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Page 3
“...these descriptions is fully
accurate. Even in this remote and inaccessible
area, much was being done in the aftermath
of disaster, and a great deal of this activity
diverges, in multiple ways, from the notions
of spontaneous egalitarianism that are often
associated with 'resilience'
I describe the fraught politics involved in
distributing relief aid in a village where the local
government has been non-existent for years;
the active positioning of new political players on
the local scene; and the economic inequalities
that can arise from unlucky positioning along
geological fault-lines, a recently booming
tourist economy, and the specificities of
the Nepali government's post-disaster
compensation schemes. This article sketches
out the anatomy of disaster 'aftershock' as a
political environment rife with opportunity,
bias, and unintended consequences. As scholars
and interested observers of Nepal and the
Himalaya, we need to pay close attention to
this environment and its potentially unequal
outcomes...”
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Page 4
“... is fully
accurate. Even in this remote and inaccessible area, a great
deal was going on in the aftermath of disaster, and much
of this activity diverges, in multiple ways, from the notions
of spontaneous egalitarianism that are often associated
with ‘resilience.’
This article explores the anatomy of‘aftershock’—as a
social and political phenomenon rather than a seismic one.
In the wake of disaster, as relief aid and reconstruction
funding has poured into Nepal, a multitude of political and
economic, as well as personal and social, transformations
are taking place. Following disasters in other times and
places, people often refer to this ‘aftershock’ as a ‘second
earthquake’ or a ‘tsunami after the tsunami.’ As such
expressions indicate, the magnitude of these post-disaster
changes is easily perceived as being on par with that of
the disaster itself. The aftershock speeds up, intensifies
and—sometimes—alters the existing social structures and
processes of change. To give one obvious example...”
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Page 5
“...characterize the high
Himalaya in terms of its remoteness and developmental
backwardness (Hussain 2015; Pigg 1992). Second, it fits well
with mainstream approaches to post-disaster reconstruc-
tion that tend to operate on the basis of a simple cause
and effect relationship.2 This approach is clearly reflected
in the now globally standardized formats of the Post
Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) framework.3 Here, the
earthquake is the cause and its effects are summarized in
terms of‘damages’ and ‘economic losses’ (GoN 2015). With
this simple formula, the effects of the 2015 Himalayan
earthquake can be counted and evaluated on exactly the
same basis as the Haiti earthquake or the Pakistan floods.
The framework of this formula thus speaks to a tabula rasa
imagination of disaster, where disasters wipe clean the
slate of society so that post-disaster interventions can
be planned in the same way whether they are operating
in the high Himalaya of Nepal or the Caribbean island of
Haiti. In fact, many...”
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Page 6
“...means. In my mind, however, the
aftershock remains confusing. I feel that what I’m writing
now might be countered, again, in a month or two; that
the aftershock continues its churning that creates new
forms of political potentiality past the present moment
of stocktaking. Thus, what I write here is more a critique
of false certainties and clear-cut causalities than an
assertion of a new argument set in stone. What I empha-
size is the fluidity of the aftershock as a transformative
political-economic environment.
Relief and the Politics of Distribution: 'It's All Logistics'5
Disasters are made to appear as logistical problems
which demand intervention and legitimate tres-
pass. (Simpson 2013: 266)
Post-disaster environments can produce a resource
bubble where the ‘need to spend’ and to display efficiency
to donors may easily override concerns with coordina-
tion, local ownership and genuine needs in the name of
relief (Stirrat 2006). In northern Gorkha, from early on
relief efforts were...”
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Page 8
“...their work9 and producing a ‘subway map’ that specifies
‘staging areas,’ ‘transportations corridors’ and a ‘through-
put’ measured in metric tons per month (MT/mth).
Nonetheless, the whole operation was framed exclusively
as a matter of most efficiently pouring resources into the
area across an incredibly challenging physical terrain;
all reflections about the complicated social, political and
economic landscapes into which these resources were
inserted seemed wiped away.
Apart from this disregard for the local complexities of
patronage politics, the operation held the potential for
unintended economic consequences. As part of the WFP
operations, the main trail through the Manaslu area was
surveyed by a Swiss/Nepali team some weeks after the
earthquake. The geologist’s conclusion was clear: the
main trail was situated on a fault line in the landscape
and highly prone to landslides. Subsequently, plans were
made for an alternative trail into the area that included
high paths on the other (eastern)...”
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Page 10
“...and the Himalaya, we need
to pay close attention to these processes and their poten-
tially unequal outcomes in the years to come.
In high Himalayan places such as northern Gorkha District,
the aftershock of disaster is interacting with existing
processes of change in multiple, open-ended ways. As
many other ‘poor’ countries across the world, in the past
years Nepal has been betting heavily on tourism as a route
to economic development (GoN 2009, 2010). However,
plummeting tourist numbers after the earthquake are
now highlighting the vulnerability of tourism as a route
to economic development. Over the past decade, the
Manaslu circuit in northern Gorkha has been promoted as
an up-and-coming tourist destination, destined to become
the ‘next Annapurna.’ Nonetheless, locals currently seem
hesitant. In 2015, a total of 2,414 international trekkers
visited the area, down from 5,918 the year before. Will the
numbers go up again? Furthermore, while infrastructural
development—roads and dams—were...”
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Page 11
“...In 2016,1 was quoted salaries between Nrs. 25 and
30,000 for work amounting to an average of one day a
week.
12. .
References
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disasters: with special reference to developing countries: Oxford
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Bennike, Rune Bolding. 2015a. Distribution Day. Himal
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Bennike, Rune Bolding. 2015b. Textbook Difference: Spatial
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day Nepal. Indian Economic and Social History Review 52 (1):
53-78.
Bista, Dor Bahadur. 1991. Fatalism and Development: Nepal’s
Struggle for Modernization. Madras: Sangam Books Ltd.
Childs, Geoff H. 2004. Tibetan diary :from birth to death and
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Cohen, Charles, and Eric Werker. 2008. The Political
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