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“...Disaster Governance and Challenges in a Rural Nepali Community: Notes from Future Village NGO Acknowledgements We wish to acknowledge the financial support provided by Osaka University for this research project. Furthermore^ we gratefully appreciate government officials; NGOs workers; scholars to share their disaster relief and recovery experiences with us. Finally we are very grateful to the many villagers in our research area who shared their views on; and experiences of; hope and hopelessness in post-earthquake time. This perspectives is available in HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies: http:/ / digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol37/iss2/11...”
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“...the context of our NGO experience. During our trips to the region, we have observed and experienced the difficulties people and organizations are facing in the reconstruction process. We interviewed government officials and NGOs that have been involved in reconstruction, which helped us to gain insight into broader perspectives on the community or family-level realities that hinder rebuilding and community revitalization. We conclude that by mobilizing earthquake victims, it is possible to rebuild houses and revitalize communities. Conversely, little progress can be expected in Nepal's rebuilding as long as poor governance and poor coordination between major reconstruction actors prevails. Keywords: Nepal earthquake, post-disaster relief and recovery, governance, NGOs, reconstruction. HIMALAYA Volume37,Number2 75...”
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“...difficulties people and organizations are facing as they try to rebuild, and have spoken to several govern- ment officials and NGOs that have been involved in the reconstruction. In this article, we discuss our perspectives on the reasons why the reconstruction progress in Nepal has been slow; we focus on how Nepalese government and non-govern- mental organization actions have slowed the revitalization process. We argue that the government’s inefficiency to deliver funding and services to affected people, and its lack of coordination with NGOs in the aftermath of the earthquake, are among the main reasons why the recon- struction progress has been impeded. This paper has been written based on the observations we made during our several trips, the discussions we had (as represen- tatives of reconstruction projects) with government officials and representatives of other NGOs, and our first-hand experiences as members of an NGO involved in reconstruction projects. This article consists of three...”
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“...the earthquake and later by the fuel crisis; tourism took a massive hit because of this double crisis. High transportation costs also limited recon- struction progress as much reconstruction work had to be suspended. Facing the increasing social turmoil and politi- cal uncertainty, many NGOs decided to finish their disaster relief work in Nepal earlier by December 2015 and gave up the long-term recovery and reconstruction projects. Little Gets Done Without a Reconstruction Policy Effective reconstruction policy must go hand in hand with good governance, which has been clearly discussed in the literature on disaster governance. Empirical examples indicate that effective coordination between the State and NGOs helps to overcome the relief and recovery challenges to those resource-poor countries (e.g. the earthquake in Turkey on August 17,1999). Civil society’s involvement strengthens the community’s resilience to future disasters (e.g. the earthquakes in Sichuan on May 12, 2008 and on April...”
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“...tion is undermined in this post-disaster time (Chamlee-Wright and Rothschild 2007; Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2009). Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2009) also find that the state’s promises are often unrealistic, which can exacerbate pessimistic expectations among the affected communities if the rebuilding work is slow. They conclude that, in contrast with a state where power is centralized, the coordinated relationship between key stakeholders, including the state, local NGOs, interna- tional non-governmental organizations (iNGOs), and local communities, is the key to better recovery. They argue the role of the state is to create mechanisms for disaster-af- fected communities to self-recover by reinforcing their local knowledge and community resources. Nepal has faced many governance challenges in the post-disaster period. Political dysfunction resulted in a serious delay in the establishment of a reconstruction authority. During the Donor Conference in June 2015, the Nepali government promised...”
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“...Fund" The direct involvement of NGOs and INGOs in housing reconstruction is very rare. Most NGOs and INGOs in Nepal have allocated their funds to public infrastructure, masonry and carpentry training programs, and livelihood improvement activities. This dilemma was prevalent among NGOs, and in fact, in February 2016 the NRA requested that NGOs and INGOs not provide financial assis- tance or building materials directly to villagers because such organizations could not comply with building codes. Later, the NRA clarified that NGOs/ INGOs were welcome to become involved in the house rebuilding sector with the understanding that the one-door system meant they must obtain approval from the NRA and sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government of Nepal prior to becoming involved. In addition, NGOs were told that their housing projects should cover one defined and bounded area (such as a whole village or district). The NRA also notified the NGOs that no reconstruction proj- ects...”
