The aphorisms of the yoga philosophy

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The aphorisms of the yoga philosophy
Uniform Title:
Ballantyne, J. R ( James Robert ), 1813-1864
Place of Publication:
Printed at the Presbyterian Mission Press
Publication Date:
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2 pts. : ;


Subjects / Keywords:
Yoga -- Early works to 1800 ( lcsh )
non-fiction ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage:
Asia -- India
एशिया -- भारत
21 x 78 ( India )


Statement of Responsibility:
of Patanjali ; with illustrative extracts from the commentary by Bhoja Rájá ; [edited and translated by J.R. Ballantyne].

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SOAS University of London
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Special Collections
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
286322 ( aleph )
CWML C.3/14 ( soas classmark )
EB85.212 /449864 ( soas classmark )


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1 8 5 3.


a. May that three-eyed Lord of the World, by whom were
shown the several means for securing the difficultly attainable
riches of Concentration (yogaj, be [adjuvant] for the attainment
of what is desired !*
b. Thus then having declared, in the First Book, the Concen-
tration, along with its means, of him whose mind is abstracted
[from all objects];—how, preceded by the practice of means,
does the concentration of him whose mind is not abstracted, ad -
vance to accomplishment ? [Since this question presents itself—]
* H a vs?

in order to set forth the practice of what is instrumental thereto,
he declares the practical [part of] Concentration.*
hi: ferdmr: n \ n
Practices conducive to Concentration. Aph. 1.—The practical [part of] Con- centration is mortification (tapas), mutter-
ing (swadhyaya), and resignation (pramdhana) to the Lord.
a. The penances and fastings enjoined in another Institute
[—viz. the Dharma-sastra—], are what are meant by ‘ mortifica-
tion? ‘ Muttering* is the muttered repetition of formulae pre-
ceded by the mystic name of the deity [B. I. §27]. ‘ Resigna-
tion to the Lord’ is the consigning to Him, the Supremely Vene-
rable, without regard to fruit, all one’s works. These are what
are called the practical [part of] Concentration (kriya-yoga).^
b. For what purpose is this ?—He replies.]:—
* Tr^xn^^Tf^af^wikqFt §mfa-
â– yra sq-f^Hfvri^i ^mtrr?HH]T^i^T ^prai^rn-
'J, sj MX
t Hq; vjw itki nfeg araprr^FPinfe i
TjuratRfpsit wrat w. i t’aTnftraw ’jifaRrat
efftra WPTTT ’Jv'?lfa f^BTHT 1^11

The purpose of such
Aph. 2.—It is for the purpose of esta-
blishing meditation, and for the purpose of
extenuating afflictions.
a. The ‘ afflictions’ (klesa) will be mentioned [under §3]. The
‘extenuating’ of them, is the opposing their producing their
effects. ‘ Meditation’ is what has been already defined [B. I.
§20, /]. The ‘ establishing’ of it, is the repeatedly taking into
one’s thoughts [the thing to be meditated upon]. That the
purpose, or motive, of which is this, is what is so called [—i. e.
is what is spoken of in the aphorism].*
b. That is to say,—these, viz., penance, &c., being practised,
rendering inert the ‘ Ignorance’ and the other afflictions [§3]
that assail the mind, sustain the part of subservients to Medita-
tion. Therefore it is to the practical [part of] Concentration
that the Yogi should first direct his
c. ‘ For the purpose of extenuating affliction,’—this has been
stated [in §2];—what are here meant by afflictions ?
ihn: n $ ii
* WUT d«i=h v\
w: i i hfptt vh:
fnrsH i w ii
t | UH rW: 5^ WSHTHTf^rl-
Tfit agaa truth: f^HTfirnKVTrnnuTiT
^Tf^raTT ^TfifHarfTrfH II


Aph. 3.—The afflictions are Igno-
Afflictions to be alleviated by . ,
such practices. rance, Egotism, Desire, Aversion, and
Tenacity [of mundane existence].
a. And the f afflictions,’—Ignorance and the rest,—the defini-
tions of which will be stated [in the sequel], are five; and these,
giving rise to distress, the characteristic of which is its being
obstructive [to what we miserable mortals wish], are called
‘ afflictions,’ because they, operating in the mind, consolidate
that modification of the [three] Qualities which is recognised as
mundane existence* [—the state of existence which it is the aim
of the Yogi to eschew].
b. Although these are all equal in respect of being afflictions,
yet, in order to declare that r Ignorance’ (avidyaj, from its being
the root, is the principal one, he says.rf

The source of the afflictions. Aph. 4.—Ignorance is the field of the others, whether they be dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple.
a. ‘ Ignorance’ means delusion; the notion, in short, that
what is not Soul is Soul. This is the 1 field,’—the place of origin,
ufarnqwtiwsra’rn iRRI^MT^T M^rfat I
t Marfa MMMt
MTMPM TrfanT?blrj,4|f^ II

of the others, viz., ‘Egotism/ &c., which are severally fourfold
through the division into ‘ dormant/ &c. Therefore where Ig-
norance, in the shape of a mistaken notion [that what is not soul
is soul], becomes inoperative, there the springing up of the ‘ af-
flictions’ is not seen; but, since, where this mistaken notion
really exists, they are seen to spring up, it is quite settled that
it is Ignorance that is the source.*
b. ‘ The dormant, extenuated, intercepted, and simple:’—among
these, those ‘ afflictions’ are called ‘ dormant/ which, deposited
in the site of the mind, do not give rise to their effects for want
of something to wake them up;—as in the state of childhood ;—
for the child’s ‘ afflictions/ though present in the shape of men-
tal deposits, are not developed for want of something to assist in
awakening them.f
c. Those afflictions’] are the ‘ extenuated/ which, through
one’s meditating something that is opposed to each severally,
their power of producing their effect having been rendered inert,
abiding in the mind as a species of mental deposit, are incapable
• I ?f?T SJT4HI

t I rPT
’JflT feHT! WTR1 H V^IT TrJ-
i *ph wwit i tpri f?
fWHT ^jfq ^Trr: TPTW^K+IH

of giving rise to their effects without an ample apparatus [of auxi-
liaries] ;—for example [such are the f afflictions’] of the ascetic
d. Those [‘ afflictions’] are the ‘ intercepted/ which abide with
their power overpowered by some strong ‘ affliction/—as desire [is
overpowered and ‘ intercepted’] when there is the condition of
aversion, or aversion when there is the condition of [an over-
powering] desire;—for those two, mutually opposite, cannot
simultaneously co-exist.+
e. Those [f afflictions’] are the ‘ simple/ which operate their se-
veral effects when the things with which they co-operate are be-
side them;—[such are,] for example, the things adverse to Con-
centration at all times during the state of non-abstraction.]:
f. ‘ Ignorance/ though standing moreover as the root of these
four kinds [of ‘ afflictions’] severally, is recognised as [also] at-
Srf’TW. II
ftdafa i w ci’lli
I ’W ^PTqfk’jf’ST^T ^r8Jl«t TrnnFii

tending them; for nowhere is there found the nature of ‘afflic-
tions’ having the character of being irrespective of the attend-
ance of error; and when that, being a falsity, is removed by
right knowledge, these afflictions’], like burnt seeds, never
spring up again; hence it is ascertained that Ignorance is their
cause and Ignorance is their attendant. Therefore they all par-
take of the name of Ignorance; and, since all the f afflictions’
cause distraction of mind, the Yogi must cut these off at the
very outset.*
g. He defines ‘ Ignorance.’!

