The aphorisms of the Nyāya philosophy

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The aphorisms of the Nyāya philosophy
Uniform Title:
Gautama (Authority on Nyāyaśāstra)
ViÅ›vanātha Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya
Ballantyne, James Robert, 1813-1864
Place of Publication:
printed at the Presbyterian Mission Press
Publication Date:
Physical Description:
2 v. : ;


Subjects / Keywords:
Nyaya -- Early works to 1800 ( lcsh )
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800 ( lcsh )
न्याय दर्शन
Spatial Coverage:
Asia -- India
एशिया -- भारत
21 x 78 ( India )


Creation/Production Credits:
Tr. & prefaced by J.R.B. [sc. J.R. Ballantyne].
General Note:
VIAF (name authority) : Gautama (Authority on Nyāyaśāstra) : URI
General Note:
VIAF (name authority) : ViÅ›vanātha Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya : URI
General Note:
VIAF (name authority) : Ballantyne, James Robert, 1813-1864 : URI
Statement of Responsibility:
by Gautama ; with illustrative extracts from the commentary by Viśwanātha ...

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SOAS University of London
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286342 ( aleph )
CWML C.3/15 ( soas classmark )
EB85.79 /6172 ( soas classmark )


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or tiie
Printed, for the use of the Benares College,
Rev. L. G. Hay, Superintendent.
[1st edition, 550 copies.—Price 15 annas.]

In Aph. 7L read “because of its proving too much;” and so throughout the
section, where the term so rendered recurs.
In page 36,1. 19, delete the “ that,” and also the clause “As, by the”.

a. I devote myself to the brilliant Second Book oftheNyaya,
[and I worship] Hari, with [his four] arms tried in contests, [and
—if you apply my remarks to the Institute itself, which suggested
this comparison,] with its [four] Proofs [—the conquerors in all
logical contests—] which every one knows.*
b. Now the Proofs, &c. [B. I. §1], that have been defined,
having to be submitted to ordeal [with the view of determining
the pertinency of the several definitions], since there is no room
for trial without [there be] Doubt, in the first place Doubt itself
must be put on trial.f
* w. i ftat-
t sra w’infe’? ^4 fipn

c. Some say that the purpose of the [Second] Book is only
the trial of the Proofs [—the first in Gautama's enumeration of
topics—], because [—they argue—] this is in accordance with the
pupil’s desire of knowledge [—he wishing to know first the whole
truth respecting what is enunciated first—], and according to the
rule of the needle and the frying-pan [—the smith, to whom the
two are brought simultaneously for repair, polishing off the sim-
pler first—], and since thus the trial of [the definition of] Doubt
is subservient to the trial of the Proofs, &c.*
d. But in reality, since [the definition of] Braud has been put
on trial [in Book I. §§55—57], and since ‘That which is the
object of right notion’ [—the second in Gautama's list of topics
—] is to be put on trial in the Third and Fourth Books, and
Futility in the Fifth, the purpose of the [present] Book is the
examination of such of the topics as are other than these;—for
[although Motive, &c., is not examined expressly, yet] the ex-
amination of Motive, &c., also will be made here by substitu-
tion\ [—i. e. by saying—as in Aph. 7—“ Now substitute Motive
for Proof, and the same rule will apply"].
e. Here the aim of the first Diurnal Portion [or half of Book
Second] is the examination of just such topics as aforesaid, ex-
clusive of the examination of Proof with reference to the divi~

wim Tfh ii
sTO â– siTa:

BOOK II. §1.
sion thereof* [—Proof itself being put on trial, with other things,
in the first Diurnal Portion, and the question of the propriety of
its fourfold division being remitted to the second],
f. Among these, for the trial of [the pertinency of the defini-
tion of] Doubt [assigned in B. I. §23], there is an Aphorism sta-
ting the prima facie viewf [as follows]—
The account given of Doubt examined.
it \ ii
The assigned origin of APh- 1-—Doubt does not arise—[perhaps
Doubt. some one will say—] from the consideration
of characters common [to more than one] or several [ such as can-
not really belong to one and the same thing], nor [again] from
the consideration of [mutually exclusive] characters under the as-
pect of an alternative.
a. Some explain the intention of the maker of the apho-
rism to be as follows,—that here, for fear of a regressus in infini-
tum, Doubt is not an element in the examination of [the perti-
nency of the definition of] Doubt, because no doubt is entertain-
ed by the maker of the aphorisms. But this [account of the im-
port of the aphorism] is not correct, for it is not the [definition
* ii
t w? wdtwa n

of] the nature of Doubt that is put on trial, from which there
would be a regressus in infinitum [—whereas Doubt is the pri-
mordial source of all enquiry—] but it is the cause of Doubt, as
set forth in the aphorism defining it [B. I. §23] and thus the
doubt—“ is Doubt produced from the beholding of similar cha-
racters, &c , or not is quite feasible *
b. But, since there belongs to the maker of the aphorisms
certainty [in respect of everything that is set forth in his insti-
tute], Doubt is not exhibited with a view merely to the refuta-
tion of prima facie views, [—as if these had ever had any weight
with the author,—but for the purpose of explaining what are
the sources of doubt in the minds of other men;—] and so too
in the examination of [the pertinency of the definitions of]
Proof, &c. It is this that is declared in the Bhusky a where it
is said—“ In an institute, and in discussion [between a teacher
and a pupil,—see Book I. § 41] there is no Doubt.” Such is
the fact.f
c. Doubt does not arise [—says the supposed objector in the
aphorism—] from the beholding of * characters common,’ &c.,
because these [two alleged causes of Doubt] severally wander
* aaaqffanat aw
ar^aawraarfeaiTaa anrapn i a^aa i
a taraw ^xa arfq?x
awfinar i aara aaa: aaiaaa-
aafa aaa: aaiaafa n
t ara®ar faaaawi awafanaaiaaiT-
O 'x* u\
v^aTa a afaa vsaa wraTfetutaraTafa i
a^aifafaa wa w faaaaafafa aataii

BOOK II. §1.
away [—so that if the first be present, when there is Doubt, the
other is absent, and if the other be present, the first is absent;
and how can that be the cause of a given phenomenon, which is
absent when the phenomenon presents itself ?] Moreover, Doubt
does not arise from the beholding of these [two] combined under
the relation of an alternative. For, when taking cognizance
that “ This [object] has the same character as a post/’ or “ This
has the same character as a man,” one does not doubt whether
it be a post or not,—because, since resemblance implies differ-
ence, it is quite competent to one to apprehend the difference
[—and not to doubt whether the object be the one or the other
—] so soon as one takes cognizance of its possessing the charac-
ter of something different from it.* [In short, when we say
“ This is like a post,” it is implied that it is not a post, but e. g.,
a man; and again, when we say “This is like a man,” it is im-
plied that it is nd a man, but, e. g., a post;—things not being
said to be “ like” themselves, but only “ like” to something other
than themselves].
d. [Having enunciated an objection to two out of the five causes
of Doubt assigned in B. I.§ 23,] he objects to the three [remain-
ing alleged kinds of] Doubts arising from f conflict of opinion,’
x -J
t ufafa’jfa n

ii ii
The objection APh‘ 2.—Nor [—perhaps some one will say—
further. does Doubt arise] from conflict of opinion, nor
from unsteadiness [in the recognition of criteria as present or
a. ‘ Nor does Doubt arise/—so much is to be supplied* [from
b. The meaning is-, that the production of Doubt does not
depend upon ‘ conflicting opinion/ or ‘unsteadiness' in the re-
cognition [of some mark which, if we could make sure of it,
would determine the object to be so and so], or unsteadiness in
the non-recognition [of some mark which, were we sure of its
â– absence, would determine the object to be not so and so], be-
cause these severally wander away, [and every one of them in
turn may be absent while Doubt is present].f
c. There is another aphorism to convey an objection to Doubt
as the result, exclusively of other causes, of f conflict of opin-
ii n
The objection further. Aph. 3.—And [the origin of Doubt is not to be found—some one may say—] in ‘ conflict of
opinion/ because there is [in the minds of the disputants and.
the hearers, no Doubt, but rather dogged] conviction.

BOOK II. §1.
a. The import is,—that the cause of Doubt is not to be found
in the ‘conflict of opinion/ because there is no conflict of opini-
on ;—there is assurance,—assurance both in the case of the two
disputants and of the umpire :—and since assurance is, there is
no room for Doubt.*
b. Here follows an aphorism intended to demur to the two
kinds of Doubt from (1) unsteadiness in regard to recognition,
and (2) in regard to non-recognitionf [B. I. § 23].
n's ii
The objection APh- 4.—And [—some one may say—Doubt is,
further. not the result] of f unsteadiness/ because in ‘ un-
steadiness’ itself there is steadiness, [—just as, when you are
really mistaken, there is no mistake about your mistake].
a. The power of generating Doubt might then belong to f un-
steadiness in recognition’ and to f unsteadiness in non-recogni?
tion/ if there were unsteadiness also in [that unsteadiness,] it-?
self, [for there can be nothing in the product that did not pre-
exist in the cause ;] but this is not the case; and so how can that
[unsteadiness] which is steady in respect of itself, have the cha-
racter of unsteadiness in respect of something else ? Such is the
’nfcwswi fawn* i vfa wit-
wr: ii

b. He states another objection.*
Further objection. Aph. 5.—[And some one may perhaps say
that Doubt cannot arise from ‘unsteadiness/] because, if so, there
would be endless Doubt, because of the suitableness of its pro-
ducer to be continual.
a. ‘ If so/—i. e., if it were so,—if funsteadiness* [in the recog-
nising of criteria,] were the cause [of Doubt]. Some say that
this expression * if so’ does not belong to the aphorism, but is a
part of the Bhdshya\ [incorporated with the aphorism by mistake].
b. (Endless doubt/—i. e. there would be no cessation of
doubt,—f because of the suitableness to be continual/—i. e., be-
cause of the continual possibility,—* of its producer/—i. e., of
its generator,—viz., the beholding of cognizability and other
characters common J [to all things whatsoever].
c. He states the tenet§ [of the Nyaya system, in regard to
this question].

* II
t ’sraprravja: ^n § WWT? II

BOOK II. §1.
afoqTg'grajTR *trw
The fact as regards Doubt. Aph. 6.—Just from consideration as afore- said,—from one’s not discerning the differ-
ences of this or that,—there being Doubt, neither is there no
Doubt, nor is there endless Doubt.
a. ‘ From consideration as aforesaid/—i. e., from the behold-
ing of common characters, &c.;—‘ of this or that/—i. e., of the
fact of being a man or something else;—‘the differences/—i. e.,
the character which distinguishes a thing from other things ;—
the ‘ discerning’, or beholding, of that being absent [—such is the
analysis of the word apeksha here] ; from that non-discerning of
the differences, [Doubt arises ;] such is the meaning.*
b. And so, since it is agreed that Doubt may arise from such
sources as the recognition of characters common [to several
things] accompanied by the non-recognition of any differences,
it is neither the case that there is no Doubt, because [forsooth
—as has been contended in §1—4—] there is no cause of it,—nor
that there is endless Doubt, because [forsooth—as pretended in
Aph. 5—] anything whatever may be the cause of it;—such is
the meaning.f
c. And, since the recognition, for example, of characters com-
mon [to different things] may produce some separate instance
fsrifq xcrcarur&flT
hit: »
wnwww o

of Doubt, there is no harm though this should [—as alleged by
the objectors—] wander away [and not be found in every in-
stance present] as regards Doubt simpliciter ;* [—there being
nothing absurd in a “ Plurality of causes”. A man may die of
a gunshot wound, though we do not find a gunshot wound
wherever we find death].
d. And [Doubt may arise] in a ‘conflict of opinions/ because
we understand the doubt, raised by the speeches of the dispu-
tants, to belong only to the umpire.f
e. And as for your saying [at § 1.—] “ How can Doubt arise
from the recognising of characters common [to different things],
seeing that likeness implies differences ?”—this also is not [a right
account of the matter]; for the cause [of Doubt] is not the cogniz-
ing this or that as having a character similar [to what something
else has], but the perceiving that it has a character which belongs
to both [of the things of which we doubt whether this be the
one or the other]; so that there is no such fault [in our defini-
tion] as you allege.]:
f. Now, by means of this same examination of [the pertinen-
cy of the definition of] Doubt, suggesting by substitution [—see
t wra-
wih II
«T I ft

