The aphorisms of the yoga philosophy

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The aphorisms of the yoga philosophy
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Ballantyne, J. R ( James Robert ), 1813-1864
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Printed at the Presbyterian Mission Press
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Yoga -- Early works to 1800 ( lcsh )
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Asia -- India
एशिया -- भारत
21 x 78 ( India )


Statement of Responsibility:
of Patanjali ; with illustrative extracts from the commentary by Bhoja Rájá ; [edited and translated by J.R. Ballantyne].

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SOAS University of London
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Printed for the use of the Benares College
by order of Govt. N. W. P.
Rev. L. G. Hay, Sup't.

The great body of Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sets of
very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms
are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to
communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by
the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom
the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end
they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the ob-
scurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the un-
instructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.
For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an ac-
curate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as
may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits,
in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn
English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms,
brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the
criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned
Brahmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best
chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of
such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the
attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical
terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

( ii )
The translation of this first portion of the Yoga Aphorisms has
been attended with peculiar difficulties, among which it may
suffice here to mention that no pandit in these days professes to
teach this system. That the version should, in its present state,
be found faultless, is therefore very unlikely. These pages, now
submitted to the criticism of the pandits who read English, are
to be regarded as proof-sheets awaiting correction. They merely
moot the subject, on which they invite discussion.
J. R. B.
Benares College,
Sih Sept. 1851.

a. Salutation to Ganesa ! May that union of the twin-persons
of Siva and his spouse,—by the recollection of which one enjoys
emancipation, hard as it is to attain,—produce for you all bless-
ings !*
b. From such passages of scripture as this—viz.—“ Nachiketa
having received this science [viz. the Vedanta] declared to him
by Yama, and all the rules of the yoga, having arrived at the Su-
preme Soul, became passionless and immortal:—whosoever else
also thus knows the Supreme Spirit, &c.,'’—-it is inferred that the
rules of the yoga ought to be understood and practised by those
who are desirous of emancipation. Therefore the venerable Pa-
tanjali, being about to exhibit the rules of the yoga, in order to
gain the attention of his disciples, states as follows what doctrine
it is that is going to be entered upon.f
* ^twijur ’wr.i
A "

ne^t„0SCd. \ 11
Aph. 1.—Now, then, the exposition of Con-
centration [is to be made].
a. The expression ‘ Now, then/ intimates [that] a [distinct]
topic [here commences]; and it serves as a benediction* [—the
particle atha being regarded as an auspicious one].
b. The word yoga, from the root yuj ‘ to keep the mind fixed
in abstract meditation/ means such a restraining of the exercise
of the mind, or Concentration.f
c. An ‘ exposition' is that whereby something is expounded, or
declared, through its characteristic marks, its nature, &c. An
‘ exposition of the yoga,’—[such is the meaning of the compound
word] yoganusdsana. This [—viz. the expounding of the nature,
&c., of Concentration—] is to be understood to be the topic even
to the end of this Institute]: [of Patanjali's].
d. But what is Concentration < yoga) ? To this he replies :§—
sznsrauiw wiwctI ii
* ii
i JiTWFnira’f i
§ ^T’T II

Concentration defined.
Aph. 2.—Concentration, (yoga) is the hin-
dering of the modifications of the thinking principle.
a. That is to say,—Concentration is the hindering, or the pre-
venting, of the modifications—to be described hereafter [see §5]
—of the Mind or internal organ [—to which modifications the
internal organ is liable when allowed to come into contact with
objects, as will be explained further on—]; and this ‘ hindering’
is a super-sensual species of effort which is the cause of the des-
truction of these modifications.*
b. But then [a doubt may here occur]. It is a tenet [—see
Nyaya Aphorisms No. 31—] both of the Sankhya and the Yoga
that the soul just consists of the knowledge which has as its ob-
jects the modifications [in question—the two being united] like
fire and the wood [or fuel of the fire] :—on the destruction of the
modifications, then, the Soul too should be annihilated, as the
fire is in the absence of the fuel:—and therefore, at the time of
Concentration, what is the soul concerned about ? With refer-
ence to this he declares as follows :f—
Condition of the soul II II
during concentration.
Aph. 3.—Then [i. e. at the time of Con-
centration] it [the Soul] abides in the form of the spectator [with-
out a spectacle.]

a. ‘Then’;—i. e. at that time.*
b. ‘ In the form of the spectator /—i. e. of soul [—see Tattwa-
samasa §3 ±—], in the form of Thought simply [without any ob-
ject thought of]. 'Its state is’ :—such is the force of the term
avasthanaA [rendered 'it abides/ &c.]
c. And s 3 the definition [of Concentration] is this, that concen-
tration is the hindering of the modifications of the internal or-
gan [§2], which [prevention of its being modified] is the cause of
the abiding in the form of soul simply.f
d. What then is the form of this [Soul] when in a state other
than that of Concentration? To this he replies :§—
Condition of the soul at other times. H II Aph. 4.—At other times [than that of
Concentration] it [the soul] is in the same form as the modifica-
tions [of the internal organ—§ 2. b. and 5.]
a. 'At other times/—i. e. at another time than that of Concen-
tration. The ' modifications’ are those that are to be described
fagvnr wirsfa ww
* II
1wv I i wh i

[see §5]. To be ‘ in the same form* as these—means to consist of
these. The meaning [of the whole] is this, that when the inter-
nal organ [or Mind], through the senses, is affected [or modified]
by the form of some object, the soul also [viewing the object
through its organ the Mind] is as it were altered into that 'form,
as the moon [reflected] in the moving ripples of the water, is like
as if it were [itself] moving.*
b. Well, then:—it was stated that the modifications [ofthe in-
ternal organ] are to be hindered. Of how many kinds, then, are
these [modifications], or what are they like ? To this he replies : j-—
The modifications of IIMJI
the thinking principle,
how many and what like. Aph 5 t__The Modifications [of the inter-
nal organ] are of five kinds, [and they are either] painful or not
«. ‘ Modifications’;—i. e. various altered states of the internal
organ. ‘ Of five kinds,’ or of five sorts. ‘Painful’;—i. e. inva-
ded by vexations which will be defined in the sequel. ‘Not
painful’;—i. e. the reverse thereof.]:
* 1 1
anw qfiara afa Ta ’rfow aar
wariw war wwfsa aafa arfafa 11
xj xj
t aaaa^favTT^Taaf 1 ar: ga: faiaaranu:
aanan^aaiarr 1
t jMaRMaRwiafailau 1 u^a«i: a^raanu: 1

b. Which are those five Modifications ? With reference to this,
he states:*•—
These Modifications
specified. e '
A ph. 6.— [The modifications of the internal
organ are] evidence [or right notion], misconception, fancy,
sleep, and memory.
a. [All this is]
b. He defines these [modifications] in their order.]:
Right WHUTfn II 'S II
Aph. 7.—The evidences [§6.] are Perception, Infer-
ence, and Testimony.
a. Here [—it will be observed—] without stating the defini-
tion of the several kinds of evidence, this being so familiarly
known, he has only divided them. [Lest, however, the reader
should require the information, we may remark, in passing, that]
the evidence called Perception is that modification of the internal
organ which takes the form of assurance in respect of some ob-
ject not previously apprehended. Inference is the modification
of the internal organ produced from a correct notion of a general
proposition, &c. [—respecting objects previously apprehended—
+ wr www? n

as explained in the works of the Nyaya]. And the evidence cal-
led Testimony is [what produces] that modification of the internal
organ which arises from the words of one worthy* [to be received
as an authority].
b. Having thus spoken of the modification of the internal or-
gan which consists in evidence [—013 as we should rather say—
which consists in the correct state of cognition resulting from
good evidence—], he mentions that which is in the shape of mis-
conception. f
Misconception what.
fasten w 11 11
Aph. 8.—Misconception is incorrect notion,
not staying in the [proper] form of that [in respect whereof the
misconception is entertained].
a. [That is to say—] misconception is a notion arising, in res-
pect of something that is not so and so, that it is so and so; as,
in the case of mother o’pearl, the notion of silver. ‘ Not staying
in the [proper] form of that’;—that is to say, which does not
abide in that form which is the form of that thing [in respect of
which the notion is entertained],—which amounts to its not re-
vealing the form [or real nature] which belongs to the thing. J
* fwr:
7T5?: wrofafFr 11
t w^nf gfw 11

b. [To illustrate this language of our author, we may here state
the theory of the Understanding which he adopts, as we find it
laid down in the Vedanta Paribhdsha. The internal organ is
there compared to water, in respect of its readiness to adapt itself
to the form of whatever mould it may enter. “ As the water of
a reservoir, having issued from an aperture, having entered, by a
channel, the basins [or beds with raised edges formed in the
fields that require irrigation—] becomes four-cornered or other-
wise shaped just like these; so the manifesting internal organ
[or Mind,] having gone, through the sight or other channel, to
where there is an object, for instance ajar, becomes modified by
the form of the jar or other object. It is this altered state [of the
internal organ] that is called its modification.*** This f manifes-
ting internal organ/ whilst it is regarded as moulding itself upon
the object, is regarded as at the same time manifesting it—or re-
vealing it as a mirror does. To a considerable extent this theory
of the Understanding is analogous to the theory of vision enter-
tained by those who regard the retina as reflecting to the intelli-
gent principle those visible forms of which the retina itself is un-
cognisant; whilst the intelligent principle itself is cognisant of
things visible only inasmuch as they are reflected to it by the
retina. The ‘ modifications* are akin to Locke* s ‘ ideas*],
ilfwar i arajvtrfa^fafa i
a^4 a ^4 vfarja / a^4 a aarfa
waaatfa aiaaii
* aar a^fin^ai wnarar
afasa aa4^ aafa
auaafa aanfaaro asrfcfaaaaa aarr a?rfa-
faaaianiar vfunaa i a va m Rm afafaapaa u
aft*1 II