faffasjT ii *1. ii
„ Aph. 5.—Ignorance (avidi/a) is the no-
‘ Ignorance’ defined. . 1 ® ,
tion that the uneternal, the impure, evil,
and what is not soul, are [severally] eternal, pure, joy, and soul.
* cat aw anfaaiaiafa aanjaara fisara-
farai wfiRa aataa i aR ararat fau-
iranaafaTawarat wwwwia i faarr-
aarat vraa faafaarat a^atwwrar-
aat a s^ftfa arfaanfafaaaafaaiFaa-
^at fa^taa i aja: aa aa-
aug isarat firafarhianfhaTy arfaaT aaaaa
a?Rh': aRaj afa ii
t arfaaaar arwara u

a. The definition of ignorance in general, is this,—that, igno-
rance is the notion that what is not this is this. The declaration
of the varieties of that same [is made in the aphorism]. The
notion that there is eternalness in things uneternal, such as
water-jars, is called ‘ Ignorance? So too the notion that things
impure, such as the body, are pure; and the notion that objects
which are evils are joy ; and the notion that the body, which is
not the soul, is the soul, [—as when a bumpkin fancies that his
eye sees, or a phrenologist that his brain thinks—]. This ex-
plains the mistake of vice for virtue, and of the useless for the
b. In order to define ‘ Egotism’, he says.f
Aph. 6.—Egotism (asmita) is the identi-
‘ Egotism1 defined, fying of the power that sees with the power of
a. The ‘power that sees’ is Soul. The ‘ power of seeing’ is
a modification of the Quality of 1 Purity’ [—see Sankhya Apho-
risms, B. I. §62,] unobstructed by ‘ Passion’ and ‘ Darkness’,
in the shape of the internal organ [or Mind]. What is called
'W’i i to i v vzifev fiw-
snfwn^T sfaw'sjH i -sgf^r-
fajTRT f Utt?
strth; u
t II

‘ Egotism' is the notion that these two things, entirely different
as being the experienced and the experiencer—the unintelligent
and the not unintelligent,—are one and the same. For example,
—-Nature, though really neither agent nor experiencer, fancies
“ I am agent,—I am experiencer” :—this blunder is the ‘ afflic-
tion’ called ‘Egotism.’*
b. He states the definition of ‘ Desire’ (ragaJA
wn ii n
Desire defined.
Aph. 7.—Desire is what dwells on pleasure.
a. ‘ Dwells on pleasure’—i. e. reposes on [—or is the affection of
the mind when the thought rests on—] joy. This ‘ affliction’,
named ‘ Desire,’ is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for the
means of enjoyment, preceded by [—or, in other words, conse-
quent on] the remembrance of enjoyment, on the part of him
who has known joy.J
b. He states the definition of f Aversion’ (dwesha).§
HT^^fa^fwaa in ^afnratw faq^N: wri; 11
i vfa i
-J sj sj
5 ii

iw. ii n
Aversion defined.
Aph. 8.—Aversion is what dwells on pain.
a. 1 Pain’ is what has been already defined [—B. I. §31. 6].
Of him who has known it, disliking what things occasion it, in
consequence of his remembrance of it, the feeling of disapproval
is the f affliction’ called 1 aversion’.*
b. He states what is ‘ tenacity of life’f (abhinivesaj.
ii < ii
The clinging to mundane existence.' Aph. 9.—Continuant through its self- reproductive property, even on the part .
of the wise, attachment to the body is ‘ Tenacity of life?
a. Continuant ‘ through its self-reproductive property /—that
is to say, it flows on by reason of its own nature, just by reason
of its being self-continuant. The f affliction’ called ‘ tenacity of
life’ is what prevails in the case of every one, from the worm up
to Brahma, without any concomitant cause [in addition to its
own self-continuant property], in the shape of the constant
clinging [which expresses itself in such terms as], “ May I not
be separated from the body and things sensible, &c.,”—this
springing up in the shape of dread, through the force of the im-
o d C\
t ii

pression from the experience of the pain of a death that took
place in a previous life.*
b. Since thus, then, non-abstraction is made up of the ‘ afflic-
tions,’ the ‘ afflictions’ are at the outset to be removed by the prac-
tice of intentness on a single point;—such is the import.f
c. And not without their being known can these be removed;
therefore having, with a view to the knowledge of them, declared
their name, source, division, and characteristic, he now states
the division of the methods for the removal of these bipartitely
gross and subtilej.
a nfaunnw: u \ ® n
The Subtile ‘ afflictions’ Aph. 10.—These, when subtile, are to
how to be evaded. , , , , , . . ,
be evaded by an antagonistic production.
* WW n^atfa i nt-
W. nan-
wraam: afkfnnarfefaaa ftadn aT
aaa»npr. at^nraai^rnt’a fatwa faai nna-
aiai sfafaaaw. wa: ti
t aan sjrsnw naa ifiar: nfr^nan n
t aaT^rarat ant nft^n: w. nrafafa am amaia ftara a^aafaam Aigww-
aafaarat ant n^wmraftawar? n

a. These subtile ‘ afflictions/ which, abiding in the form of
mental deposits, do not occasion any change, in the shape of a
‘ modification’ [—see B. 1. §5,—stored in the mind, like Locke’s
‘ ideas’ while not objects of attention—], these are ‘ to be evaded/
to be avoided, ‘ by an antagonistic production/ by an alteration
adverse to them. When the understanding, with its deposits,
having done its work, lapses into its cause, viz., egotism, then
how should these [‘ afflictions’], being deprived of their root, pos-
sibly continue?*
b. He now mentions the method for the removal of the ‘gross*
'aia^aw^aa: ii \\ u
The gross ‘ afflictions’ how Aph. 11.—Their f modifications’ [—
to be got nd of. when the ‘ afflictions’ modify the mind
by pressing themselves upon the attention—] are to be got rid
of by meditation.
a. The ‘ modifications/ in the shape of pleasure, pain, or in-
difference, which consist of these f afflictions’ that have set in ope-
ration their effects,—these are ‘to be got rid of/ to be quitted, by
means of meditation, i. e., by intentness of the mind on a single
point;—such is the
* a a aTaaWWTafeaT a gfwtf
a afaaaaa afa^raafrsnira w-
WjfiSIT: I qM>l a?r afat aafa aar graaiat fa^aranat w: n
t wrat 'aravnaar? ii
t aat ^naraRswaTwt ar:

b. These ‘from their being gross, can be removed by the mere
practice of what purifies the mind [—see B. I. §33, c—], as the
coarse gross dirt on clothes and the like is removed by mere
washing; but that subtile [impurity] which is in them can be re-
moved only by such [more recondite] expedients as bleaching, &c.*
c. Having thus mentioned what the ‘ afflictions’ are he re-
marks as follows, with the view of mentioning the stock of
worksf [that stands at each man’s credit or discredit].
iuw: n M a
Aph. 12.—The stock of works, whose
One’s merits and demerits. . . .
root is the ‘ afflictions, is what is to be
had fruition of in this visible state, or in that unseen.
a. By ‘ the stock of works’ the nature of this [that he is
speaking of] is set forth, for works exist only in the shape of
mental deposits.]:
fanrr ar ^naa firaasurarawa w
* faaqfwwwro faafaw-
afa awr aadh aa: aar: waaaiaara
faawS w aa w. a aakula^-aiqa
faa=afaa wi
+ a»ania w wiafaf^a aar aiaar-
pw araifarn

b. By ‘ whose root is the afflictions’ the cause is set forth, since
the ‘afflictions’ alone are the cause of acts.*
c. By ‘ what is to be had fruition of in this visible state, or
in that unseen,’ the fruit is declared. What is to be experienced
in this present state, is ‘what is to be had fruition of in this vi-
sible state.’ What is to be experienced in another life, is ‘ what
is to be had fruition of in that unseen.’f
d. Thus some meritorious acts, such as the worship of the
gods, performed with excessive impetuosity [—see B. I. §21,
b—], bestow, even in this life, fruit in the shape of rank, years,
and enjoyment,—as distinguished rank [—that of a demigod—],
&c,, accrued, even in this life, to Nandiswara, through the force
of his worship of the divine Maheswara. So to others, as Vhwa-
mitra [—who, according to the Ramayana, from being a Kshattri-
ya was raised to the rank of a Brahman—], through the efficacy
of penance, rank and long life [have accrued]. To others [has
accrued change of] rank only,—as the change to another
rank, &c., of those doing wicked acts with hot impetuosity, such as
Nahusha [who was changed to a snake], and Urvasi [—the
nymph who was punished] by her metamorphosis into a creeper
in the grove of Kartikeya. In this way is the rule to be ap-
plied, according to circumstances, distributivelv or collectively,];
fnfwrffl II
t crenf^

[—each well-deserving or ill-deserving person being understood
to receive rank, or years, or enjoyment, one or more of them, or
all of them, or none of them,—and so on through the string of
permutations and combinations possible].
e. Now he mentions the fruit of the stock of works divided
according to its division* [into merit and demerit].
wn 11 K® n
The fruit Avh. 13—While there is the root, its fructification
of works. is rank, years, and enjoyment.
a. The ‘ afflictions’ above-mentioned are the ‘root •’ whilst these
remain unsubdued, of these acts, virtuous or vicious, ‘rank,
years, and enjoyment,’ are the ‘fructification,’ i. e. the fruit.
‘ Rank’ means the being a man [or a god, or a beast,] or the
like. ‘ Years’ mean abiding for a long time in the body. ‘ En-
joyments’ mean sense-objects, the senses, and the aggregate of
pleasures and pains, because the word bhoga [—here rendered
‘ enjoyment’—] is formed [from the root bhuf\ so as to denote
the object, the instrument, or the statef [of enjoyment].
fitfw. vt?wit: i v*t-
i ^t ’Tjswtat
* wwr iw»n^ii
t sjWTjrsraun: ^n: i

