Citation
General Wood and the law

Material Information

Title:
General Wood and the law a discussion of the legal aspect of the political crisis in the Philippine islands
Creator:
Bocobo, Jorge, 1886-1965
Place of Publication:
Manila
Publisher:
Bureau of printing
Publication Date:
Copyright Date:
1923
Language:
English
Physical Description:
64 p. ; 24 cm.

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Law -- Philippines ( LCSH )
Wood, Leonard, 1860-1927 ( LCNAF )
Philippines -- Politics and government ( LCSH )
Temporal Coverage:
1910 - 1923
Spatial Coverage:
Asia -- Philippines
Asia -- Filipinas
Asya -- Pilipinas
Coordinates:
13 x 122

Notes

General Note:
VIAF (name authority) : Bocobo, Jorge, 1886-1965 : URI http://viaf.org/viaf/257722903
General Note:
VIAF (name authority) : Wood, Leonard, 1860-1927 : URI http://viaf.org/viaf/33146062

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SOAS University of London
Holding Location:
SOAS University of London
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This item is licensed with the Creative Commons Attribution, Non-Commercial License. This license lets others remix, tweak, and build upon this work non-commercially, as long as they credit the author and license their new creations under the identical terms.
Resource Identifier:
557154 ( ALEPH )

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HB 959.9

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GENERAL WOOD and THE LAW 199223 A Discussion of the Legal Aspect of t-he Political Crisis in the Philippine Islands BY / . , JORGE BOCOBO, LL.B. (INDIANA) De a n , College of Law, University of the Philippines M ANI L A . BUREA U OF PRINTING 1923 SOAS I 11111 11111 18 0438841 2 8 4 9929

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I • I SOAS LIBRARY 1

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TABLE OF CONTENTS I NATURE OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT 1. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY. The three Departments of government in the Philippines de r ive their authority and powers from th,e same source, that is, the Constitution of the United States through the Pl'esident and Congress. The Philippine Legislature i s a creation of American, Congress. The sanction which the Philippine Legislature gives to any of the laws it passes flows directly from the sovereign power. Therefore, the Governor-General i s bound by the Organic Act to uphold every act of the Legislature already approved by the Governor-General and reported to Congress . . ..... .... . ....... .... . 2 . CONGRESS AND GENERAL WOOD. An act of the Philippine Legi slature reported t o the Congress of the United States which has not Tevoked it is impliedly sanctioned by the latter. Therefore, when General Wood disregarded the clear provisions of Act No. 2803 and section 2447 of the Administrative Code, he acted contrary to the intention and authority of the United States Congress ............................. ...... . 3. THE PREAMBLE. Tbere b~ing ambiguity in the provisions of the Jones Law regardin g the powers and functions of the Department Secretaries, we mus t resort to the Preamble, which is a key to open the understanding of a statute. From the Preamble it is clear that the veto power should not be u se d to reject bills not affecting the sovereignty of the United States and that the Governor-General' s s upervision and control s hould not be destructive of the Legislature's authority to lay d9wn the duties of Department Secretaries . ... .. ... .......... . 4.. AUTONOMY. The general policy consistently observed by Congress in the organization of government of territories in the Continent of America and in the Philippine Islands is not to interfe:oo with the conduct of affairs of the territory. The PhiJ.ippine Legislature is give n gene ral legislati ve power subject to s pecifi c limitations by the Jones Law (United States vs. Limsiongco, 41 P hil., 94, deci!'led in 1920) .............. ... .... ...... . , II SUPERVISION AND CONTROL 1. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL. The Philippine Legislature has power to provide by law for the . manner and methods of general supervision a'nd control by the Governor-General, Page • 9 12 15 a s was done in .the Admi _nistrative Code ..... ........................ ...... , 27 3