•x *x

BOOK II. §1.
Intro:—J.], the examination of the other topics [enunciated by-
Gautama in his opening aphorism], he says* :—
Th. same rule to be applied APh- ?•—Where there » [room for]
throughout. Doubt, thus you are to deal in respect
of each [case of it] in succession.
a. 'Thus/—i. e., in the manner aforesaid;—‘ in respect of
each in succession/—i. e., in respect of the [several] applications
[of the present rule to the matters to which it is applicable],
‘ you are to deal with/ i. e., your are particularly to meddle with,
—i. e., you are thus to understand the relation of examination]- [to
the definition of this or that, the pertinency of which may call
for examination].
b. What, then,—is Motive also to be put on trial ? He replies
—nay,—‘ when there is [room for) Doubt/ [and here there is
none]. If there were any doubt as to the definition of that,
then that also would be put on trial, | [—but this is not the
c. Or [—to give another explanation of one portion of the
aphorism—] the meaning may be, that, dialogwise, i. e., in
the form of speech and reply, you are to deal with each, i. e.,
* VW V?TWit
faf^r? ii '
t insuw v’tj: vgrv:
+ alw rwTwwfffa i i

you are to make, in respect of the thing doubted, the examina-
tion which) [ought to be made] in respect of it.*
d. Here ends the section on the examination of Doubt.f
The examination of proof in general.
e. Now, since there is room for it, he states a prima facie view,
in order to the examination of Proof in general];.
A denial that Sense, APh- 8.—[Perhaps some one will say]
are Proofs. the nature of a Proof does not belong to
Sense, &c., for it cannot be so at any of the three times [into
which Time is divided].
a. That is to say,—the nature of Proof does not belong to
Sense, &c., because it cannot be said that, even at any of the
three times [past, present, or future], is ‘ correct knowledge’
(pramdj established by [that to which the Nyaya gives the name
of Proof—or] ‘ the instrumental cause of correct knowledge’ (pra-
* worrit *jt
uftwr n
§ iwrawrFiT:
urirgrffat unwfacdi: n

BOOK II. §2.
b. By a triad of aphorisms he explains how it cannot be so at
any one of the three times.*
usj mnnrfatT
fafi: H < ii
The anteriority of Proof to APh- 9-—For, if Proof existed an-
knowledge denied. teriorly, Perception could not “ arise
from the contact of a Sense with its object.”
a. The anteriority, in the first place, of Proof [to the know-
ledge which, you allege, results from it,] cannot be; ‘ for/ i. e., be-
cause,—fif Proof existed anteriorly to knowledge/ i. e., if Proof
were an existing thing,—it would not be the case [as asserted in B.
I. §4] that “Perception takes place from the contact of the Sense
with the object,”—because [—on the hypothesis—] the Proof
existed anteriorly to the Sense-knowledge. For, what is meant
by being a ‘ Proof is the being the instrumental cause of right
knowledge,—and, anteriorly to our getting the right knowledge,
how, moreover, can anything be called the cause of the right
knowledge [which we have not even got] ? If its existence even
anteriorly to the right knowledge must be acquiesced in, how
is it “ from the contact of the Sense with the object”?—[how
is] the production of Perception—the production of Perception,
&c.,—from contact of thq Sense with the object, &c., ?f [—an
* fw^T twifew II
t wwa rw fv va: whit:
fwflfa ’f iTtffa WW
MWH I ww fv WPJiWf I WTH
^fr?ri wim: fafrsv-
'x C»\

account of the matter apparently inconsistent with the anterior
existence of the thing so spoken of].
fair wrawr: w^rfafi:n\ • o
The posteriority of Proof to Aph. 10. If the existence [of the
knowledge denied. alleged instruments of right know-
ledge] were subsequently, then the objects of knowledge would
not be known through the instruments of knowledge.
a. If the existence of Proof were [not anterior but] subsequent
to right knowledge, the fact of a thing’s being rightly known
would be settled anteriorly to the Proof,—so that the produc-
tion of right knowledge, and the cognizance of a thing rightly
known, would not come from [what you call] 'the instruments
of right knowledge’*.
arfbnw u \\ o
The simultaneousness of Proof and -Aph. 11. If the existence [of
knowledge denied. Proof] were simultaneous [with
that of the corresponding knowledge], there would not be, in the
cognitions, [—e. g., in the case of inference—] that order of
succession which results from their being conversant about sepa-
rate objects.
a. If Proof and the knowledge ‘were simultaneous,’—were
to arise simultaneously,—there would not be that ‘ order of sue-
• ww Wl fa nnnfaifa faifafa rRTuirr: ^fai: ifa-
w m vfafafa»

BOOK II. §2.
cession1 which there really is in consequence of the cognitions*
being conversant about separate objects. For, the apperception of
a word [e. g.,] has the sound for its object, being in the shape of
an auricular intuition,—but the verbal knowledge [—the know-
ledge conveyed by the word—] has the sense of the word for its
object, being in the shape of something unperceivable [by Sense],
and generically different [from the other object];—so that these
two cannot be simultaneous, because, since they have the relation
of cause and effect [—which the Naiyayika will not deny that
they have—], they can really be in the order of succession*.
He states the tenetf [of the Nyaya, on the point].
nfMRpmRi: 11 \ n
The sceptic’s argument APh- 12.—[If there be no such thing as
retorted. Proof, ] because [forsooth] nothing can be
such at any of the three times, then the objection itself cannot
be established.
a. If the establishment of matters rightly known, by means
of Proof, is not to be admitted, because [forsooth] there can be
no such thing at any of the three times, then, at that rate, thy
objection also [to the possibility of Proof] cannot be establish
ed;—so that it is a futile objection:—such is the import]:.
i ft
vvrwvr aanfa ^nR-
aawmawa siifiraRag h
t fasraar? II
t aR wira xwafaffaRaa

b. Again, hostile evidence, moreover, going to the denial of all
evidence, cannot be admitted; and so how could the denial be
substantiated? So he says* [as follows].
This shown
Aph. 13.—And the denial itself cannot be esta-
blished, because [by the denial] all evidence is denied.
a. And if a refutative Proof be admitted, how are all proofs
disproved?—so he saysf [as follows],
II \ 8 II
And still fur- ther. Aph. 14.—Or if that one have the nature of a Proof, then all [Proof] is not excluded.
a. “ But then [—the sceptic may rejoin—] according to my
way of thinking, there is no use in establishing realities; since
the Universe is a void, the relation of Evidence and [consequent]
Knowledge is also unreal; and it has been shown that according
to thy view it is impossible that this [character of being a Proof]
should exist in any of the three times [—before the knowledge,
with it, or after it—] therefore he solves this J [as follows],
afefa hh: ii
* faw vfnwfk sn-
x) xj G\
wrwn sfv m m WTwfefire#-

BOOK II. §2.
u Mji
The antecedent existence of Aph. 15. And this [fact, that there
Proof illustrated. may be things entitled to the name of
Proof ] is not to be denied as regards all the three times, because,
as [the antecedent existence of] a drum is proved by the sound,
so is this proved.
a. The denial that this [character of a Proof] could belong to
a thing during any of the three times, was asserted [by the scep-
tic, at §8];—but this [denial] is not competent;—Why ?—so he
replies, ‘ by the sound/ &c. As an antecedently existent musical
instrument, a drum or the like, is proved, or known, [to exist,]
by the sound which takes place subsequently [to the formation
of the instrument]; or as, from the antecedently existent sun,
the chronologically subsequent illumination of things [may be
inferred] ; or as the existence of fire follows from the smoke
which is synchronous with the fire; so here also, from f right
knowledge/ which is, in every instance, posterior to the ‘ cause of
right knowledge/ is really [demonstrated] the prior existence of
a f cause of right knowledge/ such as Sight or the like*.
b. It is not to be supposed, however, that this [—Proof—] has
antecedently got the ‘ right knowledge’ associated with it; for a
thing may be entitled to the character of a Proof merely through
its association, from time to time, with c right knowledge/; just
* i g wtfa I sfia
'jr^rfvfri i wsifaw. ulftw-

as, for example, one may [without inaccuracy] say, “ Bring the
cook,” [—giving to some man, though perhaps not cooking at the
time, that name—] just because of his being from time to time
engaged in. the act of cooking :—such in the import.*
c. In the Tattwaloka it is here asserted that that [portion of
the aphorism] which ends with cha does not belong to the apho-
rism ; but, in reality, from the tenour of his own comment,
among the rest,, [it is clear that] it doe» belong to the apho-
d. But then [—some one may say—] the dealing with c Proof’
and c Object of right knowledge,’ just since this [relation] is not a
fixed thing, is not an absolutely correct procedure; just as, in
the case of a rope, the dealing with it [—under a mistaken im-
pression—] as if it were a serpent,, for instance:—so, in regard
to this doubt, he saysj :—
VaaaTV II \ ( It
Proofs, by being objects of knowledge, 16.—And the fact of
are not debarred from being causes of
knowledge. being an object of right know-
ledge [does not destroy the character of a proof], as the judicial
character of a balance [is not disproved by the fact that you can
weigh the balance itself in another pair of scales].
* Tft WTVknVTH Hat ^Utaa I a^IWtfiia
C\ -J ''
warw^aa aaraataatna^Tatatfaa aiataapa-
aa uraataraaanfea feta ara: u
t ata vanTva a ^awwafa aaaiaifik i aar-
a’aftanfearrara ataraaaaa 11
t a’afaaataraa vaT’waaajavKT a anar-
fa^T anfeata^raafeatraj^nnv«

BOOK II. §2.
a. As a balance is dealt with as an ‘instrumental eause of
right knowledge/ because it is what decides the weight of gold,
or the like,—and is dealt with as an object of knowledge when
we decide, by means of another balance, the amount of its own
weight ;—so also, by reason of the entranee of two causes [for
our taking two separate views of the same thing], the Senses
&c. are dealt with both as causes of knowledge and as objects of
b. Here is an aphorism, with a prima faeie view, intended to op-
pose [the possibility of any thing’s being a Proof ]., on the ground
of the regressus in inhnitum.f
Another sceptical objection Aph. 17.—Since it is by Proofs that
the existence of Proofs is established, the
existence of other Proofs presents itself [for demonstration].
a. Since it is agreed that it is by Proof that the Proofs are es-
tablished [as being Proofs], you must agree that there are other
Proofs [in addition to any number that can be assigned]. To ex-
plain ;—a Proof, in the first place, is not self-established, for then
we should have a case of a thing’s supporting itself., [—and, as
remarked elsewhere, a man—“ however clever”—cannot sit upon
his own shoulder, and thus convey himself dry-shod across a
river,—] therefore another Proof must be admitted;—and since
these two, if they were to be the establishers mutually of one
hi wren^R vfH II

another, would present a case of reasoning in a circle [—or, lite-
rally, of ‘resting on one another mutually/—as when two boats,
by laying hold of one another, vainly expect to avoid being drift-
ed out to sea], therefore there also another Proof [of the Proof
of the Proof] must be admitted,—and so on without coming to
any stand-still:—such is the import.*
b. But then [—the sceptic may rejoin—] a Proof may be es-
tablished, as such, without a Proof:—so he states thisf [objection
in the following aphorism].
If Proof need no cause, may Aph. 18.—Or in the absence there-
not faiowledqe need no cause ? „r . rr» r • n e
of, [—i. e., of Proof,—since Proof may, m
virtue of itself, be Proof,] then, just as Proof is established [inde-
pendently], so may this [—viz., right knowledge, independently
of any cause of it,] be established.
a. And if ‘ in the absence’ of Proof,—i. e., without Proof,—it
be agreed that Proof is,—then, just in the same way let it be
agreed that that [—viz., ‘ right knowledge’—] may exist. What
is the use of acknowledging a cause of right knowledge ? And
thus the whole world is an unsettled question, so that we end in
the void [of absolute scepticism] :—such is the import. J
* wnnat win: fat: imwT’rR^t-
i am
^raTa^ra: wravat ’afaia i am
aawfa wa: ii
I aa uawfaft: wfa faaa wfemrvI
+ afaa uawfafasfaa: mnnafatarra vawr-

BOOK II. §2. 21
b. He states the tenet* [of the Nyaya system, on this point].
a affaaarafafraa afw: u n
Proof illuminates without Aph. 19.—It is not so [—that an end-
r equiring to be illuminated. . „ „ „
less senes ot Proofs of Proofs are re-
quired—], because it [viz,, Proof,] really is, just as the light of
a lamp is.
a. For, as, by the light of a lamp, a jar, or the like, is illumi-
nated, so are the f causes of right knowledge’ the illuminators
of what things are rightly known. Otherwise, then even the
lamp would not be the illuminator of the jar, for fear [forsooth]
of the regressus in infinitum,—viz., that the lamp is [in the first
place,] the illuminator [or revealer] of the jar, and the Sight [in
the second place,] is the revealer of the lamp,—and something
else makes us aware of it, and so on.f
b. Here ends the section regarding the examination of Proof
in general.]:
faft: W’HT^taifbir i aaraMafeaaa aaa ajrfefa
apaaTat aaaaiafafa wa: ii
* ferraar^ ii
t aaife afhnaiTai^ZTffiianwaT uawTat
aaa wwaa’aat Trftaai asaanwa ufta-
uaiTW w^a^iaaiajaf?aiaaw«aTa aflat $fa
a azaatvaai: ana ii
t varx amaretatajavl^taaiWf n

The examination of the definition of Sense..
c. After the examination of Proof in general, the separate
kinds of Proof having to be examined, the one first enumerated,
viz., Sense, falls to be [first] examined. And, in respect of this
one, the definition given before [—at B. I. §4—] was through
its fruit [and not in respect of itself]:—so one objects to that
definition of the fruit, as laid down.*
Objection to the dejinition Aph. 20.—The definition of Percep-
of Perception. r .1 i II n â– 
tion [—says the Bauddha—J is untenable,
because not of the whole [that ought to have been stated] is
there a statement.
a. That which has been given as the definition of Perception,
—viz., its being what results from the conjunction of a Sense
with its object,—is untenable, ‘because it does not state the
whole? The meaning is this :—of [the species of knowledge
called] Perception, a definition, made up of its cause [—viz., the
conjunction of a Sense with its object,—] has been laid down :
in this case the insertion [in the definition,] of the totality made
up of the assemblage of causes would prevent the undue exten-
sion [of the definition, to things not intended by it], and this
[enumeration of the whole assemblage of causes] has not been
set down. Eor, f not the whole’— i. e., only the fact of being
produced by the conjunction of a Sense with its object, is set
down [in the definition] ;—but the conjunction of Soul with