c. Doubt also—for example whether the object be a man or a
post—is incorrect notion [§ 8], inasmuch as the real nature of
the object is not thereby revealed.*
d. In order to declare what modification [of the internal or-
gan] is fancy—he says as follows :—f
Fanciful notions KII
Apb. 9.—A fancy is [a notion] devoid of a thing [in reality
corresponding thereto], following upon knowledge [conveyed]
by words.
a. ( Knowledge produced [or conveyed] by words —[such is
the sense of the compound] sabda-jnana. ‘That, the habit
whereof is to follow this [verbal information]/ is what is so nam-
ed [viz. fancy]. The meaning is—that a fancy is a conception,
without a thing! [corresponding to it}.
b. Examples of this are such notions as ‘The head of Rdhu}’
and * The soul’s Thinking/—and ‘ Something like the horns of a
a hare/ &c. Even after [discovering] the absurdity [involved in
such notions], people yet deal with verbal knowledge [as if it
were strictly receivable] in such senses, [—and it depends upon
wn ii
t i
m ri^rai: i wi finm i

circumstances whether any serious error is to result from this or
c. [As a hare has no horn, the notion of a hare’s horn is a fan-
ciful one, ‘ devoid of a thing in rerum natura corresponding to
the notion.’ A person hearing the expression ‘ The head of
Rdhu’ naturally proceeds to fancy that there is some Rdhu to
whom this head belongs ;—but Rdhu is all head—being a bodiless
monster who is held to cause eclipses by swallowing the sun and
moon, which emerge from obscuration when they come to the
end of his dissevered gullet. The notion, therefore, raised by
the expression f The head of Rdhu’ that there is any more of
him besides the head, is a fancy—equally with that of the hare’s
horn—‘devoid of a thing corresponding to the notion.’ So again,
a person hearing the expression ‘ The soul’s Thinking,’ naturally
proceeds to fancy that there is some Soul to whom this Thinking
belongs,—whereas the Soul is nothing besides the Thinking.
Although, according to the commentator, such expressions are
liable to suggest fancies that have nothing in reality correspond-
ing to them, yet the employment of the expressions does not ne-
cessarily mislead if we carefully bear in mind what is the real
state of the case. Much on the same principle people in Europe
continue to speak of the sun’s rising and setting, though, hold-
ing the heliocentric theory, they do not really fancy that the sun
either rises or sets].
d. In order to declare what is sleep, he saysf—
* sai I twti
fw ’fa I
t i

I 0»
Aph. 10.—Sleep is that modification [of
the internal organ] which depends on the conception of nothing.
a. Of what modification [of the internal organ] the ground is
the conception of nothing, this is what is so called* [—viz.
b. This may be [also] stated, as follows :—Sleep is that modifi-
cation [of the internal organ] which takes place on the quitting
of all objects, through [the quality of] Darkness’s getting every-
where the upper handf [—to the exclusion of the other two qua-
lities, which,—see Lecture on the Sankhya § 96,—are held to be
constituents of the phenomenal universe].
c. And the fact that this [dreamless sleep] is a modification
[of the internal organ, and not a mere blank,] is [proved] by our
seeing that one recollects [on arising from profound and dream-
less sleep] that ‘ I slept pleasantly/—and there could not be a
recollection if there had not been a state of consciousness]; [to
furnish the matter of the recollection. Conf. Lecture on the Ve-
danta § 33].
d. In order to describe memory, he says§—
* W II
t vapt nafa i ar
ftqaqfiw’fa uawa afwi fir^fa n
t wrt wirafafa aja^-
§ ^fa an

gjfa: I \\ i
A[li. 11.—Memory is the not letting go
of an object that one has been aware of.
a. [That is to say]—memory [or recollection] is the not letting
go—or, by means of the self-reproductive quality [of the Soul
—see Tarka Sangraha p. 55]—the arising, in the understanding,
of that which has been cognised through evidence* [of the senses,
for example ;—see § 7].
sleeping, fa. Of these [modifications of the in-
ane? dreaming.
ternal organ, the three following, viz.]
right notion [§ 7. «.] misconception [§ 8.] and fancy [§ 9.] are
waking states. When just these [impressions—in the absence
of the objects or of what gave rise to them] are sensible, through
the force [or vividness] of the impression, then there is dream.
But [dreamless] sleep [§ 10] is without any object cognised.
And Recollection may take its rise either in a right notion, in a
misconception, in a fancy, or in [dreamless] sleepf [—see §10. c. Having thus described the modifications [of the internal
organl, in order to explain the prevention of these [§ 2. a.], with
the means thereof, he saysj—
-J d
t •ppiwwmpwniira?! w. i
faw i ii
t v? fiupr arr^na»{T^ n

fifing; n \ 11
Aph. 12. The hindering of these
Asceticism and mortification the [modifications of the internal organ
means of repelling the transient.
—§ 2—is to be effected] by means
of exercise and dispassion.
a. ' Exercise and dispassion’ will be defined [in § 13 and 15].
By these [viz. exercise and dispassion], the repelling of those
modifications of the internal organ which [modifications, at diffe-
rent times] have the form of revealing, energising, and obstructing,
—this is the ‘hindering’—[which is to be striven after, and
which is tantamount to] the resting [of these modifications], in
a potential shape, in their cause, viz : in the internal organ*
[without taking an actual shape as products of the internal or-
gan modified.]
b. Of the two [viz. exercise and dispassion, §12,] it is from
( dispassion,’ which originates in our discerning the perniciousness
of the objective, that aversion thereto arises. And, by ‘ exer-
cise,’ confirmed steadfastness [in the indifference towards all
objects] is produced. So, by these two, the internal organ is
hindered from undergoing modification.f
* i finest first wrs-
t Prasfiifit fifirffi^fifi fTOv: i
t fifi fiXW’IT fitfiWrfilT^ I
stwifiM irwrrafi i w«it rnffi

d. In order to describe 'exercise’ [ §12] he says.*—
Ascetic effort what. feffT yS^TT’T: II \ 3 II
Aph. 13.—' Exercise’ is the [repeated] effort that it [—viz. the
internal organ—] shall remain in its [unmodified] state.
a. The condition of the internal organ, when free from modi-
fication, existing only in its own [unmodified] form, is what we
mean by its [unmodified] state. And what we mean by 'exer-
cise’ is the effort, or endeavour, again and again to reduce the
internal organ to such a condition! [of freedom from modifica-
b. He next mentions a special character of this same]: [exer-
cise, or persevering effort].
v h f ii \ « n
Aph. 14.—But this [exercise—§13—] is a firm position ob-
served out of regard [for the end in view, and perseveringly ad-
hered to] for a long time unintermittingly.
a. That is to say :—it [—exercise—] is a firm ground [or state
■of steadfastness],—to be firm [we may remark in passing] is to be
steadfast,—this [state of steadfastness] being assiduously attend-
* anWrffiT? II
t eftrcftd^r ftw vfftrw: feft: i
t r^hr ftirwr? ii

ed to, during a long time unintermittingly, out of the excess of
regard* [which one entertains for the end to be gained].
b. He now mentions the definition of ‘ dispassion’f [§12].
Dispassion defined.
Aph. 15. Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome
[one’s desires,—this consciousness being that] of him who thirsts
after neither the objects that are seen [on earth] nor those that
are heard of [in scripture].
a. Object is of two kinds—‘seen’ (drishta) and ‘ heard of’
(anusravika). One ‘ seen’ is one apprehended here [on earth]—
such as a Sound [or other object of sense]. One ‘ heard of’ means
one in the world of the gods or elsewhere [where it cannot be
seen by us]. The Veda is called anusrava because it is [not first
read by the young student, but is] listened to (sruyate) from the
mouth of the preceptor [—and heard after, or consequently on,
the teacher’s utterance,—as the prefix anu implies]. What [ob-
ject] comes [to our knowledge] therefrom [i. e. from the Veda]
is what we mean by one ‘ heard of’J (anusravikaj.
b. What is called e dispassion’ is the reflection “ These [objects
—whether of this world or of the one beyond—§15. a.—] are my
t Itpw n
+ fkftvT fxqvT i Tvxni-
xj Xj xjf