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4 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2. POWER OF REMOVAL. _ The Chief Executive can not directly interfere with cases of official s not appointe d by him and whose removal is expressly lod ged by the Philippine Legis-Page lature in the Depar,tment Secretaries ............... ... .................... .. .... 29 3. THE EXECUTIVE POWER. The E xecutive power of the Governor-General does not carry with it the power to remove or reinstate officers not appointed by him. He can not disregard laws p assed by the Le gislature giving the power of removal or reinstatement of s uch officers to the Department Secretaries :...................... . .................. . ........ ..... ..... ... .... ...... ............ . ..... 32 4. CONSTITUTIONAL ADVISERS. Department Secretar. ies are the only constitutional advisers of the Governor-General, who can not directly or indirectly transfer their functions to the Malacafiang advisers ...... .......... ............................... ........................... _ 37 5 . GOVERNMENT OF LAWS. So lon g as Act No. 2803 and sect ion 2447 of the Administrati ve Code have not been revoked by Congre s s or declared unconstitutional by the courts, the Governor-General must respec t and obey them........ ........... . 42 G . WOOD-FORBES MISSION. The Wood-Forbes Mission Report recommended that Con gress annul acts of the Legi slature which have impaired the auithority of the Governor-General. This recommend ation was not approved by Con gres s which failed to take action . So General Wood decided to take matters in his own h ands and a ssumed the judicial po we r to declare laws uncon s titutional................ ...... . ............................ ..... .... 46 II I THE VETO POWER 1. THE VETO POWER. The unrestrained use of the veto power by General Wood places the Filipino people in a worse position as far as autonomy is concerned than t hey were before the passage of the Jones Law. Before the Jones Law was passed there was no veto power of the Governor-General and there was a majority of Filipinos ~n the Commission or Upper Hou se . The title of the Jones Law is: "AN AGT ... TO PROVIDE A MORE AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT FOR THOSE ISLANDS." But an unrestraine d use of the veto power would make the preserit Governm ent le ss a utonomou s than before the Jones Law, which w1rs never intended by Congress'............ 51 2. SOVEREIGNTY. The phras e in the preamble "without in the meantime impairing the exerci se of the rights of sov ereignty by the people of the United States," is in the nature of an exception, It is a rule of statutory construction that exceptions sho{ild be strictly construed \and s hould not defeat the main prnvis ion. In the present case the main prov i sion is the giving of a large control of domestic affairs to the Filipino people. If General Wood can veto any bill even though it concerns domestic affairs only, then it would be tantamount to saying that Congre ss granted to the Filipino people _powers which at the same time it denied.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Congress wanted to test the capacity of the Filipino people. The Jones Law was passed not for the purpose of giving an opportunity to American officials to work out tlieir own theories of administration. The Governor-General can veto only the following classes of bills: ( 1) Those bills wh i ch are manifestl y unconstitutional; (2) those which are in v i olation of any treaty of the United States with other nations; (3) those which discriminate against the citizens or subjects of other nations; and ( 4) those which attempt to challenge or d iminish American sov -5 Page ereignty over these Islands. All these bills .he may veto . ._. 56 3. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS. Section 19 of the Jones Law i s examined to show that the veto power is not unlimited. The history of American revolution shows that the unrestrained u se of the veto power on col onial legislation finds no sanction in American political thought... .............. ....... 61

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L.

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I NATURE OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT • 7

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•

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1. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY The present controversy raises the question of the nature of the government established in the Philippines, particularly the matter of the relative position of the Governor-General and the Philippine Legislature under the Jones Law. The Council of State, in the Conley case which brq: ght about the resignations, bases its contention on the Jones Law and two Acts passed by the Philippine Legislature while the Governor-General holds that his power of general s upervision i:.nd control under the Organic Act authorizes him to disregard the two Acts of the Legislature mentioned, which he seems to think are unconstitu tional. Moreover, Governor-General Wood has erroneously construed the act of the members of the Council of State as an attack upon "the authority of the Governor-General under the Organic Act and as the representative of the sovereign power of the United States." Even as early as 1910 , before the Jones Law was passed by. the American Congress, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in the case of United States vs. Bull, 15 Phil., 27, said: "This government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and organization somewhat resem~ bles that of both . . . The authority for iti;; creation and maintenance IS DERIVED FROM THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITE:O STATES, acting through the President and Congress . . . Within the limits of its authority, the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to such departments. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IS AS COMPLETE AS ' IN MOST GOVERNMENTS." If the foregoing was true at the time of the Commission and the Assembly, it is applicable now with greater force because of the Jones Law granting a more autonomous government. The new Organic Act is built upon the same plan of separation of powers as is known in American government. Thus, section 12 provides that "general legislative powers shall be vested in . a legislature which shall consist of two houses,'' while section 21 says that "the supreme executive power shall be vested in an executive officer whose official title shall be 'The Governor-9

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10 GENERAL WOOD AND THE LAW__, General of the Philippine Islands,' " and section 26 provides that "the supreme ~ourt ahd the courts of first instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore p:r:ovided." It is clear therefore tha,t these thr ee departments of government derive their authority and powers from the same source: the Constitution of the United States, through the President and Congress; that each of them is separate from the others and they are coordinate ; and that in construing their functions and determining their respective spheres, we must apply the well-known constitutional doctrine on the subject of .separatio f powers . This bring s us to a consideration of. the character of an Act duly passed by the Philippine Legislature, not vetoed by the Governor-General and reported to the Congress of the United States, which accepts it b:v its silence. Under section 19 of the Jones Law, after a bill has been passed by the Legislature, it is submitted to the Governor-General for his approval or absolute veto, there b eing an appeal in the latter case to the President of the United States. In case a bill passed by the Legislature is approved by the Governor-General, it becomes a law. Then, it is reported to the Congress of the United States which reserves .the power to annul the .same. It will be seen, therefore, that the Philippine Legislature, which makes our laws, is a creature of the American Congress. Legally speaking, the sanction which the Philippine Legislature gives to any of the laws it passes, flows directly from the sover eign power, the United States, although from the standpoint of political thought, the Legislature acts for and on behalf of the Filipino people. Moreo , ver, before a law can take effect, the Governor-General studies it and then gives his approval in the name of the1 sovereign power. It is thus that, in contemplation of law, the Philippine Legislature, no less than the Governor General, derives its authority from the United States Congress in promulgating any law. Seeing that the Philippine Legislature is a creature of the American Congress and that the Governor-General himself takes a decisive part in lawmaking by virtue of his absolute veto , he is bound by the Organic Act to uphold every Act of the Legislature not vetoed by him. He can not invoke his "general supervisi~n a;nd control" of all departments and bureaus in order to disregard any law which he thinks is unconstitutional. All laws passed by the Philippine Legisl'ature and approved by the Governor-General (and b,y the President of the United States in certain cases) can be declared void for unconstitutionality