BOOK II. §3.
Mind, [and of the Senses with the Mind,] and so on, has not been
set down;—and so it [—the definition of Sense—] extends unduly
to Inference &c., seeing that these [also] result from the conjunc-
tion of a Sense-organ [—viz., the Mind—] and an Object [—
viz., the Soul—] in the shape of that conjunction of Soul and
Mind [—which is the c non-intimate cause* of all knowledge what-
soever] :—such is the meaning.*
b. But then, since there may be a doubt that the conjunction
of Soul with Mind is not really a cause [of Perception,—in
which case the foregoing objection of the sceptic would go for
nothing], he [the sceptic,] saysf [as follows].
siWFrer. wifirVfw. II K II
An indispensable to Per- Aph. 21.—There is no Perception pro-
cePtlon' duced in the absence of the conjunction
of the Soul with the Mind.
a. The conjunction, which takes place with the Mind, of Soul
divided off [from the universal Soul] by a body,— in the absence of
that [conjunction] since there is no Perception produced,—there-
fore [—says the sceptic—on the Naiyayika*s own principles—] it
i i
i TOwnrafafrar:

is indispensable that the conjunction of Soul and Mind should be
one [element in the] cause of Perception [—and so it ought to
have been recorded in the definition]. ‘ The production of
Perception’ is what is here specified; but it is the production of
[right] knowledge [in any shape] that is meant* [to be impugned
by the sceptic].
b. But then [—some one may object to the sceptic—if the
definition is bound to specify everything which is a condition of
the production of Perception, or of knowledge in general, then]
Space &c. must be causes of it:—so he propounds this doubtf
[as follows].
ii ii
Whether Space fyc. are Aph. 22.—And were it so, then also in
cawses of Pci ception. cage Qf p^gg^g^ Space, Time, the
Ether, &c., we should find this to be the case, [viz., that these
should be enumerated among the causes of Perception].
a. Since there really is, in the case of these also, in a manner,
the relation of priority and posteriority [—these being necessa-
rily antecedent to any cognition, and therefore to be reckoned
among its causes or conditions—], if [you say that] these are
inoperative, then the same is the case with the thing in question]:
[—viz., the conjunction of Soul and Mind, which, however, the
Naiyayika cannot regard as inoperative in the matter].
* aaaT a:
a aarararfaaaT sa
aaai i w^rarfaftfa vsa i VTawfafafa faa-
+ aiauraai aarfa aaara^ aaTa-
^aifafraa asa^aji

BOOK II. §3. 25
b. In order to declare the answer in regard to this point, he
says* [as follows].
ataa^ra: II II
Knowledge im- plies Soul. Aph. 23.—The Soul is not excluded [—in our definition of Perception, or any other kind of
knowledge—], because knowledge is the Sign thereof.
a. ‘ The Soul is not excluded/—i. e., is not omitted to be ta-
ken in as one of the causes. How ?—‘because knowledge is the
Sign thereof? That of which knowledge is the Sign, is so [—i.
e., is implied as one of the causes in the production of knowledge,
in the shape of Perception or otherwise] ; for Knowledge, be-
ing a positive product, establishes [the existence of] a subject of
inherence,—and this [subject of inherence], in the ultimate re-
sort [—when nothing else remains to which we can assign the
character], is Soul alone; and there is no proof that Space and
the rest are causes [of knowledge] such is the import. And
thus it is established, also, by the sense of the terms, that the
conjunction of Mind, with Soul, the Intimate Cause, is the non-
intimate causef [of knowledge in general].
b. Since it may be asked why the non-intimate cause [of
* araTacafaaT^aiV II
t WHaT aTaaTTVT a5TT”Mafa a IW. I
Traf%T^ra i fW w aa aar 1 wra f? ara-
ana aaarfaafwa aiaafa i a^ vfcw?i ainarar a arafafa ara: i aa-
arfaawaanaiaT aaai aarar saaarfaaarafaaT-
warafava 11
" ' D

knowledge] is not the conjunction of Soul and Body, or the like,
—therefore he states an argument for the preeminence of the
Mind* [among the joint causes with Soul],
i U i
The function Of the APh' 24.—The Mind [is not excluded, in
Mind in subservi- our estimate of the causes of knowledge], be-
ence to Soul. ..
cause that by which we recognise it [—the
Mind—in the case of our cognitions—] is the fact that these
[cognitions] are not simultaneous.
a. The expression f is not excluded’ is supplied [from the pre-
ceding aphorism].f
b. It is indispensable that the Mind also be reckoned one of
the causes, because, through the conjunction of the Senses and
the Mind, this [Mind] regulates the non-simultaneousness of
cognitions [—acting, in short, the part of Attention, which is
conversant about only one thought at a time—] and it is not
by the conjunction of Body with Soul, or the like,- that this is-
regulated :—such is the import. And thus it is fitting that the
conjunction of the Soul with the Mind should be the non-inti-
mate caused [of knowledge].
t II
w. i TrWW’RMiwfc-
3^1 II

BOOK II. §3.
c. The aphorism conveying the tenet. *
Justification of APh- 25.—And, because of its being the cause
the definition. of Perception, is there separate mention of the
conjunction of the Sense and the Object.
a, r Because of its being the cause of Perception/—i. e., be-
cause of its being a cause peculiar to Perception.!
b. The meaning is as follows. In the aphorism regarding
Perception [B. I. §4], the mention of the conjunction of a Sense
with its Object is not indeed with the view of mentioning the
cause [in all its completeness], in which case the not mention-
ing the conjunction of Mind with Soul &c. would have been
a deficiency; but it was for the purpose of marking it [by a cha-
racter peculiar to itself] : and since, in such a case, it is as proper
to mention a characteristic consisting of the peculiar cause as
one consisting of the whole set [of causes], and since the pecu-
liar cause [in the case of Perception,] is the conjunction of a
Sense with its Object, it was mentioned separately. The men-
tion was proper, seeing that it constitutes a characteristic, with-
out reference to such things as the conjunction of the Mind with
the Soul, which are causes common]: [to all kinds of knowledge
as well as Perception].
• II

c. He mentions another way of settling the dispute.*
wni II
Another defence of the Aph. 26.—And [the conjunction of the
definition. Sense and the Object is the principal pecu-
liarity in Perception,] because the conjunction of a Sense with
its Object is the cause [of knowledge] in the case [even] of those
who are asleep, or whose minds are not attending.
a. ‘ Of knowledge’—is to be supplied.f
b. The fact that the conjunction of a Sense with its Object is
the main thing [in producing Perception], is proved by the pro-
duction of knowledge, quite instantaneously, in the case [even] of
those sleeping and those whose minds were not attending, by the
conjunction of the organ of Hearing with the thundering of a
cloud, for instance ; or by the conjunction of the organ of Touch
with fire, for example.]:
c. He mentions another argument.§
t viwfa w. ii
+ ^sr^rt ■sRi’rfwnf^’rr ^n^-
f^TW^w 11
§ II

BOOK II. §3.
Another reason. Aph. 27.—And by these [conjunctions of Sense
and object] are excluded the [other] kinds of knowledge.
a. The kinds of knowledge [other than Perception] are ‘ ex-
cluded/—i. e., distinguished,—set aside,—by f these/—i. e., the
conjunctions of Sense and Object. For the conjunction of Soul
and Mind, or the like, does not exclude;—for the fact of being
produced thereby is common to the other kinds of knowledge
[as well as Perception]. In like manner, the fact also of its re-
sulting from conjunction of a Sense-organ with the Mind would
not serve as the characteristic, because this would not extend to
the mental* [i. e., to internal intuition, in which case the Sense-
organ, so called, is the Mind itself;—and the definition of pret-
ty aksha must extend to internal as well as external Perception].
b. He ponders a doubt, with reference to whether the conjunc-
tion of a Sense and its Object is not the cause [of Perception],
because this may be present unattended! [by any resultant Per-
Sensation unattended 28.—This is n0J (he cause [of
by Perception. u
Perception—some one may perhaps say—],
wajrsfw. I
fv *f hst-
wrfv ’i wpre saw: n

because this [Perception] is debarred [in instances where the
conjunction of a Sense with its Object was present].
a. The meaning is, that [some one may perhaps say that] the
conjunction of a Sense with its Object is not the cause [of Per-
ception], because, at the time, e. g., of listening to a song, though
there really be the conjunction, e. g., of the Sight and a jar,
the visual perception of it, e. g., is debarred.*
b. He clears up this doubt.f
II ’'t II
Solution of the Aph. 29.—Nay,—it is from the preeminence
puzzle. of the par^cuiar Object.
a. The song, e. g., is heard, because of the engrossingness,—
the desire to attend to it, of some particular object, e. g., the
song and because thus the desire of hearing the song is an ob-
stacle, e. g., to [our taking note of] sensations of Sight, and
because it is the absence of obstacles that brings about the effect;
and the fact of being the cause belongs to the conjunction of a
Sense with its Object in cooperation therewith^ [—i. e., in co-
operation with the absence of obstacles] ;—therefore the prima
facie view [here referred to] is not right.]:
* sfv
t ii
t ’ftHTS! PRW wfelrRST? ’brlT-
x x3 X
f^rw i rem

BOOK II. §3.
b. But then [the objector, taking another line of objection,
may say—] if Perception were a different kind of Evidence [from
the others], the investigation of its definition would be fitting,—
but it is really no such thing:—which doubt he next ponders.*
Whether Perception be not Aph.—30. Perception [some one may
a case of Inference. -> • r ,, xk i t r
say—] is [none other thanj Inference,,
because the apprehension [to which we give the name,] is through
the apprehending of a part, [which is to us a Sign of the whole].
a. What we regard as a Perception, e. g., the cognition of a
jar, is an ‘inference/ i. e., a conclusion;—because we apprehend
it after apprehending ‘a part/ viz., the part in front; and thus
the cognition, e. g., of a tree, is an inference, because it results
from the cognition of a Sign—[this Sign] consisting in the ap-
prehension of a part [of the tree] :—such is the meaning.f
b. He clears up this doubt.J
Perception not a case of Aph. 31.—Nay,—because by Perception
In/erence. apprehen(]ec[ so much as is so.
o o
i wrq’ffli

a. That Perception is Inference is not the case,—that is to
say, so far forth as it is a Perception, it is not a Conclusion.*
b. ‘ Because so much is apprehended [through Perception]
as is so/—i. e., because, even by thee it is admitted that there
is [really such an] apprehension; since 1 so much as is so/—i. e.,
some portion or other,—is apprehended by Perception,—i. e., by
c. It is to be understood, moreover, that this is but low ground
—[that we have taken up;—for we might have argued that] Per-
ception simply is not excluded [by your argument to prove its
being a case of Inference], because it [—your argument—] does
not exclude Sounds, Odours, &c.,J [—which are apprehended, by
Sense, in their totality,—-though the objects of Sight might, at
first sight, seem to afford a handle to the objector, by being ap-
prehended through the apprehension of a part].
d. He censures, moreover, [as follows,] even the assertion that
the cognition of a tree or the like, is a case of Inference.§
i i sfq w w-
§ H^fq

BOOK II. §4. 33
A thing is perceived, when Aph. 32.—And there is not [—in the
a part of it is perceived, ... „
case, e. g., ot the cognition of a tree,
—] the apprehension [merely] of a part,—because that which is
made up of the parts [—i. e., the whole—] is a reality.
a. ‘And not/—i. e., neither.*
b. Neither is it proper, moreover, to say that there is the ap-
prehension of a part only [—in the case, e. g., of a tree’s being
apprehended by vision—],—‘ because that which is made up of the
parts is a reality’—i. e., because what is made up of the parts is
[there] ; so that, at the time of the perception of the part, the
perception of that also which is made up of the parts is not ex-
cluded,—inasmuch as there is the conjunction of the Sight with
it also [—that which is in conjunction with a part, being, even
thereby, in conjunction with that to which the part pertains—] :
—such is the import.f [See the Tarlta-sangraha, §47.]
c. Here ends the Section on the Examination of Perception.]:
d. He begins a section on the subject of [a whole, or] 'what
is made up of parts’ (avayavin),—for there is pertinency in his
* ii
t II

analysing this [conception] with a view to establishing the rea-
son [to be no fiction, which was assigned in §32, viz.], f because
what is made up of parts is a reality?*
^rr^arraaafafa ii M 0
Whether there be any Aph. 33.—[Perhaps some one will say]
w^oies' there is a doubt as regards ‘ what is made up
of parts/ because it requires to be proved [that there is anything
to which the name of f a whole’ is appropriate].
a. The meaning is this :—there is a doubt in regard to ‘ what
is made up of parts/—‘ because it requires to be proved/—i. e.,
oecause that is not a reality;—that is to say, the reason alleged,
viz., ‘because what is made up of parts is a reality/ is incompe-
tent because doubtful, f
b. And, as regards this, it is impossible that f what is made up
of parts5 should be one,—because there may belong to it contra-
dictory characters, in the shape, for instance, of shaking and not
shaking, redness and not redness, hiddenness and unhiddenness.
To explain:—as far as regards the branches, a shaking, and again,
as far as regards the trunk, the absence thereof, is beheld [in a
tree] ; and it is impossible that there should exist simultaneous-
ly, in one and the same thing, a couple of contradictory charac-
ters. Therefore parts alone are such [—i. e., are realities—],
and not any other thing ‘ made up of the parts/—for there is no
evidence]: [in support of the latter].
favanaraRaa ii
t I anaiafa aiajaTafaaaTa
t aaa a^^an^ar^R^ansaanaraaaiT-