I). The gist of this is this, that the mental deposits of works,
collected, from time without beginning, in the ground of the
mind, as they by degrees arrive at maturation, so do they, exist-
ing in lesser or greater measure [—the sum of the merit being
lesser than that of the demerit, or conversely—], lead to their
effects in the shape of rank [raised or lowered—], years, and
enjoyment* [or experience of good or ill].
c. In respect of the ‘ rank/ &c., that have been declared to
be the fruit of acts, he states, according to the works that are the
cause of each, which is the efficient of which effect.f

0 II
Aph. 14.—These have joy or
suffering as their fruits, according-
ly as the cause is virtue or vice.
a. ‘Joy’means pleasure; ‘suffering’means pain. Those the
fruit of which are joy and suffering, are what are so named [—i.
hptt fwn rf^rrftr
* HWsj f

wit w w ^ranq-mPri hwt t ww qiwwn
snsn ffirnr


e. are wliat are denoted in the aphorism by the compound term
here analysed]. By *virtue’ {puny a) is meant any good deed;
ty ‘vice/ its opposite. Of what things these two, viz., virtue
and vice, are the causes, the nature of these things [is what is
meant by the compound term punyapunyahetukatwa; and it is]
thereby* [—or accordingly as the cause is virtue or vice, that
the effect is joy or suffering].
b. What is asserted is this, that the rank, years, and enjoy-
ment, originating in good works, are pleasant fruits; and what
originate in evil acts are painful fruits.f
c. This twofold character [of the fruit of works] is in respect
of mortals simply ; but to the Yogi all [mundane experience] is
sorrow, as he proceeds to state.f
aa faafaa: II u
Pleasure and pain alike APh' 15.—And, to the discriminating, all
vexations to the Yogi. js grief simply, since the modifications due
to the Qualities are adverse [to the summum bonum] through
* vk: aftawr v:wi ^wafkaan aaa
^rta hw i w wi aw i afiuftaaaw I
a aqf awr wawTa n
t capfi^afa vf^aiv^TajTWPrr apewT: i
vfkarwaT: ii
i va^f wfnraTaTa^aT arfaaar aa

the vexations of the various forms [of Nature], and of anxiety
and of impressions self-continuant.
a. That is to say,— [in the opinion] of him who understands
discriminatively the * affections/ &c., every instrument of experi-
ence [whether of pleasure or of pain] that comes under his view,
is, like food with poison in it, a grief only,—something felt to be
against the grain.*
b. Since the Yogi who has become a complete adept is distressed
even by the slightest pain,—as the eye-ball, and no other member,
experiences great pain from the mere touch of a thread of wool, so
the discriminating [votary of Quietude] is averse to the ad-
herence of even a very little pain;—how is it [that he shrinks
from such pains] ? To this he replies, ‘through the vexations of
the various forms, and of anxiety, and of impressions self-continu-
c. Since there is increase of desire in proportion as more ob-
jects are enjoyed, and since these [objects] are causes of other
pains occasioned by their non-attainment, they are really nothing
else than griefs [—according to the principle that the nature of
the- cause is not other than the nature of the product—]; thus
nw: n

is it that the various forms [of Nature presented to us in the
shape of objects] are sorrow.*
di While the means of enjoyment are being enjoyed, since
there must ever exist an aversion towards what is hostile to that
[enjoyment,—so that thus ever “ surgit amari aliquid medio de
fonte leporum”—], even at the time of experiencing pleasure, the
pain of distress is hard to be got rid of,—such is what constitutes
the pain [called] anxiety. f
e. As for the fact that (impressions self-continuant’ are griefs,
—the sense of enjoyment, and the sense of suffering, that arises
on the contact of objects which one desires or does not desire,
originates in one’s [mental] field a corresponding self-continuant
impression. Again we [thence] experience sensations of the
same sort, so that, since, through the emergence of innumerable
self-continuant impressions, the mundane state is never cut short,
every-thing whatever is a grief. J
t wsw; anrfHvfiM vfa

f. ‘ And since the modifications due to the Qualities are ad-
verse/ Of the Qualities, viz., Purity, Passion, and Darkness,
the modifications [or psychical influences] which arise in the
shape of Pleasure, Pain, and Indifference, are opposed to one
another, since they reciprocally are overpowered or do overpow-
er. These are but griefs, since they are, in absolutely every in-
stance, the cause of grief* [—grief continuing while the mun-
dane state due to the Qualities continues].
g. What is asserted is this, that to the discriminating one}
who desires entire and complete cessation of suffering, the whole
quaternion [enumerated in the aphorism] are causes of the
alleged descriptionf [i. e., causes of grief]. Hence, since all
objects exhibit themselves in the shape of vexations, therefore
the harvest of all works is in the shape of vexation alone.f
h. This, that, since the aforesaid fund of ‘ afflictions’, the har-
vest of [each one’s] stock of works, takes its rise in Ignorance,
and since Ignorance, as being in the shape of false knowledge,
is to be expelled by correct knowledge, and since correct know-
ledge consists in the ascertainment of what is to be rejected and
what to be accepted, with the means [ofrejection, &c.,]—inorder
[—I repeat—] to declare this, he says.J—
* wsfafintwrafa i wwt ffwuwsiwt si
fwTT WTSW l t i

vsfa n

What is to <4ph. 16.—What is to be shunned is pain not yet
be shunned. come.
a. Since what has been is past, and what is being experienced
is incapable of being shunned [whilst being experienced], it is
only mundane pain not yet arrived that is to be shunned:—such
is what is here asserted.*
b. He states the cause of that which is to be shunned.f
ii 11
The origin Aph. 17.—The cause of what is to be shunned is
of evil. the conjunction of the seer with the visual.
a. The ‘ seer’—in the shape of Thought. The f visual’ means
the principle of understanding [which does not itself see, but is
Thought’s organ]. The conjunction of these two, occasioned by
the absence of discriminative knowledge,—their contact as the
experienced [—for all that seems external is developed out
of the principle of the understanding—] and the experiencer,
—this is the cause or reason ‘ of what is to be shunned,’—of
rhfafH II
t n

pain,—of the world in the shape of a modification of the Quali-
ties ;—because when this surceases, the mundane state surcea-
ses,—such is the meaning.* '
a. We have spoken of ‘ the conjunction of the seer with the
visual? Among these things, of the ‘ visual' he states the na-
ture, the products, and the motive.}
The nature and purpose Aph. 18.—The visual [—including the
of the visible
visible—] whose habit is illumination, ac-
tion, and rest, and which consists of the Elements and the Or-
gans, is for the sake of experience and emancipation.
a. ‘Illumination’ is the property of ‘ Purity’. ‘Action,’ in the
shape of exertion, is that of ‘ Passion.’ ‘ Rest,’ in the shape of
fixation, is that of ‘ Darkness.’ Of which these,—illumination,
action, and rest,—are the habit, or the essential nature,—that is
what is so described [—i. e. described in the aphorism by the
compound epithet here analysed]. Thus has its nature been set
f:w i afv-
t i wi
t wiini: w: I fiw rofwu I

b. ‘ Consisting of the Elements and the Organs/ The ‘Ele-
ments/ according to their division into the Gross and the Sub-
tile, are Earth, &c., and the rudiments of Odour; &c. The ‘ Or-
gans/ according to their division into the organs of knowing, the
organs, of action, and the internal organ, are of three sorts.
Of which this two-fold character of percept and perception is
* what it consists of/—a modification not other than itself,—
that is what is so described [—i. e. described as f consisting of
the Elements and the Organs’]. Thus have its products [—
which are not other than Nature herself—] been stated.*
c. Experience’ means what has been already defined [at
§13. a~\. ‘ Emancipation’ is the surcease, occasioned by discrimi-
native knowledge, of the mundane state. Of which these two, ex-
perience and emancipation, are the motive or purpose, that is
what is so described [—i. e. described by the compound epithet
now analysed—], that is to say ‘ the visual [including the visi-
ferfafaawu w. i wrt w awarfWafa faft-
* ^af^aaofafa i *jarfa sfa-
anftfa asiawRaifwa i
f^aTar.anawia fafaaifa i aaaaa^i^r^wr-
aian wafw. afianar w aaarfaafaaiaa
anaaauaia n
t hwt; asfaaaiw: i anaarfaaarntfaafaaiT
aaufasfa: i ar araraaara^: aaraa hw
arfaa n