subjects; I am not their slave,”—this ‘consciousness of having
overcome’ entertained by h m who, from discerning the insipidity
of the results of both of those [classes of objects] has dismissed
all eagerness about them.*
c. He next mentions a peculiar aspect of this samef [i. e. of
f dispassion.’]
ference to all ob-
jects. Aph. 16.—This [viz. ‘ dispassion,’] carried to
the utmost is indifference regarding the ‘ qualities’ [i. e. every-
thing else than Soul], and this indifference arises from a know-
ledge of Soul [as distinguished from the ‘ qualities.’ See Lec-
ture on the Sankhya §49].
a. ‘ This :’—i. e. ‘ dispassion,’ ‘carried to the utmost:’—i. e.
elevated [to its utmost]. The first [degree of ‘ dispassion,’—see
§15—] has regard to [ordinary] objects ;—but the second [ §16],
has regard to the ‘ qualities’ [from which, according to the
Sankhya, ordinary objects arise]. This arises only from famili-
arity with the distinction between the ‘ qualities’ and Soul [—or
the objective and subjective]. From its extreme conduciveness
to abstract meditation]: [it ranks above the dispassion which has
regard only to the grosser objects].
wswn wh w. xfa vt
t ii
t atinsr i 'Wfinv i ra? vrw fawRM
J G\ '

b. Having thus stated the nature of concentration {Yoga), he
[next] mentions the difference between the nature of [medita-
tion, which is of two kinds—viz.] that 'in which there is distinct
recognition/ (samprajnata) and that ‘in which distinct recogni-
tion is lost/* (a-samprajnata).
Aph. 17.—[Meditation—of the kind
Meditation, with an object. n n , , • , - , ,, . ,. ..
calledj that ' m which there is distinct
recognition’ [arises, in its fourfold shape,] from the attendance of
(1) ‘argumentation’ (vitarkaj, (2) ‘ deliberation’ (vichara), (3)
1 beatitude’ (ananda), and (4) ‘ egotism’ (asmita).
a. The word ' Meditation’ is required to supply the ellipsis in
the aphorism.f
b. Meditation ‘ in which there is distinct recognition’ (sam-
prajnata) is a kind of ‘ pondering’ (bhdvana) whereby the nature
of that which is to be pondered is known thoroughly and well—
apart from either doubt or error. This meditation 'in which
there is distinct recognition’ excludes every modification of the
mind [or every idea—see §8. 6] other than what is to be pon-
dered :—it is, in short, meditation with its seed% [i. e. with the

+ i

object., in the effort to apprehend which exclusively the medita-
tion originates].
c. This [meditation ‘ in which there is distinct recognition’—§
17—], through its division into the ‘argumentative’ &c., is of
four kinds, viz. (1) the ‘argumentative/ (2) the ‘deliberative/ (3)
the ‘ beatific/ and (4) the ‘ egotistical.’*
d. As for ‘Pondering’ [§17. 6.], this means the taking into
the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all other objects,
that which is to be pondered. And that which is [a suitable ob-
ject] to be pondered is of two kinds, being either the Lord (is-
wara) or the twenty-five principles [—see Tat tw a-samas a §37—].
These [twenty-five principles] also are of two kinds, through
their distinction as senseless and not senseless. Twenty-four [of
the principles, including Earth, &c.], are senseless :—that which
is not senseless is Soul.f
e. Among these [objects suitable for being pondered—§17
d.—] when, having taken as the object the Senses and the Ele-
ments which are gross [in comparison with the Subtile Elements
next to be spoken of], pondering is engaged in, in the shape of
the investigation as to which is antecedent and which is conse-
quent [—i. e. whether the Senses generate the Elements or the
fArfa: i nWq fefqvifW i

Elements generate the senses—] then the Meditation is [techni-
cally said to be] ‘argumentative’ (savitarka) .*
f. When, having taken as the object something subtile, as the
Subtile Elements and the Internal Organ, pondering is engaged
in, in so far as regards the where and the when thereof,—then it
[—the pondering—] is [technically said to be] ‘deliberative’
g. But when the c pure element’ (sattwa—see Sdnkhya Lecture
§50) of the Internal Organ, commingled with somewhat of [the
two other elements,—viz.] c passion’ and ‘ darkness’ [—Sdnkhya
Lecture §51 and 52], is pondered, then the meditation is [techni-
cally termed] 1 beatific’ (sananda—§17 c.), because the ‘pure ele-
ment’ then pondered, which consists in the manifestation of joy
[Sdnkhya Lecture §50], is predominant—inasmuch as the intel-
lectual faculty is then [—i. e. in this particular case of ponder-
ing—] a secondary matter.]:
h. After that [pondering of the ‘ pure element’ commingled
with the two others—§ 17. g.—], the meditation which is engag-
ed in, having, as that on which it rests, the clear ‘ pure element’
unaffected by even a little of ‘ passion’ or ‘darkness,’ is called
c egotistical’ meditation [§17. c.], because, here, [personal] ex-
* ax an x^Taaf^arftirwynfa faaaataTaia
varqaraaanaawaaT vaaa aai afaa^xrfa: n
C\ o
+ aaRTxranamirxwi fawwafsa w ^r-
araawra^aa xiaat waa aai xfaaT<: n
t a?ia aaraxwanafa^ar.aiTWta wxa
a?T amwraiftwawirani’iw awaia-
^T^wsTa^arfwafa ii

istence only remains, since tlie intellectual faculty becomes now
predominent inasmuch as the ‘pure element1 which is to be ap-
prehended [as the object of the meditation] is here disregarded*
[as the mere stepping stone to higher things],
i. Among these [four kinds of ‘meditation, where there is dis-
tinct recognition1 of an object,—§ 17. c.], the first, the * argu-
mentative1 meditation [§ 17. e.] includes all [that belongs to] the
four. The second, the 'deliberative,1 leaves out the ‘ argumenta-
tion1 [of the preceding] :—the third, the f beatific,1 leaves out the
deliberation [of the second] :—the fourth, consisting in mere self-
consciousness, leaves out that [beatitude which belongs to the
third]:—and all these [four] are meditations with something to
rest uponf [as the object ponderedthe soul of the ascetic, like
the body of the young swimmer, requiring supports to begin with,
which are successively laid aside as power and confidence are
gained by practice],
j. He next tells what is meant by that [meditation] ‘in which
distinct recognition is lost1]: [§ 16. b.—the practised ascetic hav-
ing parted with every vestige of object, as the practised swimmer
with his last cork or bladder].
rRjt ’WWfc
t t II

Aph. 18.—The one [kind of medita-
Meditation without an object. ,. . , , _ . , , . ,,
tion just described] is preceded by the
exercise of thought in the shape of repose;—the other [—inde-
pendent of any fresh antecedent-—] is in the shape of the self-
reproduction [of thought, after the departure of all objects].
a. By ‘repose* (virdma)vre mean that whereby one is rested,—
the abandonment of all anxiety about argumentation, &c. [§ 17.].
Well—‘ thought* in the shape of this ‘ repose* is what we mean
by the compound expression virdma^pratyaya;—and what we
mean by the ‘exercise* (abhyasaj of this, is the reiteratedly
dwelling mentally thereon, and constantly rejecting with a nega-
tive [as a delusion and an unreality] whatever ‘ modification* [or
idea,—see § 5.—] springs up there [to interfere with it] ;—such
is ‘ the exercise of thought in the shape of repose.* This [as re-
marked in the first half of the aphorism] produces meditation ‘in
which there is distinct recognition’* [§17:—and we have now
to consider that kind of meditation which differs from this].
b The other [kind of meditation] has nothing left but the
self-reproduction of thought. It is different from that [above de-
scribed]; that is to say, it is [as contra-distinguished from medi-
tation ‘ in which there is distinct recognition,*] that ‘ in which
distinct recognition is lost.’ Here there is nothing to be thought
of or accurately apprehended [—as it was necessary that there
should be in the former process—] ;—it is meditation ivithout a
sr’t: i fiuwwr: i wwre:

seed* [—i. e. without any object—see §17 b.— in any effort to
confine one's self to the apprehension of which the meditation
has been entered upon].
c. Well, having thus stated the [two] distinctions [§18] in the
nature of Concentration [§2], and having compendiously men-
tioned its methods, the author proceeds to speak of these me-
thods more fully, first premising some account of the spurious
semblance of concentration.f
ii ii
Spwiows semblan- Aph. 19.—Of [the meditative state attained
ces of abstract Me- „ •
ditation. t° by the two classes of aspirants, technically
called] < the unembodied and resolved into Na-
ture/ the world is the cause.
a. By ‘ the unembodied and resolved into Nature' we mean
to speak of [those technically called] ‘ the unembodied' [as one
set], and f the resolved into Nature' [as another set]. Of these
the Meditation is caused by the world,—that is to say, it is such
that the cause, or instrumental agency on which it depends, is
the world—the creation—[—the phenomenal—beyond which the
vision of these extends not to the discrimination of pure Spirit,
and the uncreated energy Nature].]:
* i wwwh i n
wwurwrftr wrorfv: ii
t amt
w-wwi: wW tow w main

b. The meaning is this—that, only while the world is manifest,
are these men participators in such [inadequate] meditation [as
we have described]. And this is a mere false semblance of me-
ditation, because these do not discern the ultimate Reality.
Hence, by him who desires emancipation, effort is to be made
for [attaining to] the knowledge of the ultimate Reality, and for
pondering that* [instead of the lower things pondered by those
of narrower ken, whose vision cannot pierce the phenomenal,
and discriminate the spectator Soul, and the nalura naturans\.
c. And, of the persons spoken of in the aphorism, those who,
having their energies directed to ‘ beatific’ meditation [§17. gJ\,
do not discern any other Reality, in the shape of Nature or Soul,
these are they who are meant by the term the ‘ unembodied’
(videha), because their body and their self-consciousness are de-
parted [—but they are not further advanced towards emancipa-
tion]. And those who [going just one step further] are content
with the ‘ egotistic’ meditation [§17. A.] but do not discern the
Supreme Soul, and whose intellect has been resolved into [the
natura naturans which is] its cause, these are they who are called
the ‘ resolved into nature’f (prakritilaya)—[See Sdnkhya Lec-
ture, §15 and 54].
* I W VfTT? rmrPfV’J HT-
Hnfff I UUT^T?^T nvnw frfcwfk nsn fnvn
i nt wn-
nrarrnnu a nif-

d. But of others than those* [whose inadequate style of medi-
tation has been stated in aphorism 19, the meditation is as stated
in the aphorism here following].

