A lecture on the Vedánta

Material Information

A lecture on the Vedánta embracing the text [and English translation] of the Vedánta-sára
Uniform Title:
Sadānanda Yogīndra
Ballantyne, J. R ( James Robert ), 1813-1864
Benares College
Place of Publication:
Printed at the Presbyterian Mission Press
Publication Date:
Physical Description:
84 p. : ; 21 cm.


Subjects / Keywords:
Vedanta ( lcsh )
वेदान्त दर्शन
non-fiction ( marcgt )
Spatial Coverage:
Asia -- India
एशिया -- भारत
21 x 78 ( India )


General Note:
Preface signed: J.R.B. [i.e., J.R. Ballantyne].
General Note:
"This lecture is a sequel to those on the Nyáya philosophy delivered in the session of 1848, and to that on the Sánkhya philosophy, delivered in 1849."
Statement of Responsibility:
printed for the use of the Benares College, by order of Government, N.W.P.

Record Information

Source Institution:
SOAS University of London
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
596462 ( aleph )
EB85.202 /166816 ( soas classmark )
CWML C.3 /16 ( soas classmark )


This item has the following downloads:

Full Text
Printed for the use of the Benares College, by order
of Govt. N. W. P.
Rev. Jos. Warren, Superintendent.

This lecture is a sequel to those on the Nyaya Philosophy deli-
vered in the session of 1848, and to that on the Sankhya Philoso-
phy, delivered in 1849, to the senior pupils in the English De-
partment of the Benares College, " with the view of introducing
them to the Philosophical terminology current among their learn-
ed fellow-countrymen the pandits.”
Of the text-book here employed, an English translation was
published by Dr. Roer, in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of
Bengal for 1845. The advantage of referring to this version has
not been neglected; but a much more lucid style of exposition
being required for the class of youths for whom the present ver-
sion was prepared, no scruple has been felt in departing from
the phraseology, &c., of any who have written before on the
Vedanta, wherever such departure appeared advisable.
That this exposition of the most abstruse of the Hindu systems
should be faultless, is very far from probable. In bringing it—
as it now stands—before the senior English students, and the class
of pandits, in the Benares College, who have for some time been
studying English, the intention includes its being submitted to a
searching criticism, so that any errors entertained in regard to
the system, by Europeans, may have the better chance of being
discovered and rectified.
J. R. B.
Benares College, “1
Wth April, 1851. J

No. 1.—[The term Vedanta, as remarked by Mr. Colebrooke
(Essay, v. I. p. 326), signifies “ the end and scope of the Vedas.”
The compendium in which this doctrine is usually (first studied,
and which will form the text of the following observations, is
that by Sadananda—the Veddnta-sdra—or “Kernel of the Ve-
danta.” A commentary on it, by Ramat£rtha, is called the
Vidwan-mano-ranjini—the “Rejoicerof the mind of the Learn-
ed.” The compendium commences thus :—]
Il HHr Tnirsn^ II
No. 2.—Salutation to Ganesa !
a. Eor the accomplishment of what is desired I take refuge with
the Indivisible [that consists of] existence, knowledge, and joy,—
no object fitted for the organ of voice [—see No. 51—to de-
clare] , nor for the mind [to comprehend] —Soul—the substratum
of all.

b. Having reverenced my preceptor Adwayananda, who is sig*
nificantly so too named [—the name signifying“ undivided joy”]
—because the notion of duality is [in his case] destroyed—I shall,
according to my understanding of it, declare the Kernel of the
c. [In this exordium the whole doctrine of the Vedanta is sum-
med up. According to that doctrine there is but one thing—one
reality—viz. Soul, or Brahman—i. e. the Vast one—who consists
of “ existence, knowledge, and joy,”—and of nothing else.
When a man gets rid of the notion that there is any thing be-
sides this one solitary reality, he of course regards himself as
this reality :—according to the Vedanta, he then knows himself to
be “ undivided joy,” like the preceptor of our author—see No. 18.]
hut Bqfawmsi I
No. 3.—[But what is meant by the term] Vedanta? [By
this is meant] the evidence [of there being nothing but Brahman]
constituted by the Upanishads, and [by the same term are deno-
ted] such works ancillary thereto as the Saririka Aphorisms.
a. [The word upanishad, from the root shad ‘to destroy/ is
employed to denote, in the first instance, that knowledge of
Brahman as the only existent, which knowledge is held to anni-
hilate all else. By the same term, Upanishad, the aggregate of
the sections of the Veda which treat of such knowledge is, by
a trope (upacharat'), designated also. These sections of the Veda
are regarded as containing all the evidence on which this dogma
rests—such other works on the subject as the Aphorisms of Ba-
darayana being subservient and explanatory, but adding nothing
new. The term upanishat-pramana may be rendered, optionally,
the evidence of the dogma, or the evidence contained in the
scriptural treatises. This ‘ evidence’ {pramana—‘ instrument in
the production of right notion’*—) is called vedanta, as being
that the providing of which is the c end or scope of the Veda’].

thht^W: I
No. 4.—Since, in consequence of this work’s being concerned
about the Vedanta, it is clear that this has the same moving con-
siderations (anubandha) as that has, these do not require to be
considered as if they were something different [from what the
readers of the Vedanta are accustomed to].
a. [The author, as the commentator remarks, was here assail-
ed by the following doubt—“ An arrangement that belongs to a
science is known to those only who are versed in the science,
and not to those who are desirous of becoming versed in it:—how,
then, shall these, who at present do not know what is the object-
matter of the science, enter upon it ?” In consequence of this
apprehension, that some one, on his attention’s being requested to
the present volume, might be unacquainted with the established
distribution of the matter, the author l( proceeds to exhibit con-
cisely the arrangement (not of his own work, which, in the way
of arrangement, presents nothing new, but the arrangement)
merely which belongs to the science itself”].
No. 5.—In that [i. e. in the Vedanta—what are] the moving
considerations ? [They are] (1) the competent person (adhi-
karinf (2) the object-matter (vishayaj, (3) the relation (sarnban-
dha), and (4) the purpose (prayojana).
a. [“ In that”—as the commentator tells us, means “ in the
Vedanta.” The distribution here exhibited is not peculiar to the
Vedanta;—the statement of (1) “what it is all about”—(2)
what relation to the object-matter the book bears—and (3) what
is the use of attending to the matter at all—being an advisable
statement in the case of any science whatsoever. As Mr. F. W.
Newman remarks, (in his Lectures on Logic—p. 3) :—“The first
point of importance towards getting a clear view of any science,

is, to have accurately described its object-matter* and its pur-
pose.” In the present instance, however, the first question is—
“ Who is competent to enter on the study?” To this our author
replies as follows].
No. 6.—But [who is] the competent person ? [He is] that
well-regulated person who, by the perusal, as prescribed, of the
Vedas and their dependent sciences, has attained to a rough no-
tion of the sense of the whole Veda:—who, by renouncing, in
this or in a former life, things desirable and things forbidden;
and by observance of the constant and of the occasional ceremo-
nies, of penances, and of devotions, being freed from all sin, is
thoroughly purified in his heart:—and who is possessed of the
quaternion of requisites [see No. 9].
a. [What is meant here by “ things desirable,” &c., the author
proceeds to state].
* This is usually called the subject-matter ; but, since vishaya is so frequent-
ly rendered “ object,” we shall follow Mr. Newman. Sir William Hamilton
(—Reid’s Works, p. 97—) says “ In philosophical language, it were to be wish-
“ ed that the word subject should be reserved for the subject of inhesion—the
“ materia in qua ; and the term object exclusively applied to the subject of ope-
“ ration—the materia circa quam. If this be not done, the grand distinction
“of subjective and objective, in philosophy, is confounded.”

V< ^NP^TRTnl Tt iraTSFffi I
No. 7.—f Things desirable ?' These are the means, such as
the jyotishtoman sacrifice, of obtaining things desired—such as
a. ‘ Things forbidden ?’ These, such as the killing of a Brah-
man, are what lead to things undesired—such as hell.
b. ‘ Constant ceremonies ?' These, such as the morning and
evening prayers, &c., are those which, in their omission [under
any circumstances] are causes of sin.
c. ‘Occasional ceremonies ?’ These, such as the jateshti, are
those contingent on some occasion, such as the birth of a son,
[and not obligatory, for example, on one to whom a child has not
been born].
d. (Penances ?’ These, such as the chandray ana} are what
cause [not the acquisition of anything positive, but] merely the
removal of sin.
e. c Devotions ?’ These, such as [are inculcated in] the doc-
trine of the saint SXndilya, consist of mental operations whose
object [—see No. 25—] is Brahman with [—and not, as we shall
have to regard the Absolute in the last result, as devoid of] qua-
f. Of these [three sets] of which the c constant ceremonies' are
the first, the chief purpose is the purification of the intellect; but
of the (devotions' the chief purpose is the concentration of it.
g, [In regard to these ceremonies, &c., with the particulars of
which we are not at present concerned, some authorities are next

fq^T^i f^r^T t^RW i
No. 8.— [The positions above laid down are deduced] from
such scriptural texts as this, that “ Him do the Brahmans seek to
know by means of sacrifices [performed] in conformity with [the
directions of]the Veda:”—and [they are deduced also] from
such regulations as this, that “By austerities one destroys
sin :—by knowledge one obtains the water of immortality.”
a. The result attendant on the constant and the occasional ce-
remonies, and on devotions, is the attaining to the abode of
the progenitors and of the celestials—[and this is deduced] from
the text that “ The abode of the progenitors is [to be attained to]
by works, and the abode of the gods by knowledge.”
b. [The e quaternion of requisites’ necessary for the ‘ competent
person’—see No. 6.—is next explained].
No. 9.—f Requisites ?’ These are (1) the discrimination of
the eternal substance from the transient; (2) disregard of the
enjoyment of the fruits of here and hereafter; (3) the possession
of tranquillity and self-restraint; and (4) desire of liberation.
a. [These four are next severally to be explained].
No. 10.—(Discrimination of the eternal substance from the
transient ?’—This is the discerning that God is the eternal sub-
stance, and that all else is non-eternal.

hhjt faro
No. 11.—‘ Disregard of the enjoyment of the fruits of here
and hereafter’ is the entire neglect of them, because of the fact
that the enjoyments of the things of hereafter, also, such as the
water of immortality, are un-eternal, just as the enjoyments of the
things of the present, such as garlands and unguents, are un-
eternal, because they are produced by works.
a. [That which is produced by works must have had a begin-
ning, and that which had a beginning is not eternal, and is held
to be liable to destruction].
i wt
^rt -«r i
I f^W! I
No. 12.—Butf Tranquillity, Self-restraint,’ &c? These are (1)
Tranquillity, (2) self-restraint, (3) quiescence, (4) endurance,
(5) contemplation, and (6) faith.
a. ‘ Tranquillity’ itself ? This is the restraining of [the a in-
ternal organ”] the mind from objects different from the hearing,
&c. [about the Lord :—see No. 25].
b. ‘ Self-Restraint ?’ This is the restraining of the external
organs from objects different therefrom. [See No. 12, a.]
c. ‘ Quiescence’ is the inaction of the organs thus [No. 12, 6.]
restrained from objects different therefrom. Or—it is the aban-

donment, according to the injunction [given to Brahmans on
reaching a certain period of life], of works enjoined [on Brah-
mans otherwise circumstanced].
d. ‘ Endurance ?’ This is the sustaining of such pairs as cold
and heat [—with indifference alike for the pain or pleasure they
may tend to produce].
e. ‘ Contemplation* (samddhdna) is the intentness of the mind
restrained [from all else] on the hearing, &c. [concerning the
Lord—see No 12, a.], or on kindred objects [by which the con-
templation of the Lord is facilitated].
f. ‘ Faith’ (sraddhaj is belief in the assertions of the spiritual
guide and of the Vedanta.
1 urn: H^TrfT I
sj J
No. 13.—c Desire of liberation ?’ This is the wish to be libe-
a. Such a well-regulated person [as the man who possesses the
qualifications enumerated in No. 6, and explained in the para-
graphs following it] is a competent person [to engage in the stu-
dy of the Vedanta].
b. [Authorities in support of this are next cited.]
iit^t Tfn i
No. 14.—[That such is the character of a fit enquirer may be
inferred] from the scriptural text beginning "Tranquil and self-re-
strained, &c.” And it has been said, “ To him who is tranquil in
mind, who has his organs in subjection, whose sins have disap-
peared, who acts according to the commandments, who is pos-
sessed of good qualities, docile, ever desiring liberation—this
[doctrine of the Vedanta] is always proper to be imparted.”