BOOK II. §4.
c. In like manner is this to be gathered from observing that a
cloth, of which a part a reddened by safflower, is not red as re-
gards the ends [which were not dipped into the dye],—and so
too from observing that, as far as regards the surface [presented
to us], &c., a thing is not hidden [—while it is hidden as regards
its other parts] :—such is the prima facie view of the Bauddhas.
And here the prima facie aphorisms of the Bauddhas, and the
things penned by the author of the Variika, are not written, for
fear of prolixity.*
d. The aphorism containing the tenet.f
11 s y ii
Proof that there are Aph. 34.—Were wholes unreal, everything
wholes‘ would be imperceptible.
a. If the whole [ ‘ made up of parts'] were not a reality,
all its qualities, actions, &c., would be imperceptible; and thus
sf I
Wil SSjq-
w^fR 1 cq frtwu g sqsft
Riiigt uwg: 1 qrfr
Gx G\

even a thing’s being shaking or not shaking, red or not red,
would not be perceptible,—because these [characters,—according
to the objector,—] belong to the Atoms [or absolutely small
‘parts’ of things], and the [indispensable] condition of percep-
tion is bulk,* [—which does not belong to Atoms].
b. He states another reason.f
Another Aph. 35.—And [there must be ‘ wholes,’] because
holding and pulling are [—only on that supposition—]
a. A whole is something other than the parts [of which the
whole is made up], because, it being so, the holding and pulling
[of masses] involves no absurdity;—while, were it the fact, on
the other hand, that only heaps of Atoms exist [—constituting
no wholes—■], then it would not be the case [—as, however, it
is—] that, by holding a part, we hold the whole, and, by pulling
a part, we pull the whole :—such is the meaning.]:
b. You must not say this, [—with well-intentioned but misdi-
rected zeal—] that that, “ As, by the [‘ There are such things
t u
+ arawararar wa-

BOOK II. §4.
as wholes] because then this [pulling, &c.] is reasonable/ as, by
the pulling of the boat, the person standing in the boat is pulled,
—and as, by the holding of the pitcher, the curds in the pitcher
is held /*—[you must not say this,] because it is altogether in
virtue of a peculiar conjunction [—quite different from that of a
boat and the person standing in it—] that the relation of parts
and whole, or its absence, comes to exist. Therefore, holding
that only the previously assigned argument [in §35,] is the proper
one, he [the author], pondering the solution in respect of this
matter offered by some one else, condemns it* [as follows].
ii a ii
A plausible argu- Aph. 36.—If [any one should say] it is like
ment disowned. 1 .
the case of an army, or a forest, [we reply
that] it is not so,—because Atoms are supersensual.
a. If [any one says], though a very distant man, or single tree,
or the like, is imperceptible, yet, as an army, or a forest, or the
like [aggregate of things separately imperceptible], is perceived,
—so too, though a single Atom be imperceptible, a collection of
them, in the shape of a jar for example, may be perceptible,—
[we reply, that] this too is not so,—c because Atoms are super-
sensual? What is meant is this, that, since bulk is the [indis-
pensable] condition of Perception, the perception of an army, or
a forest, or the like, is fitting [—inasmuch as the constituents of
the aggregate have bulk themselves—] ; but not [so is it] in the
case of Atoms, because these have no bulk.f
* WMT-
G\ '*3

b. Here ends the section on the examination of ‘wholes’.*
The Definition of Inference examined.
c. Since this is the proper place for it, in order to test [the
definition of] Inference, whose turn has arrived, he states a pri-
ma facie view.f
The evidence of Infer- Aph. 37.—[Some one may say that] In-
ence impugned. . _ „ 1
ference is no Proof, because it wanders
away in the case of (1) the embankment, (2) the damage, and
(3) the likeness.
a. That Inference is of three kinds, has been stated already
[B. I. §5]. If the [whole] three kinds of this be proved not to
be the causes of right knowledge, it will be settled, by the sense
of the terms, that Inference is no Proof;—in reliance upon which,
thisj [is propounded which is propounded in the aphorism].
" C\
w?: ii
* II
t jothdupwr ii

BOOK II. §5.
b. Inference,—‘admitted to have the character of inference,—
is no ‘ Proof’,—i. e. no cause of right knowledge,—because of the
fact that the reason [assigned in any case of inference] is one
that wanders away,* [and presents itself where what it ought to
certify is not found to accompany it].
c. Among these three kinds [of Inference, thus all alike im-
pugned,] he exhibits the wandering away [of the Sign from the
thing signified] by saying f through the damming up,’ &c.f
d. [According to the objector,] the inference of rain, as tri-
partitely exemplified,—from the swelling of the river, the carry-
ing off of their eggs by the ants, and the screaming of the pea-
cocks,—cannot be, [—i. e/ cannot be an absolutely certain means
of right knowledge,—] because there may be a disjunction [be-
tween the Sign and the thing signified], inasmuch as the swell-
ing of the river may have depended on the damming up of the
river,—and the ants’ carrying away their eggs may have result-
ed from their nest’s having been damaged,—and the sound like
the voice of a peacock may have been uttered by a man. J
e. He clears up this doubt.§
S^T’rlT«PlT § W^l

Inference really a means Apfr, 38.—Nay [—it is not to be deni-
â–  of right knowledge. -i i . i . .
ed that the recognition of a Sign is a
cause of right knowledge—], because that [which we mean by a
Sign,] is something else than the part, and the fear, and the like-
ness, [referred to by the objector].
a. That the recognition of a Sign is not a means of right know-
ledge is not the case. There is no fault [—in the Signs, the re-
cognition of which we say leads to right knowledge—], because
the swelling of the river, and the rest, which are Signs, are some-
thing other than that swelling of a river which results from the
damming up a part of it, and that carrying off of their eggs by
the ants which results from fear [—when their nest has been dis-
turbed], and that scream which was [only] like the scream of the
peacock. And there is not, in every instance, the doubt of the
wandering away [of the Sign unaccompanied by the thing signi-
fied] .—and where this [doubt] does occur, since it can be removed
byredargution [B. I. §39], there is no fault:—such is the im-
b. Here ends the section on the examination of Inference.!
The examination of time present.
c. [Perhaps some one will say—] that is not proper, which
nt vtv: i arfx-
l WRW TfVqifSHT^ it^f W-
t ii

BOOK II. §6.
you imagine, that the recognition of a Sign has reference to the
three times [—past, present, and future,—see B. I. §5], because,
since there is no present,—because there is neither past nor fu-
ture, the conception of which is dependent on that [—i. e., on
the present, which is a nonentity], the receptivities—in the shape
of the triad of times—do not exist;—so, with reference to this,
commencing a section for the examination of time present, he
[—in the character of the objector—] demurs to time present.*
nan: n ii
The sceptic denies time Aph. 39.—There is no present time [—-
present. says scep^c—because, of a thing fall-
ing, we can demonstrate [only] the time through which it has
fallen and that through which it has to fall.
a. ‘There is no present time/—i. e„ there is no kind of time
other than past and future. He explains this, saying r of a thing
falling/ &c. Of a thing falling, a fruit for instance, there is the
distance fallen, a certain space, the limit of which is the tree ;
and there is a certain distance to be fallen through, the limit of
which is the ground ; but there is no concernment also with a pre*
sent:—such is the import.f
sj 'J
Twnnn TfRawfatrfa i
t sr^fpnwr: i ar-
vHrf Tfa i u«=ra: : ^rgg
ag: qfrfrnvT wqafrii: ^ga gfaasrraT aa; Ta-
x A C\ H
win wt. i

b. He clears up this doubt.*
ii «<»»
Proof that there must be Aph. 40.—Those two also [viz., the past
time present. and future] would not be, if the present
were not; because they are relative to it.
a. If the present were not, then f those two/—the past and the
future, would also not be ;—‘ because they are relative to it/—i.
e., because what is meant by being past is the being the coun-
terpart to the destruction of the present; and because what is
meant by being future is the being the counterpart to the ante-
cedent non-existence of the present:—such is the import.!
b. But then [the sceptic may rejoin that], since those two are
substantiated just by their mutual relation, they have no rela-
tion to a [needlessly postulated] present:—therefore he says —
Past, and future not imme- Aph. 41.—The past and future are not
diately related. , . .. . , . . T r.
substantiated by mutual reference.
a. That is to say, because this would be a case of mutual de-
pendency^ [—or of reasoning in a circle].
* ^ffreni
ri w-
t JFf ^T?ll

BOOK II. §6.
b. What were the loss [—enquires the sceptic—] if these two
also [—past time and future—] did not exist ? Therefore he
states another argument.*
nmn’r'Tw. 11 s t ti
Proof that there is a Aph.. 42.—Were there no present, there
present. would be no cognition of anything, because
perception would be impossible.
a. If there were no present, perception could not take place,
because time present is the receptivity of perception. For this
reason he [Udayanacharya] says, “By the sight, &c. is appre-
hended what is adapted [to the sense], and present [in time]/5
And if there were no perception, there would be no ‘ cognition/
—or knowledge,—of anything; because the other kinds of know-
ledge have their root in perception:—such is the import, f
b. But then [the sceptic may say], if what is meant by being
past is the being the counterpart of the destruction of the pre-
sent [—see §40, a—], and what is meant by the being future,
the being the counterpart of the antecedent non-existence of the
present, then, in the case of a jar which exists only in the pre-
sent, how comes the notion “ It was black, and [—after baking
in the kiln—] it will be red?55 To this he replies.J
* 3>T srwnw? I



How a thing present may be
spoken of in the past or fu-
ture tense.
Aph. 43.—It [•—the jar—] may be
conceived in both ways [—i. e., both
as past and future,—] because the facts
of having been made and of having to be made, are conceivable
[in respect of its past and future qualities].
a. That is to say,—since, of the black and red colours, for ex-
ample, of a jar or the like, though this exist only in the present,
the facts of having been made and of having to be made, i. e.*
the facts of their being past and future, are conceivable, there-
fore the jar or the like also may be spoken of as past or ^future,
through its being connected mediately* [—with the past and the
future, through its past and future qualities].
b. Here ends the section on the examination of time present.t
The Examination or the Proof drawn from Likeness.
c. Now, as the occasion presents itself, in order to test [the
tjuh vix?r »
t Wtf THHPTCvhgTWwr II

BOOK II. §7.
pertinency of the definition of] the ‘Proof drawn from Likeness*
(upamanaj, he sets forth a prima facie view, as follows.*
11 8 8 n
The Proof from like- Aph. 44.—An argument from Likeness is not
ness objected to. i , i ,
substantiated either through complete, consi-
derable, or partial similarity.
a. It was stated [at B. I. §6], that [the proof called] Compari-
son fupamanaj arises from a previously known similarity. This
[according to the sceptic] is not right, because [as regards the
matter in question] similarity will not suit, whether it be com-
plete, considerable, or slight. For, on the ground of complete
similarity, it is never argued that “ A cow is like a cow nor, on
the ground of considerable similarity, that “ A buffalo is like a
cow /* nor, on the ground of there being some similarity, that
" A mustard-seed is like mount Meru.” And the comparative
proof drawn from dissimilarity is in like manner to be refused
admission, because similarity implies this in addition.!
b. He clears up this doubt.]:
* uftfarf g
-J C\
t ufaTfi i Hsr mtwt-
fa^rwir rnvr! vrfa-
towt vfa ?r v
t wfai n

xrf^i; ii « a, n
Reply to the Aph. 45.—Since an. argument from Likeness is
substantiated through previously known similarity,
the aforesaid objection fails.
a. f Previously known’—[or, as it may be explained, diffe-
rently from the way in which it is explained under B. I. §6—]
that similarity which is known, in a high degree [—as likeness to
a cow exists, in the Bos Gavaeus, in a high degree] as contradis-
tinguished from a buffalo or the like,—since the knowledge of
this is the instrumental cause of a ‘ conclusion from resemblance’
(upamiti), there is no fault, [such as the sceptic objects to us].
And the similarity consists in this or that [—e. g., shape colour,
size, &c., &c.], according as the case may be, &c.*
. b. He states, as a doubt, the opinion of the Vaiseshikas [—ap-
parently, therefore, anterior to himself—] that there is no other
kind of Proof, such as the f argument from resemblance,’ since
the end is attained by f Inference,’f [of which this is only a case].
n s (n
Aph. 46.—[The case is not different from or-
Kantida’s opinion. ,
dmary Inference,] because it is [—like any
* nfet uwsr jtfwftanswn fas wr
^Tq: I
t qpfflfaq vffafa falHfa qqi’ITT’rRfafa