d. And since this, the ‘ visible/ which consists of modifications
in the shape of various conditions, requires to be known as what
is to be shunned in order to declare its conditions, he says.*
The aspects of the Quali- Aph. 19.—The divisions [of condi-
tion] of the Qualities are (1) the di-
verse, (2) the non-diverse, (3) the merely [once] resolvable, and
(4) the irresolvable.
a. The divisions, i. e. the several conditions, of the Qualities
are to be understood to be four,—such is what we are here in-
formed of. Among these, the ‘ diverse’ are the gross elements
and the organs; the ‘non-diverse’ are the subtile elements and
the internal organ; the ‘ merely [once] resolvable’ is intellect
[—which is resolvable into the Undiscrete, but not further—] ;
the‘irresolvable’ is the Undiscrete [or Nature]:—thus has it
been declared.f
b. The four conditions [of developement] of the Qualities
are set forth as necessarily requiring to be known at the time of
Concentration, because we recognise the Undiscrete, which con-
sists of the three Qualities, as being present everywhere that
t avnat aa mil ^naan vma-
favamfa I aa firaai a^THaf^aifar i ajfaw-

these are,* [—so that if we did not know these, then the Undis-
crete, the cause of bondage, might be present undetected].
c. Since the visible requires first to be known as that which is
to be shunned, having thus explained it, with its conditions, in
order now to explain what is to be accepted [and not to be got
rid of—viz.] the ‘seer/—he says.f
sfwa: tth sfq wnaw. u ® u
Aph. 20.—The 'seer* [Soul] is vision simply,
Soul defined.
though pure, looking directly on ideas.
a. The (seer,’ i. e., Soul, is ‘ vision simply/ i. e., mere Thought.
This f though pure/ i. e. though abiding as itself, without be-
coming modified, or the like. f Looking directly on ideas —•
‘ideas’ are thought coloured by objects :—it looks ‘ directly on’
these,—immediately,—without the intervention of successive
stages, or the like. What is asserted is this, that, whilst it is
only the intellect that becomes coloured by the object, Soul is
spectator merely through proximity.]:
• wa Phjui i-=t (q
W TTaarafa aanfx wfar fafavrfa 11
t W(T I 7TTT I vfa-
mfaarRmraa ^rnfkir sfa i vajaratrajr. i wn
wfa i capw^fa i wrafwn-
Miiaiqiaa atr ^firaiaaraaia aaw svwfWfa n

b. It alone is the experiencer;—so he says.*—
ii \ ii
Aph. 21.—For the sake of it alone is the
Soul is the experiencer, , .
entity of the visible.
a. The ‘ entity/ the self, of the ‘ visible' which has been al-
ready defined [§17. a.],—this is ‘ for the sake of it—the bringing
about that ‘ it,’ the Soul, shall be an experiencer, is its aim, to the
exclusion in short of any selfish end. For Nature, energizings
energizes not with a view to any purpose of her own, but with the
design “ Let me bring about Soul's experience."!
b. If thus the motive be only the effecting of Soul's experi-
ence, then, when this has been effected, it should cease striving
for that in the absence of a motive :—and, when it is free from
alteration, since it is pure [—exhibiting neither the Qualities of
Passion nor of Darkness when all three are in calm equipoise—],
all souls should be freed from bondage, and the mundane state
should be cut short. Having pondered this doubt, he saysj—
* II
wri i afe vvia nTaaiaama; fa>f^ Jjawa fapPT WRT HPT WT^amtfa II
t aij# WW WWa a? T w-
fau afarafgrr^arwa faxaamnt ^na i afijfa
ufunaiM aa jcttt asqffvn: «r»rag
xainraar? n

The emancipation of one entails Aph. 22. Though it have ceas-
not that of others. ed f0 |n respect of him who
has effected what is required, it has not ceased [in regard to all],
because it is common to others besides him.
a. Although, since it causes experience just till there is dis-
criminative knowledge, it ceases to be, i. e., desists from acting,
in respect of some soul which has effected the end [of discern-
ing discriminatively], still, since it is common to all souls, it con-
tinues, as regards others, with its operations undestroyed.
Therefore, since Nature is common to all experiencers, it never
ceases; nor does the emancipation of one involve the emancipa-
tion of all:—such is what is asserted.*
b. Having explained the ‘ visible’ and the ‘ seer,’ in order to
explain their conjunction, he says—J
The conjunction of soul
and nature what.
Aph. 23.—The conjunction is the
cause of the apprehension of the actual
condition of the natures of the possessed and the possessor.

st wrt 11

a. He characterises this through its effect* [—telling us not
what the conjunction is, but what it is the cause of].
b. ‘The nature of the possessed’ is the nature of the visible.
‘ The nature of the possessor’ is the nature of the ‘ seer.’ More-
over, the apprehension of the nature of these two, correlated as
the known and the knower,—that which is the cause of this is
the conjunction [here spoken of];—and this is none other than
the nature of their cognate habit as the experienced and the ex-
periencer. Because, of these two, which are from everlasting and
all-pervading, there is no conjunction other than their essential
character. That the experienced’s character as something expe-
rienced, and the experiencer’s character as an experiencer, has
existed from everlasting,—this alone is the conjunctionf [or re-
lation between the two].
c. Moreover he states the cause thereof.]:
Aph. 24.—The cause thereof is
The cause of the conjunction. t . ... ,
what is to be quitted—viz., Igno-
* ^ii wfa n
t wftfihw i W? i
i ’rfv wn-
i hpw
i wifa 11

" a. That which has been already described [§4.] as Ignorance,
in the shape of delusion, consisting in the confounding the un-
real with the real, is declared to be of that conjunction in the
shape of the absence of discriminative knowledge, the cause,—
what is to quitted,—the [grammatical] object of the act of
( quitting?*
b. What, again, is the ‘ quitting' thereof? To this he replies.!
TAe quitting of conjunction Aph. 25.—The ‘ quitting’ consists
wAat .
in the surcease of the conjunction, on
that [Ignorance];—this is the isolation of the soul.
a. ‘ Of that,’ i. e., of Ignorance, eradicated by its essential
opposite, viz., right knowledge, ‘ the surcease,’—when this takes
place, the surcease also of its effect, viz., of the conjunction, is
what is called the ‘quitting’ of it.J
b. What is meant is as follows ;—abandonment does not apply
in the case of this as in that of a circumscribed body [from
which you may disjoin yourself by moving away into a portion
of space unoccupied by it] ; but, when discriminative knowledge
* vt fararerfonn hiwu ffw arwn
+ TOT ^fejFTT: «RFT

has been produced, the conjunction, which was due to the ab-
sence of discriminative knowledge, ceases quite of its own ac-
cord ;—such is the ‘quitting’ of it. And, moreover, that quit-
ting which there is of conjunction [with Nature], being for all
eternity, is what is called the isolation (kaivalya) of the soul
[thereafter existing entirely] alone (kewalaj.*
c. Thus have the nature, the cause, and the effect, of the con-
junction [of soul with Nature] been declared.f
d. Now, by means of declaring the means of ‘ quitting’ [what
ought to be quitted], he states [by implication] the cause of [the
attainment of] what [condition] ought to be accepted]: [as the
most desirable possible].
faaai’siTfavfasaT ^iaima: n ( u
The means of quitting the Aph. 26.—The means of quitting
con/unc?ton. [the state of bondage] is discrimina-
tive knowledge not discontinuous.
a. The ‘ knowledge,’—the perfect cognizance, of the distinc-
tion, in this shape, viz., that the Qualities are one thing and
Soul is another thing, is ‘the means,’ the cause, ‘ of quitting,’
i. e., of abandoning, the visible [or phenomenal]. What sort of
[knowledge]? fNot discontinuous.’ That [knowledge] is ‘ not
discontinuous,’ in respect of which there is no skipping,—no
* aa^T W fsjRT
araiat faaarenaTafawwiafafiraaaTa:
faaaa TTa w vra i a$aa aaia^j via aea
fast ^awrfv sivf^ajra n
t a^a aartw afuvi ana^Twivaa u

breaks between and between, in the shape of non-abstraction*
[or re-conjunction of soul with the things of sense].
b. The import here is this, that, when Ignorance is dissolved
by force of meditating on what is opposed to it, that advent
which there is of a reflection, in the soul, of the introspective
intellect, where the conceit of being knower or agent has been laid
aside, and when it is unoppressed by the filth of Passion and
Darkness, is what is called discriminative knowledge, [—or the
knowledge of the non-identitv of soul and Nature]. And when
this prevails permanently, there simply becomes, through the
cessation of the rule of the visible, isolation.-^
c. While telling of what description is the discernment of that
soul in which discriminative knowledge has taken place, he de-
clares [by implication] the nature of discriminative knowledge
itself. J
* wr wiw m w wifn n
wr tfto w'tfw’ww. i i
If arrant-
w w vt ii