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NATURE OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT 11 ' ONLY by the courts, accor ding to the well-known judicial power to annul a n y law because it i s unconstitutional. Until and unless s uch action is taken by the courts, every person, from the hum blest citizen to the Governor-General him se lf, must obey such l aws . As has been .said by the Supreme Gourt of the Philippine Islands in the case of Chanco vs. Imperial, 34 Phil., 329: "The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Philippine Le gislature H A S THE SAME POWERS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISL A NDS, within the sphere in which it may operate, AS CONGRESS ITSELF (Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U. S., 549) ; and it has strongly intimated that when an Act of the Philippine Legislature is reported to Congress and has not been annulled by that body it is a lawful and valid Act. By this it is not meant to say, as we understand it, that the Philippine Legislature can pass a valid law which . is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any other Act of Congress ; or that it can legis late in a field which Congres s has a lready occupied by appropriate legislation (U. S. vs. Bull, 15 Phil., 7). In the Bull case we held that an Act of th~ legislative authority of the Philippine Government which has not been expressly disapproved by Cong .r . es is valid, unless its subject-matter has been covered by congressional legislation or its enactment forbidden by some , provision . of the Organic Law; and that the reservation by Congre s s (Act of July 1, 1902) of the power to suspend valid Acts of the Philippine Commission and Legislature does not operate to suspend such Acts until approved by Congress, or when approved, make them laws of Congress. THEY ARE VALID ACTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS UNTIL ANNULLED.''

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, / 2. CONGRESS AND GENERAL WOOD , Our proposition in this chapter may be hriefly stated thus: an Act of the Philippine Legislature reported to the United States Congress, which has not revoked it, is impliedly sanctioned by the latter; therefore, when General Wood disregarded the unmistakable provisions of Act 2803 and section 2447 of the Administrative Code, h e acted contrary to the intention and authority of the United States Congres~. Said laws give power to Department Secretaries to take final action in certain cases. Section 19 of the Jones Law provides that "all laws enacted by the Philippine Legislature shall be reported to the Congress of the' United States _ which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." The Administrative Code was passed by the Legislature in 1917, approved by the Governor-General and reported to Con gress. Act No. 2803 was enacted in February, 1919, sanctioned by the Chief Executive and a lso reported to the United States Congress. Neither law has been annulled by Congress. There fore, both laws have been approved by that body. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a territorial law transmitted to and not annulled by Congress, rec~ives the implied sanction of said Congress. Passing upon ' an Act pas• sed by the Territorial Legislature of Utah, the Su preme Court of the United States in the case of Clinton vs. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. (U. S.), 434 (decided in 1872), said: "In the first place, we obs erve that the law has RECEIVED THE IMPLIED SANCTION OF CONGRESS. It was adopted in 1859 \ It has been upon the statute book for more than twelve years. It must have been transmitted to Congress snon after it was enacted, for it was the duty of the secretary of the territory to transmit to that body copies of laws on or before the first of the next December in each year. THE SIMPLE DISAPPROVAL BY CONGRESS AT ANY TIME WOULD HAVE ANNULLED IT. IT IS NO UNREASONABLE INFERENCE, THEREFORE, THAT IT WAS APPROVED BY THAT BODY." Referring to a law passed by the Territorial Legislature of Dakota, the Supreme Court of Dakota in 1889, in the case of Ferries vs . Vannier, 6 Dak., 186, 42 Pac., 31, said: "Congress has before it the laws of each session of our legislature containing these provisions, and the amendments made 12