The genuine order of ab-
stract Meditation.
Aph. 20.—[In the practice] of others,
this [Meditation] is preceded by Faith,
Energy, Memory, Meditation, and Discernment.
a. “ Of others”—i. e. of Yogis other than [those called] the
f unembodied’ [§ 19. c.] and the f resolved into nature’! [§ 19. c.].
b. “ Preceded by Faith, &c.” To complete the sense, we must
supply the word ‘ Meditation.’ ‘ Preceded by Faith, &c.,’—that
is to say—the means antecedent [and conducive] to which are
Faith, &c. And these, ‘ Faith, &c.,’ acting in the relation of
means to an end, constitute the means [or appliances] for Medi-
tation ‘ in which there is distinct recognition’! [—§ 17.].
c. Among these [antecedents enumerated in the
Faith defined. ^p^orism^ ‘Faith’ (sraddha) means a mental ap-
proval of Concentration § [as a worthy and possible aim].
Energy. d. r Energy’ (virya) means perseverance. ||
* II
§ 9prfwr uw. i
« I

Reason for
this order of
e. ( Memory’ [or ' Recollection’—smriti] has
already been explained,* [—see § 11].
f. ‘Meditation’ (samadhi) means intentness on a
single point.f
g. ‘Discernment’ (prajna) means thorough discri-
mination of that which is to be known. j
h. Among these [antecedents,—to account for the
order of statement adopted in the aphorism, we may
remark, that]—of him who has ‘ Faith’ there arises
'Energy,’—he becomes persevering in meditation;—and to one
thus persevering the 'Memory’ of past subjects springs up; and
his mind becomes absorbed in ' Meditation’ in consequence of the
recollection thereof; and he whose mind is absorbed in medita-
tion arrives at a thorough ' Discernment’ of rhe matter pondered. §
i. Such are [according to those whose practice is recorded in
§20.] the means of that Meditation ' in which there is distinct re-
cognition’ [§ 17.]. The [still higher step—the] Meditation 'in
which distinct recognition is lost’ [§ 18.] is arrived at through
diligent practice [§ 13.] of this [' in which there is distinct recog-
* grfMwrrn i
t WT I
§ -j g\ o e
«TT«ufH I

nition’ of some object pondered], and through extreme ' Dispas-
sion’* [§ 16].
j. He next mentions the subdivisions of adopting the
abovementioned means, according to the difference of method
adopted by them.f
ii n
Ascetics divisible accord- Aph. 21.—[The attainment of the state
^ced^re^7'°~ of abstract Meditation is] speedy in the
case of the hotly impetuous.
a. To complete the aphorism, the words ‘The attainment of
the state of abstract Meditation’ require to be supplied.];
b. By f impetuosity’ (samvega) is meant a more energetic self-
reproducing impulse, which is a cause of action. Those persons
in whose ‘ transcendent’ methods [§ 22.] this [impetuosity] >is
violent, are close upon the attainment of abstract meditation and
the fruits of meditation;—that is to say, this is, in their case, ra-
pidly brought about.§
twrgaamwraa: n
i vfa ij w. i
vara n

c. Who are those (hotly impetuous’ [§ 21] ? To this he re-
fcw. II II
Aph. 22.—Through the ‘ mild,’ the ‘ medium/ and the f tran-
scendent’ [nature of the methods adopted] there is thence also
a distinction [among the ascetics who adopt the methods].
a. Through the diversity of these various methods, viz. the ‘mild’
&c., there is a distinction of those who employ the methods. The
divisions of method are the ‘mild’ (mriduj, the ‘medium’ (madhya),
and the ‘transcendent’ (adhimatra). These are severally threefold
from their being severally subdivided into the ‘ mildly impetuous/
the ‘ middlingly impetuous/ and the ‘ transcendently impetuous?
And in accordance with this division there are
The nine divisions njne cjasses of followers of the Yoga. Thus—
there is the ‘mild method’—[the follower of
which may be] the ‘ mildly impetuous/ the ‘ middlingly impe-
tuous/or the ‘transcendently impetuous? Then there is the
‘ medium method’—[the follower of which may be] the ‘ mildly
impetuous/ the ‘ middlingly impetuous/ or the ‘ transcendently
impetuous.’ And there is the ‘ transcendent method’—[the fol-
lower of which may be] the ‘ mildly impetuous/ the ‘ middlingly
impetuous/ or the ‘ transcendently impetuous’. And great en-
deavours ought to be made after the ‘ transcendent method’ and
after warm impetuosity [in following out the same]. So much
for the declaration of the distinctionsf [among the followers of
the Yoga}.
* a nbrew ii

b. By ‘mildness' [as we learn from Bhavaganesa] is here
meant ‘smallness'. The meaning of ‘middlingness' is the fami-
liar one. By ‘ transcendentness’ is meant the exceeding of all
measure,—excessiveness, in short*.
c. Now he mentions a method which differs from these me-
thods in being an easy one.-f
t’vrvfavKKT ii n
, Aph. 23—Or by profound devotedness
The devotional method. r J r
towards the Lord, [the ascetic may attain to
the state of abstract Meditation].
a. By “ the Lord" (iswara) we mean what will be defined [in
§24]. By “ profound devotedness" towards Him, we mean a
kind of devoted attachment, a peculiar serving of Him, the con-
signing of all one's actions to Him. The person [under the in-
fluence we speak of ] desiring no fruit [of his actions] in the shape
of enjoyment of sense-objects, or the like, makes over all his ac-
i wSiwpt: i sqwn sftwiw. i
i ?nr^’r. i

tions to Hina, the pre-eminent guide. This ‘ profound devoted-
ness' is a pre eminent means of abstract Meditation and of the
attainment of its fruits.*
The devotional method }ias been just stated that abstract
has reference to the
‘ Lord.’ Meditation may be attained through pro-
found devotedness towards the Lord. With
reference to this, he now proceeds to declare, in order, the nature,
[§24] the proofs [§25], the pre-eminence [§26], and the name
[§27], of the Lord, the order of His worship [§28], and the fruit
thereoff [§29].
m i* i wRifa t5su u a n
The term ‘ Lord’ Aph. 24.—The Lord is a particular Spirit
(purusha) untouched by troubles, works, fruits,
or deserts.
a. ‘Troubles'—i. e. things that distress,—such as ignorance
&c.. which will be spoken of [in the 2nd section]. f Works'—i.
e. [actions involving] merit or demerit. f Fruits'—i. e. what
ripen out of works, as birth, life, or whatever is experienced [by
mortals as the consequences of their actions]. By ‘ deserts' are
’rt: TOPRretkfa
fiiraM ^Frrv t tout i
W? wra wtf mwjwra’mCT smr

meant those self-continuant conditions, or tendencies [—leading
to their inevitable consequences—], which take the name of
tisaya [—from the root si fto sleep,—] because they rest on the
tablets of the mind until their fruit shall have ripened. [The
Lord, to whom no such things are attributable, is declared to be]
‘ Untouched’ by these—i. e. not affected by them during any of
the three times, [—past, present, or future].*
b. A ‘ particular Spirit,’—i. e. one who is different from other
spirits;—such is the force of the term here rendered ‘particu-
The Lord upholds all things c. ‘ The Lord’ (is ward)—i. e. [—from
by His mere will.
the root si ‘ to possess power’—]who is
accustomed to rule,—who is able to uphold the world by his mere
will. Such is the nature of ‘ the Lord.’f
d. Having thus stated the nature of the Lord, he now [§23.
A] states the proofs§ [that such a Being exists].
* fera’Htfa ^fa^r^ai i aw
varaari Urmwri: i an^ar-
faqKTafaraWT WTH'SjSnW WTO*. I
farefa a wv: i
t v^rfaifa: i far fatwa cfa
faw I
t i i vwto ’uwsprf
xfa n
§ wwfww 11

rF=f faKfWTW^flWII Xt II
Proof that there is ^ph. 25.—In Him does the germ of the
such a Being as the . . . .
Lord. omniscient become infinite.
a. c In Him’—i. e. in that divine Being. The germ of omni-
science is the less or more of the knowledge of the past, the fu-
ture, &c. This is the germ, because like a germ it is the root [of
what springs from it]. This [knowledge which in others is less
or more] in Him, is infinite, or reaches its extreme limit. [And
it is held to be a fair inference that Knowledge reaches the limit
of Omniscience somewhere], for, properties that are capable of
degrees, such as Parvitude and Magnitude, are [in particular in-
stances] seen to have reached their extreme limits,—Parvitude,
for example, in an Atom, and pre-eminent Magnitude in the
Ether. So too Knowledge and the like, properties of the intel-
lect, are seen admitting of degrees. They reach their extreme
limit somewhere, and He in whom they are infinite is the Lord.*
h. Having thus declared the nature of the Lord, and the proof
that such a Being exists, he next [§23. 3.] declares His pre-emi-
nence. f
* i afgpf i ^fatriT-
SFSM'fl i’ST Tfa II
t wf wwre n