V -J
i t WTO ^TTTJTt W wfn Ht
wh fkwSw? ii

w wwi w K n
Discriminative knowledge
of what nature.
Aph. 27.—Of that [enlightened soul]
the perfect knowledge, up to the ground
of the limit, is of seven kinds.
a. ‘ Of that’ [soul] in which discriminative knowledge has
sprung up; ‘the perfect knowledge*—in the shape of the discrimi-
nation which it behooves us to understand; f up to the ground of
the limit’, i. e., as far as is the extent of all the meditation that
has a support [—see B. 1. §17, j,—] ; is of seven sorts.*
b. Among these [seven], that which consists in liberation from
the products [of mind] is of four sorts,—(1) “ That which is to
be known is known by me(2) “ There is nothing that ought
to be known(3) “ My ‘ afflictions’ are destroyed,—there is no-
thing of mine requiring to be destroyed(4) “ Knowledge has
been attained by me, discriminative knowledge has been attained
by me—and so, by the abandonment of all other impressions, in
that state of things, just such perfect knowledge takes place [as
is spoken of in the aphorism]. Such perfect knowledge, being
pure knowledge the object of which is some product [of mind],
is what is called ‘ liberation from the products.’]*
flTrlWT |
G\ C\
+ wi i wt w i
*r i h ain:
fafrfa w

c. ‘Liberation from the mind’ is of three sorts,—(1) “My
mind has done its office [in enabling me to discern the distinc-
tion of soul and nature](2) “ and the Qualities have lost their
influence [over me],—like stones that have fallen from a moun-
tain-peak they will not again resume their place; for why should
these, when tending towards resolution into their cause, spring
up again in the absence of the fundamental reason [for their
springing up] which is called ‘ delusion,’ and in the absence of
a motive?”—(3) “And my meditation is such as has become one
with soul;—such being the case, I exist in my real nature.”
Such is the threefold ‘liberation from mind’.*
d. So then, when there has sprung up such a sevenfold per-
fect knowledge, reckoning as far as to the limit [where medita-
tion ceases to rest upon an object], we say that soul is alone-f
[kevala, or in the desiderated state of kaivalya].
e. It has been stated [§26] that discriminative knowledge is
ataa i w faaa ^ta ataIa-
* I vftflTAT fl flfi: I flW
xj xj xj
fflftftRrfflvfflHT va atata: aa:
fwffl A ATflrfA AW! UAflTfflflWIflt ^TVTfflVT-
wrarhjng fl flflrfa: aIwa
fflfn i triit fflwsrrr fwnf^flfw:n
t fi^flteasri’ flvfavnrAflffln^RTflysnATflt
Wf: AW TApflA II

the cause of the removal of the Conjunction [between soul and
nature] ; but what is the cause of that ? To this he replies.*
ii â– c ii
Ascetic practices clear the way Aph. 28. Till there is discrimi*
to discriminative knowledge. native knowledge, there is, from the
practice of the things subservient to the Yoga, an illumination
[more or less brilliant] of knowledge [which is operative] in the
removal of impurity.
a. The ‘things subservient to the Yoga’ are what will be
mentioned [in §29]. ‘ From the practice’ of these, i. e. from the
practice of them preceded by a knowledge of them,—‘ till there
is discriminative knowledge/—that ‘ illumination of knowledge’
which, more or less, as a modification of the pure [or enlighten-
ing] principle, is [operative] ‘ in the removal of impurity’—in
the removal of impurity in the shape of the ‘ afflictions’ whose
characteristic is their hiding the light of the pure principle of
the mind,—until discriminative knowledge [takes place], that
is the cause of this knowledge [of the distinction between soul
and nature] ;—such is the meaning.t
igfrnFEj: ii

b. ( From the practice of the things subservient to the Yoga,
—in the removal of impurity/—has been said :—what, then,
are those (things subservient to the Yoga’ ? So he enunciates
The eight subservients of ^ph. 29.—The eight things subservi-
Concentration. ent jj-0 Concentration] are (1) forbear-
ance, (2) religious observance, (3) postures, (4) suppression of
the breath, (5) restraint, (6) attention, (7) contemplation, and
(8) meditation.
b. Some of these, as ‘ attention/ &c., are immediately sub-
servient, since they are directly conducive to meditation. Some,
as f forbearance/ ‘ religious observance/ &c., conduce to medi-
tation by means of their eradicating [all] hesitation about things
opposed to it, such as killing, &c. Of ' postures/ and the rest
[in the list,] the conduciveness is successive, it being, e. g., when
one has succeeded in regard to f posture/ that there is steadiness
in f suppression of breath /—and so it is to be inferred also in
respect of the others [in succession] .f
t TV
xj 'J
vunivTn^ i wiii

b. He describes these iu their order.*
ii $ o n
Aph. 30.—‘ Forbearance* (yama) consists
Forbearance what. e . n.
of not killing, veracity, not stealing, contin-
ence, and not coveting.
a. Among these [—to speak first of the first—], ‘ killing* is
acting for the purpose of removing life; and this is a cause of
all evils. The absence of this is what is meant by ‘not killing.*
Since ‘ killing* must be abstained from at all times, its opposite,
‘ not killing’ is set down firstf [in the list J.
b. ‘Veracity* means conformity, in speech and mind, to fact.
Its opposite is falsehood. ‘ Theft* is the taking away another’s
property. Its absence is ‘ not stealing.* Continence* is the sub-
jection of one’s members. ‘Not coveting’means not desiring
for one’s self means of enjoyment.}
c. These five, ‘ not killing,* &c., which are meant by the word
* SfOTut WW II
t firi u: ii
t w i i

‘ forbearance/ are laid down as things conducive to Concentra-
d. He states a peculiarity of these.f
Honesty independent
of circumstances.
versal great duty.
Aph. 31.—These, without respect to
rank, place, time, or compact, are the uni-
a. ‘ Rank’ means Brahman-hood, &c. ‘ Place* means a place
of pilgrimage, &c., ‘ Time’ means the fourteenth of the month,
or other [date which may affect the meritoriousness or otherwise
of this or that otherwise perhaps indifferent act]. ‘ Compact’
means that a Brahman, for example, is the motive [of our doing
or leaving undone]. The aforesaid ‘ forbearances,’ viz. c not
killing,’ &c., without respect to these four [considerations],
abiding in all places—i. e. [as the moral law written on the
heart, in all] understandings,—are what are called ‘the great
t wr II
t ajrfdih^’UriTfc: I

b. To explain‘ I will not kill a Brahman/—‘ I will not kill
any one at a place of pilgrimage/—‘ I will not kill any one on
'the fourteenth of the month/—‘ I will not kill, except for the
benefit of a god, a Brahman, or the like/—[well, the ‘forbear-
ances’ must be] without this fourfold qualification,—unqualified,
—thus ‘ I will not kill any one, anywhere, at any time, or for
any purpose whatever.’ And the same holds in respect of ‘ truth’
and the rest, mutatis mutandis. It is these thus unqualified, and
acted upon in their full generality, that are called ‘the great
c. He states what are ‘religious observances’ (niyama)A
u ii
Aph. 32.—Religious observances f'niya-
Religious observances.
ma) are (1) purification, (2) contentment (3)
austerity, (4) inaudible mutterings, and (5) persevering devotion
to the Lord.
a. ‘ Purification’ (saucha) is of two sorts, external, and inter-
nal. The external is the cleansing of the body by earth, water,
* nwi st hN vfir-