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NATURE OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT 13 thereto from time to time, and it has neither disapproved nor modified them. They have therefore, within the rule laid down by the supreme court of the United States, RECEIVED THE IMPLIED SANCTION OF CONGRESS" (citing Clinton vs. Englebrecht, supra). The Supreme Court of New Mexico, having before it the question of whether an act of the legislative assembly of the Territory of New Mexico was valid, said in the case of Baca vs . Perez, 8 N. M., 187, 42 Pac., 162 (decided in 1895) : "It is fundamental that congress, not rejecting territorial legislation, approves it-the corollary of the statute ' which re quires the submission of the acts of the legislature to congress, and declares that 'if dis ' approved they shall be null and of no effect .. .' "If wrong, it has been permitted to pass current as law by competent and controlling authority, and must be accepted as AFFIRM,ATIVE TANTAMOUNT TO CONGRESSIONAL DECREE. ACQUIES CENCE BY A PARTY WHO MIGHT HAVE REPUDIATED IS RATIFICATION." Judge Cooley, one of the foremost authorities on constitutional law, in his standard work on "Constitutional Limitations," page 37, sayS': "Congress creates territorial governments of different grad~s, > but generally with plenar:y legislative po, wer, (;lither .in the gov ernor and judges, a territorial council, or a territo,rial leg:_islature, chosen by the people; and the authority of this body extendS' to all rightful subjects of legislation, subject, however, to the disapproval of congress . . . The legislation, of course, fuust not be in conflict with the law of Congress conferring the power to legislate; but a variance from it MAY BE SUPPOSED AP PROVED BY TH}T BODY IF SUFFERED TO REMAIN WITHOUT DIS APPROVAL FOR A SERIES OF YEARS AFTER BEING DULY RE PORTED TO IT." The same doctrine has been app lied by the Supreme Court of the United States to an Act of the Philippine Legislature, even before the Jones Law. In upholding the well-known Borja Bill (Act No. 1986 of the Philippine Legislature, enacted April 19, 1910), which ratified the act of Governor Forbes ,in deporting certain persons of Chinese nationality, the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U. S., 549 (decided in May, 1913), gave aS' one of the grounds for its decision, the :l'ollowing: "By section 86 of the Act of July 1, 1902, all laws passed by the Philippine Government are to be reported to Congress; which reserves power to annul them. IT IS WORTHY OF MENTION THAT

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14 GENERAL WOOD AND THE LAW ' THE LAW UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS REPO RTED TO CONGRESS AND HAS NOT BEEN ANNULLED." Referring to the ab0ve decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Justice Moreland, speaking for~the Supreme Court of the Philippines in the case of Chanco vs. Imperial, 34 Phil., 329 (decided in March, 1916), said: "The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE HAS THE SAME POWERS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, WITHIN THE SPHERE IN WHICH IT MAY OPERATE, AS CONGRESS ITSELF (Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 u. s., 549) ; and it has strongly intimated that when an Act of the Philippine Legislature is .reported to Congress and HAS NOT BEEN ANNULLED BY THAT BODY IT IS A LAWFUL AND VALID ACT . " From all the foregoing ~ we can conclude that the Philippine Legislatre is a creature and delegate of Congress ; and that when a law passed by the Legislature and approv ed by the Gov erpor-G ' eneral, is reported to Congress, and . said Congress does not annul the law, then that body has impliedly sanctioned such a law which consequently becomes, to all intents and purposes, an Bxpression of the will of the United States Congr ess . in the present case, one of the laws in question wai;; reported to Congress six years ago, and the other law, four years ago, and Congress has not annulled them. It is to be noted, in this connection, that in the Chinese deportation case, the Borja Bill had been pas sed by the Philippine Legislature only three years before the Supreme Court of the United States handed its deci sion in the case of Tiaco vs. Forbes, and yet the highest court under the American flag held that said Borja Bill had been im pliedly approved by the United States Congress . . . We conclude, therefore, that when General Wood disregarded Act No. 21303 and section 2447 of the Administrative Code, both of which give final authority to Department Secretaries in certain cases, he acted against the will and the authority of the United States Congress. Believing that he was upholding his prerogatives as a representative of the soverign power, he was in fact encroaching upon the constitutional sphere of the Congress of the United States.

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3. THE PREAMBLE The present controversy between the Filipino people and General Wood has for its main cause the confli ,cting ,interpreta tions placed by one and the other side, upon the provi'sions of the Jones Law. While the Filipino people contend that the Organic Act should be so construed as to give the country the largest possible measure of autonomy, General Wood on the other hand is for a ktrict interpretation of the Jones Law, claiming as he does that as the representative of the sovereign power, he can wield tremendous prerogatives. This issue has manifested itself principally in two questions: the veto power and the general supervision and control over the Secretaries of Department. Last year, the Governor-General vetoed no less than sixteen bills and also a number this year. The Governor-General holds that the Department Heads are only his advisers and that all Acts of the Legislature taking away from him the right of final decision (as in the Conley case) are void. The provisions of the Jones Law on thes . e two points are sus ceptible of different interpretations. While sections 6, 7, 8, and 12 grant very comprehensive ,legislative powers to the Philippine Legislature, section 19 gives the_ power of_ absolute veto to the Governor-General. The Filipino people firmly believe 'that shquld this veto power be construed as having been intended 1 by Congress fo be applicable to bills of purely domestic concern, then the law-making power of the Philippine Legislature would be nullified. General Wood on the other hand believes that he has a right to veto any bill of whatever nature. As for the Secretaries of Department, it i , s to be noted that while section 32 author. izes the Philippine Legislature to "increase the number or abolish any of the executive departments or make such changes in the names and DUTIES thereof AS IT MAY DEEM FIT," section 21 provides that the Governor-General "shall have general supervision and control of all departments and bureaus of the Government in the Philippine Islands AS FAR AS IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT." We believe that when Congress authorized the PhUippine Legislature to fix and determine the DUTIES of the executive department it was not the intention of Congress that such duties should be ren-15