a. [The question as to who is competent to enter upon the stu-
dy of the Vedanta having been thus determined, the second ques-
tion—of the four started in No. 5.—as to the ‘ object-matter* of
the Vedanta—falls to be considered].
No. 15.—The e Object-matter’ (vishaya) ? This is the fact—
to be known for certain—that the soul and God are one; for
this is the drift of all Vedanta treatises—[and consequently of
the one in hand],
a. [The third question—of the four started in No. 5,—as to the
correlation—next falls to be considered].
No. 16.—The ‘ relation’ (sambandhaj ? This, between the
identity [of soul and God—see No. 15.—] which is to be known
as certain, and the evidence thereof contained in the scriptural
treatises which ascertain it, is that of the information [communi-
cated] and the informer.
a. [This relation, which must evidently be the same in the case
of every book which gives information on any subject, is specified
in order to prevent a quibbler from arguing that, as no relation
between the two is stated, there is therefore no relation between
them at all—in which case the discussion would be aimless.
b. The fourth question—of the four stated in No. 5—as to the
purpose—the “ cui bono ?”—next falls to be considered].
No. 17.—But fthe end,’ (prayojanaj [which, by its desirable-

ness, should move one to enter upon the enquiry at all] ? This
is the cessation of the ignorance which invades this identity that
is to be known [of soul and God—see No. 15—•], and the attain-
ment [by soul, thereon,] of that bliss which is His essence—[see
No. 2].
a. [Authorities, in support of the assertion that this end can
be thus attained, are next cited].
No. 18.—[That it is possible, by means of knowledge, to es-
cape from the bondage of mundane existence, may be inferred |
from the scriptural text, that “ He who knows what Soul is,
gets beyond grief—and from the text, that “ He who knows
God (brahman), becomes God.”
i ^farqrfti: i wr
No. 19.—This qualified person [—No. 13—], being burned
by the fire of this world in the shape of birth, death, and the like,
as one whose head is heated [by the sun’s rays—takes refuge] in
a body of water, having approached, with tribute in his hands, a
teacher who knows the Vedas, and who is intent on God, follows
him—[or becomes his disciple] :—for [there is] the scriptural
text—“ with fuel in his hands [as an offering, the enquirer ap-
proaches] him who knows the Vedas and is intent on God, &c.”
a. The teacher with the greatest kindness, instructs him by
the method of the 1 refutation of the erroneous imputation / [as

might be inferred] from such texts as the one beginning “ To
him, when he had approached, the learned man thus spoke, &c.”
b. [What is meant by the f erroneous imputation* and its ‘re-
futation’ has next to be considered:—and first of the ( erroneous
No. 20.—1 Erroneous imputation,’ (adhydropaj is the allega-
tion that the Unreal is the Real [see No 10]—like the judg-
ment, in respect of a rope which is no serpent, that it is a ser-
I' a. ‘The Real?’ This (vastu) is God [consisting—see No. 2.—
' of] existence, knowledge, and happiness—[the One] without a
h second.

b. 'The Unreal’ (avastu) is the whole aggregate of the sense-
less—beginning with ignorance.
c. [As the right understanding of this point is the key—if
there be any—to the whole system, particular attention is here
desirable. The definition of this technical term (ignorance’ here
^16* I
No. 21.—But ignorance? They [the Vedantins] declare that
this is a somewhat that is not to be called positively either enti-
ty or non-entity*—not a mere negation, [but] the opponent of
knowledge,—consisting of the three fetters.
a. [According to the Naiyayikas, ajnana is merely the non-ex-
* Conf. Plato’s ov kcll p/rj ov, as opposed to the ovrws ov, in Sir Wm.
Hamilton’s note on Reid’s works, p. 262.

istence, or negation, (abhava), of jndna. To deny this, the writer
calls it bhava—implying that it is not abhdva.
b. That there is such a thing as Ignorance, the author next
undertakes to prove by an appeal to human consciousness and to
No. 22.—[That there is such a thing as Ignorance may be de-
duced] from the judgment [forced upon the consciousness of
every man] that “ I am ignorant;”—and from such scriptural
texts as the one beginning with—“ The power of the divine soul
clothed* with its qualities,” &c.
a. [Before going further, let us consider the way in which the
conception of ‘ Ignorance’ may have come to occupy the place
which it occupies in the system under examination.
b. Sir G. C. Haughton, in his reply to Col. Vans Kennedy’s
strictures on Mr. Colebrooke’s Essay—(London As. Jour. vol. xviii,
p. 217,) —after quoting from different writers to show in what
diverse fashion different persons have endeavoured to represent
their notion of the Vedanta doctrine, remarks as follows:—“It
“ must be indeed clear, from all that has been said, that such a
“ system, if it be even perfectly comprehensible, cannot be repre-
“ sented by language, but must be inferred by the mind from
“ the principles,”—and so on. Let us collect, then, into one
view the pre-requisites for that mental inference which, according
to Sir G. Haughton, each one must make for himself who is to
comprehend the system.
c. Suppose that God, omnipresent—omniscient—and omnipo-
* The Divine life, as alone the finite mind can conceive it, is self-forming,
self-representing will, clothed, to the mortal eye, with multitudinous sensuous
forms, flowing through me and through the whole immeasurable universe.”
Fichte’s System—in Lewes’s History of Philosophy, Vol. IV. p. 164.

tent—exists. Suppose, further, that, at some time or other, God
exists and nothing else does. Suppose in the next place, as held
long in Europe and still in India, that nothing is made out of
nothing (ex nihilo nihil fit;—) and suppose, finally, that God
wills to make a world. Being omnipotent, He can make it.
The dogma “ ex nihilo nihil fit” being, by the hypothesis, an
axiom, it follows that God, being able to make a world, can make!
it without making it out of nothing. The world so made must
then consist of what previously existed,—i. e. of God. Now—
what do we understand by a world ? Let it be an aggregate of
souls with limited capacities—and of what these souls (rightly or
wrongly) regard as objects—the special or intermediate causes of
various modes of intelligence. Taking this to be what is meant .
by a world, how is God to form it out of Himself? God is om-
niscient—and, in virtue of his omnipresence, his omniscience is
everywhere. Where is the room for a limited intelligence ?
Viewing the matter (if that were strictly possible) a priori, one
would incline to say, “nowhere.” But the Vedantin, before he
had got this length, was too painfully affected by the conviction,
forced upon him, as on the rest of us, by a consciousness which
will take no denial, that there are limited intelligences. “ I am /•
ignorant”—says the thinker quoted in the text; and if he is
wrong in saying so, then his ignorance is established just as well
as if he were right in saying so. Holding, then, that the soul is
God, and confronted with the inevitable fact that the soul does
not spontaneously recognise itself as God—there was nothing for
it but to make the fact itself do duty as its own cause;—to say
that the soul does not know itself to be God just because it does
not know it—i. e., because it is ignorant,—i. e., because it is ob-
structed by Ignorance (ajndna).
d. At this point let us suppose that our speculator stopped;
but that a disciple took up the matter and tried to make some-
thing more palpably definite out of the indefinite term Ignorance.
Were it not—he argues—for this afindna, of which my teacher
speaks, the soul would know itself to be God—there would be

nothing but God—there would be no world. It is this ajndna,
then, that makes the world; and, this being the case, it ought to
have a name suggestive of the fact. Let it be called prakriti,
the name by which the Sankhyas (—see Lecture on the San-
khya,—Nos. 4 and 6,—) speak of their unconscious maker of
worlds. Good, says another ; but recollect that this prakriti or
‘ energy’ can be nothing else than the power of the All-power-
ful—for we can admit the substantial existence of God alone;—
so that the ajndna which you have shown to be entitled to the
name of prakriti, will be even more accurately denoted by the
word sakti, God’s ‘ power,’—by an exertion of which alone the
fact can be accounted for, that souls which are God do not know
that they are so. The reasoning is accepted, and the term sakti
is enrolled among the synonymes of ajndna. Lastly comes the
mythologist. You declare—says he—that this world would not
even appear to be real were it not for ignorance. Its apparent
reality, then, is an illusion—and for the word ajndna you had
better substitute the more expressive term mayd—f deceit, il-
lusion, jugglery.’ The addition of this to the list of synonymes
being acquiesced in, the mythologist furnishes his Maya with all
the requisites of a goddess, and she takes her seat in his pantheon
as the wife of Brahma. Such we may conceive to be the genesis
of may a—that conception which Mr. Colebrooke (Essays, Vol. I.
p. 377) takes “ to be no tenet of the original Veddntin philoso-
phy,”—but which, to our mind, appears (as we have explained)
to be, nevertheless, in such a way involved in the conception of
ajndna, when once treated as something external to the mind, that
it quite naturally became evolved in the later writings of the Ve-
e. The mental, or subjective, state of ignorance having thus
projected itself (—see No. 35—) outwards, and being then treat-
ed as something objective, we are reminded of the correspondence
between this view and that of Fichte, (quoted at No. 92 of our
Lecture on the Sankhya philosophy), which is as follows:—

“ To use the language of Fichte”—says a writer in Branded
Dictionary—“ the ego is absolute, and posits itself; it is a pure
activity. As its activity, however, has certain indefinable limits,
when it experiences this limitation of its activity it also posits a
non-ego, and so originates the objective world. The ego, there-
fore, cannot posit itself without at the same time projecting a
non-ego, which, consequently, is in so far the mere creation of the
So—according to the Vedanta—the soul (being God) is abso-
lute—not requiring that some other agency should originate it—
but simply positing itself, or laying down the position or proposi-
tion “ Here I am.” It meets with what Fichte calls “ certain in-
definable limits.” The Vedanti gives these limits a name. They i
are, in his opinion, the limits which confine that knowledge which
in the soul would otherwise be omniscience. The limitation of
knowledge he designates Ignorance; and, as Fichte holds the ob-
jective world to be what the ego projects, in the objectifying of
its own limitations, when it attains its indefinable limits, so the
Vedanti holds the objective world to be that which the soul pro-
jects, in the objectifying of its own limitations as regards know-
ledge. The limitations of what would otherwise be omniscience,
being thus objectified, or regarded as something external, they are
then spoken of as the trammels of the soul, and are spoken of col-
lectively under the name of the subjective state then regarded as
caused by them—that is to say, the objective limitations are
spoken of under the name of Ignorance, just as the subjective
state is.
f. Ignorance (ajnanaj thus viewed objectively, and the tram-
mels (guna) of Ignorance, are not to be understood as different
but as the same. The word guna, “ a cord,” means something
“ fettering the soul” (—to employ the expression of Mr. Cole-
brooke—Essays, vol. I. p. 249—) and Ignorance is the “ three-
fold cord” or “ triple chain” (—see our Lecture on the Sankhya

Nos. 49 and 96—), that binds all save God—who is therefore spo-
ken of as nirguna “ the unfettered”—the unlimited. As the w’ord
guna means also a quality, and familiarly a good quality, it must
;; be recollected in what technical sense the term guna is employed
when God is spoken of as nirguna.
g. On the subject of Ignorance, thus viewed objectively let us
now hear our text-book further.]
I rb
No. 23.—This Ignorance is treated as one or as many accor-
dingly as it is regarded collectively or distributively. That is to
say—as of trees, when regarded as a collection, the singular de-
ji nomination is “ forest,”—or, as of waters, when regarded as a
collection, it [i. e. the singular denomination] is “ a piece of wa-
ter,”—so the ignorances, attached to souls and apparently mul-
titudinous, receive, when regarded as a collection, the singular
denomination thereof—[i. e. the name of ‘Ignorance’—in the
No. 24.—[That it is proper to speak of Ignorance—see No. 23.
__as one} may be deduced] from such scriptural texts [as that
which speaks of it] as “ The unborn—the single,” &c.
No. 05.—This aggregation [of Ignorance—No. 23—], since it

is the abode of [One who is] its Superior, has chiefly pure Good-
ness in it [and very little—not more than He chooses—of the
other two fetters—Passion and Darkness—see Lecture on the
Sankhya § 49—]. Intellect (chaitanya) of which this is the abode
[or body] being possessed of such qualities as omniscience, omni'
potence, and superintendence over all, imperceptible, all-pervad-
ing, Maker of the world, is called the Lord [isivara.~\
[How the Lord is inferred to be omniscient, he next states.]
’SR! I
No. 26.—His omniscience [may be inferred] from the fact that
he is the enlightener of all [that would else be unenlightened]
Ignorance; [and it may be learned authoritatively] from such
scriptural texts as “ who is omniscient—-who knowetli all.”
â– *< 'J
No. 27.—This His aggregation [of Ignorance,] since it is the
cause of all [No. 25,] is His body—causing [whatever else ap-
pears.] Since there is in it a plenitude of happiness, and it
[i. c. this body of the Deity] envelopes all as the cocoon [of the
silk-worm does its tenant,] it is this that is called the sheath of
happiness [in which the soul first rests.] This [body of the deity]
is [nothing different from] profound sleep, for it is into this that
every soul [in profound sleep] subsides. Hence it is called the
place of the dissolution of both the gross and the subtile worlds.
[That is to say—when a man falls into a profound sleep, the
external world and the world of dreams both cease to exist for
him—and then his position is held to be that described above.]

which it subdues,] has chiefly impure goodness in it [—it not be-
ing in the power of the resident to eject the impurities, as it is in
the power of the Superior—see No. 25.]
Thought [or soul] located in this, having such qualities as want
of knowledge and want of power, [—being the soul of mundane
beings—] is called ‘ the very defective intelligence’ (prdjna.)
The smallness of its intelligence [may be inferred] from the
fact that it is the illuminator of [but] a single Ignorance [i. e. of
an individual—unlike that which,—see No. 26,—is the enlight-
ener of all—];—it has not the power of enlightening much be-
cause its abode [—as abovementioned] is not clear [—being tain-
ted by Passion and Darkness.]
No. 32.—Since it [viz. Ignorance regarded distributively—
No. 31,—] is the cause of the conceit of individuality and the
like, it also [—as well as the aggregate spoken of in No. 27,—]
is [spoken of as] a body that causes. Since there is in it a ple-
nitude of happiness, it [also] is called the sheath of happiness.
It [also] is [nothing different from] profound sleep, for it is in this
that all ceases to do aught. Hence it [also] is called the place
of the dissolution of both the gross and the subtile body. At
that time [i. e. during profound sleep] the two, the Lord and the
individual intelligence, enjoy blessedness by means of the very
subtile modifications of Ignorance [these modifications being] il-
luminated by intellect, [—for, in the absence of the light of in-
tellect, nothing would be experienced at all.]