»T p-q rawTlv ’TO! W II f II
G\ ''-J '
The pre-eminence Aph. 26.—He is the preceptor even of the
of the Lord.
first, for He is not limited by time.
a. ' Of the first /—that is to say, even of the earliest [of cre-
ated beings], such as Brahma, &c. He [the Lord] is the precep-
tor, or instructor; for He is not bounded by time, since He is
■without beginning,—and these, on the other hand, are limited by
time because they had a beginning.*
b. Having thus declared the pre-eminence [of the Lord], he
declares His name [§ 23. 5.], with a view to its employment in
W 3T W. W. II 'S II
The mystical name Aph. 27. His name is Glory.
of the Lord.
a. fHis/—i. e. of the Lord as thus defined [§24], the name,
or appellation, is ‘ Glory’ (pranava), [which is the technical term
employed in speaking of the mystical name] ‘ Om.’X
b. And of the two [—i. e. of the Lord and this name—] the
relation, as ‘ denoted and denoter/ is eternal. It is convention-
* uyu I ^U^JT-it

ally declared,—but not made by any one. Just in like manner
as the actual relation between a father and his son is declared
[and not created] by some one who says “ This is that one’s fa-
ther, and that is this one’s son.”*
c. He next speaks of worship! [—§23. Z>.]
Haw the name of the Apk. 28.—Its repetition [should be made,
worship. and also] reflection on its signification.
a. ‘Its’,—i. e. of this mystical name, consisting of three and
a half prosodial moments [viz: (a=2) -f- (w=l) +
(om=3|)], the repetition, or proper pronunciation; and reflection
on, or re-iterated mental attention to, its signification—viz : the
Lord,—is a means of concentrating the thoughts ; therefore it is
here stated that the follower of the Yoga ought to repeat the
mystical name and to reflect upon its import, with a view to the
effecting of abstract Meditation. J
b. He next mentions the fruits [§23. 5.] of such worship.§
t II
t W
wfa n
5 ivnv^rrvT: ifivwr? n

Aph. 29.—Thence conies the knowledge of the rightly intelli-
gent [Spirit], and the absence of obstacles.
a. ‘The rightly intelligent [Spirit]’—i. e. the Spirit possessed
of knowledge,—He being an intelligence who rightly knows,—i.
e. who knows in an opposite, or inverse way, [as contradistinguish-
ed from mortals, whose understanding—as explained under § 5.—
is supposed to flow out and become modified by objects. Such a
process of gaining knowledge, being regarded as undesirable in
the case of mortals, is not to be imagined to belong to the Lord,
who is therefore said to know in some opposite way]. There
accrues to him [the ascetic] a knowledge, a complete apprehen-
sion, of Him,* [through the practice recommended in §.23].
b. The obstacles [to the attainment of the end in view] will
be mentioned. The absence of these means the exclusion of
their power.f
c. Now, which are those obstacles ? This being a point in
doubt, he proceeds to remark as follows.]:
^aagfa wfijaat fasaa naw. i a^r
H^fa II
t am a jarrai ranwraww I

’w’nhsnwfn Www ?fRFn: n » n
The obstacles of the Aph. 30.—Sickness, languor, doubt, care-
lessness, laziness, addiction to objects [of
sense], erroneous perception, failure to attain any stage [of ab-
straction], and instability [in the state when attained],—these
distractions of the mind are obstacles [in the way of the ascetic],
a. These nine, prevailing through the power of the passionate
and dark qualities [—the two which are opposed to the element of
pure or good in the phenomenal world—] become distractions of
the mind :—that is to say, the mind is distracted by these which
are opposed to the mind’s concentrating itself on any point.*
Sickness. b. Among these, ‘ Sickness,’ is a fever, or the
like, caused by disorder of the humours.f
Languor. c. ‘Languor’ is the mind’s inactivity.]:
Doubt. d. ‘ Doubt’ is a [sort of] notion that leans
to both alternatives. As, for example, [where one hesitates]
“Is the Yoga practicable [e. g. for me the doubter], or is it
not ?Ӥ
t era wufe: ii
+ Jibril faw II

Carelessness. 1 Carelessness’ is a habit of inattention,
—a listlessness about the effecting of abstract meditation.*
Laziness. /. ‘ Laziness’ is a heaviness of the body and
mind, which causes a want of exertion in the department of ab-
stract meditation.f
Addiction to objects. g. f Addiction to objects’ (aviratij is a gree-
diness consisting in attachment of the mind to objects of sense. J
Erroneous perception. h. ‘ Erroneous perception’ is a mistaken no-
tion [§8. a.] such as the notion that the thing is silver when
it is mother o’pearl. §
Failure to attain any stage By <■ failure to attain any stage’ we
of abstraction.
mean the failing, for some reason or ano-
ther, to attain to, or arrive at, the state of abstract meditation. ||
Instability. j. ‘ Instability’ is, even when the state of
abstract meditation has been reached, the mind’s not continuing
steadily therein.^
* wtrsng.'gFrtlnrTn nnrfwvn
tn: ii
+ ftnnnwunm nt: 11
nwfc ii
H nPUnwfu nnrfvsjni fnwn
a^mfrgi ii

k. These [§ 30.] are called ‘ obstacles’ because., as they present
themselves, they oppose concentration or meditation.*
l. In order to declare other obstacles also, which cause distrac-
tion of mind, he saysf :—
n ii
Aph. 31.—Grief, Distress, Trembling, and Sighing, are ac-
companiments of the distractions.
a. When, from whatever cause, distractions [such as enume-
rated in § 30.] have arisen, then these, viz. Grief, &c. [§ 31.]
come on. J
Grief. b. Among these [§ 31.] f Grief’ is a modification of
mind, resulting from [other] mental affections and characterised
by annoyance, in consequence of which annoyance sentient crea-
tures exert themselves for its removal. §
Distress. c. ‘Distress’ is a tremulousness of mind, arising ei-
ther from external or internal causes. ||
t fliiw fHphj v?i th-
§ TIW. qfuHTflT
ii ^wrir. ^rrdo^w^^wni

Trembling. d. ‘Trembling’ (angamejayatwa) is a shaking of
the whole body which prevents steadiness either in prescribed
postures or in mind.*
Sighing. e. ‘ Sighing’ (swasaj is an excessive entrance of air
into the body. An excessive expiration of air from the body, is
what is meant by praswdsa.-\
f. These [§ 31.], prevailing along with the distractions [enu-
merated in § 30.], are to be excluded by means of ‘exercise’ [§
13.] and ‘ dispassion’ [§ 15.] as aforesaid; and therefore it is
that they are mentioned here.]:
h. He now mentions another method for the prevention of the
obstacles [§ 30.] together with their supervenients [§ 31.].§
i «
Means of combating Aph. 32.—For the prevention thereof let one
distractions. truth be dwelt upon.
a. For the prevention, or hindrance, of these distractions, one
should dwell upon, or again and again confine the attention, to
w: n
t W. I W5T<3T ^r?TVT-
^T»rr fiin^T n

one truth,—some accepted truth,—by force of which, when con-
centration on one point has taken place, the distractions sub-
b. He next states another method, premising some mention
of purifying processes which conduce to the perfecting of the
Amiable habits 33.—Through the practising of benevo-
recommended. ienC6j tenderness, complacency, and disregard to-
wards objects [i. e. persons who are respectively in possession] of
happiness, grief, virtue, and vice, the mind becomes purified.
a. ‘ Benevolence’ is good-heartedness; ‘ tenderness’ is'compas-
sion; ‘ complacency’ is sympathetic joy; ‘ disregard’ is indiffer-
ence. He should exercise these, respectively, towards the hap-
py, the grieved, the virtuous, and the vicious. That is to say,
when people are happy, he should show benevolence, saying,
“ Blessings on their joy !”,—and not [show] envy. When people
are grieved, he should show tenderness, saying “ By what means,
verily, can they be freed from their grief ?”—and not [show] a
disposition to stand aloof. And when people are virtuous, he
* fwwnt
fsr^VT: I

should exhibit complacency, by sympathetically rejoicing in their
virtue,—and not [show] aversion by saying “ What!—are these
forsooth virtuous ?” And in regard to the vicious he should prac-
tise simply indifference, showing neither sympathy nor aversion.*
b. In the aphorism, by the words ‘ happiness’ ‘ grief’, &c., are
denoted those to whom these belong. So, in this manner, by
the purifying influences of friendliness, &c., the mind being ren-
dered cheerful, the production of abstract meditation takes place
c. This purifying process is an external one [and not an inti-
mate portion of the Yoga itself]. As, in arithmetic, in effect-
ing the calculations of questions of Alligation, &c. the operations
of Addition &c., are valuable [not so much in themselves, but] as
aids in effecting the important matter, so by exercising benevo-
* nWt i' i wot i i
fwur i
qyaw’r wish
t uffraTf^ra: | FriH
W^Tf wfa ii