BOOK II. §7. 47
other case of Inference—] an establishing of the unperccived by
means of the perceived.
a. f By means of the perceived/—i. e., by the species of re-
semblance to a cow,—since there is [nothing else than] an infer-
ence of what unperceived [animal] is meant by the word Bos
Gavaeus,—there is no other proof such as Comparison.*
b. He replies to this.f
aaa narnnaaqaTW ii# ii
How Comparison differs Aph. 47.—It is not in respect of a Bos
from Inference. ~ . » ,, ,. ,
Gavaeus unperceived—that we see the need
of ( the recognition of Likeness’ (upamana) as the instrument
of right knowledge.
a. That is to say,—it is not in respect of what is ‘unperceived/
—i. e., not perceived inasmuch as it is [in relation to U3 only as]
something possessed of a Sign (vyapya)—[which Sign, say, is
perceived],—since that [we grant you] would be a case of In-
ference,—that we see ‘ the need of this as the instrument of right
knowledge/—i. e., the subserviency of ‘ the recognition of Like-
ness’ to right knowledge.]:
b. Or the meaning is,—we do not regard as a case of Infer-
ence the object of the evidence called Comparison,—that right
knowledge,—viz., the right knowledge due to Comparison,—‘in
WTafa^aruna mawfafa ii
t araravifa n
waiwaaavaiw a wra ii

respect of the Bos Gavaeus/—i. e., in respect of what belongs
to the Bos Gavaeus,—viz, that ‘unperceived thing/—i. e.f the
fact of being what is meant by the word Bos Gavaeus. The im-
port is, [that this is not a case of Inference,] because there is not
the knowledge of ‘ constant attendedness/* [—which,—see the
Tarka-sangraha,—is what constitutes anything a Sign from
which alone something else can be said to be inferred}.
c. But then [it may be objected]—let it be granted that the
knowledge of ‘ constant attendedness’ is indispensable [to Infer-
ence :—have we not it here also ?]—so, with reference to this, he
states another argument.j-
This shown Aph. 48.—It is not the case that it is not different
[from Inference], because, through the compendi-
ous expression “ So,” it is settled that there is [a special kind of
evidence called] the ‘ Argument of Likeness’.
a. It is not the case that the ‘ recognition of Likeness’ is not
different from the ‘recognition of a Sign/—because, f through
the compendious expression ‘ So,’—i. e., from the information
that “ As is a cow, so is a Bos Gavaeus,”—it is settled by the
‘ Argument of Likeness/—i. e., the ‘ conclusion from Likeness’
(uparnitl) is settled, in dependence on the ‘ Argument of Like-
ness’ (upamana). And in like manner it is settled by conscious-
* Wit
t srsr aafHprfsraw.

BOOK II. §8.
uess that the ‘conclusion from likeness’ is dependent on a know-
ledge of likeness, without reference to any knowledge of f con-
stant attendedness.’ Moreover, we do not say [—in the case of
the recognition of the Bos Gavaeus—] “ I infer” ('anuminomij,
but “I conclude from its likeness [to a cow]” (upaminomi) :—and
so it is impossible that the cconclusion from likeness,’ thus rigo-
rously ascertained [to be a specifically separate species of evi-
dence], should be redargued :—such is the import.*
b. Here ends the section on the examination as to whether
the ( Argument of Likeness’ be a [separate] kind of evidence.!
Examination of Verbal Evidence in general.
c. With a view to testing [the pertinency of the definition of ]
verbal evidence, which presents itself next in order, he states a
primti facie view, as follows.]:
â– 5?% II II
x, vj '
* Threw i h^v^rth i
'J xS G\
tr: i
t vtwrfaii

A doubt whether testimony APh- 49.—Verbal evidence [—perhaps
be other evidence than In- some one will say—] is a case of infer-
ference. ence, because the thing, inasmuch as it
is not perceived, must [—if known at all—] be inferred,
a. The complete sense is,—that verbal evidence consists in the
‘recognition of a Sign/ so that its consequent ‘knowledge de-
rived from verbal evidence’ (sabda-bodha) is an inference. And
thus verbal evidence is, as a species of Sign, the instrumental
cause of inferences,—because ‘the thing’ revealed by verbal
evidence, as it is not ‘perceived,—i. e., is not an object of per-
ception,—must be one inferred. And so the import here is, that
‘ knowledge derived from verbal evidence’ is an inference,—either
because its object is unperceived, or because it is different from
what is perceived.*
b. He mentions another reason,f [in support of the prima
facie view].
II U. o II
Aph. 50.—[Knowledge derived from verbal evi-
denee is not other than an inference,] because
the apprehension [in the two cases] is not of two kinds.
a. ‘ The apprehension,’—whether regarded under the charac-
ter of verbal evidence, or regarded as an inference. ‘ Because it
W’q <3T-
t II

BOOK II. §8.
is not of two kinds/—or is not engaged in two ways. [Hence]
to be an inference, and to be the result of verbal evidence, is not
to be two [separate] kinds of things;—because, inasmuch as it
is as a species of Sign, that a word conveys knowledge, it [—viz.,
knowledge resulting from verbal evidence—], being like know-
ledge resulting from any other Sign, is not generically different.*
b. He states another reasonf [in support of the prima facie
. , Aph. 51.—And [knowledge derived from verbal
Another reason. . .
evidence is not other than an inference] because
of the connection [between the Sign and the thing signified,
which is the same in the case of words and in that of other
a. ‘ Because of the connection/—i. e., supplying the ellipsis,
—because of the invariable concomitancy recognised. For a
word conveys information inasmuch as it has reference to an ap-
perception of invariable concomitancy [between word and mean-
ing, just such as exists, in the case of inference, between Sign
and thing signified]. Hence knowledge derived from verbal
evidence is an inference :—such is the import.]:
t •
ft i Rn vrr^ivT sgfafa-
ftft wv. II

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet [of the Nyaya, on this
point, here follows].*
n v n
Aph. 52.—There is reliance on the mat-
Reply to the objection. .
ter evidenced by words, through the virtue
of the enunciation of one worthy [to be trusted.]
a. ‘ Of one worthy/—i. e., of one devoid of error, &c.;—
what ‘ enunciation/—i. e., verbal evidence ;—what ‘ virtue*
there is in that,—viz., the fact of being qualified by ‘grammatical
coherency’ (akanksha), ‘adaptation of means to ends’ (yogyata),
&c. [—see the Tarka-sangraha; §70]—from thisf [it is, that we
mean that certainty may be arrived at].
b. “ By verbal evidence I know this,”—such is the phrase,—
but not “ I
c. He declares further, that a word and its meaning are not
connected§ [as in the physically established relation of Sign and
thing signified].
ii u n
C\ x3 '
The sense not necessarily Aph. 53.—And there is no [invariable]
associated with the sound.
connection [between the sound and the
thing meant], because we do not find filling, burning, and split-
ting, [to accompany the words food, fire, and hatchet],
* II
t n »jt-
5 wunr n

a. The thing is not connected with the word;—i. e., there is
no constant attendedness [of the word by the thing]. He states
the reason, saying, ‘ filling/ &c. If a word were constantly at-
tended by what is meant by it, then by the words ‘food/ f fire/
and (hatchet/ there should be a filling of the mouth,—a burning
of the mouth, and a splitting of the mouth,—because, since
[—on the hypothesis—] the word, viz., the thing constantly ac-
companied, is present, the thing also, viz., the food, &c., must
be there also.*
b. How then,—does a word acquaint us even with a thing not
connected with it ? Were it so, then more things than enough
would present themselves:—so he ponders this doubt.f
11 v «
Relation between sound Aph. 54.—Since there is a special alloca-
and sense mooted. ,. „ , , . r
tion of words to meanings, [some one may
suppose that] there is no negation [of their being mutually con-
nected ; just as, in physics, are the Sign and the thing signified].
a. f There is no negation/—i. e., it is not to be denied that
there is a relation between sound and sense;—‘ since there is a
special allocation of words to meanings/—for only some one
word denotes some one thing,—not every one everything. And
since it is agreed that in this way there is a connection, constant
* arraniur: i i
t hh fM wr i

attendedness also is necessary through that connection;—and
that connection does not [—nevertheless—] necessitate the fill-
ing of the mouth [when the word ‘ food’ is uttered], &c—such
is the import* [of the doubt].
b. He replies.-]-
a aTafaaT^iaaWiaaT II V. »
This point determined.
Aph. 55.—Nay,—for it is through its be-
ing conventionally qualified that the mean-
ing of a word is understood.
a. In my opinion also words and meanings are not without
their allocation [each to each]; for they have a relation in the
shape of power, since the word is conventionally qualified to call
up the meaning which belongs to it,—i. e., it is dependent on
our apprehension of the power [—else the word calls up nothing].
And this is not [a case of] constant attendedness, because that
is dependent on the relation which [—not conventionally but
physically—] determines the [actual] conditions [of things]
Such is the importj
arrafaaaarfaaani u ( h
* arafaaa: aa^iifaaai a a^raar-
atafaraarra asfava fv arvafa a
aa: aafafa i aaa aa a a’aTcarfafaaraa
J Cx
afaara: n
t aaaafa 8
+ aajasfa a a^anataan^r-
aw?w aiafaaaTa afifiWataana

BOOK II. §8.
No essential connection bet-
ween sound and sense.
Aph. 56.—And [a word is not natu-
rally connected with its sense], because
it is not restricted to [the denotation of] any particular species.
a. There is no natural connection of any sound with any
sense, f because it is not restricted to any particular species/—
i. e., because we see that a word has not [—in the mouth of
every one—] one [and the same] determinate sense.*
b. For, by the word yava, the Hindus understand a kind of
long-awned [grain], but the barbarians panic-seed. But if
there were a restriction [of each word to one and the same
meaning], every one would understand every one [in the same
sense as his neighbour]. But this is a matter of chance [—that
two persons, of different countries, should use a word in the
same sense]; because, even in the case of there being several
powers [assigned to a word in a given language] in whichever of
the senses each one understands it, that is the meaning of it
which presents itself to him.f
c. Here ends the section on the examination of [the perti-
nency of the definition of] verbal evidence in general.J
ftft n
* si ^nwfw. wr.
t ft

Examination of the varieties of verbal evidence.
d. It was stated [—B. I. §8—] that verbal evidence is of two
sorts, accordingly as it has reference to the seen or to the un-
seen; and, of these, with a view to try [the pertinency of the de-
finition of] that verbal evidence, viz., the Veda, which has refer-
ence to the unseen, he states the prima facie view.*
Authority of the Veda Aph. 57.—That [—viz., the Veda—] is
questioned. no jnstrument of right knowledge, because
of its faults of untruth, self-destructiveness, and tautology.
a. That verbal evidence, Which is other than what has refer-
ence to the seen, viz., the Veda, is no instrument of right know-
ledge. Why ? Because it has the faults of untruth, &c.f
b. And among these [faults of the Veda], there is untruth;
because when the sacrifice for the sake of a son, or the like, has
been made, we sometimes see that the fruit is not produced.]:
c. ‘ Self-destructiveness’ is a contradiction between a prior and
a subsequent [enunciation]. Eor example,— “Let him sacrifice
'O A ^3

BOOK II. §9. 57
when it is risen /’ [and again] " Let him sacrifice when it has
not risen/’*
d. The aphorism conveying the tenet.f
ii ii
How the promises of the Aph. 58.—Nay,— [the default of the
Veda fail to be fulfilled. o â–  , . n , i . o
fruit is not in consequence of the untruth-
fulness of the Veda, but it comes] from some disqualification in
the performance, in the operator, or in the instruments.
a. It is not the case that the Veda is no instrument of right
knowledge, because the absence of the fruit arises ‘ from some
disqualification in the performance, in the operator, or in the
instruments/ Disqualification ‘in the performance/ i. e., in
the [sacrificial] act, consists in its not being according to rule,
&c. Disqualification ‘ in the operator/ consists in his not being
a learned man, &c. Disqualification ‘ in the instruments/ i. e.,
in the butter, &c., consists in their not being [duly] sprinkled,
&c. For if the fruit were awanting when the thing was done as
directed, then [indeed] there would be a case of untruthfulness;
—but it is not so :—such is the import.]:
* sitvth: qqjq^fq^rq; i q^rr i i
C\ ^3
qprfya qryrfn ii
t II
+ if qr-mnqr-
vqvr: i sfik’n: i q>a-

b. He repels [the charge] of Self-destructiveness.*
II mA It
Consistency of the Veda Aph. 59.—[There is no inconsistency,]
asserted • •
though you might allege the charge in res-
pect of a different time from that which was intended.
a. Supply—“ there is no self-destructiveness.”f
b. There is no self-destructiveness [implied in the two appa-
rently contradictory injunctions], though you might allege the
charge aforesaid if, at the time of taking the fire, having intend-
ed, i. e., having agreed upon, the sacrifice after sunrise, for ex-
ample, one were to perform the sacrifice before sunrise, or the
like :—such is the meaning. J
c. He repels [the charge of J tautology. §
n (o ii
'The Veda denied to be
Aph. 60.—And [—the Veda is not charge-
able with tautology, though things are re-
iterated in it—] since re-inculcation is suitable.
«. The w and” here has the sense of “ again.” ‘ Since re-
ihculcation is suitable,’ again, there is no tautology. For it is
when there is no motive [for the reiteration] that reiteration is a
fault. ||
« snmri n
§ ii
ii uara i miwei 1fa^-
Aw. ii