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16 GENERAL WOOD AND THE LAW dered inoperative by the Governor-General who claims that he can, under his power of general supervision and control, alter or modify the DUTIES of the Department Secretaries as fixed by the Philippine Legislatu re. Our view is strenghthened by two considerations . : (1) Section 21 of the Jones Law says that the general super vision and control vested in the Governor-General shall be "AS FAR AS IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT," and (2) According to the decisions o f the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands the legislative power of the Philippine Legi s lature is general and comprehensive. Thus, in the case of United States vs. Limsiongco, 41 PhiL, 98, decided in 1920, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands said that when any of the Philippine cour~s has to decide as to the validity of an Act of the Philippine Legislature, "it must always be deter mined, not whether the power is g-iven, but whether in express terms or by necessary implication it is forbidden and whether the field has been entered by the Congress of the United States." ~aving shown that there is ambiguity in the provisions of the Jones Law on the matter of the veto and the. functions of the Secretaries of Department, we come now to a discussion of the value of the preamble in the determination d: the general intent and object of Congress : The preamble of the Jones Law is as follows: "Whereas it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipiency of the War with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial aggrandizem~nt; and "Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to RECOGNIZ]!) THEIR INDEPENDENCE AS SOON AS A STABLE GOVERNMENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED THEREIN; and "Whereas for the sp eedy aocomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to PLACE IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE . / PHILIPPINES AS LARGE A CONTROL OF THEIR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS as can be given them without, in the meantime, impairing the exer cise of the rights of sovereignty by the peo . ple of the United States, in order that, by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the BETTER PREPARED TO FULLY ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND ENJOY ALL THE PRIVILEGES OF COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE." (

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NATURE OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT 17 In volume 36, page 1132 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Proce dure , we read: "In case of doubt as to the proper construction of the body of a statute, resort must be had to the preamble or recitals, for the purpose of ascertaining the legislative intent." Lord Coke says that the preamble is "a good means to find out the meaning of the statute, and is a true key to open the understanding thereof." The Supreme Court of Alabama in the case of White vs. Levy, 91 Ala., 175, 8 So., 563, said: "If the legislative intent is clearly expressed in the preamble, and the body of the act is so constructed as to render its, mean. ing and intent uncertain; and if the act admits of two construc tions, one in accord with the intent clearly expressed in the preamble, and the other in conflict with it, courts should adopt that construction which harmonizes with the preamble." The Supreme Court of the United Sta:tes has held that the preamble is "a key to open the understanding of a statute." Coosaw Mining Co. vs. State of South Carolina, 144 U. S., 548. In the same case, the Federal Supreme Court also said: "The preamble in the Act may be resorted to, to aid in the construction of the enacting clause when any ambiguity exists. The ambiguity here referred to is not simply that arising from the meaning of particular words, but such as may arise, in respect to the GENERAL SCOPE AND MEANING OF A STATUTE when aH of its provisions are e:x:amined." In view of the foregoing authorities which show that the preamble is a key to open the understanding of a stafute, in case of uncertainty or doubt, we believe that the preamble of the Jones Law \ clearly points out to the intention of Con gress, among other things, that the veto power should not be used as . to those bills that do not in any way affect the sover eignty of the United States and are of mere local concern, and that the Governor-General's supervision and control over the executive departments should not be destructive of the Legislature's authority to lay down the duties of the Secretaries of Department under section 22 of the Jones Law. This liberal construction in favor of Filipino autonomy is necessarily warranted by the letter and the spirit of the pre amble of the Organic Act. For General Wood's contruction would defeat the paramount object of the Jones Law which is that the Filipino people, in the words of the preamble, "may { 19922.S-2

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18 GENERAL WOOD AND THE LAW be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilites and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence." How can the representatives of the Filipino people learn to make wise laws, as contemplated by Congress, if the Governor-General uses the veto power to the extent of disapproving any and every bill which, according to him, is not g o od for the country? . Would it not be more in keeping with the intention of. Congress to let the Legislature have a free hand in lawmaking upon local matters? As for the supervision and control over the Secretaries, it is needless to say that if these Secretaries are to be with little initiative and meager final authority, then the executive functions would not be in Filipino hands at all but in those of the Governor-General, which is contrary to the main purpose of the Jones Law as expressed in the preamble.