[That such is the case the author offers the following evidence
to prove.]
rfrr i wwh faif^r
fai rt^r i
No. 33.—[That this—see No. 32,—is the case, is to be infer-
red] from the scriptural text “The individual intelligence enjoys
bliss [during profound sleep] being [then] more peculiarly that
intelligence [which, unfettered altogether, is joy simply:]—and
[it may be inferred] from the fact that [on any other supposition]
there would be no such reminiscence as that of one risen [from
sleep—who says] “ I slept pleasantly,—I knew nothing.”
[According to European notions, the person so speaking refers
back, to the time when he was unconscious, the pleasant feeling
of refreshment which he becomes conscious of on awaking.]
i fan ?f ^Tensr I
No. 34.—Of these two—[namely Ignorance regarded in the
two points of view—see No. 30,—i. e.] regarded collectively and
distributively there is no difference, as there is none between a
forest and [its] trees or between a body of -water and [its] wa-
ters. And there is likewise no difference between the Lord and
the individual soul affected by these [two kinds of really identical
Ignorance] as there is none between the ethereal space that is

occupied by the forest and by the trees [that constitute the forest J
or between the ethereal expanse that is reflected in the whole bo-
dy of water and in the [separate] waters thereof:—[as may be
inferred] from such texts as “ This [individual intelligence] is
[none other than] the omniscient,” &c.
As there is for the forest and its trees and for the ethereal space
occupied by these, or for the body of water and its waters and for
the ethereal expanse that is reflected therein, an absolute expanse
in which these [particular expanses] are located—[so likewise rea-
son compels us to assume] for these two, viz.—the [collective and
distributed] Ignorance and the two [Lordly and individual] intel-
ligences to which they pertain, an absolute intelligence which is
their basis. This is called “ the Fourth”—[and this assertion is
made] because of such texts as this—viz. “ They regard him
as blessed, tranquil, without duality, the fourth.”
[There are four conditions of the soul, viz. (1) waking, (2)
dreaming, (3) dreamless sleep, and (4) that which is here called
“ the fourth.”]
No. 35.—This—and just this—the “ Fourth” [No. 34,]—pure
intelligence, where not discriminated apart from Ignorance, &c.
and the intelligence located therein, like [the fire and the iron
viewed indiscriminately in] an ignited iron ball, is what is the
express meaning of [the term ‘ Thou’ in] the great sentence [in
which the teacher first addresses the pupil—viz.—“ That art thou”
—meaning “Thou art Brahma”]. Where [on the other hand]
discriminated [from Ignorance and intelligence located therein]
it is called the meaning indicated.

[To explain:—people say “ the hot iron burns the hand/’ but,
though they expressly assert here that the iron, being heated,
burns the hand, yet they mean—if they mean rightly—that the
heat located in the iron burns the hand. This therefore is the
meaning indicated, though not expressly asserted—see the Sdhi-
tya Darpana § 13. a. In like manner, in the ‘ great sentence’
« That art thou,” the speaker makes the express assertion that
«thou”—i. e. the combination of ignorance and intelligence con-
stituting the person addressed—art “ That”—i. e. that absolute
intelligence;—but, in so saying, he means (—or, in the phraseo-
logy of the text, he says by indication,—) “ Thou apart from the
ignorance that now envelopes thee, art That.”]
No. 36.—Of this Ignorance there are two powers—envelop-
ment (dv aranaJ and projection (vikshepaj. As for the enveloping
power:—as even a small cloud, by obstructing the path of the eye
of the spectator, hides the sun’s disc which extends over many
leagues, such also is the power of Ignorance, which, though finite,
by obstructing the mind of the observer, hides as it were the soul
which is infinite and not subject to worldly vicissitude.
w 'faiajH ^Tfrl
jy?: i riWT
No. 37.—Thus it is said, [in Hastamalaka’s Eulogium]—“As
the very stupid man, whose eye is covered by a cloud, thinks that

the san is covered by a cloud and void of radiance, so likewise
that [Soul] which, in the sight of the stupid, is as it were bound
[—* 1 cabined, cribbed, confined/—] that, in the shape of the eter-
nal understanding, am I myself?’
W ^T^T^T^TT^t TWt I
tto. 38.—In respect of the soul covered with this—[No. 36—]
there arises the impression that it is liable to mundane vicissi-
tude—that rt is an agent, a patient, happy, grieved, and so
forth; [—See Lecture on the Sankhya—No. 43—]; as in the
case of a rope, concealed by ignorance in regard to its character,
[there arises] the impression that it is a snake.
I rP|’W
No. 39.—But the projective power ?—As ignorance of [the
fact that a certain rope is] a rope produces, by its own power, on
the rope enveloped by it, [the appearance of] a snake or the like,
so [this projective] Ignorance, by its own power, raises up, on
the soul enveloped by it, [the appearance of ] a world—ether, &c.;
—[and thus the thinker mistakes himself for a mere mortal, as
he mistook the rope for a snake]. Such is this power.
Thus it is said, “ The projective power can create [every thing],
beginning with the subtile body, [see No. 44], arid ending with
the whole external universe.”
[This projective power may be illustrated by the habit of a
jaundiced eye, which projects its own yellow hue on a sheet of
white paper].

NrfM ^TTVT^rT^T fafat( WWlfw
XfVT^TrT^n ^TT^FPg H^fn I ^T TH rpffvf?T
Gk sj
SJVT^rT^T t^Trf W^ft^’^T^rr^T’TT^T^^ H^frl |
No. 40.—Intellect (chaitawya) [i. e. Knowledge or Deity] lo-
cated in Ignorance with its two powers [No. 36], is, in its own
right, the instrumental cause; and in virtue of what it is located’
in [viz. Ignorance] the substantial cause [of all]—-as the spider is
l': personally the instrument, and, in virtue of its own body [in which
the soul of the spider resides], the substance, in regard to that
product [which we call] its thread.
< [According to this view, God, regarded as Soul or pure spirit,
is the instumental cause but not the substantial cause (—i. e.,
here, the material cause—) of the world. He is the substantial
cause in virtue only of that wherewith he hath invested himself-—>
which some people call ‘ matter/ and regard as really existing,
and which the Vedantins prefer calling ‘ ignorance'—denying its
sight to be regarded as really existing—see No. 20. 6.]
j No. 41.—From Intellect immersed in Ignorance with the Pro^
: j’ective power in which [out of the three constituents of Igno-
rance—see No. 25—] darkness prevails, there arises the Ether:—
from the Ether, Air; from Air, Fire; from Fire, Water; and
from Water, Earth. [This may be inferred] from such texts of
Scripture as this, that “ From that [Intellect which has been
spoken of] from this same soul was the Ether produced, &c."
ww i

No. 42.—That there is the prevalence of darkness [see No.
41] in the [special Ignorance which is the] cause of these [five
Elements—may be inferred] from the excess of senselessness ob-
served in them [—the Elements being unenlightened by intellect
which they quite obscure].
a. Then [—although darkness is the chief ingredient in the
cause of these, yet as it is not the sole one—therefore] Purity,
Foulness, and Darkness are produced in these [elemental pro-
ducts of the cause in question—-see No. 46. a.—viz. the] Ether,
&c., in the degree in which they exist in the cause [—for, accord-
ing to the Hindus, the qualities existing in any product are just
those that existed in that of which it is the product].
b. It is these same [five] that are called also the f subtile ele-
ments’ (sukslima-bbuta), the ‘that merely’ (tan-mdtra), and the
f not [yet] made into the [gross] five’ (a-panchikrita) [by inter-
mixture—see No. 68—].
No. 43.—From these [subtile elements—No. 42—] are pro-
duced the subtile bodies [No. 44] and the gross elements, [No.
No. 44.—Subtile bodies? These are the cbodies whereby [the
individuated soul] is recognised’ (linga-sariraj, consisting of the
seventeen portions [No. 45].
No. 45.—But the portions ? These are the set of five intel-
lectual organs, Understanding and Mind, the set of five organs
of action, and the set of five [vital] airs [or involuntary bodily

a. [These ‘portions’ that make up the ‘subtile body’ are now
to be described in their order].
1 ww-
No. 46.—The intellectual organs are those called the hearing,
the touch, the sight, the taste, and the smell.
a. These are produced from the separate pure particles of the
Ether, &c. [No. 41] severally in their order.
[That is to say, the organ of hearing is produced from pure
etherial particles, that of feeling from pure aerial particles, and
so sight from light, taste from water, and smell from earth.
Compare the Tarka-Sangraha—p. 6].
No. 47.—Understanding ( buddhi) is that condition of the in-
ternal instrument (—antahkarana—thec inner man’__) which con-
sists in assurance.
a. Opining (manasj is that condition of the inner man which
consists in judging or doubting.
b. In these two [conditions] thinking and self-consciousness
are included [—thought being a matter of understanding, and
self-consciousness one of opinion].
c. Thinking is that condition of the inner man which consists
in seeking about.
d. Self-consciousness is that condition of the inner man which

consists in the conceit [that "it is I who affirm—opine—doubt, '
&c.” See Lecture on the Sankhya—No. 17—•].
uh i nut
No. 48.—These again [—No. 47—] are produced [—not like
the senses—see No. 46—from the particles of one separate ele-
ment severally, but] from the mingled pure particles belonging
to the Ether, &c.
a. That they are formed from the pure ( sattwika) particles [is
evident] from their consisting of enlightenment.
[See Sankhya Lecture—Nos. 50 and 39].
No. 49.—This understanding, being associated with the intel-
lectual organs, is the f intelligent sheath* (vijnanamaya-kosha)
[of the soul].
[The soul, viewed as being individuated or divided off—which,
however, the Vedantin does not admit that it ever in reality is,—
from the Absolute—the indivisible essential Joy-thought—-, is
treated as if it were deposited in a succession of sheaths envelop-
ing one another like the coats of an onion. The first, or inner,
most, of these integuments is the one just described. The out- '7
most sheath is our body of flesh and blood. The intermediate »
ones will be described in their order],
No. 50.—This [—i. e. the soul in its ‘ intelligent sheath*—No.
49’—] practically regarded [—for in strict truth there is no dif-

fercnce in soul at one time and any other time—] haunting this
world or the other world [which it is doomed to do] through its
U having the conceit that it is an agent and a patient [see Sankhya
Lecture §17] is called the ‘inferior souk (jivaj.
a. [The ■ subtile body’ consists of more than one sheath. Here
follows the account of the second one].
^fTrf HTfa I
No. 51.—But the mind, being associated with the organs of
action, becomes the ‘ mental sheath’ (manomaya-kosha).
[The soul (jiva) was divided off, from the Absolute, first by
the conceit of its own individuality. ItjLS removed a step further
from the tranquil joy of deity by its betaking itself to the opera-
tions of opining and doubting—the operations of the mind or the
judgment—-see No. 47. a.]
No. 52.—The organs of action [No. 45] are the voice, the
hands, the feet, the organ of excretion, and that of generation—
[See Lecture on the Sankhya—No. 29],
UrTTf^T TiH-
No. 53.—These [organs of action—No. 52—] again, several-,
ly in their order, are produced from [not the pure—see No. 46. a,
but from] the foul [or urgent and energetic] particles of the
Ether, &c. separately.
[Compare No. 46, and Sankhya Lecture §51].

^wt?W i
wCU*twft n
No. 54.—The [vital] airs ? These [No. 45] are respiration,
flatulence, circulation, pulsation of the throat and head, and as-
/ a. That called respiration is that which goes forward—having
its place in the forepart of the nose [—or being the breath of
one’s nostrils].
b. That called flatulence, which goes downwards, has its place
in the lower intestine, &e.
c. That called circulation, which goes every-where, is found in
the whole body.
d. That called pulsation of the throat and head, having its plaee
in the throat, is the ascending air that goes upwards.
e. That called assimilation, moving in the middle of the bodyy
assimilates the food that is eaten or drunk. But assimilating
means digesting—the making of juices, blood, semen, excrement^
No< 55.—But some say there are five other airs [besides those’
mentioned under No. 54] called [in slang language] the snake,
the tortoise, the partridge, the conch of Arjuna, and the god of

? fire. Among these—the snake produces retching; the tortoise
produces winking, &c.; the partridge produces hunger; the conch
of Arjuna produces yawning; the god of fire fattens.
a. Some say that there are only five—that of respiration, &c.
[No. 54]—because these [other varieties] are included under res-
piration, &c. [being merely modifications of them].
b. [The question of the ‘ vital airs/ being a question of physi-
ology, is one that we are not here particularly concerned with].
No. 56.—This set of five—respiration, &c. [No. 54] is produced
[not from the separate—see No. 53—but] from the mingled foul
[or energetic] particles [No. 53] that belong to the Ether, &c.
No. 57.—This set of five—respiration, &c. [No. 54] associated
with the organs of action becomes the f vital sheath' (pranama-
No. 58.—That this [set of five—No. 54—] is a product of the
foul [or energetic] particles [No. 56] [is evident] from the fact
that it consists of action.
[Compare No. 48, and Sankhya Lecture, No, 51].
i *rt-
^r: | q fwil ^frT |