BOOK II. §9.
b. He declares that the utility of re-inculcation is a settled
point in the world.*
Re-inculcation Aph. 61.—And because the utility is admitted
not needless a p . i • n • • • p -i •
oi this division ot discourse.
a. ‘Because the utility is admitted/ i. e., because it is agreed,
—supply “ by the learned,”—that there is a motive,—‘of this
division of discourse/ i. e., of discourse divided [from the other
species of discourse] by the character of re-inculcation. For the
learned, having divided discourse according to the distinctions
of enactive, re-inculcative, &c., hold that the re-inculcative also
has its reasons. So is it in the case of the Veda:—such is the
b. He shows the division of discourse in the ease of the
Discourse Aph. 62,.—Because speech is distributed into in-
dwided. junction, persuasion, and re-inculcation.
a. Through the distinction of hymn (mantra) and ritual (broth-
mana) the veda is of two sorts. Of these, this division [—viz.,
* II
t qrqufwrw w’pn^sr rhwwut
-J 'J
t snwfauuf ii

that stated in the aphorism—] belongs to the ritual portion.
Because the Veda is ( distributed/ i. e., divided, accordingly as
the speech is an injunction, or as the speech is one of persuasion,
or as the speech is one of re-inculcation. Or,—‘ because it is
distributed/—i. e., because of the distinction;—and so, through
the distinction of injunction, &c.,—supply “the ritual-portion is
tripartitely divided.”*
b. Among these he states the characteristic of an injunction
fefvfiivTW. u n
An injunction what. Aph. 63.—An injunction is that which
a. An injunction is a speech in which there is articulated an
affix indicative that something is the means of good :—e. g., " Let
him that desires Paradise perform the fire-sacrifice.”:}:
b. ‘ Persuasion’ (arthavada) is the setting forth of the end, i.
e., of the motive;—that is to say, it is a speech intended to com-
mend the object of an injunction. For a persuasive speech, by
means of laudation, &c., commends the object of an injunction
* fwpr: i
t *sf?nh< wm wfc 11

BOOK II. §9. 61
with a view to our quickly engaging* [in the performance of the
ceremony enjoined].
c. With reference to this, he divides Persuasion according to
the distinction of Laudation, &c.f
n < y o
Topics of per- Aph. 64.—Laudation, Blame, Warning, and
Prescription,—such are [the topics ofj Persuasion.
a. Laudation (stuti) is speech directly calculated to commend
the purpose of an injunction.]:
b. Blame (ninda) is that which urges the motive of the injunc-
tion by means of acquainting us with the undesirable § [conse-
quences of neglecting it].
c. Warning (para-kriti) is the mentioning of something mutu-
ally opposed to what belonged to some particular person, || [—and
which “ act of that other/-’ as having led to bad consequences,
ought to serve as a warning].
d. Prescription (purdkalpaj implies the mention of something
* I f^J WRT-
titrw mmfa ii
t ^rfa: hww ^twii

as having been handed down by tradition,* [and commended
by this “ conjecture of its antiquity”].
e. He states the characteristic of re-inculcationf (anuvada).
fafvfafv?'ii O. n
„ . , , Aph. 65.—Re-inculcation is the mention-
iie-inculcation what.
ing subsequently of what has been enjoined
by an injunction.
a. The mentioning ' subsequently/ i. e. afterwards, of what
has already presented itself, with a motive [for the reiteration], is
Re-inculcation:—such is the generic character. Its peculiarity is
[its being the reiteration] ‘ of what has been enjoined by an in-
junction /—that is to say, there is the re-inculcation of the in-
junction, and the re-inculcation of what was enjoined.J
b. And this division of Persuasion and of Re-inculcation belongs
to passages which are enounced as injunctions;—therefore, though
it does not include theological passages, which are in the shape
of statements of fact, there is no defect. §
c. He ponders a doubt.||
* 11
t n
§ Wwrf»W< G\

BOOK II. §9.
Whether Re-inculcation
differ from Tautology.
Aph. 66.—[Perhaps some one will say,]
there is no difference between Re-inculca-
tion and Tautology, because what presents itself [in either case]
is a repetition of some expression.
a. That is to say, Re-inculcation is not different from Tauto-
logy ; because ‘what presents itself/ i. e. what there really is
[in the one case as in the other] is a ‘ repetition of some expres-
sion/ i. e., a repetition, or employment over again, of an ex-
pression, the sense of which has been already communicated.*
b. He clears up this doubt.f
biirq: II {O II
Re-inculcation not Aph. 67.—Since there is a re-employment,
like the instruction to go faster, it [—viz., re-
inculcation—] does differ [from mere reiteration].
a. It is not the case that Re-inculcation does not differ from
reiteration; ‘ since there is a re-employment/ i. e., since there
is a motive for the re-employment. He states an illustration of
this,—saying f faster/ &c. As in the world, after having said
" go on,” one says over again “ go on, go on,” &c., for the pur-
pose of signifying that there should be no delay in the action, or
the like,—so is it in the case in question.]:
t II
t vum wuTfuihi: i ujwjiuth i wnw

b. Having thus repelled what would go to prove that it [—viz ,
the Veda—•] is no instrument of right knowledge, he demon-
strates that it is an instrument of right knowledge.*
wrarn < n
Argument for the au- Aph. 68.—And the fact of its being a
thority of the Veda. i. • . i ■< -> ...
cause of right knowledge, like the hymns
and the medical science, follows from the fact that the fit one
[who gave the Veda] was a source of right knowledge.
a. Since a fit person, a maker of Veda [—i. e., of knowledge
—], is a cause of right knowledge,—i. e., is a teacher of what
is true, it may be gathered from the sense of the terms that the
Veda was delivered by such a one. By means of this reason it
is to be inferred that the Veda is a cause of right knowledge.
He states an example in respect of this—f like the hymns and
the medical science.’ A hymn [or spell] counteracts poison, &c.,
and a portion of the medical science exists in the Veda. Since
these, by universal consent, are held to be causes of right know-
ledge, by means of this example, in so far forth as anything is
Veda, its being a cause of right knowledge is to be inferred.f
* nuw i
njipwiwf i rrpjw-
'J xj
fcqiw. vq i qq wihr uun-

BOOK II. §9.
b. Some [explain it otherwise, and these] say :—that is [—in
accordance with the etymology called] Veda where the fact of
being a cause of right knowledge is found, or admitted;—and by
its having such character of Veda, the fact of its being a cause
of right knowledge is to be inferred.*
c. Here ends the section on the examination of the varieties
of verbal evidence.f
d. So much for the first daily portion, entitled “The Exami-
nation of Proof and its Subservients, without reference to the
examination of its division,” in the commentary, on the Apho-
risms of the Nyaya, composed by the venerable Viswanatha
e. Now the examination of Proof with reference to its divi-
sion ; and this it is that is the matter of this Diurnal Portion.
And in this there are four sections. Among these there is, in
the first place, the section of the enquiry whether they be four;
and the others will be mentioned in their several places. On
this point [—of the kinds of evidence being four—] we have an
aphorism of objection.§
XTWTXXXXfafa xtfxa |
t xaix ii
xa fkatx-

On the question whether the kinds of evidence are
II << II
Whether the kinds of Aph. 69.— [The Mimansaka will say—]
evidence be four. ,, , „ r n .. n _
they are not tour [only], because Rumour,
Conjecture, Probability, and Non-existence, are [also] causes of
right knowledge.
a. The kinds of evidence f are not four/—i. e., the fact of
being a cause of right knowledge is not invariably attended by
the fact of being one or other of the set of four aforesaid [—see
B. I. §3-] ; because it belongs to others than those stated.*
b. In regard to this, he explains how it belongs to others, say-
ing ( Rum our’ &c. A rumour (aitihya) is what is expressed in
this way—“ thus indeed people say,” &c. For it is an assertion
which has come from one to another, without any first assertor
being indicated :—for example, “ In every Bengal fig-tree there
is a goblin,” and the like. And this is not included under ver-
bal evidence, because there is no certainty of its having been
declared [in the first instance,] by one worthy [of credit] :—such
is the
WUffTfir I I
fra i ii
t i
i fifk

BOOK II. §10.
c. Conjecture (arthdpatti) is, from a thing unaccounted for, the
imagining the producer of it; for example, from rain, the know-
ledge of [there having been] clouds. Since the cloud is not in
the same place with the rain, this is not an instance of constant
attendednessj and therefore the case does not fall under the head
of Inference.*
d. Probability (sambhava) is knowledge dependent on frequent
concomitancy. For example :—“ it is probable that there is
learning in a Brahman/’—“it is probable that among a thousand
there are a hundred.” And here there is no reference to con-
stant attendedness [—which would bring the case under the
head of Inference—] ;—such is the import.f
e. But [the proof from] Non-existence is, in dependence on the
knowledge of the absence of one opposite, [out of two], the con-
jecturing of the other opposite:—for example, on our knowing
that the ichneumon is absent, the conjecturing of the ichneu-
mon’s adversary, the snake. Here also there is no reference to
constant attendedness :—such is the import.]:
ts^waa aw aax ai ai vanfe1
a^anuasajTfaaaTa wswtra ata am:•
gVJT aa^Ta I aw W
aiaaia sawia: u
t waT i aat i aarafa
faani a^afa avar arai araa arrfaaTa-
t wre faxrqHTwaTataftTTaraaafaja i

f. Or the import maybe, that [the proof from] Non-existence
is, from the knowledge of the absence of the cause &c., the
[consequent] knowledge of the absence of the effect &c.; for it
is only constant attendedness belonging to something positive
that is subservient to Inference.*
g. The aphorism conveying the tenet.f
n «° 11
The kinds of evidence not Aph. 70.—Since Rumour is nothing
more than four. . ....... , . „
else than verbal evidence, and since Con-
jecture, Probability, and [the argument from] Non-existence, are
nothing else than Inference, there is no opposing [our division
into four],
a. There is no opposing the quaternion of Proofs, since Ru-
mour is nothing else than verbal evidence, i. e., is included un-
der it. Although generally there may be the knowledge whe-
ther the assertion were that of one worthy, yet in reality the
knowledge of the assertion’s being that of one worthy is not a
cause in respect of what [knowledge in general] is derived from
verbal evidence, but [the cause is] the knowledge of the interde-
pendence &c. [of the words,—see Tarka-Sangraha, §70 ] ; and
right knowledge derived from verbal evidence is dependent on
i arrw i
aiTfq^TqfwqTw. u
t fcTOH II

BOOK II. §10.
right knowledge of the ‘ fitness** [of the things spoken of, to
produce the fact asserted:—see, further, Tarka-Sangraha, §73 ].
b. Conjecture &c. are included under Inference; because,
without an idea of constant attendedness, the supposition of a
producer is impossible. Moreover, in the [fact of a portion of
water’s] being rain, for instance, there really is constant attend-
edness, by the fact of being produced from a cloud, f
c. Probability also, as it has its root in constant attendedness,
is Inference; and if it have no reference to constant attended-
ness, then it has not the character of evidence, because it may
stray away J [where the thing which it vouches for is not present].
d. In like manner, Non-existence [—as furnishing evidence—],
having respect to constant attendedness, is Inference. And,
since constant attendedness does belong to a negative [—as well
as to things positive,—notwithstanding what is alleged under
§69,/—], there is no inconsistency in its being one member [in
tho subdivision] of Inference:—such is the import.§
mwnihiTw wrwwfa ii
fipn anfwpi ’Pjpfa i
anfapsfa ii
§ pPTPl I
gpuiprr^ farrs Tin n

e. An indifferent person [—neither a follower of the Nyaya nor
of the Mimansa—] propounds the following doubt,—that there
might be a question whether it [viz., Conjecture,] were not in-
cluded, or were included [under Inference], if Conjecture were
any cause of right knowledge,—but that it really is not so.*
araTafaraamaaaaPa^ia u n
A HoM Whether Conjecture 4>A. 71.—Conjecture [—says some
be any cause of right know- one—] is no cause of right knowledge,
leclrje' because of its indeterminateness.
a. A case of Conjecture (arthapattij is this, that, since there
is no rain when there is no cloud, where there is a cloud there is
rain :—and here [—says the objector—] there is not the charac-
ter of producing right knowledge, because of indeterminateness;
because, even when there is a cloud, there is [frequently] no raimf
b. He clears up this doubt.J
^aTq^nq^usTafaaTaTau ii
Aph. 72.— [Indeterminateness does not ne-
Coni ectur e defended. .... , , r ,
cessarily belong to Conjecture,] because [when
you allege this fault,] you suppose that to be a [legitimate] Con-
jecture which is no [legitimate] Conjecture.
* inaasa afwarawiafaan aiq
araifaa^gr. awa ii
t arafa aaataaa afa aa gfaaaah
ajanfafaawa a a mawt aaifq aa sviaw-
+ aaura n