t fsfswiJfr? ii

&c. The internal is the washing away the impurity of the mind
by means of benevolence, &c.*
b. ‘ Contentment’ (santosha) means contentedness. The rest
have been already described. These, viz. ‘purification,’ and the
rest, are what are meant by the term ' religious observances.’!
c. How are these subservient to Concentration ? To this he
facHnrrw ufinwm I M I
„ , , -Aph. 33.—Tn excluding things
How these things are of use. • n i i •
questionable, the calling up some-
thing opposite [is serviceable].
a. ‘ Killing,’ &c., as opponents of Concentration, are e things
questionable,’ because they are doubted about [—it being ques-
tionable what real good they can do]. If these are excluded
when things opposed to them are called up, then concentration
is facilitated. Hence ‘ forbearance’ and ‘ religious observances’
really are subservient to Concentration^
t ^Twfv: i iter: vfaa Haamsnwr. i va
wraTvar faaaa^ran: n
t ^faajH ^ITV II
§ faa^a vfa faiwr auniffaffaaT I
aat sfaa^iarfa afa afa am aafa aai faJw
3WT Wlftfa Haafa afffaaHTat II

b. Now he states, in order, the nature, the divisions, the kind,
the cause, and the fruit, of the ‘ things questionable’ (vitarka).*
vfatmHFwrii ii
Account of objectionable Aph. 34.—The f things questionable,’
killing, &c.; whether done, caused to
be done, or approved of; whether resulting from covetousness,
anger, or delusion; whether slight, of intermediate character, or
beyond measure; have no end of fruits [in the shape of ] pain
and ignorance;—hence the calling up of something opposite [is
every way advisable].
a. These the ‘ killing,’ &c., aforesaid are first divided tripartitely
through the difference of ‘ done,’ ‘ caused to be done,’ and ‘ ap-
proved of.’ Among these, those are ‘ done,’ which are carried
into effect by one’s self. Those are ‘ caused to be done,’ which
are brought about by the employment of the incentive expression
‘ Do it, do it.’ Those are ‘ approved,’ which, when being done
by another, are consented to by the expression ‘ Well done, well
done.’ And this threefold character is mentioned in order to
debar hallucination in regard to these respectively; otherwise
some dull-witted one might reflect thus, “ The killing was not
done by me myself, therefore the blame is not mine.”f
* fawTmt wi h? wit ^npit
t vh vtw fwT ?iw-
i wi

b. In order to declare the causes of these questionable
things"], he says, ' resulting from covetousness, anger, or delu-
c. Although‘ covetousness" is the one first specified, yet, since
the source of all the ‘ afflictions’ is delusion, whose mark is the
conceit that what is not soul is soul, this we must be sure is the
root, because, when it takes place, ‘ covetousness" f anger" and
the rest arise in consequence of there having gone before the di-
vision of self and other one [—but for the existence of which de-
lusive division there would have been no room for either cove-
tousness or anger]. We mean, then, that every class of evils
results from delusion.f
d. ‘ Covetousness" is a t’airst. ‘ Anger’ is an inflamed condi-
tion of the mind, which uproots all discrimination between what
ought to be done and what ought not to be done. J
Aswan: wra gifaafftsar ^arfgai: i ca^
awrarrar^faamar^i'aia i wn
a^a *r ^4 fw ?rafa awgAia
afa i
* vaat afnanrfaaTW^
t aajfa gaitm-ai ar?-
gnawanTwrfwaarqw fwa *aa G G\
i ar^afaaiT gaT ^naarfafna’a: i
t arrwwr i atra: Uw
ama>fg=aaa: n

e. ‘ Killing/ &c., moreover, which are severally threefold
through the distinction between ‘ done/ &c., (§34. «.], are divid-
ed tripartitely through their having as their cause ‘ delusion/ &c.,
[§34. Z»]. He mentions, of these again, a threefold character,
through their difference of state, as ‘ slight, of intermediate cha-
racter, and beyond measure.’ The ‘ slight/ or slow, are those
that are neither fierce nor middling. Those fof intermediate
character/ are what are neither slow nor fierce. Those that are
f beyond measure’ are what are vehement, neither middling nor
slight. Thus the nine divisions, since there is thus a further
threefold character, become twenty-seven.*
f. The ‘ slight/ &c., moreover severally may be of three sorts
through the distinction of slight, intermediate, and excessive.
These are to be combined accordingly as they can combine. For
example, the ‘ slightly slight/ the ‘slightly intermediate/ the
‘ slightly excessive/ and so on.f
ff. He mentions their fruit, saying, f having no end of fruits
[in the shape of] pain and ignorance.’ ‘ Pain’ is a state of mind,
dependent on the Quality of passion, exhibiting itself as some-
* faWTTT affq
afcnarfa ?rw: i aw arfa Afar: i ^rfa-
HT?n: At ST a aw arfa aw Tfa aa aw T r?f
afa-er asfaafa: u
t rjwftarafir am atf a^TfaaraaW’ia’f^
aanfa i asraAnA aw I asiar l Wfatfa af Afa wife n

thing repugnant. ‘ Ignorance* is false knowledge, in the shape
of doubt or error. Those [f questionable things*] of which the
endless, or unlimited, fruits are these two, viz. pain and igno-
rance, are what are so spoken of* [—i. e. spoken of by the com-
pound epithet here analysed].
h. Thus it is enjoined, that the Yogi, by meditating on ‘ some-
thing opposite* is to get rid of these [‘ questionable things*]
which he has understood by means of the division of natures,
causes, &c.,f [that has been now set forth].
i. With a view to declare, in order, how perfections arise, con-
sequent on these [‘ forbearances,* &c.], when, by practice, they
have reached their highest degree, he says.]:—
rWblVT II U. ill
Aph. 35.—When harmlessness is
Influence of the Yogi that is .
harmless. complete, near him, there is aban-
donment of enmity.
a. When the harmlessness of him that practises harmlessness is
complete, even natural enemies, as the snake and the mungoose,
abandon [when near him] their enmity, and abide in amity;—
* wit? vfW i
h rraufiT: n
t Tr?r hwt ufarrg-

that is to say, those that delight in destroying, leave off their
b. What happens in respect of him that practises veracity?
To this he replies.f
amfa^Tat ftiaTtfianaacw 11 n
Aph. 36.—When veracity is complete,
Influence of veracity. .
he is the receptacle of the fruit of works.
a. For works, such as sacrifices, being performed, give fruits,
such as Paradise. But of that Yogi who practises veracity, the
veracity rises to such a degree that the Yogi receives the fruit
even without the work's being performed. At his bidding, the
fruit of works accrues to any one soever, even though not per-
forming the work :—such is the meaning. J
b. He states the fruit accruing to him that practises absti-
nence from theft.§
* aanftat HT^aaT sftamfa^Tat a^afaTTft-
araafta^arrftat awai faaanaaTaana aa-
fa i ftanar: ftarft vftaia^fta: n
t aaaunaaa: ft aaaftr? 11
t ftaTaro ft ftar aiaiftan: aft
va^fti i aai aarnaraaaT arfaaarar aft
aaiarajaiaTaft ftarataiat aswraTfa i
aaaaiw wfta ftaw^aaTsftftaraft aa-
afta: n
§ apaawTaaa: araar^ n

11 ® 1
„ ,. . Aph. 37.-—When abstinence from
1 he reward of not thieving.
theft is complete, all jewels come
near him.
a. When he practises abstinence from theft, then, on its reach-
ing its highest degree, the jewels that exist in every quarter
come to him even though he covet them not.*
b. He states the fruit of the practice of continence.y
II 3^ II
Aph. 38.—When continence is com-
The reward of continence. , . . r
plete, there is gain of strength.
a. He, indeed, that practises continence, when it is complete,
there is revealed in him excessive strength, or power. For con-
tinence is the preserving of one’s manly vigour; and from this
[continence] being of a high degree, vigour in body, organs, and
mind, attains a high degree.J
b. He states the fruit of the practice of non-covetousness. §
wwnfwifa i fr w
§ ii