No. 59.—Among these sheaths the intelligent sheath [No.
49], having the faculty of knowledge, is of the nature of an agent.
The ‘ mental sheath’ [No. 51], having the faculty of volition, is
of the nature of an instrument. The vital sheath [No. 57],
which has the faculty of action, is of the nature of a product [of
the union of the two former],
a. They say that such is the division of these [three sheaths],
for there is a fitness [in their mutual relations thus regarded].
frrf^Trf I
No. 60.—This triad of sheaths [No. 59], being united, is call-
ed. the ( subtile body’ (sukshma-sarvra).
Herf?r i
No. 61.—Here also [as in the cases referred to in No. 34 and
elsewhere], the totality of the subtile bodies, by being the locus
of the one [collective] intelligence [No. 62], is [—or may be re-
garded as—] collective—like the forest or like the mass of wa-
ters [see No. 34] ; and, by its being the locus of more than one
intelligence, it is [—or may be regarded as—] distributive—like
the trees [which constitute the forest] or like the waters [which
constitute the mass of waters].
No. 62.—Intellect located in this collective totality [of r sub-
tile bodies’—No. 61—], is called ‘ Soul-thread’ (sutratman) be-
cause it is passed like a thread through all, and [it is called] the
1 embryo of light’ (liiranyagarbha) because it is the superinten-
dent of [that sheath—see No. 49—wherein resides] the power of

knowledge, and [it is called] ‘life’ (prana), because it is the su-
perintendent of [that sheath—see No. 57—wherein resides] the
power of action.
(X iX '•
No. 63.—This collective totality [of the subtile bodies], from its
being subtile in comparison with the totality of the gross [see No.
76], is called the subtile body of him [Hiranyagarbha—No. 62].
This triad of the sheaths [-Hiranyagarbha’s subtile body-] formed
of knowledge, &c. [see No. 59], as it is made up of the continu-
ance of our waking thoughts [without the presence of the objects
that gave rise to them] is [what we call] ( dream ;’ and therefore [it
is called] the place [or scene] of the dissolution of the totality of
> the gross [—for then the sight of trees and rivers, and the sounds
of voices, &c., are present to us, without the actual things called
trees, &c. being present at all. To the dreamer the whole exter-
nal world is as it were not—and, in the opinion of the Vedantin,
to the dreamer it really is not].
No. 64.—Intellect located in the distributive arrangement of
this [aggregate of subtile bodies] is [called] ‘the resplendent’
(taijasa), because it is located in that inner man which is formed
of illumination—[light being the type of knowledge].
No. 65.—This distributive totality [of the subtile bodies] of

him fi. e. of ‘the Resplendent*—see No. 64], from its being sub-
tile in comparison with the gross body, is also [—as well as that
spoken of in No. 63—], called the subtile body. It [also] is the
triad of sheaths formed of intelligence, &c. [see No. 59]; and as
it is made up of the continuance of our waking thoughts [in the
absence of the objects that gave rise to them] it [also] is [what
we call] dream ; and for that reason it [also, as well as the col-
lective aggregate—see No. 63—] is called the scene of the disso-
lution of the totality of the gross.
No. 66.—Those two, the ‘ Soul-thread* [No. 62] and the ‘ Res-
plendent,* [No. 61] then [i. e. at the time of one*s dreaming—
No. 65—] by means of the subtile modifications of the mind, per-
ceive the subtile objects, [—the soul when awake, on the other
hand, perceiving the gross ones.]
a. [This may be inferred] from such texts as the one begin-
ning “The Resplendent, the enjoyer of the subtile,** &c.
b. [But where is the difference between the collective totality
and the distributive totality? He goes on to mention that there
is really none.]
No. 67.—Here also [as at Nos. 34, 61, &c.J there is no differ-
ence between the collective totality and the distributive totality
[of subtile bodies], nor between the ‘ Soul-thread* and the ‘ Res-
plendent* located therein >[i. e. in these severally—see Nos. 62,

and 64,] just as [there is no difference] between a forest and its
trees nor between the spaces designated [and occupied] by these
[i. e. by the forest and by the trees,] and [just as there is no
difference] between a body of water and its [constituent] waters,
nor between the sky reflected therein [i. e. reflected in the body
of waters and reflected in the separate portions of the water.]
a. Thus is the production of the subtile body.
HTli 1
No. 68.—[What then are] the ‘ gross elements* (sthula-bhuta-
nij ? They are what have been made [to possess the qualities of
the] five.
a. But [what is meant by] ‘ making [to possess the qualities of
the] five* ? [It is this.] Having [first] divided each of the five
[subtile elements—No. 41—•] Ether, &c. bipartitely and equally
[i. e. into two equal parts]• having [next] divided severally into
four equal parts the five first portions out of those ten portions;
the uniting of those four portions—after having abandoned the
second portion [of the bipartite division,] with the other portions
[of the other elements]—this is [what is called] the making [one
to possess the various qualities of the] five.
b. [Thus a measure—say of eight parts—of any of the gross
elements is held to consist of four parts of the subtile element
which it bears the name of, and one part of each of the other sub-
tile elements. Hence, while the subtile elements are the substrata
severally of a single quality—as Ether of sound, Water of savour,
and so on—the gross elements exhibit the qualities blended,—

Earth, for example, exhibiting all the five qualities that the five
senses take cognizance of].
i q^farcwr-
ri^T^r^T^ vvr i $faw i *h5t i ^drr
^sratwftr i ’W ^iwr: i vfzw
ww.’ I
No. 69.—And the doubt is not to be entertained that there is
no proof of this [i. e. of the fact which is asserted under No. 68,
«.,] because, by the text which speaks [expressly] of the combina-
tion by threes, [which no follower of the Vedas will question] the
combination by fives also [which we here assert] is indicated [—
conf. No. 35.] Although the five [gross elements, constituted in
the way explained in No. 68, a. and 6.] are alike in respect that
each is made up of all the five, yet the name of Ether is appropri-
ate to one, and of another [as the name of Earth or Air] to ano-
ther, according to the maxim [conveyed in the 22nd Aph. 3rd ch.
2nd Lecture of BadarayaNa] viz.—“But, as they differ [in having
each a large portion of one subtile element and a comparatively
small portion of the others—see No. 68. b.—] the one is called this
[—e. g. Ether,] and the other is called that [e. g. Earth or Air,
&c.”] Then, in the Ether [the quality of] sound is manifested;
in Air, sound and tangibility; in Eire, sound, tangibility, and
colour; in the Waters, sound, tangibility, colour, and savour; in
Earth, sound, tangibility, colour, savour, and odour.

HTTRt sf^T-
7T^^firT^Hf4^WniIX3tT'nnT3:i^T^T?^m^T7 i
No. 70.—From these gross elements [No. 68,] arise the worlds
that are one above the other—viz. those [heavens] called Bhur,
Bhuvar, Suiar, Mahar, Janar, Tapar, and Satya; and those that
are one beneath the other—viz. those [hells] called A ala, Vitala,
Sutala, Rasatala, Taldtala, Mahatala, and Patala; and [from the
same gross elements arise] the egg of Brahman [this vaulted
world] with the four kinds of gross bodies [No. 71,] contained in
it, and their food and drink, &c.
[The topography, &c. of the heavens and hells, being a matter
of mythology, we are not here concerned with.]
STCrTTfa I ^TrfTfa
No. 71.—Bodies are those called [severally] viviparous, ovi-
parous, equivocally generated, and germinating. The viviparous
are those that are produced from a womb—as men and the like.
The oviparous are those that are produced from an egg—as birds,
snakes, &c.; the equivocally generated are those produced from
sweat [or hot moisture]—as lice, gnats, &c.; the germinating are
those produced by springing from the earth—as creepers, trees,
sj GV Vi

n fwfefa W?HTfa-
Krf^^TT7^ ■U^RTT^WT^ I ’^WT wfe ^T-
Tzr^TH i
No. 72.—Here too [as in the other cases already mentioned,
where an aggregate may be viewed either collectively as one
thing, or distributively as many things], the gross bodies of the
four descriptions [specified in No. 71], since they may be the ob-
ject of cognizance as one or many, are [viewable as] either a col-
lection—as a forest or a mass of water,—or a distributive aggre-
gate—as the trees, or as the waters [that make up the forest and
the mass of water]. Intellect located in the collective aggregate
thereof, is called, as well as by other names, the ‘ Spirit of Hu-
manity’ (vaisivanara) and the f Ruler of the various’ fvirdtj,—be-
cause it arrogates to itself that it is all mankind, and because it
rules over the various kinds [of structures specified in No. 71].
This collective aggregate thereof is the gross body [of the Deity] ;
and since it is a modification of the food [out of which the gross
bodies of animals and vegetables are formed], it is called the nu-
trimentitious sheath (annamaya-kosha); and as it is the scene of
the experience of the gross [i. e. of the material objects, whether
of a pleasing or an annoying description, which are held—see No.
63—not to exist at all during sleep] it is called fthe awake’ [or
the waking world, in contradistinction to the world of dreams.]
No. 73.—Intellect located in the distributive aggregate thereof
[—No. 71—] is called the ‘Pervader’ fviswaj, because, without

abandoning the subtile body [No. 60,] it enters into [all] the
gross bodies, &c. This distributive aggregate thereof also [—as
well as the collective aggregate—see No. 72—] is the gross body
[of the Pervader;] and since it is a modification of the food [out
of which the gross bodies of animals and vegetables are formed,]
it is called the ‘nutrimentitious sheath / and as it is the scene of
the experience of the gross [objects whether pleasing or annoy-
ing,] it [also] is called fthe awake’—[see No. 72.]

No. 74.—Then [—i. e. during the state that we call the wa-
king state, see Nos. 72 and 73—] these two, the intellect of the
aggregate distributively [No. 73] and the intellect of the aggre-
gate collectively [No. 72,] take cognizance of sounds, feelings, co-
lours, savours, and odours by means respectively of the five or-
gans [of sense], whereof the hearing is the first, which are pre-
sided over, in their order [—see Sankhya Lecture §56—] by the
Sky, the Wind, the Sun, the regent of the waters, and the twin
physicians of the gods :—and [further—these same intelligences
are concerned about] uttering, taking, going, evacuating, and en-
joying, by means respectively of the five organs [of action] where-
of the voice is the first, which are presided over in their order by
Fire, Indra, Upendra, Yama, and Prajapati;—and [lastly—they
are concerned about] judging, determining, feeling self-conscious-

ness, and cogitating, by means respectively of the four internal
faculties called opining, understanding, consciousness, and think-
ing, [—see No. 47,] which are presided over in their order by the
Moon, Brahma, Siva and Vishnu;—[thus do these two come to
be concerned with] all these gross objects [—gross as compared
with the more subtile fabric of dreams—see No. 32. And—that
this is the case may be inferred] from the text beginning “ The
soul, in its waking state, outside,” &c.
[With the mythological reasons for the assignment of the seve-
ral provinces of cognition or of action to the several superinten-
dents here mentioned, we are not at present concerned.]
3T I
No. 75.—Here too, as before, [i. e. as in the other cases alrea-
dy mentioned where an aggregate may be viewed either collect-
ively as one thing or distributively as many things], there is no
difference between the distributive aggregate and the collective
aggregate of the gross, and between the ‘ Per vader’ and the f Spi-
rit of Humanity’ located in these, as [there is none] between the
forest and its trees, and between the space designated [and occu-
pied] by these severally, and [as there is none] between a body
of water and its [constituent] waters, and between the sky as re-
flected in [the one and the other of] these severally.
No. 76.—Thus does the gross [or material] world arise out of
the five elements [rendered gross by being] intermingled [in the
way set forth under No. 68].
H=rfrT | ^TT-

No. 77.—The collective aggregate of these worlds—the gross
[No. 76] the subtile [No. 66] and the causal [No. 26], is one
great world ; just as the collective aggregate of all the included
forests constitutes the one great forest [that includes these consti-
tuent parts]; or as the collective aggregate of all the masses of wa-
ter included in the collective mass is one great mass of water. So
too the intellect located therein—the intellect, reckoning from the
‘ Pervader’ [No. 73] and the ‘ Spirit of Humanity' [No. 72] up
to the f Lord’ [No. 25], is one only—just as is the space [but
one space—which is] designated [and occupied] by the [various
smaller] forests included [in the great forest], and as the sky [is
but one—that is] reflected in the [various smaller] masses of wa-
ter included [in the great mass of water].
x j q '
VRfrf I HTfrT I
No. 78.—Intellect—which is not [really] invested [with that
phenomenal world which seems to invest it], when not discrimi-
nated out of these two, viz., the great world [constituted by the
three specified in No. 77] and the intellect [seemingly] immer-
sed therein—[when undiscriminated, we repeat,] like [the heat
undiscriminated from the iron in] an ignited iron ball [see No.
35], is what is [ostensibly or] expressly spoken of in the great
sentence “ All this, truly, is God only.” [But, just as, when we
expressly say “ the hot iron scorches,” we really mean to say
“ the heat scorches”—and this meaning is indicated in the former
expression—so too] intellect discriminated [apart from all pheno-
menal investment—under which absolute aspect it is technically

named ‘ the Fourth’—sec No. 35—] is the really indicated [and
intended] meaning [of the terms in the great sentence,—which
therefore reduces itself to the identical formula that “ God is
No. 79.—Thus have we exhibited, under its generic aspect,
the [great error, announced in No. 20, of] clothing or investing
the Real with the Unreal [—of imputing to God the garb or ves-
ture of a phenomenal world when there is really no such thing].
a. [But this, which is held to be an error common to deluded
mortals of all descriptions, takes particular aspects in particular
cases, and these the author proceeds to specify.]
No. 80.—Now this or that person attributes this or that [er-
roneous] investment to Soul. The varieties [of opinion on this
point] shall be now stated.
a. [To make sure of an exhaustive enumeration, he commences
with the man who knows so little about the nature of the soul as
to be misled by a familiar metaphorical application of the term
to a beloved object. Each man, it may be remarked, here cites
Scripture in favour of his own view, offers a reason, and makes
an appeal to consciousness].
^H^frT ||
No. 81.—But a very uncultivated man says “ My son is my
sold/’—because the Veda declares, for example, that " Soul is
born as one’s son—and because one sees that one has love for
one’s son just as for one’s self; and because one feels that “ If
my son be destroyed or be in good case, I myself am destroyed
or am in good case.”