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“...The NRA has encouraged NGOs and INGOs to deposit funds for private house reconstruction in the NRA’s Reconstruction Fund. During interviews, high-ranking gov- ernment officials pointed out that the one-door system is necessary to avoid poor NGO governance in the post-earth- quake context. While the number of NGOs and INGOs in Nepal has increased dramatically in the past three decades, their governance has long been questioned due to their lack of transparency in the monitoring and evaluation of project expenses and of their general activities (Dhakal 2007). This explains why the guideline requires at least 80% of an organization’s total project budget to be allocated to project activities, not staff salaries and traveling expenses, which is fair. However, this attempt to avoid corruption and mismanagement in NGOs has resulted in many NGOs simply giving up on their house rebuilding plans, or allo- cating funds to other recovery activities. It is estimated that less than 2% of the rebuilding...”
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“...by offering them ‘better deals’ (meaning that no financial or in-kind contribution from locals would be necessary). Consequently, we stopped the project and removed all building materials. As a local and volunteer-based NGO, we did not have enough human resources to look for a new beneficial school. This story illustrates that if better coordination existed among NGOs, we could distribute resources wisely and widely so that more schools could be benefited faster. The sustainability of the top-down reconstruction approach has been a serious concern. In our two-year observation, the coordination between the State, the NGOs and INGOs, as well as local communities, has been very limited. Instead of simply offering financial resources in an efficient way, we believe that good governance and effective coordination will determine whether Nepal can be rebuild. Our NGO experience in post-disaster recon- struction clearly demonstrates that there is reason hope for revitalization as well as immense...”
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“...building codes to receive the next installment of support. Nevertheless, 20 families eventually decided to accept the support from our organization; the community selected those families to receive steel frames in April 2016. Our organization also approached different government officials, and despite their promise to support us, nothing was achieved. Finally, in April 2016, the Nepali government established a policy that made it clear that families who had received or would receive support from NGOs to rebuild their houses would be ineligible to receive the government’s support. The new policy resulted in more and more people taking a wait-and-see attitude: they would not rebuild anything until the government distributed money. As a result of this policy most families spent another monsoon season in temporary shelters. Around April 2016, it also became clear that NGO’s were no longer allowed to operate without obtaining an approval for their reconstruction projects from the NRA. Therefore...”
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“...grassroots NGO. We have highlighted some of the challenges of this project, and have interwoven several recommenda- tions into our discussion for future policy-makers. Our reconstruction experience clearly demonstrates that the dominance of government control, bureaucracy, lack of long-term commitment among NGOs as well as the villag- ers’ wait-and-see attitudes all undermine the capacity of the community’s ability to rebound. In a resource-poor village like Katunge, civic participation from villagers, NGOs and private sectors are the key for post-disaster recovery. We suggest that the Nepali government should have a more encouraging framework to govern NGOs and an attitude to let the NGOs do what they need to do, so that they can mobilize others to help the local residents rebuild their communities. The more time passes without things being done, the fewer opportunities Nepali people will have to rebuild their homes safely. It has been argued that the people are always happy and satisfied...”
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“...emergency relief, but also implemented long-term disaster recovery and reconstruction projects. Varun Khanna is a scholar with interests in Education, Globalization and Development at the School of Human Sciences at Osaka University, and a European Commission fellow with a concurrent position at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, University of Amsterdam, and University of Oslo. He is also part of the project panel for The Chance Initiative and Future Village, NGOs in Nepal. He has previously held other nonprofit positions such as National Vice President of Stonewall Japan, Vice Chair of Foreign Citizens'City Council atToyonaka (Osaka), and Global Ambassador of the University of Tokyo. Rob Kuipers is an undergraduate student at the School of Human Sciences of Osaka University, Japan. He recently completed fieldwork on education in post-disaster Nepal and is a part of The Chance Initiative by Future Village, a Japanese NGO.