The reward of non-
Aph. 39.—When non covetousness is es-
tablished, there is knowledge of all about
[former] states of existence.
a. ‘All about it’ means the condition how [—kathantd being
the abstract of the indeclinable katharri]. ‘ All about states of
existence/ such is the meaning of janma-kathanta. The ‘ know-
ledge’ thereof, the perfect understanding. That is to say, he
knows perfectly every thing in regard to the question f Who was
I in a former state of existence ? What sort of person ? The doer
of what actions?’*
b. It is not merely the coveting of the means of enjoyment
that is [here meant by] covetousness. Covetousness is [meant]
even as far as the soul’s coveting a body. Since a body is an
instrument of enjoyment whilst it exists, from its association
with desires, our energy being directed to the external, no real
knowledge reveals itself. When, again, without regard to covet-
ing a body, &c., one betakes one’s self to indifference, then, since
one abandons desire, &c., the acquaintance with past and future
states of existence becomes indeed a cause of right knowledge
to the indifferentj- [person, who thus discerns how little there is
deserving of a wise man’s regard in any mundane condition
* wn: wni

c. The fruits of the ‘ forbearances* have been stated. Now he
mentions [those of] the ‘religious observances.**
urnd’rf': 11 8° i
Mental result of purifica- Aph. 40.—From ‘ purification/ loath-
ing for one*s own members, and uon-
intercourse with others.
a. He who practises ‘ purification/ to him there springs up a
loathing, an aversion, even for his own members, through his
thoroughly discerning the cause and nature [of a body];—“ This
body is impure; any fondness for it is not to be entertained /*—
and so for the same reason, there is ‘ non-intercourse/ the absence
of intercourse, the avoidance of intercourse, ‘ with others/ with
other possessors also of bodies;—such is the meaning. For
whoso loathes his own body, through his discernment of this or
that fault, how must he judge of intercourse with the similar
bodies of others ?f
* w?st wrt far?: I fieromr? i
sj xj
w: wnrwq; I v: fw w

b. lie states another fruit of this same ‘ purification?*
_ f r . Aph. 41.—And purity in the
Other results of purifications.
Quality of Goodness, complacency,
intentness, subjugation of the senses, and fitness for the behold-
ing of soul, [are fruits of ‘ purification*].
a. ‘Are’ is required to complete the sentence.!
b. The ‘ Quality of goodness’ is what consists of light, joy, &c.,
[—see Sankhya Aphorisms B. I. §62]; its ‘purity’ is its not
being oppressed by Passion and Darkness. ‘ Complacency’ is
mental joy, from there not being the oppression of distress.
‘Intentness’ is steadiness of the mind on an object; to which the
senses are confined. ‘ Subjugation of the senses’ is the abiding
in themselves of the senses averted from objects. The ‘ fitness’
of the mind means its power of beholding soul,—[this ‘behold-
ing’ being] in the shape of the knowledge of the distinctness!
[of soul from Nature].
* IHr n
t w’ntfk n
t i lift: ywHW-
jprfwT. i WH'W jnMi utfa: i
u=hHM( i
3^ »

c. These, ‘ purity in the Quality of Goodness/ and the rest,
manifest themselves in succession, in the case of him that prac-
tises purifications. That is to say, from ‘ purification’ comes
* purity in the Quality of Goodness ;’ from ‘ purity in the Quali-
ty of Goodness/ ‘complacency; from ‘complacency/ intent-
ness ; from ‘ intentness/ ‘ subjugation of the senses / and from
‘ subjugation of the senses/ ‘ fitness for the beholding of soul/*
d. He states the fruit of the practice of contentment.!
11 » u
Aph. 42.—From contentment there
The fruit of contentment. . . _ , ,. „ ,. ,A
is acquired superlative felicity.
a. From contentment’s reaching its highest degree, there is re-
vealed to the Yogi such an inward joy that the external enjoyment
of objects is not equal to a hundreth part of it.J
b. He states the fruit of (austerity’ (tapasj.^
irmH i ww i
t WWW WflT? II
t ^wrfw-
afa w fiuwg’t ajatwfa a wr ii
5 HW. 0

Aph. 43.—The perfection of the bodily
The fruit of austerity. senses, by the removal of impurity, [is the
fruit] of austerity.
a. 'Austerity/ when thoroughly practised, brings ‘perfec-
tion/ i. e. a heightening, of the bodily senses, through the re?
moval of the impurity, consisting in the ‘ afflictions/ &c., of the
b. What is meant is this;—by the chdndrayana [species of
fast], and the like, there is the removal of the ‘ afflictions’ [§ 3]
of the mind. By the removal of these there is developed, in the
senses, the power of, for example, discerning the subtile, the
hidden, and the infinite ; and, in the body, [the power of assum-
ing] at will either an atomic or an enormous bulk, &c.f
c. He states the fruit of ‘inaudible muttering’ swddhydya.\
Aph. 44.—Through inaudible muttering
The fruit of inaudible . . .
muttering. there is a meeting with one s favourite
a. When ‘ inaudible muttering/ in the shape of charms and
spells directed [to some deity or other], is at its height, there
â– 'J
t i wwfan i Hrg-
t II

takes place, in the case of the Yogi, a meeting with the ‘ favou-
rite’ deity, i. e. with the one to whom this [inaudible mutter ♦
ing] was directed. That is to say, the deity becomes visible*
[—and most probably says “ Ask a boon”].
b. He states the fruit of ‘ persevering devotion to the Lord’
(iswara-pranidhdna). f
Aph. 45.—Perfection in meditation
The fruit of persevering
â– devotion to the Lord. comes from persevering devotion to the
a. As for this species of faith in the Lord, there is developed
therefrom Meditation, which has been already described,—be-
cause that Divine Lord, being pleased, having removed the ob-
structive ‘afflictions,’ elicits meditation.]:
b. Having spoken of the ‘ forbearances’ and the ‘ religious ob-
servances’ [§29], he speaks of the ‘postures’ ('asana
* HT-
t whv? ii
t t’ar ht sn wraHTWjfrirw-
hvth HHThRprmfa II
5 ii

11 « ( n
Postures what. Aph. 46.—A ‘ posture* is what is steady and pleasant.
a. A 'posture* means what one sets one’s self in,—such as
the padma, the danda, the swastika, &c., [with the precise cha-
racter of which we are not at present concerned]. When this is
* steady/—not wavering,—and ' pleasant/—not uncomfortable,—
then this serves as a subservient to Concentration.*
b. He mentions a plan for producing steadiness and pleasant-
ness in this same.f

‘ Postures’ how managed. Aph. 47.—Through slightness of ef- fort and through attaining to the infi-
nite [do * postures/ become steady and pleasant].
a. The construction [with the preceding aphorisms] is this,
that that,—viz., ‘ posture,* becomes steady and pleasant through
slightness of effort and through attaining to the infinite. J
I fist wfa
hvt Hinvrjwr ii



b. When, when he forms the wish—“ Let me establish [myself
in such and such] a posture,”—that ‘posture’ is effected with
slight effort, with little trouble; and when the mind attains
to the boundlessness that belongs to space,—i. e. when in
thought one has identified one’s self with it,—then, from there
being neither body nor self-consciousness, the ‘posture’ is no
cause of pain;—when this command over the f postures’ has beeu
attained, the tremblings, &c. [B. I. §31], which are obstacles to
meditation, no longer prevail.*
c. He mentions a fruit of this same when accomplished.f
, Aph. 48.—Thence there is no assault
Fruit of the ‘postures.
by the pairs.
a. When this command of the ‘postures’ has been attained,
the Yogi is not assailed by ‘the pairs,’ cold and heat, hunger and
thirst, &c.;—such is the meaning.]:
* 3(31 ^Ufrf imij-
wfa ?n?wir-
trjh t(3t i
’jfa wwjq-

b. Next after the mastering of the ‘postures/ he speaks of
the ‘ regulation of the breath’ pranayama/*
nfgFt W umn-
3JTW. n u
Aph. 49.—When this has taken
Regulation of the breath. . . . _ _ .
place, there is regulation of the breath,
a cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration.
a. When steadiness in a ‘ posture’ has taken place, that species
of auxiliary of Concentration, viz., ‘regulation of the breath/
to which this [steadiness of posture] is conducive, is to be prac-
tised. Of what sort is this ? In the shape of ‘ a cutting short of
the motion of inspiration and expiration’.f
b. c Inspiration and expiration’ are what have been described
[B. I. §31, e]. What is called ‘regulation of the breath/ is the
‘ cutting short/ or restraining, ‘ of the motion/ or flow, in the
places external or internal [—see §51—], of these two by means
of the threefold process of [regulated] expiration, retention, and
inspiration,]: [—see B. I. §34, «].
t vi-
t ®FF?rw I cHTTfe^T
M<«rc( C\ ''J x
â– Miw II