lence, &c., which are [moods of mind] opposed to aversion and
covetousness, the mind, in which composure has [thereby] been
produced, becomes fitted for meditation—that ‘in which there is
distinct recognition of an object’ [§ 17.], &c. Covetousness and
aversion are the very chief raisers of distractions :—if therefore
these be radically extirpated, then, through its composure [and
freedom from distraction], the mind [the more readily] becomes
concentrated on one point.*
d. He mentions another expedient.!
AxRiinwrt *rr vrw 0 a a 11
. Aph. 34.— [Or, he may combat
Another expedient for combating 1 . u .. .
distraction. distractions] by forcibly expelling
and by restraining the breath.
Regulation of the breath. a. The ' expelling’ of the breath is the vo-
miting or emitting it [by a slow but complete expiration]. The
‘restraining’ it, is the stopping it [by shutting the mouth and
closing both nostrils with the fingers of the right hand]. And
this, we mean to say, takes place after inhalation [—though men-

hi wrt f^t
1 vnriftnhf nweiT


tioned in the aphorism as if immediately following expiration—],
because, after expelling the breath, it is impossible to restrain it
without [having made a previous] inhalation. Thus, then, the
regulation of the breath [pranayama], being of three descriptions
according to the distinction of ‘ expiration’ (rechaka), ‘inspira-
tion’ (puraka), and ‘restraining’ (kumbhaka), causes steadiness of
the mind, and its concentration in a single direction.*
b. He states another means of steadiness.+
ai figrfafaafiaat II M
Another expedient. Aph. 35.—Or a sensuous immediate cognition,
being produced, may serve as a cause of the steadiness [of the
a. To complete the sentence, we must supply ‘ of the mind.’J
b. Objects of sense are odour, savour, colour, touch, and sound.
Wherever these exist as fruits, that case of perception, or especi-
ally immediate cognition, is sensuous :—and this, when it is ex-
cited, causes fixation of the mind.§
* nw vwfa aaa aaafafa aiaa i faawni
^ai i arrant ipcanaaw i vaah'af aaa> faaT
faaiaarearara i a?a vaawrwaiaiHva fafaa:
awnarafa w fwfaaaaaat faaxifa n
t fiafafaaKrr^aaTa 11
i aaa afa anaira: n

c. To explain :—in the case of him who
Mystical sense-perception.
fixes his mind on the tip of his nose, there
arises a perception of celestial odour. [If he fix his mind] on the tip
of the tongue, in like manner, there is a perception of savour ; on
the fore-part of the palate, a perception of colour ; on the middle of
the tongue, a perception of the touch; on the root of the tongue,
a perception of the sound. Thus, then, through this or that or-
gan, the perception arising of this or that celestial sense-object
becomes a cause of the mind’s concentration in one direction.*
d. He mentions another expedient of the like description.f
firing ssnffrjrnt o u
Another expedient. Aph. 36.—Or a luminous [immediate cogni-
tion, being produced,] free from sorrow, [may serve as a cause of
the steadiness of the mind].
a. To complete the aphorism, we must supply ‘an immediate
rft gfw. i *jt-
* i srwv faw vixw
TOftii i

cognition, being produced, may serve as a cause of the steadiness
of the mind?*
b, Here, by the word ' lumen’ (jyotis) is meant the light that
consists of the Pure element [out of the three elementary quali-
ties that constitute the phenomenal]. A luminous immediate
cognition [§ 35. A] is that in which this [Pure element] is excel-
lent, abundant, exceeding.!
c. 1 Free from sorrow/—that is to say, that cause of the stea-
diness of the mind in respect of which [agency] all sorrow, which
[—see Sdnkhya Lecture, § 61.—] is a modification of the Pas-
sionate [or foul element of the phenomenal universe], is removed
by virtue of the exercise of the ‘ beatific’]; [degree of medita-
tion—§ 17. g.,—where the ascetic, not yet liberated from the
phenomenal, is nearly freed from the two coarser of its three
Dwelling on the inner d. The meaning is this, that, on the disap-
hoht of the hcci'rta p i-i ✓ i'p »• i rc e? i ii i
y J pearance of all ‘ modifications [§ 5.J through,
the beholding of perfect knowledge, steadiness takes place in the
mind of him who, in the midst of the lotus-cup of his heart,
broods on the Pure element of thought [spread out in the heart]
like the milky ocean when its waves are stilled. §
* Mgfww faw ferfafirafswtfa qrww: u
t wifir; : wn i nwt
t tw.-
nfnrwpi wk 11

e. By means of exhibiting another expedient, he declares an
object [worthy of being meditated] in the meditation ‘ in which
there is distinct recognition of an object’*—[§ 17].
Aph. 37.— Or the thought, taking as its obiect
Dwelling on 1 ° ° j
admirable some one devoid of passion, [may find what will
examples. serve as a cause of the steadiness of the mind].
a. To complete the aphorism we must supply ‘ may [find what
will] serve as a cause of the steadiness of the mind.’f
b. ‘ Devoid of passion/ i. e., who has abandoned all desire for
objects of sense,—like Sanaka and others. [The mind, we re-
peat, may be steadied by the expedients previously mentioned,]
or the thoughts of the Yogi, directed to this [—i. e. to one devoid
of passion as Sanaka was—], becomes fixed;—that is to say, the
unimpassioned thought becomes more firmly steady through re-
flecting on one whose thoughts are devoid of passion.]:
t w:

c. He mentions another expedient of this description.*
Recourse had to dream- Aph. 38.—Or the dwelling on
mg and sleeping. r.i x x *x tpi * â–¡
* r ledge [that presents itself J m dream,
or in
sleep, [may serve as a cause of the steadiness of the mind].
Dreaming defined. a. ‘ Dream* is that wherein the soul is af-
fected through the mind alone, when the modifications of the ex-
ternal organs of sense have departed.f
b. ‘ Sleep* has already been defined^ [—see § 10.].
c. [We say, then, that] knowledge dependent on dream, or de-
pendent on sleep, when dwelt upon, causes steadiness of mind,§—
[there being in either case nothing to distract the attention].
d. Since [different] men have different tastes, on whatever
thing the Yogi places his faith, by meditating on that same thing
he may attain what he wants [—viz. steadiness of mind] :—in or-
der to declare this, he states as follows.||
* i
wr. n
t ll

11 11
Anything you please may be dwelt
upon to steady the mind.
Aph. 39.—Or [the steadying of
the mind may be effected] by pon-
dering anything that one approves.
a. [That is to say] the mind becomes steadied when any object
that one prefers is pondered,—whether external, as the Moon or
the like, or internal, as a congeries of arteries or the like.*
The fruit of meditation. b. Having thus exhibited the means [of ac-
complishing meditation], in order to exhibit the fruits, he pro-
ceeds to remark.f
srsjWu:« a ° 11
To apprehend the infinitely
small or great.
Aph. 40.—His mastery extends to the
atomic and to the infinite.
a. The ascetic, effecting, by these methods, steadiness of mind,
obtains, through meditation on subtile objects, unresisted maste-
ry as far as the Atoms ;—that is to say, his mind, in [dealing with]
subtile objects, even as far as the Atoms [which elude the cog-
nizance of ordinary perspicacity], is nowhere baffled. In like
fiw. w
win vh: ii
t ww-ivi n

manner no mental obstacle arises anywhere to him meditating
the gross, even to the extent of infinite magnitude,—as the Ether,
for example;—but everywhere he is uncontrolled,—such is the
b. Of the mind thus by these methods rectified, what is the
aspect [or actual condition] ? To this he replies.f

ii n
The state of the mind
properly intent on a
single object.
Aph. 41.—To that [mind] whose ‘modi-
fications' [—all save that there remains some
one object of meditation—] have disappeared,
there occurs, as [occurs] to a noble gem [—e. g. rock-crystal,
when brought into conjunction with a coloured substance—], when
intent on any one out of these—viz.—the perceiver, the percep-
tion, and the perceivable,—a tingeing thereby.
a. That is to say—to that [mind] whose ‘modifications' [§ 5.]
snXTT’tf '-VJiT-MXT
\ J
fag ’riorr'^vit-
arr? ii

have disappeared, which has repelled all modifications except that
which has to be pondered,—which has accomplished that con-
centration f in which there is distinct recognition’* [of a single
object to the exclusion of all others,—§ 17.].
b. ‘ Out of [the three viz.] the perceiver, the perception, and
the perceivable’—i. e. Soul, the organs of sense, and the [five]
c. ‘ To it [—-the thought—] intent on any one [of these §41,
b.—] there occurs a tingeing thereby? By ‘ being intent there-
on’ we mean attending to that alone. ‘ A tingeing thereby,’—
i. e. the [thought’s] coming to consist thereof [by taking the co-
lour or character of the object as its own] ;—the coming to be of
the same description;—that is to say, it [—the thought—] be-
comes modified into the aspect of that J [which is thought upon].
d. He mentions an illustration. To the noble—i. e. pure
[transparent and colourless]—gem, such a gem as rock-crystal or
the like, there occurs this or that colour in consequence of its
being the receptacle of this or that colour, [—as when the red or
other colour of flowers has place within a crystal vase—]. In
like manner, to the stainless pure element of thought [§36. d.~\
* ii
t ii
+ H ii