VT ’JWflW ^2nfip!JT. I V^TPJ^T-
frfo^sfcrrr erwv
SjsrjjHvr^ mftornvfa v^f?r n
No. 82.—But a [man of the sect named] Charvaka says that
the gross body is the soul—because the Veda declares, for ex-
ample, “ This same man [by which is meant the soul] consists of
solid food and juices and because one sees that one escapes
from a house on fire—even leaving one’s son; and because one is
conscious that “I am fat” or “I am lean”—[so that this “I33
must be the body.]
i S 'fc uthit: vmTvfW i
V^frT I
No. 83.—Another Charvaka says that the organs [of sense
and action—see No. 45] are the soul; because the Veda declares
that “Those vital airs, having approached Prajapati, said”—and
so on; and because in the absence of the organs, there is the ab-
sence of the functions of the body, and because [—feeling that
the loss of an organ is the loss of a part of one’s self—] one [hav-
ing lost an organ] is conscious that “ it is I that am one-eyed,”
or “ it is I that am deaf” &c.
vTmiHiv fwwF
Vim mi^flT I
No. 84.—But another Charvaka says that the vital airs are the
soul; because the Veda declares that “The other inner soul is
that that consists of the vital airs,” and so on; and because in
the absence of the vital airs the organs are not capable of their
functions; and because one is conscious that “ it is I that am

hungry,” or “ it is I that am thirsty,” &c.—[and these conditions
pertain to the vital airs on which depends the digestion—see No.
^T7?TT I
No. 85.—But another Charvaka, says that the mind is the soul,—
because the Veda declares that “The other, the inner soul, con-
sists of mind,” and so on; and because one observes that, when
the mind is asleep, the vital airs [—see No. 84—] are absent;
and because one is conscious that “ it is I who opine” or “ it is I
who doubt,” &c. [—and there is no question that these—see No.
46—are functions of the mind].
â– J sj
^frT I
No. 86.—But the Bauddha says that understanding [—see No.
46—] is the soul, because the Veda declares that the other, the
inner soul, consists of knowledge; and because, in the absence
of an agent, there is no power in the instrument [—and the mind
is held to be an instrument—see No. 46—] ; and because one is
conscious that “ it is I that act,” or “ it is I that experience”—
[and these even the other parties will allow to be functions of the
No. 87.—The Prabhakaras and the Dialecticians say that ig-
norance is the soul, because there is the text beginning with “ The

other, the inner soul, consisting of joy” and so on; and because
we see that the understanding and the rest resolve into uncon-
sciousness [during profound sleep; and, as the commentator ex-
plains this doctrine of the Prabhakaras, the soul, the substratum
of knowledge, must be something else than the knowledge which,
in the train of thought, momentarily occupies it,—so that, as'it <■
is not jndna, it must be ajndna ;—] and [the Prabhakaras hold
that the soul is unconsciousness] because one is aware [at one
time] that “I am ignorant,” and [at another time] that “I am '
cognizant” [—so that the “ I” is not knowledge, as the Bauddha
supposes—see No. 86—but the soul and knowledge stand in the
relation of subject and attribute].
: i hw
9 rT^T^frT T^frT ||
No. 88.—But the Bhatta says that intelligence united with
ignorance is the soul, because the Veda declares that “the soul
consists of knowledge alone, with much happiness,” &c.; and be-
cause, in profound sleep, there are present [at once] both light
[in the soul] and the absence of light [—for, as the commentator
says, referring to the sentence—see No. 33—“ I slept pleasantly
—I was aware of nothing”—if there were not light, or know-
ledge, in the soul, how could the sleeper have known that his
sleep was pleasant ?■—and if there were not the absence of light,
or knowledge, how could he say “ I was aware of nothing ?”] ;
and [the Bhatta further argues that the case is as he says] be-
cause [every] one has the consciousness that “ Myself I do not
^frT II

No. 89.—Another Bauddha says that the void is the soul, be-
cause the Veda declares that “ This [universe] previously was
simply non-existent,” &c.; and because in profound sleep [No.
33] every-thing ceases to exist; and because [every] one, on
arising from a deep sleep, has a conviction which has for its ob-
ject the recollection of his own non-existence— [thus] “ During
that deep sleep, I was not.”
a. [These various opinions respecting the nature of the soul—
' Nos. .81—89—he now undertakes to refute].
I sl^frr I
No. 90.—It shall be now explained how these, beginning with
“the son” [No. 81] and ending with “the void” [No. 89], are
not the soul.
a. As for these mere semblances of scriptural evidence, of ar-
gument, and of judgment, adduced [in support—see No. 80. a.—
of their respective opinions as to the nature of the soul] by the
speakers, from the “ very uncultivated man” [see No. 81] down-
wards ; since we see that the seeming texts arguments and judg-
ments of each one that comes first are rendered nugatory by the
seeming texts arguments and judgments of each that follows, it
is clear that “ the son” [whom the “ uncultivated man” regards
as his soul] or any of the others [of the things suggested in suc-
cession] is not the soul.

b. [Moreover, as each of these holders of an incorrect opinion
supports his view of the matter by what he fancies to be an ap-
propriate text, argument, and appeal to consciousness—No. 80.
a.—■, we, adopting so much of their example as is good, proceed
to remark that the opinions which have been just detailed are in-
correct] because [first] they are at variance with such very forci-
ble [and unmistakable] texts as this that “ The soul is not mind,
it is not an agent, it is mere Thought, existent[secondly] be-
cause whatever is other than Thought—beginning with“ the son”
[No. 81] and ending with “the void” [No. 89]—is no more
eternal than a water-jar or the like, seeing that it is only through
Thought that it appears at all ;* and [thirdly] because the wise
man’s consciousness, that “ I am Brahma,” is of more force, [as
an argument, than the mistaken notions for which your ignorant
man fancies that he has the evidence of direct consciousness —
for all these reasons—] and also because [as remarked in No. 90
a.] each of the seeming texts arguments and judgments is render-
ed nugatory [by some of the others,—it follows that] all these,
beginning with “ the son” [No. 81] and ending with “ the void”
[No. 89] is not the soul.
ii ii
No. 91.—Therefore [—i. e. for the reasons specified under No.
90—] the eternal, pure, intelligent, free, self-existent, and self-
evident Thought alone, to which each of these [that is regarded
see No. 81—89—by erroneous thinkers as the soul] owes that it
appears at all, is the soul. Such is the direct conviction of those
who understand the scope of the Veda.
a. So much for the “ erroneous imputation” [—to the soul—
of characters that do not belong to it;—see No. 20].
* The law maxim “ de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio”
is here followed out to the letter.
t On the liability to mistake inference for direct consciousness consult Mr.
J. S. Mill’s “ System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive,” Introduction, §4.

-J 3 V J
stjiwr?: ii
s> x xj s.
No. 92.—[What then, is] the Refutation [see No. 19. b. of the
“ erroneous imputation” referred to under No. 91. a.]? It is
the recognition of the reality itself, instead of the unreal world
which, originating in ignorance, envelopes the reality; and this
is like the recognition of the rope itself [see No. 20] instead of
the serpent [the erroneous notion of ] which enveloped the rope
[and, till the discovery of the mistake, prevented the observer
from discerning the real nature of the object].
irrTlf^T Tf^rTWldTfq
^frT I RrTrfR KTR
J W^frT 1 ^rf
'J Gs
No. 93.—That is to say [—for the passage No. 92 may require
illustration—], (1) this scene of fruition, consisting of the four
kinds of gross bodies [No. 72, the souls encased in which enjoy or
suffer,] and (2) the food and drink and other things in the shape
of what is adapted to their fruition, and (3) the fourteen worlds,
beginning with the Earth [No. 70] which sustain these [bodies
with their food, &c.], and (4) the substrate of [all] this, viz. Brah-
ma’s egg [or the created and vaulted universe], all this is merely

[or nothing other than] the gross elements [No. 68] which are
the cause thereof [—as a jar is nothing else than the baked clay
of which it consists].
a. These [things enumerated under No. 93], along with Sound
and the other objects of sense originating in the gross elements
[as mentioned under No. 93], and whatever is the product of the
subtile body [No. 60],—all this is nothing else than the unmin-
gled elements [No. 41. 5.], which are the cause thereof [—i. e.
the cause of the gross elements, &c.].
b. These unmingled elements [No. 93. a ] along with the Qua-
lities, beginning with Purity [No. 25], in the converse order of
their origination [as laid down in No. 41],—all this is nothing
else than Intellect immersed in Ignorance, which is the cause
thereof [—i. e. the cause of the f unmingled elements/ &c.].
c. This Ignorance, and Intellect immersed in Ignorance taking
the shape of the Lord [No. 25], &c.,—all this is nothing else
than ‘ the Fourth’ [No. 34], i. e. mere Deity, in the shape of In-
tellect not immersed [in any qualities], and which is [as intimat-
ed in the exordium of the book] the substratum of all [the nn-
realities that appear].
frT I I
Wl ^HT^RZTI^T H^frT | Hr^’TT^Tf^rTTVT^rFR-

No. 94.—The clearing up of the sense of the words ‘That’ and
'Thou* [in the sentence “That art Thou”—see No. 35—Jis
effected by means of [a right understanding of ] these two, viz.,
the ‘ Erroneous imputation’ [see No. 20], and the ‘'Refutation’
thereof [see No. 92].
a. [To explain]:—(1) the collective aggregate of 'Ignorance
[No. 23], (2) Intellect immersed in this and distinguished by the
possession of omniscience, &c., [No. 25], and (3) that not immers-
ed in this [—i. e. the ‘ Fourth’—see No. 34—], these three, when
they seem to be one, like an ignited iron ball [—in which—see
No. 35—the heat and the iron are intimately commingled—] are
what the word c That’ literally means [—the word ‘ That,’ there-
fore, designating the collective aggregate of all things].
b. [Again] :—the real [or the ‘indicated’ as opposed to the
'literal’] meaning of the word f That’ is the absolute Intellect
[No. 34] which is the substratum of that [qualified Intellect—
No. 25] which is immersed therein [i. e. immersed in Igno-
c. [Further]:—(1) the distributive aggregate of Ignorance
[No. 28], (2) Intellect immersed in this and distinguished by the
possession of partial knowledge, &c. [No. 31], and (3) that not
immersed in this [—i. e. the ‘ Fourth’—see No. 94, a.] these
three, when they seem to be one, like an ignited iron ball [—sec
No. 94. a.] are what the word ‘ Thou’ literally means ; [the word
‘ Thou,’ therefore, appropriately designating any individual in
the distributive aggregate of all things].
d. [And again] :—the real meaning of the word ‘ Thou’ is the
absolute Intellect [—see No. 94. A], in the shape of joy, the
r Fourth’ [No. 34], which is the substratum of that [qualified In-
tellect—No. 28—] which is immersed therein [i. e. in Igno-
rance] .

e. [The question here, it will be observed, is furnished by the
declaration—see No. 35—‘That art Thou'—i. e. ‘Thouart Brah-
ma* ; and the question is this—how can the term ‘ That’ and the
term ‘ Thou’ mean the same thing ? If they cannot be shewn to
mean the same thing, then the sentence does not enunciate a
truth. The author therefore undertakes to show that they do
mean the same thing. This he does by showing, as we have just
seen, that the only apparent difference between the senses of the
two terms is that which appears to exist between Ignorance in
its collective aggregate (No. 94. a.) and Ignorance in its distribu-'
live aggregate (No. 94. c.); and as it has been ruled (at No. 34)
that these have no difference—“ as there is none between a forest
and its trees”—it follows that there is no difference in meaning
between the term ‘ That’ and the term ‘ Thou’ in the sentence
‘ That art Thou.’ The author proceeds to illustrate this impor-
tant point as follows].
No. 95.—Now the sense of the Great Sentence [No. 35] shall
be explained. This great sentence—viz., ‘ That art Thou’—de-
clares to ns, through the three relations [which the sentence in-
volves] what is meant by ‘the Indivisible’ [see No. 2. a.]
i ^t: i w-
rT^f | cTT
No. 96.—The ‘three relations’ [—No. 95—•]? These are (1) the
reference to one and the same thing of the two words [‘ That’ and

' Thou’], (2) the relation, of subject and predicate, in which the
things stand that these two words [primarily] denote, and (3) the
relation of what is ‘ indicated’ [or really meant] and the ‘ indi-
cator/ which is the relation between pure Soul and the [primary]
senses of the two terms [‘That’ and ‘Thou’].
a. This has been declared [by an ancient writer] as follows :—
“ Reference to the same thing, and the relation of subject and
predicate, and the relation of ‘ indicated’ and ‘ indicator,’ are the
relations between Soul and the primary senses [of the words
‘ That’ and ‘ Thou’].”
b. [How each of these relations applies to the case in hand is
next to be explained.]
No. 97.—As for their relation of ‘reference to one and the
same thing’ [No. 96], it is as follows. As, in the sentence ‘ That
[person whom I saw on some former occasion] is this same De-
vadatta [whom I now behold’], there is between the word ‘ That’
—which denotes the Devadatta of the previous occasion—and the
word ‘ This’—which denotes the Devadatta of the present occa-
sion—the relation that consists in their both referring to one
and the same person; so also, in the sentence ‘ That art Thou/
there is, between the word ‘ That’ which denotes the Soul with
the [negative] attributes of invisibility, &c., and the word ‘ Thou’

which denotes the Soul with the [positive] attributes of visibility,
&c. [attached to it in the shape of its attendant body]—the rela-
tion that consists in their both referring to one and the same In-
telligence [—see No. 35].
I ^’STT ^^T^rTt^T-
i rrsn^rfg
TT^T^rqXT wrf^r-
No, 98.—As for their relation of ‘ subject and predicate’ [No.
96—], it is as follows. As, in that same sentence [viz., ‘That is
this same Devadatta’—see No. 97—], there is, between the De-
vadatta of the prior occasion—who is denoted by the word ‘That’
—and the Devadatta of the present occasion—who is denoted by
the word ‘This’—the relation of subject and predicate, which is
constituted by the exclusion of tlieir mutual difference [viz., the
consideration of past and present time—] ; so also in this sen-
tence [viz., ‘ That art Thou’—] there is, between the Soul with
the [negative] attributes of invisibility, &c.,—which is denoted
by the word ‘ That’—and the Soul with the [positive] attributes of
visibility, &c., [attached to it in the shape of its attendant body],
the relation of ‘ subject and predicate,’ which is constituted by the
exclusion of their mutual difference [—viz., the Ignorance—see
No. 35—which is no ‘ Reality’—see No. 20. 6.].