BOOK II. §10.
a. Indeterminateness does not [necessarily] belong to Conjec-
ture :—so much is a wan ting* [to complete the aphorism].
b. And, in regard to the example [§71, «] “Where there is a
cloud there is rain, because there is no rain where there are no
clouds,”—we agree that the knowledge of [the existence of] a
cloud [may be gained] by rain;—but where the notion of [the
existence of] rain [is deduced] from [the existence of] a cloud,
there we have the mistake of [supposing that there is what we
here render] a Conjecture when it is no [legitimate] Conjecture.f
c. And this is not inconsistent with its [viz., Conjecture’s]
character of being a cause of right notion, because [if this were
enough to debar anything’s being a cause of right notion, then]
we should find that even Inference is no cause of right notion.—
for we see that there are also erroneous inferences through error
in regard to the constant attendedness [—leading to the formal
error of Non-distribution of the Middle Term—], &c.J
cl. Some write, at the commencement of this aphorism, the
expression “ Indeterminateness does not belong to Conjecture,”
[which is, in truth,] the introduction [of the aphorism] in the
* ibn ii
WT | W r^TW-
uwravif’rwr. ii
^IT^T ||

e. He states also a bar* [to the objection].
The objector’s argument Aph. 73.—And [if the argument al-
retorted. leged at §71 were valid,] the objection
would be invalid, through its indeterminateness.
a. According to your showing, your objection also would be in-
valid, through indeterminateness;—because nowhere can we
manage to set aside the charge of indeterminateness, since there
is [on your showing, in respect of every argument that could be
made use of, for that or any other purpose, the fault of] indeter-
b. Now, if you [—the objector,—in reply to this retort,—]
say, the fact of indeterminateness is not everywhere a fault, but
in respect of itself [it is a valid mode of argumentation], then
[by parity of reasoning] Conjecture also is not invalid :—so he
says as follows :—J

Aph 74.—Or, if that be valid, then Conjecture
Another retort. . , . ,
is not invalid.
a. If you hold that your own argument is valid, because what
is indeterminate is sufficient in respect of itself [—i. e., is a
* ii
fwi Tfa «lfe «twn

BOOK II. §10.
sufficiently good form of argument where that particular form
of argument is under trial—], then Conjecture also is valid in
respect of itself,* [—and an argument from Conjecture may as
fairly be employed to establish the validity of arguing from Con-
jecture, as an argument that proves indeterminately can be em-
ployed to invalidate forms of argument alleged to prove indeter-
b. An indifferent person propounds the doubt that Non-exist-
ence is not included among the causes of right notion.]-
snHBiww 11 n
A doubt whether Non-
existence be any cause
of right knowledge.
Aph. 75.—Non-existence [says some one,]
is no cause of right notion, since no object of
such knowledge exists.
a. There might then be a cause of right knowledge called
Non-existence, if there really existed, in respect thereof, any ob-
ject of right knowledge; but there is really none such:—that is
to say, since Nonentity is mere emptiness, we cannot deal with
it as if there were here a cause of right knowledge.]:
b. The aphorism conveying the tenet. §
fefi: ii f ii

t -T WOT Tfa H3W. »
§ falH’rreWI

How Non-existence serves Aph. 76.—By their not being marked
to mark out. .
by the mark [that is found] in things
[thereby] marked, it [viz., Non-existence,] has, as its objects of
right knowledge, the things not [thereby] marked.
a. Although Non-existence cannot be marked by a Quality, an
Action, &c., still it is marked by the absence of a mark;—for,
when we say “ Bring the one which is not blue,” the absence of
blueness, by excluding others [which are blue], is a mark:—
therefore Non-existence is not invalid evidence :—-such is the im-
b. Hinting an objection, he clears it up.f
0 ii
An objection to Non- Aph. 77.—If you say that where the thing
existence disposed of. . • • . .
exists not, its JN on-existence is not,—it is hot
so ; because the mark is possible elsewhere.
a. You cannot [—says an objector—] talk of a Non-existence
(abhava) where there is no counter-entity (pratiyogi); and
where there is the counter-entity, how can there be its Non-
existence ? If any one says this, it is not so,—because ‘ it is pos-
sible,’ i. e., the Non-existence is possible through there being
elsewhere the f mark,’ that is to say, the actual existence of the
counter-entity. For it is not looked for that the counter-entity
should actually be in that very placet [where its Non-existence
*n^T fv vaTsrri shtmt mtht-
t ii
t vf‘r&lf’WnMT MW M WH Ufa-

BOOK IT. §14).
b. He ponders a doubt.*
n u
Whether the absence of Apli. 78.—Though it effect that, [where
a mark can mark. • , ■ . . _
it, viz., some mark, is present,} yet [some
oue may object,] in what things are not marked, it [viz., the Non-
existence of the mark,] is no cause [of precision].
a. Though some mark, in things that are marked, 1 effect
that/—i. e., effect discrimination, yet, in what things are not
marked, f it is no cause/ i. e., non-existence [of the mark] is no
cause, is excluded as a cause ;—that is to say, what has no essence,
for there is the absence of the mark, cannot define.f
b. He clears up this.J
n ii
Aph. 79.—Nay,—[a Non-existence is not
doubt disposed of. . in, .
ineffectual as a mark,] because it does exist
in relation to the presence of the [positive] mark [of which it is
the absence].
a. The prima facie view [taken in §78,] is not right, because
such a thing [as the Non-existence that we speak of, ] does exist
vfa 3s i ^wtr-
nfFrarhra: wdfaw n
* will
fg: w, Il
t II

in relation to the presence, i. e., the existence, of the character
which is its counter-entity. The meaning is this. Since it is
only through the knowledge of the nature of some counter-entity
that it is possible to describe the nature of any Non-existence, we
are not to expect any mark of the Non-existence [itself]:—such
is the import.*
11 » 11
Non-existence when A pit. 80.—And [there really is what may be
rightly known thereby,—i. e., by means of a
Non-existence as a mark,] because we find the Non-existence an-
tecedently to the production [of its counter-entity].
a. ‘ There really is what may be rightly known,’—so much is
supplied, by a frog-leapf [—not from the aphorism immediately
preceding, but from §76].
b. Because every one has a preception the object of which is
such an antecedent Non-existence as [is implied in the expres-
sion] “ There will be a jar” [which as yet is Non-existent in the
halves which are destined to compose it ] ; because ‘ we find/ i.
e., we perceive, the Non-existence ‘ antecedently to the produc-
tion’—viz.,—of the counter entity :—such is the import.]:
* w -r ww
C\ 'O
wraw i i uffljnfW

BOOK II. §11.
c. By the 'and/ it is included that also Emergent Non-
existence and the others are established by perception,* [—the
fact that the jar, on being broken, has ceased to exist, being a
matter of ocular cognizance].
d. [Since gestures also may communicate right knowledge, it
may be remarked that,] if Gesture had no modus operandi [—as
a Sign, e. g., produces knowledge through the special operation
of syllogizing—paramar sa—],then it would be no species of evi-
dence :—but, in reality, since, like alphabetical characters, &c., it
is a conventional thing, it also is included under Inference or
under Verbal Evidence, f
e. Here ends the section on the question whether there be a
quaternion of kinds of evidence.]:
Respecting the non-eternity of sound.
f. There being the doubt, that the authority of the Veda is
established by the authority of one worthy [of credit], and that
this is inconsistent, since the Veda is eternal,—he [therefore,]
commences the subject of the non-eternity of Sound, on the
ground that, since letters are not eternal, how can the Veda,
which is in the shape of an aggregate of these, be eternal ? In
regard to this, the aphorism conveying the tenet§ [here follows],
* u
t st wRt
w w WFrWR Tt?f II
t wix nRra^iwi’URii

The eternity of Sound Aph. 81.—From its having an origin,
denied a
from its being cognizable by sense, and from
its being spoken of as factitious, [Sound is not eternal],
a. Sound is not eternal, &c., f from its having an origin/ i. e.,
from its having a cause. But then [—some may argue—] it ha?
not a cause, because it may be accounted for, [not only by causal
origination, but,] moreover, by manifestation, [—see the Mimansa
Aphorisms, B. I.—] through the impact &c. of the throat, pa-
late, &c.: so he adds (from its being cognizable by sense/
r From its being perishable/ i. e., from its being destructible,
like anything artificial.*
b. He considers the doubt whether there be not a fallacy in
the arguments in the preceding]- [aphorism],
The preceding arguments Aph. 82.—Nay, because the Non-exist-
questioned. „ , . , _
ence ot ajar, and its genus, are eternal,
[though the arguments in the preceding aphorism, if valid, would
ijfqqwca sar? i i

BOOK II. §11. 79
apply to them,] and eternal things also are spoken of as if un*
a. The aforesaid are not [valid] reasons. The fact of having
a beginning strays away [from things uneternal, of which you
imagine it to be exclusively characteristic], —because f the nori-
existence of a jar/ i. e., the destruction of a jar [—which had a
beginning when the jar was broken—], is ‘eternal/ i. e., inde-
structible. The fact of being cognizable by sense belongs unduly
[—so far as your argument is concerned—] to Genus, [—for,
when a jar is seen, its Genus, i. e., the fact of its being a jar, is
visible also;—yet Genus is eternal]. ‘ Because eternal things
also are spoken of as if uneternal/—as when it is said, “ The
jar’s space is produced” [—whereas only a certain portion of
eternal space is now divided off and occupied by the newly pro-
duced jar—],—“ I have become happy” [—though the “ happy
I” has not just come into existence, having existed always], &c.*
b. He repels the [charge of] fallacy.!
n s n
The first objec- Aph. 83.—Through the distinction of the diver-
fton repelled. real anj the dependent, there is
not the fallacy [alleged in §82].
a. Through the ‘ distinction/ i. e., the difference, of the ‘ di-
versity/ i. e., the severalty of ‘ the real/ i. e., the absolutely ex-
istent, and the ‘ dependent’ [or not substantially existent], there
is no straying away [of the alleged character of things uneternal
uwv ’5’ft «iT?t ii
* arbunf ii

to things eternal]. For, in the case of destruction [on emergent
non-existence], its being produced [certainly] implies its having
a beginning;—but, the fact of not having that eternalness which
consists in the fact of belonging to the three times [—past and
present as well as future—], is really to be not eternal. That a
thing is eternal because indestructible [—while not having exis-
ted from eternity—] is a figure of speech. Therefore there is no
straying away* [as alleged].
b. Or the meaning is, that, by ‘ having a beginning’ is meant
the fact of being an entity, this being specialized by the fact of
having previously not existed;—and a Non-existence is not [such
a thing as] this.f
c. He refutes [the charge of] fallacy in respect of the second t
n it
The second objection Aph. 84.—Because, in the inference of a
repelled. son, a distinctiona
a. ‘ In the inference of a son,’ i. e., in the making the con-
clusion [that “ This is such a one’s son”], it is through the dis-
tinction of some token [and not through our directly perceiving
in him the generic character of sonship,] that the son is regarded
firaFTirr. twins arfiisn:: t
^r®r: n
t fxnfir n

BOOK II. §11.
as a son,—recognised as peculiarized by that single character.
Therefore, according to the maxim “ Since there is the posses-
sion of the genus,” &c., there requires to be a distinction,* [—and
this is not the case with the perception of Sound, which is di-
rect and simple].
b. He sets aside the [charge of] fallacy in respect of the thirdf
The third objection Aph. 85.—It is through a causal [ungenera-
repelled. substance's being designated by the term
Position, [that it comes to be spoken of as a thing produced].
a. There is really no cause of [the Ether or] Space ; but the
treating of Space as if made up of positions is figurative;—'be-
cause, by the word Position, a thing that is [only] a cause gets
the name of a thing that has a cause;—and Space is not such a
thing. J
b. So in the example “ I have become happy,” &c., it is only
the production of the happiness, &c., [and not of the percipient
soul,] that is the matter [of the proposition] :—such is the im-
sii iitfa n
t siti sgftRR IRlfl ii
mi: nxi^arer ihiiht
inri mnirinreiin
§ ui irn ’giRwfar* fin ?f?r
mi: ii

c. And it is not the case that there was nothing to call for
[the enunciation of] the aforesaid reasons, because they are refu-
ters of the opposite opinion, as he declares as follows.*
11 (n
Application of the pre- Aph. 86.— [Sound is not eternal,] be-
vious arguments. . . .
cause it is not perceived antecedently to
pronunciation, and because we do not perceive any veil, &c., [so
that it might exist unperceived].
a. If sound were eternal, then it would be perceived before
pronunciation, because [being admitted to be a quality of the
all-pervading Ether,] it is actually in contact with the organ of
hearing. And theie is here no obstacle [to its being heard, if it
existed] ; so he says ‘ any veil/ &c.:—because c we do not per-
ceive/ i. e., we are certain of the non, existence of, any ‘ veil’ &c.,
as an obstruction,f
b. But since Sound has no limits, its going [from one place]
to another place is not possible; J [—so that its not being per-
ceived, while yet existing, is not to be explained on such a sup-
c. The hypothesis that Sound is not eternal is decidedly sim-
ple in comparison with the hypothesis of there being innumerable
imperceptible hinderers [of its being perceived at all times] : —
such is the import.§
t 7r% fspti: ^n^RTinrr wTCFsuirH
w. ii