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4. AUTONOMY It is proposed in this article to ascertain the general policy of the United States Congress in establishing territorial governments in newly acquired territories. As every student of American history knows, mos t of the present area under the American flag has been added to the United States subsequent to the declaration of independence by the original colonies. The Revolution brought to them the great region northwest of the Ohio River. Then, successively came the Louisiana purchase 'in 1803, from France, Florida from Spain in i819, Texas from Mexico through the Texas Republic in 1845, Orego n partl y by original occupation and partly by treaties with Spain, Russia and Great Britain from 1803 to 1846, California and New Mexico from Mexico in 1848, the Gadsden purchase from Mexico i n 1853, Alaska from E,ussia in 1867, Hawaii from the Hawaiian Republic in 1898, and Porto Rfoo and the Philippines from Spain in 1898. The following are some of the judicial interpretations of the norm of action followed by Gongress in providing for the government of these territories. These judicial pronou,ncements were made in connec tion with q uestions relating to the organic laws of these territories. In 1872 the Supreme Court of the United States had occasion to announce what, in the opinion of that august body, the policy of Congress was in the establishment df government in these territories. In the case of Clinton vs. Englebrecht, 13 Wall (U. S.), 434, decided in 1872, the Federal Supreme Court had before it a certain law passed by the territorial legislature of Utah. The i:!ourt said in part: "The theory upon which the various. governments for portions of the territory of the United States have been. organized has ever been that of LEAVING THE INHABITANTS ALL THE POWERS OF SELF GOVERNMENT consistent with the supremacy and supervision of national authority, and with certain fundamental prin ciples established by Congress." In another case, Hornbuckle vs . Toombs, 85 U. S., 375, 21 L. Ed., 966, (decided in 1874), the Supreme Court of the United States, in d_iscussing a certain territorial law of Montana, said: ' ' 19

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20 GENERAL WOOD AND THE LAW "As a general thing, subject to the .general scheme of local government chalked out by the organic act, and such special provisions as are contained therein, THE LOCAL LEGISLATURE HAS BEEN INTRUSTED WITH THE ENACTMENT OF THE ENTIRE SYS TEM OF MUNICIPAL LAW, subject, also, however , to the right of Congress to r evise, alter, and revoke at its discretion, THE POWERS THUS EXERCISED BY THE TERRITORIAL LEGISLATURE ARE NEARLY AS EXTENSIVE AS THOSE EXERCISED BY ANY STATE LEGISLATURE.;' The Supreme Court of New Mex ico in the case of Territory ex rel. Hubbel vs. Armijo, 14 N. M., 205, 89, Pac., 789, decided in 190 7, passing on the question of whether the Governor of the Territory of New Mexico, appointed by the President of the United States, could, in the exerdse of his executive . power as representative of the Federal government, remove a sheriff, contrary to ,the pr, ovisions of a law passed by the territoria' l legis liature, held that the Governor could not exercise such power, and said: "And it is, indeed, of a piece with the GEN ERAL POLICY OF CONGRESS NOT TO INTERFERE EX CEP T IN . EXTREME CASES WITH THE CONDUCT OF THE AFFAIRS OF A T E RRITORY BY ITS PEOPLE. It has considered and treated the territorial form of government as a kind of training school for statehood-the territory as the embryo of the future state-a state like its sister states in all essential particulars, NOT AN AUTOCRACY, but a state to which the Nation must, under the Constitution, 'guarantee a republican form of government.' To that end, it has been, no doubt, deemed advisable that the people of the territories should, to a great extent, suffer the co:usequences of their own errors of omission and commission in legislation and otherwise, and learn, even at the cost of sore experience, to be self-governing, as the people of the states must be. To teach the people of a territory that they may elect unfit officers and rely on the EXECUTIVE OVER WHOM .THEY HAVE NO DIRECT CONTROL, to.free t~em from the results of their own acts or negligence, it may naturally have been thought would lead them away from self-government ; and not toward it. Besides affording a training for statehood, the mann~r of dealing with such a subject by the people of a territory furnishes for Congress an important test of their fitness for statehood." Now, if the above principles govern the general policy of Congress with regard to territories which are organized with a view to admitting them as States in the future, much more would Congress be disposed to leave local matters to the Philippine Legislature, because the avowed intention of the Amer-

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NATURE OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT 21 ican people is to recognize the independence of the Philippines as soon as a stable government can be established. The con cession of autonomy to the Filipinos is to give them an opportunity to demonstrate their capacity for self-government to the sa,tisfaction of the American people. This is not possible if the Governor-Gener.al is going to absorb all the essential executive functions and practically hol ' d the ultimate legislative authority by freely and unrestrictedly wielding the veto power. Success of the Philippine Government under such an arrangement, which plan seems to be the policy of the present occupant of Malacafi.ang Palace, would not demonstrate Filipino fitness for self-determination, but it would meTely indicate General Wood's capacity for governmental organization. Such success being mainly credited to General Wood, because attained under his direct " supervision and control," would not in any way furnish any evidence by which the American people could judge Filipino accomplishment uno.er the Jones Law. Coming now to judicial declarations upon our Organic Acts, we find that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in several cases has suhstantfally he1d the same doctrine announced in the cases quoted above. Thus, in the case of United States vs. Bull, 15 Phil., 7, (1910) the Supreme Court of the Philippines said: "The legislative power of the Government of the Phi'lippines is granted in general term~ subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exe1rcise the legislative power subject to re strictfons stated. It is true that specific authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress ha, s itself ,legislated upon certain other subjects. 1 These, however, should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to ad, and not as implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen . of U. S . , April 16, 1908.) "The fact that the Congress reserved the power to annul spe cific acts -of legislation by the Government of the Philippines tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government of the Philippines shoufa be regarded as one of GENERAL INSTEAD OF ENUMERATED POWERS. THE SITUA TION WAS UNUSUAL. THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS TO OPERATE FAR,, FROM THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY . TO RELIEVE CONGRESS FROM THE NECESSITY OF LEGISLATING WITH REFERENCE TO DETAILS, it was ,thought better to grant general legislative power to the

