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“...Werker. 2008. The Political Economy of “Natural” Disasters. In Working Paper: Harvard Business School. Dixit, Kunda. 2015. Operation Mountain Express. Nepali Times, 19-25 June. Fujikura, Tatsuro. 2001. Discourses of Awareness: Notes for a Criticism of Development in Nepal. Studies in Nepali History and Society 6 (2): 271-313. GoN. 2009. Tourism Vision 2020. Kathmandu: Government of Nepal, Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation. GoN. 2010. Nepal Trade Integration Strategy 2010. Kathmandu: Ministry of Commerce and Supplies, Government of Nepal. GoN. 2015. Nepal Earthquake 2015: Post Disaster Needs Assesment. Kathmandu: Government of Nepal, National Planning Commission. Guha-Sapir, Debarati, Indhira Santos, and Alexandre Borde. 2013. The economic impacts of natural disasters. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Hallegatte, Stephane, and Valentin Przyluski. 2010. The Economics of Natural Disasters: Concepts and Methods. In Policy Research Working Paper: The World Bank. HIMALAYA Volume37Number2...”
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“.... Pigg, Stacy Leigh. 1992. Inventing Social Categories through Place: Social Representations and Development in Nepal. Comparative Studies in Society and History 34 (3): 491-513. Pigg, Stacy Leigh. 1993. Unintended Consequences: The Ideological Impact of Development in Nepal. South Asia Bulletin 13 (1 & 2): 45-58. Sander, Catherine, Kimber Haddix McKay, Angjuk Lama, and Pralhad Dhakal. 2015. Pro-Government’ Is Not ‘Pro- Corruption’ in the Aftermath of the Nepal Earthquakes. Anthropology News 56 (6). Simpson, Edward. 2013. The political biography of an earthquake: aftermath and amnesia in Gujarat, India. London: Hurst. Simpson, Edward, and Michele Serafini. 2015. The Neoliberal Aftershock. Himal Southasian, 12-52. Stirrat, Jock. 2006. Competitive humanitarianism: relief and the tsunami in Sri Lanka. Anthropology Today 22 (5): 11-16. Tamang, Seira. 2015. Dangers of Resilience. The Kathmandu Post...”