BOOK II. §11.
d. A couple of aphorisms, having reference to the prima facie
view of some mistaken person.*
ll Il
Aph. 87.—[Perhaps some one will say,] we
A futile suggestion. 7 . . , . _ .,
do perceive the veil [by which Sound is hid-
den], because we do not perceive the non-perception thereof
[spoken of in §86].
a. It is not made out, by the non-perception thereof, that there
is no veil, just as non-perception actually exists notwithstanding
the non-perception [of that non-perception]. Just as you
allege that, because of the non-perception of the veil, it [the
veil,] does not exist; so, since that non perception of the veil is
not perceived, there must be the absence of that—[i. e., there
must be the absence of the non-perception of the veil, or, in
other words, there must be] just the perception of the veil. Or
if [you say that,] notwithstanding the non-perception of the non-
perception of the veil, the non-perception of the veil does not
ce,ase to exist, then also, by the veil’s not being perceived, it is
not made out that the veil does not exist:—such is the meaning.f
b. The aphorism conveying the tenet J
* II
'J xj
' '-J
t II

n ii
Aph. 88.—This is no reason, because the non-
ius refutation. t „
perception consists of non-perception.
a. To say that the veil is perceived, because the non-percep-
tion of the veil is not perceived, is a futile answer,—‘ no reason/
—i. e., no means of setting aside my opinion;—because ‘the
non-perception/ i. e., the non-perception of any veil, f consists
of non-perceptlon/ i. e., consists of the absence of perception;—
and since this [want of perception of anything] is readily appre-
hended by the mind itself, the non perception thereof [—i. e.,
the non-perception of the want of perception—] is nothing real:—
such is the import.*
b. He ponders the doubt whether it be not a case of equally
balanced arguments.f
maama n ii
Apl,‘ 89-B“ause » is intangible.
a. That is to say [—suggests some one—], Sound is eternal,
because it is intangible, like the Ether J [or Space],
b. It is not a case of equally balanced arguments, because your
argument is indeterminate ;—so he says.§—
arav I a aajanfaaaanra i arawswa-
^maaa^awanarafmfa WTwaram ma aai
aaaaa ^^maa^awfaRfaifa wa: n
t aajfaa^arwa n
+ farm: aiaram^aasffkfa an: n
§ a aarfaa^nfta^arraafTfaramfaair? 11

BOOK IL §11.
«i II < o tl
Tt . Aph. 90.—Nay, because Action is not eternal
Its refutation.
[—although intangible],
a. Intangibility does not establish the eternity of Sound, be-
cause, in the case of Action, it [viz. intangibility,] presents itself
straying away* [unaccompanied by eternalness].
b. [But some one perhaps may say,] even what is indetermi-
nate may still prove [the point] ; so in regard to this he says.f
A plea in demur re- Aph. 91.—Nay, because an Atom is eter-
nal, [but might be proved otherwise if we
were to admit this],
a. Were what is indeterminate allowed to prove anything,
then an Atom, i. e., an indivisible part, would not be eternal;—
because we should then find arguments, for its uneternalness, in
its possessing Colour, &c., [which stand in the same category
with Intangibility] :—such is the meaning.]:
b. He ponders a doubt.§
n M n
Another doubt, in favour Aph. 92.—By reason of traditionary
of the eternity of Sound. , , . r > ,
teaching, [suggests some one, Sound must
be eternal].
* sfaw u
t wd u
§ W II

a. By reason, i. e., of the handing down of knowledge by the
preceptor to the disciple;—and thus the antecedent existence of
Sound [—or of the words in which the knowledge is conveyed—]
is proved;—and so its eternity is proved by the sense of the
terms [or self-evidently], according to the maxim “ The thing
has been permanent for so long,—and who, afterwards, will not
acknowledge this [as having been eternally thus] ?” Such is the
b. An aphorism conveying a tenet.f
ii M »
Aph. 93.—This is no reason, because it is not
Its refutation. . , . J,
perceived in the interval.
a. The disciple being seated near him, the preceptor lectures
him; and, if Sound were eternal, then, immediately on the arri-
val of the disciple, even before the lecture, sound would be per-
ceived ;—so, as it is not perceived, there is no sound [antece-
dently to utterance]: hence what you have alleged [in §92,] is
no reason. J
b. An aphorism conveying a prima facie view.§
* wut fwrv f^n^rr:
-J -V '
t II
t fw f^nj;

BOOK II. §11.
u < a n
Aph. 94.—You are not to set aside Tiny argu-
The objection
reiterated. ment, —says the objector—J, because there is the
a. That is to say,—the setting aside of my argument is not
right;—why?—‘ because there is the lecture’:—if, during the
intermediate time, sound [or the words to be employed in the
lecture,] did not exist, how could the lecture take place ? But the
non-perception of sound is accounted for by the absence of its
manifesters, in the shape of the concussions of the throat, the
palate, &c.,* [as the non-perception of a jar is accounted for by
the absence of a lamp or other light to reveal it].
b. An aphorism conveying a tenet.f
Its further refutation.
Aph. 95.—Onq or other of the two alter-
natives is not set aside by [that argument
of ] the lecture.
a. Supply as follows:—the objection, against one or other al-
ternative demonstrating the non-eternity of Sound, which is
drawn from the ‘ lecture,’ does not hold ;—because the fact of
the ‘ lecture’ is common to both alternatives, [which are the
contradictories of one another;—so that, being no peculiarity of
either, it must needs be irrespective of what is to be proved by
either the one or the other]. For a lecture consists in pronoun-
cing after the pronunciation of the preceptor, or in pronunci-
* ufrrqvr i i
w wr w«n xrjh Tfa xn: ii
t H

ation conducive to tlie pupil’s pronunciation;—and this, which
is the case alike on the alternative of the permanency or the
non-permanency [of Sound], can furnish no corroboration of the
eternity of Sound. For a lecture is not a bestowal [of the
language employed], so that, with an eye to the relinquishment
of one’s own property in it, and the making over of it to another,
its permanency need be contemplated :—nor is the thing possible,
—for it is a contradiction that a thing should simultaneously be
the property of many, and one cannot make over the property of
another;—but it is just a case of direction, as in the case, e. g.,
of teaching to dance, [—where you will scarcely contend that the
pirouettes, taught to the pupil, had a persistent previous exist-
ence] :—such is the import.*
b. An aphorism conveying a prim a facie view.f
II << II
Another objection, in favour Aph. 96.—[Sound must be permanent,
of the eternity of Sound. , n,
says some one,J because it is dwelt upon.
a. For that which is permanent is perceptively dwelt upon: for
* 3! Ufa-
wnrsiwi ^T^rar-
__ _ _______♦ __ t __ *
3T I HW X5?-
r^^wnrswt^i si 3i
t ii

BOOK II. §11.
example, one looks ten times at some colour [which is a persis-
tent thing];—in like manner, one recites a chapter [of the Ve-
da] a hundred times;—so that, ‘because it is dwelt upon/ Sound
is permanent:—such is the import.*
b. He replies.f
u n
Aph. 97.— [Nay,] because even were they other
Its refutation. . , . ,
[or numerically different], the dwelling upon them
might take place.
a. The primet facie view is not right:—why ? ;—because c even,
were they other/ i. e., even were the words [numerically] differ-
ent, the dwelling upon the lecture ‘might take place/ i. e., were
possible. For a ‘ dwelling upon’ [or repetition] does not esta-
blish persistency,—for we see a ‘ dwelling upon’ the thing [or a
practice of it,] even where there is a [numerical] difference, in
such cases as “He sacrifices twice,” “He dances thrice”, &c.:—
such is the import.J
b. An indifferent person here proposes the doubt how there
* afi avtaeraTa aavT’ratRUpt
aia: ii
t WfRafail
t wrar ar a^f: i i ajajR aitfa W’rf
^WIWW avaRTH warn i a aia
vraafa ais’awnavTar-
fafa w. ii

can be f practice even when there is difference,’ seeing that there is
really no such thing as difference [or f otherness*] in the world.*
II < 77 II
Whether there be such a Aph 98.—There is no such thing [says
thing as ‘ otherness. L
some one,] as f otherness/ because what is
[called] other than some other, is not other, because of its not
being other [than itself].
a. That which is called other than something else, is not other
than itself;—so how is it other,—since it is a contradiction to be
both other and not other ? Such is the import. The heart [or
essential point in this argument,] is this, that it is impossible for
a thing to be other than itself [and if it can, with truth, be said
that a thing is ‘ not other/ how can it be said, with truth, that it
is * other’ ?]
b. He clears up this.J
ayauf arwaajar a^rftararur^fai: n »
. Aph. 99.—Though this [—viz., other-
‘ Otherness is relative.
ness,] may be absent [in the relation of a
thing to itself], it is not the case that there is no [such thing
as] otherness, because these two [—viz., otherness and identity,]
exist with reference to one another.
* ^aa ^afa ai’ftfa
fcfa asw n
t a^-twa^-pja aa ’wya’ayfasj i aa
^aa^ ^nafafa
t aaraa ii

BOOK II. §11.
a. ‘Though this may be absent/ i. e., though otherness may
be absent, it is not further the case that there is no otherness;
because ‘these two/ i. e., otherness and identity, exist through
mutual reference to one another; because, in reality, either, i. e.,
any one of two,—e. g., identity,—exists in respect of the other
[e. g., in respect of otherness], because it [viz., identity,] is such
that it exists with reference to the knowledge of otherness, i. e.,
of [numerical] difference [—the word same having no meaning
to him who does not understand the word other] :—such is the
b. He ponders a doubt.f
\ ® u
Another objection in favour Aph. 100.—[Sound, says some one,
of the eternity of Sound. ,
must be eternal,] because we discern no
cause why it should perish.
a. [For the reason alleged,] sound is eternal, &c. Non-discern-
ment means either absence of perception, or absence of know-
ledge,]: [such, e. g., as might come by inference;—see §102, a].
b. In the first place he states what debars this.§
â– ^3
* HVHTH Hlftl
fat: I TH-
fnfiw arm ii
t II
t fnaj i hi ii
§ Tira HfanfeHTT II

2eZrntpr°VeS Aph' 101’—EWere non-perception suffici-
ent to prove non-existence,] we should have
constant audition, because of our not perceiving any cause why
we should not hear.
a. If non-existence were established by non-perception, then,
as we perceive no cause of our not hearing, we should not eease
to hear;—that is to say, we should find that there is hearing
b. But, in the second place, he says.f
11 \ \ n
The argument refuted Aph. 102.—And, since the non-perception
is not a fact, inasmuch as it [viz., the cause
of the cessation of hearing,] is discerned, this [argument of
yours] proves nothing.
a. The cause of the cessation being gathered by inference, &c.,
since there is not non-perception of it, your reason ‘ proves no-
thing/—i. e., does not establish,—because it is itself unsound.
The fact is, that we conjecture the perishableness [of Sound]
from the fact of its being a product.]:
b. Another aphorism of the author of the tenets.§
t ii
c?T7T| WT. II
§ favTf’fw: ii

BOOK II. §11.
siFftrafar: 11 \ <» »
One cause of the cessa- Aph. 103.—There is not non-perception
h’on of Sound. cause of |.]ie cessation of Sound],
sound ceasing on the application of such a cause as the hand.
a. When a gong, or the like, is sounding, since the cessation
of sound is perceived ‘ on the application/ i. e., on the contact,
of a cause—in the shape of the hand, there is not a non-percep-
tion of any cause of the cessation of Sound.*
b. But then, since the contact of the hand with a bell or the
like, stops the sound, [some one may say] the sound must really
reside in the bell, or the like, [and not in that imaginary sub-
stratum of Sound, the Ether]; so, in reference to this doubt,
he says:f—
n \ ® s n
The substratum of Sound Aph. 104.—This objection will not
hold, because it [the ethereal substratum
of Sound,] is intangible.
a. Complete thus:—the alleged objection does not hold, be-
cause the substratum of Sound is intangible [and cannot there-
fore be the tangible bell, or the like]. For Sound is not a dis-
tinguishing quality of what things possess tangibility,—for it is
not a product following from any such quality in its [substantial
* VTfWTfqfcjTUjl KWH
wfarfkfa n
t ’Fi M’wifeurfnrejnw wren-
kw ua?: wf^nwraFir?ii

cause], not being the result [e. g.,] of contact with fire as the
non substantial cause :—such is the drift.* [To explain;—if we
suppose the tangible bell to be the substantial cause of Sound,
then the non-substantial cause is that contact of something with
the bell, which elicits the Sound :—but then/ire is tangible, no
less than a bell; yet contact with fire does not produce Sound.]
6. In order to explain this same point, he says :f—
fwifei'twwiig aaia n \ ° 4ji
.. . 7 Aph. 105.—And [Sound is not one] in
A peculiarity of Sound.
an assemblage [of qualities belonging to
some tangible substratum], because there really are various di-
visions [of Sound apparently belonging to the same object].
a. It is not proper to say, that, ‘in an assemblage/ i. e., in
a compound of tangibility and other [properties], Sound exists
in combination,—‘ because there really are various divisions’, i.
e., several varieties of acute and grave, &c. The meaning is
this;—in one single conch-shell, or the like, various sounds, acute,
grave, &c., are produced; but [we do not observe anything of
this kind in the case of what are really qualities of the shell, or
the like; for] Odours &c. do not alter without contact with fire,
[whereas the Sound alters without any alteration of the shell] :
—such is the import.]:
* ws: vfa^vr a wwi
arfa ifa: i w a affawar
â– jrj: ii
t vaaa ararrafaaaiv n
+ aaxa adrrfaaaaia arlMia aaa ?fa