Your search within this document for 'Government' resulted in twelve matching pages.
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“...Disaster Governance and Challenges in a Rural Nepali Community: Notes from Future Village NGO Acknowledgements We wish to acknowledge the financial support provided by Osaka University for this research project. Furthermore^ we gratefully appreciate government officials; NGOs workers; scholars to share their disaster relief and recovery experiences with us. Finally we are very grateful to the many villagers in our research area who shared their views on; and experiences of; hope and hopelessness in post-earthquake time. This perspectives is available in HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies: http:/ / digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol37/iss2/11...”
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“...after the earthquake, now only a few are confident that they will ever rebuild their homes. In this article, we describe the reconstruction progress, followed by a critique of why the reconstruction progress has been so slow. We conclude with reflections on reconstruction challenges interwoven into the context of our NGO experience. During our trips to the region, we have observed and experienced the difficulties people and organizations are facing in the reconstruction process. We interviewed government officials and NGOs that have been involved in reconstruction, which helped us to gain insight into broader perspectives on the community or family-level realities that hinder rebuilding and community revitalization. We conclude that by mobilizing earthquake victims, it is possible to rebuild houses and revitalize communities. Conversely, little progress can be expected in Nepal's rebuilding as long as poor governance and poor coordination between major reconstruction actors prevails. Keywords:...”
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“...by the government (Rigby 2016). This left approximately three million people without permanent shelter (Save the Children 2016). At that time, most of these affected families were still living in temporary shelter unsuitable for Nepal’s intense mon- soons and cold winters. In some extreme cases, people were even living in tents or had moved back into their damaged houses (Basu 2016). The slow reconstruction pace has been met with substan- tial criticism both inside and outside Nepal, and many organizations, including donors, have urged the Nepali government to expedite the reconstruction and the distribution of grants (Nikhil 2016). Despite this pressure, the reconstruction progress only started to accelerate in August 2016, when a campaign was undertaken to finally distribute the reconstruction grant installment of NRs. 50,000 to the affected families that had signed grant agreements. This long-awaited installment was part of a series of installments that the Nepalese government had promised...”
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“...rebuilt by the Nepali government or NGOs; however, no clear plan had been implemented for rebuild- ing the remaining classrooms. Reconstruction of the health facilities has also been slow, with construction only start- ing for 444 of the 1,080 destroyed health facilities by the end of September 2016, and currently only 200 facilities have been reopened. At the same time, construction has only just begun for 49 of the 750 damaged cultural heri- tage sites, making problems worse for an already suffering tourism industry (National Reconstruction Authority 2016).2 The lack of progress strongly contrasts with the promises made during the conference of donors held in June 2015. During this conference, donor countries pledged nearly 4.1 billion USD for the long-term recovery of Nepal, a level of commitment that surprised many, and covers just under half of the 9.18 billion USD the Nepali government now expects will be needed to rebuild the country. In return, the Nepali government promised to establish...”
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“...important reconstruction principle for the Nepali government’s post-earthquake response. An unjust reconstruction policy could further escalate the tense ethnic divisions and anxieties following the earth- quake, therefore the Nepali government has enforced a limit on housing grants, and to avoid duplication of relief and reconstruction efforts it has retained all decision-mak- ing power for reconstruction projects. Influenced by the approaches used by the State Government of Gujarat to rebuild following the 2001 earthquake in India, and the advice from the World Bank, the government of Nepal decided an owner-driven approach would be the most effective and culturally sensitive way to rebuild private houses (National Planning Commission 2015). However, what government officials promote as equality, in reality, does not mean equality for everyone, especially the 78 HIMALAYA Fall2017...”
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“...to rebuild houses by themselves. However, the hope for getting more and more housing grants makes everyone take a wait-and-see attitude and solely depend on government. This is one of reasons for the severe delay in housing reconstruction.” At the end of September 2016, the NRA announced that over 80% enrolled beneficiaries (361,575 out of 455,710) received the first housing grant installment. According to our observations in the Dhading district (one of the 11 most earthquake-devastated districts), even though most villagers had received the housing grant, active rebuilding had not yet commenced. Some villagers told us they used the money for food purchases and festival celebration. Many villagers also mentioned that they did not have sufficient knowledge to build earthquake-resilient houses. Government: "NGO Fund is Also a Government Fund" The direct involvement of NGOs and INGOs in housing reconstruction is very rare. Most NGOs and INGOs in Nepal have allocated their funds to public i...”