PAGE 24

22 GENERAL WOOD AND THE LAW new governme nt, subject to broad and easily understood pro hibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul acts if they met with disapproval." It is to be noted that the above case was decided .six years before the P'assage of the Jones Law which grants a more auto nomous form of government to the Philippines. Hence, the principles enunciated by the S upreme Court of the Philippines in the ca se quoted have a greater weight now than before the I enactment of the Jones Law. In fact our Supreme Court has reiterated the. above princf ples in another case in which the validity of sect ion 138 of the Administrative Code, passed by the Philippine Legislature created by the Jones Law, was upheld. In the case of United States vs. Limsiongco, 41 Phil., 94, decided in 1920, our Supreme Court, holding the constitutionality of said sec tion 138 of the Administrative Code, said in part, through Mr. Justice Malcolm: "As fundamental in nature and as partially decisive in the question before us, the ieasure of the powers granted by the Congress of the United States to the Government of the United States is not in doubt. THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE IS GIVEN GENERAL LEGISLATIVE POWER SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC LIMITA TIONS • . . Somewhat akin to what American courts do in. p • assing upon the constitutionality of an Act of a State Leg'is. lature must be done in the Philippine courts when any one of them has to decide as to the validity of an Act of the Philip pine Legislature, namely, i t must always be determined, NOT WHETHER THE POWER IS GIVEN, BUT WHETHER IN . EXPRESS TERMS OR BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION IT IS FORBIDDEN, AND WHETHER THE FIELD HAS BEEN ENTERED BY THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES." As illustrative of this comprehensive power of the Philippine Legislature to enact laws, we may cite the question of deporta tion. The Supreme Court has held that the Governor-General has an inherent power to deport aliens but such power may be restricted or taken away from him by the Philippine Legislature under the latter's general legislative power. The court said in the Dick case (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil., 94), decided in 1918: "Until and unless he is deprived of s uch authority by some act of Congress or OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE ! the powlr of the Philippine Government to deport aliens as an act of .state i.s vested in the Governor-General by virtue of his office, subject only to the regul ,ations prescribed in section 69 of the Administrative Code , of 1917, -0r by future legislation on the subject.

PAGE 25

NATURE OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT 23 "WE INCLINE TO THE BELIEF THAT AUTHORITY TO CONTROL., LIMIT, RESTRICT, AND PERHAPS EVEN TO PRO.HIBIT THE EXERCISE BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THIS POWER, BY APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION, WAS CONFERRED UPON THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE, THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE ISLANDS, UNDER THE TERMS OF THE JONES LAW (ACT , OF AUGUST 29, 1 •916) PROVIDING A MORE AUTONOMOUS FORM OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS." In conclusion, then, we can say that the daim of General Wood that his "general supervision and control" of all the departments and bureaus of the Government authorizes him to go over the heads of Department Secretar. ies in spite of spedfic provisions of Acts passed by the Legislature, and that his veto power recognizes no restriction, is not in keeping with the general policy consistently observed by Congress , in the org::tniza tion of governments of territories both on the continent of America and in the Philippine Islands.

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II SUPERVISION AND CONTROL 25

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\

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1. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL The place ,of the Goyernor-Gen:eral in >the g,overnment or ganized by and under the Jones Law, is 'the main issue in the presen t quest i on . That issue is sharply presented in the Conley case where Governor ,Vood invokes section 21 of th~ Jones Law which provid es that "the supreme executive P? .wer shall be vested in an exec utive officer, w hose offidal t::.tle shall be 'The Governor-General of the P hilippine !islands' . . . He shall have general supervision and control of a ll of the departments and bureaus o f the gover ,nment in the Philippine Islands as is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." If we correctly understand the contentio n of General W , ood, h e seems to hold that the foregoing provisions of the Or, g : anic Act authorize him to disregard section 2447 of the Admini strative Code which vests 1 the power of removal ,of members Of the police department of Manila in the Secretary of the Interior, "who s e determination of the matter shall be final." It see ms to be his belief that said section 2447 o f the Administrative Code i s u nconstitutional becau se it deprives him of the power of "general supe rvision and control" with which he is clothed by the Jones Law . . It will be noted that section 21 of the O rganic Act calls the Governor-General "an executive officer." As such his function is to execute rthe laws of the land, consisting o:f the organic laws and the statutes passed by the Legislature. Acc@rding to said section 21 of the Jones Law; "he s hall be responsible for the f ait:q.ful execution of the LA ws OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and of the United States operative within the Philippine Islands." He must exerc i 1 se his executive powers in ac cor dance with the limitations and methods pres c ribed by the laws in force. This rule is clearly established in American law. Thus, in 12 Ruling Case Daw, ;page 1001, we re•ad: "The 'supreme executive power' of a governor implies such power as will secure an efficient execution of the laws, which is the peculiar p rovince of the department, TO BE ACCOMPLISHED, HOWEVER; IN THE MANNER AND BY THE METHODS AND WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES OF THE STATE." In the ;,Present case, the "Constitution" according to the fore going citation is the Jones Law, and the "statute" is the Adminis ?,7