No. 99.—As for the relation of what is ‘indicated* and the
'indicator’ [No. 96], it applies to the case as follows. As, in
that same sentence [viz., ‘ That is this same Devadatta’—see No.
97—], when we leave out the distinction of contradictory times,
past and present, belonging to the words ' That’ and ' This,’ or to
what these primarily denote [viz., the Devadatta of former days
and the Devadatta of the present,] then these words stand
in the relation of ‘ indicator and indicated’ as regards Devadatta
[simply]—who is not the contradictory of himself;—so also in
this sentence [viz., 'That art Thou’], when we leave out the dis-
tinction of the contradictory properties, ' invisibility, &c.,’ and
' visibility, &c.,’ pertaining to the words ' That’ and ' Thou,’ or to
what these primarily denote [—viz., the invisible Soul and the
embodied Soul—], then these words stand in the relation of ' in-
dicator and indicated’ as regards the [absolute] Intelligence—
which is not the contradictory of itself.
a. This [indicatory employment of terms] is what [in Rhetoric]
is called bhaga-lakshana—i. e., the ' indication of a portion [ab-
stracted from what the term primarily denotes].’
b. [The author now proceeds to contend that the meaning of
the ' Great Sentence’ cannot be accounted for on other princi-
ples of interpretation than those that have been just set forth].

No. 100.—In this sentence [—viz. ‘ That art Thou’—] the li-
teral meaning of the sentence is not coherent, as it is in the ex-
pression ‘ The lotus is blue? In that expression, since the blue
—the quality denoted by the word (blue? and the lotus—the
substance denoted by the word ‘ lotus’, exclude such qualities as
1 white’ and such substances as ‘ cloth’ [but do not exclude one
another], the literal meaning of the sentence is coherent, because
no evidence, from any other quarter, opposes our accepting this
as the sense of the sentence that the two are united as subject and
attribute, or that either one, to which the other is attributed, is
identical with it [—the ‘ lotus’ being the thing that we call
‘ blue,’ and the ‘ blue’ thing being what we call ‘lotus.’ But the
case does not stand thus with the terms ‘ That’ and ‘ Thou’ as we
shall now see].

No. 101.—But in this sentence [—viz., ‘That art Thou’—as
opposed to the sentence considered under No. 100—] since the
Soul ‘ invisible, §c.,3 denoted by the word ‘ That,’ and the Soul
‘ visible, $c.,3 [in association with the body] denoted by the word
‘ Thou,’ exclude each other mutually, the literal meaning of the
sentence is not coherent, because the evidence of the senses, &c.,
opposes our accepting this as the sense of the sentence that the
two [which mutually exclude each other] are united as subject
and attribute, or that either one, to which the other is attributed,
is identical with it.
a. [The author now proceeds to reject another principle of in-
terpretation—see No. 99. b.—on which it has been sought to ac-
count for the ‘great Sentence’.]

f^^i^Twrwi4 q-tx^^r Tr^f^Sl^^nrnn
3rwT55F^^n i
No. 102.—But again, there [i. e. in the sentence 'That art
thou1] coherence is not arrived at by our supposing the terms to
be ' indicatory with the relinquishment of their own primary mean-
ing5 [—see Sahitya Darpana §15. a.] as is the case in the sen-
tence, ‘ The herdsman dwells on the Ganges’. In the case of this
latter sentence, since there is a complete incompatibility in the
primary meaning of [the terms in] the sentence, which indicates
that the Ganges and the herdsman stand in the relation of 1 loca-
tion and located’ [—while we very well know that the surface of
the Ganges is no location for a herdsman—], we do arrive at a co-
herent sense by holding that the case is one of ' indication with
the abandonment of the primary meaning’ [—the word ' Ganges’
abandoning its primary meaning of a particular stream, and then
standing for the bank thereof—] seeing that it [i. e. the stream
itself] is quite qualified to indicate the bank adjoining it [—inas-
much as we may quite intelligibly talk of Benares as standing
' on the Ganges’ when we really mean that it stands ' on the
bank of the Ganges’].
No. 103.—In this sentence, on the other hand, [as distinguish-
ed from that of ' The herdsman on the Ganges’—No. 102—] co-
herence is not to be arrived at by our supposing the terms to be
* indicatory with the relinquishment of their own primary mean-

ing’; because, since there is only a partial incompatibility be-
tween the things denoted in the sentence [‘ That art thou’] which
asserts the identity of the invisible Soul and of the Soul visible
[as embodied], it would not be fit that, abandoning the residue of
the meaning, there should be indicated something else [quite dif-
ferent,—as, on the other hand, the word ‘ Ganges,’ entirely aban-
doning its own sense, very fitly indicates a ‘ bank’—in the sen-
tence ‘The herdsman on the Ganges’}.
err srrsrr^TfvjrriT^ tt
'• GK sj
No. 104.—And you must not say—(< As the word c Ganges,’
by relinquishing [—see No. 102—] its own primary meaning,
indicates that which is the primary meaning of the word ‘ bank,’
so also let the word f That’ or the word ‘ Thou’, by relinquishing
its own primary meaning, convey the meaning of the word ‘ Thou’
or of the word f That’ [—the meanings being thus interchan-
ged—} ; and therefore why does [the figure of speech called] f In-
dication with the abandonment of the primary meaning’ [No.
102] not apply here [as well as in the case of ‘ The herdsman on
the Ganges’] ?” [The two cases differ] because, although, in the
case of the one expression,—since, from the word bank’s not being
heard, the sense of that word did not offer itself,—it was to be ex-
pected that it should be conveyed by indication; still it was not
to be expected that, when the sense of the two terms f That’ and
‘ Thou’ had been apprehended by the hearing of the terms' That’

and ‘ Thou/ the sense of each should be conveyed over again,
indicatorily, by each term reciprocally.
wt vnr^frr i
ilH Trf^XTVTfHwr^^n^T?-
^•^UTT I 7T
wfa?W ^rferr^ str
mfa |
No. 105.—To this sentence [viz., 'That art thou’] also [the
figure of speech called] ‘Indication without relinquishment of
the primary meaning [see Sdhilya Darpana §14. a.] does not ap-
ply as it does in the case of the expression f The Red gallops/
In the case of this expression [viz., ‘ The Red—or the Chest-
nut—gallops'], since the primary meaning of the sentence is in-
coherent—purporting, as it does, that a quality, viz., 'red,' moves
[—whereas motion can belong only to a substance*—•], the appli-
cation of [the figure of speech called] 1 Indication without relin-
quishment of the primary meaning5 may take place, since we
may get rid of the incoherency of the sentence by holding that
some substratum of the quality,—for example a [chestnut] horse,—
is indicated without the relinquishment of the primary meaning.
[The word ' red5, when it indicates a horse of that colour, still
continues to convey its primary sense along with the horse;—
which is not the case with the word ‘ Ganges,5 when, as under No.
102, we speak of ‘ a city on the Ganges5.] But in the case of
this expression [—viz. ‘ That art thou5—], the application of [the
figure of speech called] f Indication without relinquishment of
See Kanada’s Aphorisms, Leet. I. Sect. 1. Aph. 15.

the primary meaning’ cannot take place, because, whilst the pri-
mary import of the sentence —viz., the one-ness of the invisible
and of the [embodiedly] visible soul—is incoherent, the incohe-
rence cannot be removed by either term’s indicating anything
else whatever in connection with its own primary meaning re-
rTrq^T^' =TT I V?T: TTW W
^TUT^tsfi^TUfjrfTT =(FST I ^r5 TmT^TVFrf^T-
No. 106.—And you must not say—“Let the word 'That’
[—in the sentence f That art thou’—■], or the word r Thou,’ by
relinquishing the inconsistent portion of its primary meaning
[—see No. 103—] indicate [severally and reciprocally] the thing
meant by the word ‘ Thou’ or by the word f That/—and why
then [—if this suffice to explain the matter—] postulate an indi-
catory power of another description—viz., [that which, at No. 99.
a., you appear to think it necessary to admit under the name of
the] ‘ Indication of a portion [abstracted from what the term pri-
marily denotes]’ ?” [This you must not say] because it is impos-
sible that one single word should indicate both a portion of its
own primary meaning and also the sense of another word [such
an incongruous kind of f Indication’ being nowhere recognised by
the authoritative expounders of the powers of language—], and
because no one expects that what has been already intimated by
a separate word shall be indicatorily intimated over again. [For
example,—if we employed the expression c A city on the bank of
the Ganges/ no one would look to the word 1 Ganges’ to imply
the * bank/—as one does, however, look to it to imply when allu-
sion is made to •* A city on the Ganges’.]

ih ysr ^f?r h^h tt r^-Rr-
HwrafifijTOtaj ^^TrnRr^
7TWT H^TT^tfTT ^Tlgj cPpTT 3fT ^T^rif^f^fjJ'g'
rfiWW^W 3TW§^n$ f^TTVTf^^’TTT^^T-
No. 107.—Therefore, as the sentence f That is this same De-
vadatta’ [—see No. 96. a.—], or what is primarily meant by the
terms thereof,—since there is a partial inconsistency in the sen-
tence, importing, as it does, the Devadatta of prior times and the
Devadatta of thepresent time,—having abandoned the inconsistent
portion,—viz., the being one of prior times and the being one of
the present time,—indicates merely that portion of Devadatta
[viz., Devadatta minus the time in connection with which he is
spoken of,] which involves no inconsistency;—so also the sentence
r That art Thou/ or what is primarily meant by the terms there-
of, —since there is a partial inconsistency in the sentence, im-
porting, as it does, the invisible and the [embodiedly] visible
Soul,—having abandoned the inconsistent portion,—viz., the be-
ing one possessed of invisibility, &c., and the being one possessed
of visibility, &c.—indicates merely the Indivisible Intellect, which
involves no inconsistency.
a. [This view of the matter may be illustrated algebraically.
Not being able to admit as an equation the expression ‘Devadat-
ta-|-past time=Devadatta-(-present time/ we reflect that the
conception of time is not essential to the conception of the Deva-
datta's nature ; and we strike it out of both sides of the expres-
sion which then gives ‘ Devadatta=Devadatta/—the equality be-
ing that of identity. In the same way, not being able to admit

as an equation the expression ' Soul-|-invisibility, &c.=Soul-{-vi-
sibility, &c.,’ we reflect that the visibility, &c., are but the modi-
fications of 1 Ignorance/ which, we were told at No. 20. b., is no
1reality? Deleting the unessential portion of each side of the
expression, we find (Soul=Soul/—the equality being here also
that of identity.]
b. (The next thing to be determined is how the student is to
make a practical application of this to his own case.]
No. 108.—Now we shall explain the import of that expression
of [a sagacious] consciousness ‘ I am Brahma’ [—which, see No.
90. b.t is held to be intuitive in the wise, as the feeling of hunger
or of thirst or the like is in the ordinary man],
a. When the meaning of the ‘ Indivisible’ [see No. 95] has
thus been communicated by means of the Sentence [' That art
thou’], after the teacher has in the foregoing manner [Nos. 94—
LOT—] cleared up the sense of the two terms ‘ That’ and ‘ Thou’,
—then does there occur to the competent student [No. 6.] a
modification of the understanding as moulded on the form of the
f Indivisible,’ [to which he gives utterance in such terms as the
following,] viz., “I am the eternal, pure, knowing, free, true,
self-existent, most blessed, infinite Brahma,—[One] without a se-
b. [Here it may be worth while to consider what is in-
tended by the expression ‘ modification of the understanding’
(chitta-vritti). What we here speak of as 'the understanding’ is

elsewhere named also 'the internal organ’ (antahkaranr.J. In
the Vedanta Paribhashd we find this organ of the soul compared
to water, in respect of its readiness to adapt itself to the form of
whatever mould it may enter,—as follows : “ As the water of a
reservoir, having issued from an aperture, having entered, by a
channel, the basins (or beds with raised edges formed in the
fields that require irrigation) becomes four-cornered or otherwise
shaped just like these beds ; so the manifesting internal organ,
having gone, through the channel of the sight or some other
organ of sense (except through which the internal organ cannot
reach its object, just as the water, without a channel, could not
reach the beds to be irrigated), to where there is an object, for
instance ajar, becomes modified by the form of the jar or what-
ever the object may be. It is this altered state (of the internal
organ) that is called its 'modification’ (vriZZz.)”* This 'mani-
festing internal organ’ is regarded as not only moulding itself
upon the object but as revealing or exhibiting it as a mirror does.
Thus, when the competent student has arrived at the point now
under discussion, his ' internal organ,’ or understanding, mirrors
the ' Indivisible.’ But this does not suffice, as the author goes
on to say.]
rT^wT^rn^rsjTffiT^T^TftrTT f^T^FRfq- ^T-
* 3RT
zftuRH i n Tfc0 11