there occurs the hue of this or that, through the adjacent hue of
this or that thing which is meditated upon.*
e. ( The perceived, the perception, and the perceiver’—such is
the inverse order in which these are to be understood [—instead
of the order adopted in the aphorism—-], because it is on ‘the
perceived’ [—the external or objective—] that meditation is first
fixed,f [—see §17. e. &c].
f. He now states [in three aphorisms] a fourfold division of
the abovementioned [§41] change]: [of the mind into the like-
ness of what it ponders].
Ht afarrar 11 a n
7%e first stage of the mind APh' 42.—This [change of the mind
properly intent. into ii]£eness of what is pondered—
§41—], when mixed up of the fancy of the ‘ word,’ the ‘ mean-
ing/ and the ‘knowledge/ is [technically termed] the ‘argu-
a. A ‘Word/ is what is apprehended by the organ of hearing,
or [in the technical language of the grammarians] a manifesta-
tion § (sphota).
* i arfawraar faaw aw; wfaaa-
aaj^xn^raawL a'a^vrofa: i va faaara
7\ 0s
faWiW a^TaatawqTTam WajUTUfaf! I
t amrraa aiaata aa:
w arerfa^ va aarfaftfa ii
t T^rataaaar ca aaiawaafaaw^ara ii
§ araf^aar^j: ar ’a*?: i

b. The f Meaning’ i. e. the thing meant by a sound or word]
is a genus [—such as* cow/ ‘ horse/—] &c.,* [see Sdhitya Dar-
pana §12].
c. ' Knowledge/ is a modification of the understanding [—see
§5 and 6—] where the quality of Purity prevailsf [—to the sup-
pression of the elements of Passion and Darkness,—see §17. g\.
d. A ( Fancy’ has been already defined [in Aph. 9].
e. c Mixed up of these’—i. e. in which the three—viz. the
c Word/ &c., [§42],—by mutually commingling, appear in an
[ambiguous and] fanciful shape,—in the shape [at once] of the
word (cow/ [for example], the thing fcow/ and the notion‘ cow/—
this is what is called [technically] f the argumentative’ (savitarkd)
change§ [of the mind reflecting a mixed object of thought—
while the attention is divided among the sound, the thing signi-
fied, and the knowledge of the thing].
f. He now mentions that f non-argumentative’ [affection of the
mind] which is the opposite of the one just defined|| [§42].
* w wsrrfe: i
t jfefn: i
t w^rspir: i
’nftfa 'sU’i[Jt I
ii firfifrVFwr? i

d â– *> c\
rPfiTlI 8^ II
The second stage of the mind 43.—On the clearing off of the
properly intent. memory [of the word and the sense at-
tached to it by convention], the [mental] display only of the
thing itself as if of something indefinite [and no longer re-
ferred to any term—no longer regarded as being what is
meant by the word ‘ cow/ or what is meant by the word
(horse/ &c.—], this [affection of the mind which no longer re-
flects a mixed object of thought—§42—] is that which is called
[technically] the ‘ non-argumentative.’
a. (Of the memory’—i. e. of the memory of the convention
as to the sense of the word. ‘The clearing off’—i. e. the de-
parture. When this takes place, the change [of the mind] when it
reveals the thing itself alone, as if devoid of any character [which
would suggest a term as applicable to it],—when it [the mind in
its changed state—§41—] is employed about the object to be
pondered alone [without regard to its having any name], and thus
clear of ‘ fancy’ [—nothing being pondered but the actual thing
itself—], is what is called the ‘non-argumentative’ [affection of
the mind]; such is the meaning.*
b. In order to declare another division, he says :f—
* gm: i vrwTsigimgm: i
t w’H’C n

to n a» n
The third and fourth stages APh- 44—Just by this [mental affec-
of the mind properly intent. fjon the two aspects explained in
Aphorisms 42 and 43], that which is [technically termed] ‘ deli-
berative' (sa-vichdraj, and [that termed] ‘ non-deliberative’ (nir-
vichara), where the object [pondered,—instead of being gross as
in these two preceding cases—] is ‘ subtile/ has been [sufficiently]
explained; [—the distinction between this pair, out of the four
referred to at §41 f, being the same as that between the other
a. Just by this mental affection, in the shape of the ‘ argu-
mentative’ [§42] and the ‘ non-argumentative’ [§43], where the
object is a f gross’ one [as contradistinguished from the ‘ subtile’
objects,—see §44 b.—], the pair of mental affections also, in the
shape of the ‘ deliberative’ and the ‘ non-deliberative/ where the
object is ‘subtile/ has been explained.*
b. What sort [of mental affectionj is that where the object is
subtile ? That [mental affection] is so called, the object whereof,
such as the ‘ subtile elements’ or the ‘ organs’ [§ 17. /.], is subtile.
By this [mention that the object, in the case of the latter pair,—
§44, a.,—as ‘ subtile’] it is declared that in the former [pair] the
object is ‘gross,’—for [in truth] it is on the gross elements that
it [—the former pair §42—43—] is dependent. That is [called]
the ‘ deliberative’ [§44] in which the ‘ subtile object’ appears
whether as the object of a question as to the name, the meaning,
and the notion [§42], or apart from any such question, but yet as
qualified by the characters of space and time, &c. That [on the

other hand] is [called] the ‘ non-deliberative’ [§44], in which the
‘ subtile object/ in the shape of the Subtile Elements or the Or-
gans, independently of the properties of space and time, &c., is
presented simply as the thing itself. It is of this [pair of mental
modifications] alone that the objects are f subtile’* [—and not
of the other pair,—see §44. a].
c. In reply to the question how far [the term] ‘ where the ob-
ject is subtile’ [§44] [extends], he says:—f
The limit of analysis. Aph. 45.—And fthe having a subtile ob-
ject’ ends with the Indissoluble.
a. This fact that has been mentioned of the ‘ deliberative’ and
the f non-deliberative’ mental affections [§44], that their object is
a ‘ subtile’ one [§44. A], ends with the Indissoluble,—meaning,
by the f Indissoluble,’ Nature, [that primordial principle—see
Sankhya Lecture §7—] which is nowhere resolved [into any
thing underlying it],—or which [to take another etymological
* ^strait i
G\ C\
wi ’JT 1 wi wfw 1

explanation] declares or suggests nothing. It is at this point
that ‘the having a subtile object’ ceases* [—seeing that, beyond
this, there exists nothing more subtile lying further back],
b. To explain :—in the modification of the Qualities there
arise four divisions—(1) that which has a diversified character, (2)
that which has an undiversified character, (3) that which merely
has a character, and (4) that which has not a character. [By]
‘that which has a diversified character’ (visishta-linga) [is meant]
the [gross] elements [Sankhya Lecture §33], [By] ‘that which
has an undiversified character’ Cavisishta-linga) is meant the sub-
tile elements and the organs [S. L. §25]. [By] ‘that which
merely has a character’ (linga-matra) is meant Intellect [S. L.
§8]. [By] ‘that which has not a characteristic attribute’ (alinga)
is meant the First Principle [S. L. §7] beyond which there is
nothing subtilef [underlying or originating it.]
c. He next mentions, as the topic presents itself, the motive
for [valuing] these mental affections [or tinges, §41.] J
riT ct CTtsuwfw. n «
* i-'i 4131
CTPf I HrCT’ff wfCTCTifflfa I
t iwrfv i ’j’nwit vftuw vrnir ctiAt Atw
AriRAfwfw fasTiTCTArHfft i AfavfW
i ct WCTikCTfi' I

What the aforesaid mental
affections constitute.
Aph. 46.—These themselves constitute
‘’Meditation with its seed’ [§17. Z>].
a. ‘ These themselves/ i. e. the mental affections above de-
scribed. Meditation ‘ in which there is distinct recognition'
[§17. 6.] is called [meditation] ‘with its seed’—i. e. that which
is with a seed or with something to rest upon—because all these
[varieties of mental affection which we have been treating of ]
have something to rest upon* [—which—see §17. i.—must even-
tually be deserted].
b. Now he states the fruit of the ‘non deliberative’ [mental
affection], seeing that, of the other mental affections, this ‘ non-
deliberative’ one [§44] is the fruit./
n n ii
Aph. 47.—When wisdom has come, through
The fruit of this. f non-deliberative’ [mental affection], there
is spiritual clearness.
a. What we mean by ‘ non-deliberative’ has been already ex-
plained]: [—§44],
b. ‘ Wisdom’ here stands for ‘ purity’.§
* ht i vv
t Garret
§ ii

e. In comparison with the ‘ argumentative’ [mental affection],
when the object is a gross one, the ‘ non-argumentative’ is the su-
perior. In respect of that too the ‘ deliberative/ whose object
is a subtile one, [is the superior]. In respect of this again the
‘ non-deliberative’ [where the object is subtile, is the superior].
And when, in virtue of pre-eminent practice of this, there has
arisen wisdom, or purity, then there is spiritual clearness. By
‘ spiritual’ we mean what resides in the soul, or in the understand-
ing. Such clearness [viz. spiritual clearness] arises [from the
‘ non-delibera+ive’ mental affection with a subtile object]. And
it is just this spiritual clearness which we mean by the firm stead-
fastness* [attained on the removal of distractions—§32].
d. [Well],—this having been attained, what next? To this
he replies.f
From spiritual clearness Aph. 48.—In that case there is know-
comes right knowledge. • . , , . ,
ledge which holds to the truth.
a. By ‘ knowledge which holds to the true’ we mean that
^■rajiraT?: i ’J’ruw i rng?i:
IfttTVWq JiTVfi | na figrai
t albi-rII