c. In order that this same may be easily understood, he states
the nature of it, with its divisions.*
uftwr ^Mrw. u V »
This explained. Aph. 50.—But this, which is (1) outer, (2)
inner, and (3) steady, peculiarised by place, time, and
number, is long or short.
a. ‘ That which is outer’ is the expiration, or expelling; ‘ that
which is inner’ is the inspiration, or filling ; f that which abides
steady,’ within, is called kumbhaka. It is called kumbhaka be-
cause, when it takes place, the vital spirits rest motionless like
water in a jar (kumbhaj.-\
b. This threefold regulation of the breath, further peculiarised
by place, time, and number, is termed ‘ long or short’. ‘ Peculi-
arised by place,’ e. g., [see the direction] “As regards beginning
and end, twelve from the nose—that is to say, as far as twelve
inches, beginning from the nose. ‘ Peculiarised by time,’ as,
“ For the duration of thirty six mdtras,” &c. Peculiarised by
number,’—e. g. the first udvata is made by so many inspirations
and expirations, so many times; and the employment of number
is had recourse to in order that this may be known [by substi-
tuting the definite number for the indefinite ‘ so many’]. By
udvata is meant the impinging of the air sent [upwards, in speak-
t brer. i wre: i
w tot smansA Whv. it

from the pit of the stomach, on the head,5^ [from which it
is supposed to be reflected down again, so passing out of the
b. Having mentioned three regulations of the breath, in order
to declare a fourth one, he says.f
0 ma u
Aph. 51.—The fourth recognises both the
A special variety. .
outer and the inner spheres.
«. The (outer sphere’ of the breath is that [space] from begin-
ning to end [—reckoning from the nose—] of twelve [inches ;—
see §50, Z>]. The ‘ inner sphere’ is the heart, the navel, the
plexus, &c. The fourth regulation of the breath is that which,
in the shape of motionlessness, is a cutting off of the motion [of
the breath], recognising, i. e. having an eye upon, both those
two spheres.]:
fgar nMa i iiraiwRar axr
SOTTISH VrUafg: ^rg-
waiw. u’W war nafa ca^wa wurenia-
vra i xfrai arfw^Taifca^ atar:
t ata TnurrararafHaia «
t mw faw i aean

b. The distinction between this and the third one, viz., the
kumbhaka [§5O, a,] is this. That one [—the kumbhaka—],
without paying any regard to the two spheres, the outer and the
inner, suddenly, like a lotus dropped upon a heated stone, at
once arrives at the condition of rigidity;—but tfAis one is a res-
trainment that has respect to the two spheres.*
c. This also, like the former [§50, 6], is to be regarded as be-
ing peculiarised by time, space, and number.!
d. Of this [regulation of the breath] which is of four descrip-
tions, he mentions the fruit, f
na: MjtaH wtjjfruri ii V u
The fruit of the regulation of the breath. Aph. 52.—Thereby is removed the obscuration of the light.
a. ‘ Thereby/ i. e. by that regulation of the breath, there is
(removed/ or destroyed, that ‘ obscuration* which, in the shape
fawn h

gwr wswn fawca i w
faviv; Il
+ Mi'sWN *

of the 'afflictions’ [§3], there is 'of the light/ that belongs
to the Pure Quality of the mind;—such is the meaning.*
b. He mentions another result.!
afaai aaa: II 3 II
Aph. 53.—And the mind becomes fit for
A further result.
acts of attention.
a. 1 Acts of attention’ are what will be spoken of [in the se-
quel] . The mind, freed from its defects by the several kinds of
regulation of the breath, wherever it is directed to, there it
remains fixed, and does not suffer distraction.]:
b. He defines 'restraint’ (pratyaharaj.^
WfaaaaHiaTaTWa faa^J ^aiaaTT
aaf^annt n V >
Aph. 54.—' Restraint’ is as it were the ac-
‘ Restraint’ what. i ■ P
commodation of the senses to the nature of
the mind in the absence of concernment with each one’s own
* aa: aaaan-nRaraTa aarw faaaaiaw
a^rara araaa aa t ww? ii
+ airaiT awnac i arg awnaia: ataara
aar aa aa aiaa aa aa fiav aafa a fwa
aaR u
§ aarau^ awaara n

a. It is called ‘ restraint/ because, when it exists, the senses are
restrained, are withheld, from their respective objects. And how
is this effected ? He replies;—‘ of the senses/ Sight, &c., there is
‘each one’s own object/ as Colour, &c :—‘concernment’ there-
with is any energizing with respect thereto:—the ‘absence’ of
this is the abiding in their mere nature after having abandoned
all regard to such things. When this takes place, the senses
simply accommodate themselves to the nature of the mind; for,
all the senses are observed to follow obsequiously the mind, as
the bees their leader. Hence, when the mind is restrained [from
the exercise of its functions], these [senses] are restrained ; and
their accommodation to the nature thereof [under such circum-
stances] is what is called ‘ restraint’.*
b. He states the fruit.f
The fruit of restraint. Aph. 55.—Therefrom is there complete
subjection of the senses.
sftjfsrfa w^r: i i
5RTV HTfsr U3?T ^r^r: v^t^r ws: ii

a. For, when 'restraint* is practised, the senses become so
subjected, so subdued, that, even when attracted towards exter-
nal objects, they will not go;—such is the meaning.*
Recapitulation. b. Thus, then, [—to recapitulate briefly—] of
Concentration, which was defined in the First
Book, having declared that appendage, viz., the ' Practical [part
of J Concentration* [§1], the fruit of which is the alleviating of
of the ' afflictions* [§2]; having mentioned the names of the
'afflictions’ [§3], their cause and source [§4], their nature and
fruit [§5—11]; having stated also the division, cause, nature, and
fruit, of works [§12] ; the nature and cause of fructification are
set forth [§13—14]. Then, since the 'afflictions,* &c., are to be
got rid of, and since it is impossible to get rid of them without
knowing what they are, and since knowledge is dependant on
instruction, and since the instruction assumes four aspects, as it
respects (1) what is to be got rid of, (2) what is not [desired] to
be got rid of, (3) what is constituted by the cause, and (4) what
is the cause constitutive, and since, without [an explanation of
what is meant by the expression] ' getting rid of,* the nature, of
' what is to be got rid of * cannot be explained, [therefore] having
set forth the fourfold arrangement, with [an explanation of
what is meant by] 'getting rid of*, and with [an account of] the
cause of each thing severally [§15—27]; having explained, along
with the fruits, the nature of those appliances, ' forbearance,* &c.,
which stand in the relation of causes, immediate or mediate, in
respect of the constitutive cause [of emancipation], viz.,' discrimi-
native knowledge’ [§28—46]; having exhibited the 'postures,*
&c., as far as ' attention,* arranged according to their mutual re-
lation as conduced to and conducers [§47—52] ; their fruits,

along with the respective characters thereof, have been set forth
c. Thus this 'Concentration/ having, through 'forbearance/
' religious observances/ &c., attained to the condition of a seed,
and having sprouted by means of the ' postures' and ' regulation
of the breath/ and having blossomed by means of ' self-restraint,'
will fructify by means of ' attention/ ' contemplation/ and ' medi-
tation' [§29]. Thus has the Book on the Means been explained.f
C\ G\
airwai fasaTataafaaTa iraTarahi afTK”i ahi
atfaaia fam wa anni arfaf^aa aaw-
s?T^Tr«h*!(’?l ar a auaTaa^Ta^ awrer a aaraaanTiiTariaT-
tnfaaraaiaafaa ^araunralaaafHaTa
avr^TaarR’naaiaT faaa^Ta: aiTT’nwnaTa’a^-
afaripnaa ffgraiat aunat aarftat aiar-
afaa ansa? aRnnwaiat arear^at ’w-
aaanaraaiuaiaT^aTaf^raTaTaiaafHaTa arair-
aiarafafaaa ii
t a^a apfr aafaaarfefa: uTsftawa: anaa-
awTaTa^^fra: sasfaaT apnurana-
aaifafa: qifapaatfa arraia: araaai^:»

d. Thus has been completed the Second Book—that on the
Means—of the commentary called the Raja Martanda, composed
by the illustrious great king and governor, kingBhojaraja, on the
Aphorisms of Patanjali's System of the Yoga.*
* vfa rnwr-
vhts: ii

â– . i