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“...managed by the Nepali government. In March 2016, we visited one influential NGO that had planned to help poor villagers rebuild their houses, but had changed their plans when negotiations with the government broke down. One of the reasons these negotiations halted was that this NGO was asked to rebuild the entire district, but the NGO simply did not have the ability to do so. The NGO was concerned about handing over donations to the government. The NGO officer pointed out that safe shelter for affected villagers should be the top priority, but it was difficult to deal with the bureaucracy. Finally, the decision was made to allocate funding to less controversial reconstruction sectors, such as education, health and water facilities. Five months later, the officer told us that the MoU with the Nepali govern- ment was finally signed. According to the MoU, the NGO would provide financial support to 8,000 households in four districts to rebuild their houses and the government had the right to decide...”
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“...months that followed, we established partner- ships with several organizations and produced a strategy to rebuild earthquake-resistant houses in Katunge. In short, we designed an earthquake resistant steel frame,4 which could be distributed among the affected families. Architects and engineers from our partner organizations would provide free training to the community on how to erect the steel frames, the necessary foundation for the frames, and how to build the rest of the house according to government regulations. Apart from the steel frame, the materials to build the walls, roofs and floors could be sourced from the surrounding environment and the house could be built in accordance with cultural and traditional knowledge and customs. Meanwhile, our organization took on the responsibility of mobilizing local people, leading the project and partly financing it through our global donor network. Several fundraising campaigns had already helped us to raise suf- ficient donation funds to finance...”
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“...It was around this time that the government had also announced the amount of money the earthquake-af- fected families would be entitled to and the criteria for receiving such support. Villagers split into two groups: some preferred to rebuild their houses faster and requested we order more steel frames, but most chose to wait for the government’s support. We also noticed that most of the villagers did not understand the conditions for receiving such government support. They were under the impres- sion that the government would give them a sum of money upfront as the first installment and were unfamiliar with the condition that they had to rebuild their house in accordance with the building codes to receive the next installment of support. Nevertheless, 20 families eventually decided to accept the support from our organization; the community selected those families to receive steel frames in April 2016. Our organization also approached different government officials, and despite their promise...”
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“...documented the post-earth- quake reality of a rural project area involving a grassroots NGO. We have highlighted some of the challenges of this project, and have interwoven several recommenda- tions into our discussion for future policy-makers. Our reconstruction experience clearly demonstrates that the dominance of government control, bureaucracy, lack of long-term commitment among NGOs as well as the villag- ers’ wait-and-see attitudes all undermine the capacity of the community’s ability to rebound. In a resource-poor village like Katunge, civic participation from villagers, NGOs and private sectors are the key for post-disaster recovery. We suggest that the Nepali government should have a more encouraging framework to govern NGOs and an attitude to let the NGOs do what they need to do, so that they can mobilize others to help the local residents rebuild their communities. The more time passes without things being done, the fewer opportunities Nepali people will have to rebuild their homes...”
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“...University, Japan. He recently completed fieldwork on education in post-disaster Nepal and is a part of The Chance Initiative by Future Village, a Japanese NGO. The authors wish to acknowledge the financial support provided by Osaka University for this research project Furthermore, they gratefully appreciate government officials, NGO workers, and scholars who shared their disaster relief and recovery experiences. Finally, the authors are very grateful to the many villagers in the research area who shared their views on, and experiences of, hope and hopelessness in post-earthquake time. Endnotes 1. On March 10, 2017, the Nepali government has adopted a 744 local body system, fulfilling the requirement of the new constitution of Nepal that was established in 2015. All old municipalities and villages (of which there were more than 3,900) were restructured to total only 744 new Municipalities and Villages. Katunge village, together with Marpak and Semjong, have been merged...”
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“...2, 2016). Chamlee-Wright, Emily and Daniel M. Rothschild. 2007. Disastrous Uncertainty: How Government Disaster Policy Undermines Community Rebound. Mercatus Policy Series, Mercatus Center, George Mason University, No. 9. (Accessed on September 2, 2016). Dhakal, Tek. Nath. 2007. Challenges of Civil Society Governance in Nepal. Journal of Administration and Governance 2(1): 61-73 (Accessed on November 2, 2016). Jaiswal, Pramod. ed. 2016. Constitution of Nepal: Evolution, Development and Debates. New Delhi: G.B. Books. Jalai, Rita. 2002. Civil Society and the State: Turkey After the Earthquake. Disasters 26 (3): 120-139. HRRP. 2017. Nepal Earthquake 2015: Housing Reconstruction Two Years On. Housing Recovery and Reconstruction Platform. Version 1. National Planning Commission. 2015. Post Disaster Needs Assessment. Government of Nepal. (Accessed...”