No. 109.—But this modification of the understanding [No.
108. a.], being accompanied by the reflection of Brahma [thus
accurately mirrored in the understanding], having taken as its
object what was not previously recognised, viz., the supreme
Brahma, who differs not from the individual Soul, puts an end to
the ' Ignorance’ in respect thereof. Then, as a web is burnt when
the yarn that was the cause of it is burnt; so too, when ‘ Igno-
rance,’ which is the cause of all productions, is put an end to,
since every one of its effects is put an end to, then this modifica-
tion of the understanding, mirroring the form of the ‘Indivisi-
ble,’ is put an end to also—it being one [product] among these
[various productions which all havef Ignorance’ as their cause.]
a. [This,—though it may sound strangely—yet follows logical-
ly ; for, if everything other than the ‘ Indivisible’ is f Ignorance/
and if ‘Ignorance’ is nothing, then the act of the understanding
which rightly recognises the ‘ Indivisible’ is itself a non-entity,
and disappears in the act of recognition].
^rT No. 110.—As the shine of a lamp, having no power to illumi-
nate [and not being required to illuminate] the shine of the sun,
is overpowered thereby; so too the [reflected] Soul, as reflected
in that ‘ modification of the understanding’ [discussed under No.
108. a., &c.], through its having no power to illuminate [and not
being required to illuminate] that self-luminous Supreme Brahma
who is none other than the individual soul, being overpowered
thereby, leaves nothing besides the Supreme Brahma who is none
other than the individual soul,—just as, on the removal of a mir-

ror, the reflection of a countenance leaves nothing besides the
countenance itself,—[and we say that nothing besides the Su-
preme Brahma is then left] because that ‘modification of the un-
derstanding/ which is a portion of that [f Ignorance’] in which
He was immersed, has been put an end to [by the recognition of
the fact that nothing besides Him exists].
rT I
No. 111.—And, the matter standing thus [as set forth in the
passages just preceding], there is no inconsistency between the
two texts of scripture ‘ By the mind He is to be apprehended/
&c., and ‘who is not comprehended by the mind/ &c.; because,
while admitting [as we did under No. 108] that He is made an
object of the understanding, we laid down [in No. 110] a denial
that this involved the [usual] consequence [—as we go on to ex-
plain,—first citing an authority in support of our assertion].
rpnf^l ^4 ^Z
^[rf ^Z Wf^F
^z wfa i
^zif^ fwftepzr wct
No. 112.—And [in regard to the point referred to in No. Ill]
it has been declared as followsWhilst it is necessary that the
understanding should be available for the destruction of ignorance

respecting God, it is denied by the authors of the Institutes that
the usual result of this applies to Him also.” For, again—" Since
He is self-luminous, there is no need of light [to be thrown up-
on Him, any more than there is need of holding a candle to the
sun, which shows itself on the removal of intervening obstacles] .”
a. There is a [great] difference between a ' modification of the
understanding’ when moulded on a material object and this [when
mirroring the Supreme Intelligence]. To explain :—Suppose we
have the case—“this [I perceive] is a jar”—Here, having taken
as its object the jar, previously un-recognised, the 'modification
of the understanding’ mirroring the form [and character] of the
jar, on dispelling the ignorance that previously attached to the
object, throws light upon the jar by the light of its own intelli-
gence ;—just as the shine of a lamp, when it throws itself upon
the surrounding jars, &c., in the dark, on dispelling the darkness,
illuminates them with its own light:—[but this usual sequel to the
removal of intervening darkness or ignorance does not apply when
the object of the understanding is the Supreme Intelligence].
No. 113.—Until Intellect [or Deity] becomes in this way di-
rectly manifest in its own form, since it is necessary to persevere
in(i) hearing, (2) pondering, (3) contemplation, and (4) medita-
tion, these also shall be now explained.
No. 114.—As for 'hearing’ [—No. 113—] this implies the de-
termining, through the six characters [or conducers to knowle ge],
the import of the whole of the theological sections of the Vedas'

YedXnta. 67
in regard to the f Real' [No. 20 o.J, besides which there is nought
No. 115.—The characters—[or conducers to knowledge—No.
116—] ? These are [six peculiarities in the teaching of the Ve-
da, which conduce to the hearer’s accurate apprehension of the
truth—] viz., (1) the ‘beginning and ending with’ [see No. 116],
(2) ‘ inculcation,’ (3) the ‘ novelty’ [of the fact asserted,—see No.
118—], (4) the [‘alluring mention of the] fruit [to be gained
from the knowledge offered],’ (5) the ‘eulogizing of the subject/
and (6) ‘ illustration from analogy’.
^TTr I *TWT ^1^^ W
No. 116.—Among these [enumerated in No.. 115] the ‘begin-
ning with and ending with’ imply that the matter to be declared
in any given section is declared both at the beginning and at the
end thereof:—as, for instance, in the sixth section oi the Chhan-
dogya Upanishad, the ‘ Real, besides which there is nought else’—
which is to be explained in that section—is declared at the out-
set in the terms “ One only, without a second,” and at the end
in the terms “ All this consists of That.”

No. 117.—‘ Inculcation’ [No. 115] is the declaration again
and again therein [i. e. in some given section of the Veda] of
that thing which the section is concerned with declaring :—as,
for example, in that same section [referred to under No. 116],
the ‘ Real, besides which there is nought else’ is set forth [no
less than] nine times in the shape of the assertion ‘That art
No. 118.—‘ Novelty’ [No. 115] here means that the Thing,
which the section is concerned with declaring, is not an object
[previously ascertained by means] of any other proof [besides the
declaration then first made] .—as, for example, in that same sec-
tion [referred to in No. 116], the truth regarding the ‘ Real, be-
sides which there is nought else’ is not the object of any other
proof [besides the declaration of the Veda, and is not to be
learned elsewhere].
No. 119.—By the ‘ fruit’ [No. 115] we mean the motive which
is heard stated, in this or that [section of the Veda], for seeking
the knowledge respecting Soul that is brought forward in the
sect on, or for persevering therein [i. e. for persevering in the ef-
fort to realize this knowledge for ourselves] :—as, for example, in
that same section [referred to in No. 116], we learn that the in-
ducement for acquiring a knowledge of the ‘ Real, besides whom
there is nought else,’ is that we may attain to [being ourselves]

that [Reality] ;—for [we find it written as follows]—“ The man
that hath a [fit] teacher knoweth [the truth]; but [not immedi-
ately attaining to emancipation] he must abide until he be re-
leased [from the body] ; then will he attain [to absorption into
the one Reality].
rri" Trif irsi^rR’shT^: I
No. 120.—The f eulogizing of the subject’ [No. 115] is the
glorifying of what is set forth in this or that section [of the Ve-
da] ; as for example, in that same section [referred to in No.
1J6], the glorifying of the ‘ Real, besides whom there is nought
else,’ in the following terms :—“ Thou, O disciple, hast asked for
that instruction whereby the unheard-of becomes heard, the in-
conceivable becomes conceived, and the unknowable becomes tho-
roughly known.”
rTl- THF I
rr< f^rr wnr
No. 121.—An f illustration from analogy’ [No. 115] is the ex- *
hibition of a reason, heard stated in this or that [section of the
Veda], for the establishment of what is set forth in the section :—
as, for example, in that same section [referred to in No. 116], we
hear stated, as illustrations from analogy, such arguments as
the following, to show, when establishing what is the ‘ Real, be-
sides whom there is nought else,’ that His [supposed] mutations

[are mere figures of speech, or] rest on nothing but words :—•" O
gentle one ! As, by means of a lump of clay [properly under-
stood], everything that is made of the clay is perfectly known to
us,—its modifications, or various names, [such as jars, &c.,] resting
merely on language, whilst the truth is that there is [nothing
really else in the case than] the clay [which may change its name
but not its nature;—so also is it with the one Reality].”
a. [Having directed that the student is to hear the Veda—see
No. 113,—and having explained how the Veda is adapted to im-
press the hearer, the author next explains what he means by the
< pondering’ (mananaj recommended at No. 113],
No. 122.—But ‘ pondering’ [No. 113]? This is the dwelling
with uninterrupted attention on the f Real, besides whom there
is nought else,’ which he has heard [declared to him in the Ve-
das], together with such illustrations [of the truth—see No.
121—] as are in accordance with the Vedantic doctrine.
rTT^TT 5%: i
No. 123.—‘ Contemplation’ (nididhydsanaj [No. 113] is the
homogeneous flow [or continuance] of the understanding mirro-
ring its object, when this object is the f Real, besides which there
is nought else,’—to the exclusion of the notion of body or any
other thing heterogeneous [to the one Reality mirrored in the
understanding as explained at No. 108. 3J.

i tt^t
jfa t rTHTH 7T W HUffi I |
rfa^^T 3RlW*i TT wf^HTrf <^^5^ I
in 7Tihr ^ri i Tfw u S> sj J
*r6rf^vjTTT Ksfe A h fanr^- ^if^r i
No. 124.—'Meditation* (samadhi) [No. 113] is of two kinds
—(1) ' recognising such distinctions as that of subject and object*
(savikalpaka), and (2) ' recognising no such distinctions as that of
subject and object* (nirvikaipaka).
a. Of these, that [meditation] ' which recognises such a distinc-
tion as that of subject and object’ ? This consists in the continu-
ance of the understanding in that modification [No. 108, £.] in
which it mirrors the ' Real, besides which there is nought else,*—
without any concern about the sinking of the distinction between
the knower, the knowledge, &c., [which are not really distinct
from each other].
b. Then [i. e. at the time of meditation without exclusion of
the distinctions just mentioned] the ‘ Real, without a second,*
does shine forth even whilst there is the appearance of duality;—
just as there is the recognition of the clay [—the only reality in
the case—see No. 121—] when we perceive such a thing as an
elephant formed of clay [—the elephant being here a mere name
given to the clay].
c. Such [meditations, without exclusion of the distinctions
just mentioned,] have been uttered by [sages] intent [on emanci-
pation],—in terms such as the following:—“ I am that being, in
the shape of [simple] vision, like the Ether [all-pervading], pre-
eminent, immediately manifest, unproduced, one and imperish-
able, unsoiled [by contact with aught else], omnipresent, self-

existent, without a second, and for ever free. I am the pure
[act of ] vision, unchangeable :—I have no fetter, nor am I set
free [—having always been so].”
fa R^T^RT^TfarTTRT R^R^faRRR^tHRRR^fa |
No. 125.—But that [meditation] ‘ which recognises no such
distinction as that of subject and object’ [No. 124] ? This con-
sists in the [unvaried] continuance of the understanding modi-
fied so as to mirror the ‘Real, besides which there is nought
else/—[not, as in No. 124, a., without, but] with advertence to
the sinking of all distinction between the knower, the knowledge,
and the known,—in absolute oneness [of the Reality and the un-
derstanding of the Reality].
a. Then [i. e. at the time of meditation ivith exclusion of all
distinction between subject and object &c.], the‘Real, besides
which there is nought else/ shines forth alone, in the absence of
the [separate] recognition of the understanding as mirroring the
solitary Reality;—-just as there appears nothing but the water
when the salt, which [on solution] took the form of the water for
its own, is no longer recognised.
R ^^fa iTsprfa rrih
No. 126.—And you must not entertain the doubt whether
there be therefore [—i. e, seeing that the understanding, as mo-

(lifted by any impression, disappears here as well as in sound
sleep—see No. 33—you must not doubt, we repeat, whether
therefore] there is no difference between this [viz. the state of
cognition described in No. 125, a.], and sound sleep; because,
whilst the non-appearance of the modification [of the under-
standing] is common to both cases, the two cases differ just in
this that it is present in the one case [though not perceived],
while in the other [viz. in deep sleep] it is not present at all.
No. 127.—The practices subservient to this [meditation—see
No. 125—] are (1) ‘ forbearance’ (yama), (2) ‘ religious obser-
vance’ (niyama), (3) ‘ postures’ (asana,) (4) ' suppression of the
breath’ (pranayama), (5) ‘restraint’ ( pratyahara), (6) (atten-
tion’ (dharana), (7) (contemplation’ (dhyana,) and (8) ‘ meditation’
[of the kind mentioned at No. 124, «].
No. 128.—Of these [enumerated under No. 127,] the acts of
‘forbearance’ are (1) not killing, (2) not lying, (3) not stealing,
(4) continence, and (5) not accepting gifts.
No. 129.—Acts of ‘ religious observance’ [No. 127] are (1)
purification, (2) contentment, (3) penance, (4) study, and (5) per-
severing meditation on the Lord.
ht5t i
No. 130.—‘ Postures’ [No. 127] are the various modes of dis-
posing the hands, feet, &c., spoken of as padma and swastika,
&c., [which need not be here described].

a. [With these and other such like matters of ceremonial our
enquiry at present is in no degree concerned; but we proceed
with our text-book].
No. 131.—f Suppressions of the breath' [No. 127] are those me-
thods for checking respiration spoken of as (1) slow expiration
(2) slow inspiration, and (3) stopping the breath by shutting the
mouth and closing both nostrils with the fingers of the right
No. 132.—f Restraint' [No. 127] is the restraining of the senses
from their respective objects.
No. 133.—‘ Attention’ [No. 127] is the fixing of the internal
organ [the Mind] on the solitary Reality.
No. 134.—‘ Contemplation' [No. 127,] here [as distinguished
from that spoken of under No. 123,] refers to the train of
thought’s being conversant about the solitary Reality on separate
occasions [instead of being uninterruptedly so]. And the ‘ Me-
ditation' here spoken of is only that [mentioned under No. 124, a.]
‘ which recognises such a distinction as that of subject and ob-

No. 135.—Of this [Meditation] ‘with exclusion of all distinc-
tion between subject and object, &c.,’ [No. 125], to which these
practices [No. 127], are subservient, four things may be obsta-
cles,—viz., (I) ‘ listlessness/ (2) ‘ distraction/ (3) ‘passion/ and
(4) ‘the tasting of joy [as something distinct from the tas-
No. 136.—As for ‘ listlessness’ (laya), this is the sleep of the
understanding whilst not sustaining [or mirroring] the Indivisible
No. 137.—‘Distraction’ (vikshepa) is the understanding’s mir-
roring any thing else instead of mirroring the Indivisible Reality.
No. 138.—‘Passion’ (kashdyaj consists in the understanding’s
not mirroring the Indivisible Reality, even in the absence of
< listlessness’ [No. 136] and ‘ distraction’ [No. 137], through its
being paralysed by the fancies of desire, &c.
ferret: krt-
: I WWHWf 37 I
No. 139.— The tasting of joy’ (rasaswddana) [as something-
see No. 135—distinct from the taster] is the understanding’s ex-
perience of felicity, whilst recognising such distinctions as that
of subject and object [see No. 124], when it does not mirror the
Indivisible Reality;—or [otherwise] it is the experience of felicity,

recognised as distinct from the enjoyer, at the time of commencing
Meditation [which, when freed from error, will no longer re-
cognise that unreal distinction].
vftri fcri
W rT^T faf I I
No. 140.—When the understanding, free from this quaternion
of obstacles [No. 135], like [the flame of] a lamp unagitated
when unaffected by the wind, remains simply [in the shape of]
the really existent indivisible Intellect, then is there said to be
[the condition described, under No. 125, as] ‘ Meditation recog-
nising no distinction of subject and object, &c?
rlptf I faff SR?I ^^T#
wrnf n i ?nr
No. 141.—This [fact asserted in No. 140] has been declared
in such terms as the following :—“When listlessness comes on
he should awaken the understanding; when distracted, again, he
should quiet it - when assailed by passion, he should bring it to
understand; when it has attained to quietism, he should not dis-
turb it; he should not let it enjoy any happiness [as something
distinct from itself]; by rightly discerning, he ought to become
unattached to these [external and unreal objects]”:—and again
“As a lamp, standing where there is no wind,” &c.
rl^-R^TV^TU ^TWT-

No. 142.—Now we shall describe him 1 who, yet living [in hu-
man form], is liberated' (jwanmukta). He is f liberated while
yet living/ who, intent on God, is freed from all bonds through
the removal of Ignorance and its resultant mass of actions
doubts and errors, &c., on God's becoming manifested as He
really is—the Indivisible—, through the removal of ignorance in
regard to Him,—this being consequent on the knowledge of God
as He is,—the Indivisible, the Pure.
No. 143.—[And the fact stated in No. 142 may be inferred]
from such texts as the following :—“ When He, the First and the
Last, has been discerned, then the knot of the heart [which
bound it in the narrow error of a separate consciousness] is
severed, all doubts are resolved, and one's acts are annihilated."