knowledge which is never overshadowed by error,—which holds
to the truth—i. e. to the real.*
b. ‘In that case’—i. e. when spiritual clearness has been attain-
ed, this [true knowledge] takes place.f
c. And, through this rightly intelligent view, regarding every-
thing as it really is, the Yogi attains to pre-eminent Concentra-
tion]: [§2\
d. He now states the distinction of this from other [forms of]
correct knowledge.§
wraiaarawart aarft iiaraaiTa n yon
This knowledge differs from Aph. 49.— [This kind of knowledge
ordinary knowledge. ,, , , , ,
dinersj from the knowledge due to tes-
timony and inference because the object of these two is not par-
ticulars but generals.
a. By ‘ testimony’ we mean scriptural information. By ‘ in-
ference’ we mean what has been already defined [at §7 a]. The
knowledge which arises from these two [sources of knowledge]
has generals [and not individuals] as its object; for, neither tes-
timony nor a [logical] sign [ T&cppptov , is able, like a sense-or-
gan, to convey a knowledge of particularities || [meaning thereby
the ultimate and no further explicable distinctions that exist be-
tween individuals generically similar and numerically different].
* ara aaj faafa a faaaaonww ar
a?aam wr ii
t aa i ajwarwt afa wa'taia: i
t aarrw wsrraiarraa aaraanaa arat aare
araanhfa n
§ a w. avi^aaraaaitiaare ii
ii araaraa^Taa i aaaraa^ami i hthit ar

b. On the other hand this meditative knowledge—that associ-
ated with the clearness which comes through the 1 non-delibera-
tive’ [mental affection—§47]—differs from these two kinds of
knowledge [§49 a], in its having individualities as its objects;—
that is to say, [it differs from them] because its object is the in-
dividual f subtile element’ or the individual Soul itself.* [And so
this knowledge, since its object is the particular, has an object
other than that which belongs to testimony or inference].
c. Moreover, when this has been attained, one can discern
with one’s ordinary organs "even] minute things, hidden or very
far off.f
d. The states the [especial] fruit of this correct knowledge. J
One train of thought with one Aph, 50.—The train Tof self-re-
object, is to put an end to all , L
other trains. productive thought] resulting from this
puts a stop to other trains.
a. The [self-reproductive] continuous flow [of thought—§18]
produced by this [meditative] knowledge [§49] prevents other
Wiaa WT ?5T I afa Jarfvfc-
aafeihrafavwT ii
* wfvirgT rfTHjt
fawfaaaxaia- i faw. nawr-
aa: wiaar aT faa^r w aww ii
t far^wr wax anarm
t ai^n: twt: arawr? n

trains, whether they arise during relaxation or concentration;—
is to say, it makes them incapable of producing their effects. It
is for this reason that it is directed that one should addict him-
self to this kind of knowledge alone.*
b. Having thus described Meditation where there is distinct
recognition [of an object §17], in order to declare that in which
the distinct recognition is dropped [§17.y.], he says:—f
wsnfq phih n n
Finally this last train of Aph. 51.—On the removal of this
thought is to drop its object. , . ,, . . „ ,, r,,
also, since there is removal ot all [the
mental modifications], the Meditation is ‘ without a seed?
a. On the removal, i. e. on the dissolution, of this also,—i. e.
of the meditation where there is distinct recognition of an object
[§17],—when all the modifications of the mind [§5] have been
resolved into their causes [or sources—as ajar, when broken, is
resolved into the earth which it was made of—], so that there
arises merely a continuous train [of thought self-reproductive],
thereupon, as there is nothing but the negation 'This is not’—
'This is not,’—meditation appears with relinquishment of the seed
[§17. 6];—on which taking place, the Soul is said to abide in its
own nature pure—alone—emancipated.]:
t Wlfa PPTV vfaRV ijhvt

Recapitulation. Well then [—to recapitulate briefly—],
having set forth the definition [§2] of 1 Concentration’ which is
the subject of the work [§1], the explanation of the terms "Mo-
dification of the mind’ [§5] and the "Prevention’ thereof [§12],
the definition of "Exercise’ [§13] and "Dispassion’ [§15], and
having thus stated the nature of and the difference between these
two expedients; then having stated the division of Concentra-
tion, into principal and secondary, by distinguishing it as " Medi-
tation in which there is distinct recognition’ [§ 17] and that "in
which distinct recognition is lost [§18]; then having exhibited
diffusively [§20-—22] the expedients [for attaining to concentra-
tion], after premising an exposure of the " Spurious semblance of
concentration,’ [§19] ; then, with a view to exhibiting an easy
method, having determined the nature of the Lord [§23—24],
the proof of His existence [§25], His pre-eminence [§ 26], His
name [§27], the order of His worship [§28] and the fruits
thereof [§29]; then having described the distractions of the
mind [§30] and their supervenients, grief &c. [§31], and diffu-
sively, the means of combating these—viz. the dwelling upon
some one truth [§ 32], the practice of benevolence &c. [§ 33],
the regulation of the breath [§34], and other such means—viz.
" sensuous immediate cognitions &c.’ [§35—39]-—as are condu-
cive to Meditation with or without distinct recognition of an ob-
ject; having declared the mental affections [§ 41], with an eye
to the winding up, with their definitions [§42—44], their fruits
[§ 46—48], and their object [§49]; then by finally summing up,
in regard to the Meditation with distinct recognition and that
without distinct recognition of an object,—in words to the effect
that Meditation without a seed is preceded by that which has a

seed §51 , the chapter on Concentration has been expounded*
[by Pantanjali.]
c. Thus is completed the First Book—that on Meditation—of
the commentary, composed by the illustrious great king and go-
vernor King Bhojaraja, on the Aphorisms of Patanjali’s System
of the
d. The commentator, it will be observed [—see
Introduction, b.—', justifies Patanjali’s undertaking to expound
the ^fogci, by citing a passage from the Veda [—the Nachiketa
* am
'J O » C\ "
fwfa f^w faw*
ozrmiHT ii
zit m
vwn: ii

Upanishad—] recommendatory of the Yoga. The Yoga, there-
fore, under that name, was recognised antecedently to Patanjali,
and is not to be regarded as an invention of his.
e. The term Yoga, we are told [§2], implies the hindering of
the modifications of the thinking principle. All the six Hindu
systems, five of which we have already partially examined, agree
in regarding the distinction between Subject and Object as the
most momentous of facts, and the emancipation of the former
from all entanglement with the latter as the one desirable end.
In their treatment of the Objective the systems differ, at least
in appearance, more widely than in their treatment of the Sub-
jective. The Vedanta denies reality—or most grudgingly allows
anything of reality—to the Objective. The Nyaya accords to
it a reality co-ordinate with that of the Subject, giving imparti-
ally the name of Substance to both. The Sankhya steers a mid-
dle course between these two. It treats the Objective as an ag-
gregate of qualities, which exist as such but not as substances.
In this respect, the Sankhya comes even nearer than the Vedan-
ta to Bishop Berkeley. The Yoga, as far as we have seen, con-
curs with the Sankhya on this point. While the systems thus
differ in regard to the objective or Material, they all agree, on
the other hand, in regarding the Subject ('dtmanj—call it Soul,
or Spirit,—as a self-dependant reality. The only dispute here
is, whether Soul, or Spirit, is one or manifold. The Vedanta
holds that it is one; the other systems, so far as we have yet
seen, that it is manifold. It is to be observed that nowhere in
any of the systems does the notion of a created spirit present
itself. The Vedanta, availing itself of a sufficiently loose analo-
gy, speaks of one Soul pervading all bodies as one thread might
pervade a necklace of golden, silver, and earthen, beads while
the Sankhya urges the objection that if Soul were but one, then
all would be happy when one is happy, all would die, when one
died, and so on, which is contrary to experience, [Sankhya Lec-
ture §48 and 45]. But, whether Soul be one or manifold, every
one of the systems holds it to be self-dependant. Soul is the

substance—beneath which there stands nothing ;—and the pity,
in the estimation of Hindu philosophy, is, that anything should
stand above it,—any more than beneath it. It ought to stand,
alone—apart from everything phenomenal.
f. In order to repel the transient or phenomenal, according to
the Yoga [§ 12] we must have recourse to exercise and dispas-
sion, or asceticism and mortification.
g. By means of ascetic exercises and the mortification of all
desires, the mind is supposed to attain to a state of undisturbed
Meditation [§ 17], where some one single object is pondered, to
the exclusion of all others. But as the practised swimmer parts
with his last cork or bladder, so the soul of the ascetic must in
due course part with every object, and at length meditate with-
out any object at all [§ 18]. To effect this being a matter of
difficulty, devotion to the Lord [§ 23] is recommended as a com-
paratively easy method. In admitting the existence of a Divine
Being Ciswar a J in whom the good qualities belonging to man
reach their limit, the Yoga, hence named the sesioara sankhya,
differs from the Sankhya of Kapila, which is known as the
h. As the ascetic is exposed to obstacles, these are discussed
by Patanjali [§ 30—31], and means for combating them are in-
dicated [§32—39].
i. When all obstacles have been thus removed, the mind is
supposed to be as free from all contamination of the phenomenal
as the pure crystal is free from the red colour which seems to be-
long to it while a rose is seen athwart it.