^THPTrfa- 3lfvrb
n^frT I W
No. 144.—Such a one [i. e., see No. 142, he who is f liberated
while yet living’ on earth], with his body—which is a vessel of
flesh, blood, urine, excrement, &c.,—and his set of organs—ves-
sels of blindness, torpor, stupidity, &c.,—and his mind,—a ves-
sel of hunger, thirst, sorrow, bewilderment, &c.,—though behol-
ding the actions that he performs in accordance with this or that
preceding fancy, and the fruits of past deeds which he experiences

without their obstructing his knowledge [of the truth], docs not
behold them as realities, [or really behold them] for to him they
have ceased to exist;—-just as the man who knows that so and so
is a juggler’s trick, though looking upon the illusion, does not
look upon it as a reality.
i iw sx i i
s> J
rTWTf^T q: q
s:fn i
No. 145.—[And the fact stated in No. 144, may be inferred]
from such texts as the following :—“ Seeing, yet as not seeing :—
hearing, yet as not hearing.”
a. And it has been declared that “ He, and no other, knoweth
Soul, who, in his waking state, sees not,—just as one in profound
sleep [sees not]; and who, looking on [what seems] more than
one, sees it not under the aspect of duality;—so too who, while
acting, yet [in his inmost conviction] acts not:—this is certain.”
No. 146.—As he [i. e.—see No. 142—the man c who, yet li-
ving, is liberated’] previously to the attaining of [right] know-
ledge, followed the ordinary appetites and amusements; so he
now follows the impulse to good works only, or else he is alike in-
different to good or bad.
i qqurqvjf i â– q^'sn-

No. 147.— [And since the description of the man 'living, yet
liberated/ in No. 146, as being 'alike indifferent to good or bad/
might naturally suggest a doubt, the doubt is met—for] it is said
—" If he who rightly understands that there is no duality may
act as he chooses, then what difference is there between dogs and
those that know the truth—in respect [say] of eating what is un-
clean ?—[for, the dog may eat as he chooses, and so, it seems,
may the enlightened sage. Well, the difference consists in] the
knowledge of God. So, such a one [as knows God—and not the
dog, who knows nothing of the truth—], being liberated, is, and
no one else is, the knower of Soul.”
No. 148.—Then [—i. e. when one has attained to the estate
described in No. 142—] freedom from egotism, and other such
like perfectcrs of knowledge, and such good qualities as freedom
from malice, will attend him like ornaments. And so it has been
declared :—" To him who has obtained a knowledge of Soul, such
qualities as freedom from malice belong without effort,—but
these are not now employed as means”
^f?r ^t No. 149.—What more need be said ? This one [viz. he who
has attained to the state described in No. 142], merely for the
sustenance of his body [and not for the gratification of his sen-

ses], acquiescing in the experience of those retributive fruits, in
the shape of pleasure or pain, procured from [or taking their rise
in] desire or aversion on our own part or on another’s; and
being [—so long as he continues thus much hampered by the
effects of Ignorance—] the spirit that enlightens the modifica-
tions of the understanding [not yet swallowed up—see No. 110—
in the spirit-light itself;—this man, we say,] on the cessation
thereof [i. e. of the experience of these retributive fruits, when
no more are due to him,] his life dissolving away into the Su-
preme Deity who is unmingled beatitude, on the destruction of
Ignorance and the vis inertiae of its results [—whereby it is that,
like the potter’s wheel revolving long after the motive power has
ceased to be applied to it, the man who has learned the saving
truth yet lives on hampered in the body,—then finally] abideth
God—in absolute simplicity—unvarying felicity—free from every
semblance of difference.
No. 150.—[That the fact is as stated in No. 149, may be
learned] from such texts as this, viz., “ His vital spirit does not
trasmigrate, but is absorbed; and absolutely liberated he is abso-
lutely liberated.”
No. 151.—Thus is completed the treatise called the Vedanta
Sara composed by the pre-eminent ascetic the illustrious SadX-
nanda, the chief of devotees.
No. 152.—Let us now take a retrospective glance at Sadanan-
da’s work, and endeavour to determine the inter-dependence of its
parts. The design of the book is to explain how nothing really
exists besides God—see No. 20. a.— all else being unreal and
owing its apparent reality to Ignorance,—see No. 20. b.

«. Under No. 22 we attempted to account for the way in
which ‘ Ignorance’ is spoken of by the Vedantins as the cause of
the phenomenal world. The universe, according to this theory,
being the joint result of Soul and ‘ Ignorance’—see No. 40—and
Soul being the only substance, or “the substratum of all”—see
No. 2. a.—it follows that f Ignorance’ is equivalent to and iden-
tical with the sum total of qualities. Quality, in accordance with
the Sankhya theory, is regarded, in the first division, as three-
fold; and therefore, at No. 21, ‘ Ignorance’ is spoken of as tri-
gunatrnaka—i. e. “ consisting of the three qualities” or of the
three “ fetters,”—the word for “ quality”—viz., guna, meaning ori-
ginally a “ fetter,” and the two senses, in this philosophical sys-
tem, being closely related;—see No. 22. f. Let us see what
can have led to the division of Quality into three.
b. The one reality—the universal substratum—being veiled by
the garb of the phenomenal world, certain marked distinctions of
character among the phenomena present themselves. We have
phenomena of calm cognition, of fierce emotion, and finally of in-
ertness—or, in Shakspere’s phrase, “ cold obstruction.” To one
or other of these three heads every phenomenon may, with a little
ingenuity, be referred. The three heads are named respectively,
in Sanskrit, sattwa, rajas, and tamas. According to the com-
mentator on the Tattwa-samasa (see Sankhya Lecture § 50—52),
the first of the qualities, whilst endlessly subdivisible into calm-
ness, complacency, patience, rejoicing, &c., consists summarily of
happiness. The second, on the other hand consists summarily of
pain. To these categories belong almost all the sensations and
thoughts of thinking beings;—scarcely any feeling, viewed strict-
ly, being one of sheer indifference. This indifference, the third
of the qualities, is exemplified in its highest potency in such
things as stocks and stones,—where Soul, the substratum of
these as of all else, is altogether “ immersed in matter” or obfus-
cated by the quality of Darkness—as the word tamas, the name
of the quality, literally signifies. In its lower potencies this qua-
lity exemplifies itself in sloth, drowsiness, &c.

c. These three qualities, separately or commingled, more or less
obscure the Soul, which is held to be simple Knowledge—jnana;
and as the aggregate of them is the opposite of Soul, or in other
words no^-Soul, the aggregate takes the name of a-jnana, i. e.
not-knowledge, or c Ignorance/ This account of the term may
to some appear preferable to that previously offered under No.
22. a. The Soul is ofteu spoken of as a light. Now suppose a
lamp to be enclosed in a lamp-shade; the glass may be either so
pure that the light passes through scarcely diminished; or it
may be stained, so that the light is tinged and partly dimmed;
or the lamp-shade may be of opaque materials, so that the light
within is altogether’ obstructed. These three cases may perhaps
illustrate the supposed operation of the three (dualities, as well
as account for the names by which they are spoken of as ( Puri-
ty/ ‘ Foulness/ and ‘ Darkness?
d. ‘Ignorance’—see No. 36—has two powers; that by which
it envelopes Soul, giving rise to the conceit of conscious indivi-
duality, and that by which it projects the phantasmagoria of a
world which the individual regards as external to himself.. Soul
thus invested (No. 40) is what the world consists of; and the or-
der of the world’s developement is the next topic. The order of
emanation is held to be from the more subtile to the more gross
—see No. 41. First the ‘subtile elements’appear—No. 41. b.—
and these confine the Soul within a ‘subtile body’—No. 43—con-
sisting of whatever belongs to or enwraps the individuated soul
when not lodged in a body of flesh and blood. The ‘gross ele-
ments’ arise from the blending and confusion of the ‘ subtile ele-
ments’ —see No. 68. a.—and out of these are formed the Earth,
the heavens and hells, and the ‘ gross bodies’ of their occupants,
e. Throughout his exposition of this process of development,
the author inculcates the indifference between a collection of in-
dividuals and the individuals that make up the collection. Thus
_____sce No. 23— a forest is nothing else than the trees viewed col-
lectively ; and the trees are nothing else than the forest viewed

distributively.* As, however, a name is conveniently given both
to things viewed collectively and to the same things viewed dis-
tributively, so our text-book gives names to certain collections
viewed under an aspect of mystic unity. Thus whilst f Ignorance*
is regarded distributively—see No. 31—as separately investing
separate human souls, the collective aggregate of the same is ta-
ken—see No. 24—as the vesture of I'swara—the Lord—the cause
of worlds. At No. 34 we are assured that there is no difference
between the collective aggregate tenanted by I'swara and the dis-
tributive aggregate tenanted by the separate souls then called
prajna, any more than there is between the forest and the trees of
which it consists :—but it is left unexplained how the two, thus
declared idcntical, yet vlifFer so far that the quality of sattiva is
pure in the one—see No. 25—•, and impure in the other—see
No. 31. When ‘ Ignorance/ in the course of development, has
given rise to the f subtile bodies/ the collective aggregate of
these is regarded as the mystic body of Hiranyagarbha—see No.
62. An individual soul, when invested with nothing beyond
the f subtile body/ takes the name of taijasa—see No. 64.
Lastly the aggregate of ‘ gross bodies’ is regarded as the mystic
body of Vaisivdnara—a being who, as indicated in No. 72, might
be taken for an impersonation of the Spirit of Humanity, only
that his mystic body includes all bodies whatever as well as those
of the human species. The individual soul also, as located in the
‘ gross body/ has its technical name, being then called visiva—
see No. 73.
f. When a man, with all his wits and his limbs about him, is
wide awake,—see No. 72—, he is regarded as being furthest re-
moved from the state in which he ought to be,—he being then en-
veloped in the densest investment of f Ignorance.’ When he
falls asleep, and dreams, he is considered to have shuffled off his
* Another thing, however, is apt to be tacitly assumed, which is not so evi-
dently true, viz. that each tree severally is the forest. The trees might fairly
say, “ We are the forest,” but no single one can be suffered to say “ I am the
forest,”—much less can they all be suffered to say this each of himself.

outermost coil;—and therefore, a dream—see No. 65—is spoken
of as " the scene of the dissolution of the totality of the gross?
The objects viewed in dreams are regarded as ‘ subtile objects'—
see No. 66. When a man sleeps so soundly that he has no
dream, he is regarded as having got rid not only of his ‘ gross
body’ but also of his ‘ subtile bodyhence profound and dream-
less sleep—see No. 32—is spoken of as ‘ the scene of the disso-
lution both of the gross and of the subtile body.’ But although,
in profound sleep, a man has got rid of all the developments of
‘Ignorance,’ yet he is still wrapped in " Ignorance’ itself, and
this must be got rid of. He must not, like the sleeper in No.
33, who c slept pleasantly and knew nothing’—"enjoy blessedness
by means of the very subtile modifications of Ignorance illumi-
nated by Intellect’—No. 32—■, but he must become Intellect
simply—identical with Blessedness—No. 2. a. To this Abso-
lute Unity is given the name of "the Fourth’ (Nos. 34 and 78)
because, beyond the three Qualities which constitute " Ignorance’
(No. 151, a), and which are regarded as being peculiarly cha-
racteristic of the three deities severally of the Hindd triad, lies—
as the fourth—the substratum of all things—the Indivisible.
g. Under No. 93 is explained the train of thought by means
of which the belief is got rid of that any thing really exists be-
sides the " Indivisible;’ and then the author explains at consider-
able length how the sentence " That art thou’—i. e. " thou, who-
soever thou art, art the Indivisible’—is a sentence conveying the
truth, and constructed on just principles of expression. When
the dictum has been rightly understood and accepted, the accep-
ter of it, changing the " thou’ to the first person; reflects thus—
" I am the Indivisible.’ This is so far well;—but he must finally
get rid of the habit of making even himself an object of thought.
There must be no object. The subject alone must remain—a
Thought, a Joy, an Existence,—and the only one.