PAGE 30

28 GENERAL WOOD AND THE . LAW traitive Code. The Jones Law does not provide for the manner, the methods and the limitations for the Governor-General's super vision and control of the Manila government. Hence, these are prescribed by the Administrative Code, which is a law duly passed in 1917 by the Philippine Legislature under its legis lative authority granted by the Jones Law, and approved by the Governor-General under section 19 of the Organic Law and . sanctioned by the United States Congress which has never an nulled said Administrative Code. It would be unrell!sonable to hold that in exercising his "general supervision and control" of all the departments and bureaus of the government, the Governor-General could ignore the laws passed by the Legislature organizing the government and providing for the processes of the government. Otherwise, there would be the strange spectacle of two sets of laws on the poli . tical structure: those promulgated by the duly constituted Legis lature and those laid down by the Governor-General, who would in such a case be another lawmaking power. Moreover, the power of "supervision and control" by the Governor-General, if unrestrained by any law passed by the Legislature, would enable him to change at any time the organization and func tions of each department and bureau, and to set up a system of administration other than that regularly established by law. The true situation, therefore, is that the Philippine Legi:slature under its gen .era! legislative authority granted in sections 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the Jones Law has power to provide by law for the .manner and methods of "general supervision and control" by the Governor-General, which was done in the Administrative Code. Nor is there in this proposition any danger of the Gov~ ernor-General's powers being curtailed, for he can veto any bill which is unconstitutional. The Administrative Gode was. duly approved by the then Governor-General when it was passed. The fact that it was another Governor-General who approved the Administrative Code is immaterial, for, in contemplation of law, the office is the same whoever may be the incumbent.

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2. THE POWER OF REMOVAL One of the laws upon which the Department Secretaries based their protest is Act No. 2803 of the Philippine Legislature, passed in February, 1919, which empowerS' the different Department Heads, among other things, to appoint and remove or punish "all subordinate officers and employees whose ap.point ment is not expressly vested by law in the Governor-General." In spite of this law, Governor Wood i s of th9 opinion that he may, under his constitutional power of general supervision and control of all departments and bureaus of the government, go over the heads of the Department Secretaries and remove or reinstate any of the officers and employees referred to, not withstanding the decision of such Secretaries. The Jones Law is silent upon the question of who may exercise the power of removal and reinstatement, except in two instances: (1) in section 22 wherein it is provided that "the Philippine Legislature . . . shall provide for the appointment and removal of the heads of the executive departmentS' by the Governor General," and (2) in section 18 which authorizes both houses of the Legislature to expel any of their elective members. From which silence of the Organic Act it follows that the United States Congress left the matter to the Philippine Legislature for regulation. This has been done by the Legislature in the Ad, ministrative Code and amendatory laws, such as Act No. 2803, above mentioned. Thus, the Governor-General may remove judges (sec. 173, Administrative Code), justices of the peace (section 229), officers and employees of the City of Manila who are appointed by the Governor-General (section 2447), any elective provincial official who is ineligible (section 408), municipal officials (section 2191), provincial officers (section 2078), and other officials specified in oth_er sections of the Code. Furthermore, "for disloyalty to the United States, the Governor General may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the Philippine Islands" (section 64....,b). However, all removals by him must be made according to law, for in section 64 (b) it is provided that among the special powers and duties of the Governor-General shall be "to remove officials from office CONFORMABLY TO LAW." 29

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30 GENERAL WOOD AND THE LAW As to the Department Secretaries, they can remove as already stated, "all subordinate officers and employees whose appointment i s not expressly vested by law in the Governor-General" (Act No. 2803), and the proper Secretary can re:rnove any member of the Board of Dental Examiners and of the Board of Med ic al ,Examiners (sections 788 and 762, Administrative Code), any appointive officer or employee of the City of Manila who is not appointed by; the Governor-General (section 2447, the much discussed provision of the Administrative Code), and other of ficers. and employees specified in the Code. It will be noted that the Legislat~re in exercising its power to provide for removal deemed it wise to confer s uch prerogative upon the Governor-General in most cases, and that the Secretaries can use this authority to remove only as to a comparatively few mino r officials and employees. Hence, it is not true .that the Legislature has tried to destroy the i nfluence and position of the Governor-General. In fact, the Legislature has gone . farther than it had to, by giving the Governor -General power to remove elective municipal and provincial officials. The question arises whether the Chief Executive can directly interfere even with cases of officials and employ ees not appointed by him and whose removal is expressly lodged by the Philippine Legislature in the Department Secretaries . We believe not. Our reasons are these : (1) Section 22 of the Jones Law provides that "the Philip pine Legislature may thereafter by appropriate legislation in creas e the number or abolish any of the executive departments, or make such changes in the names and DUTIES thereof as i t MAY SEE FIT." The Legislature, acting under suc h specific authority, and under its genera l legislative power in sections '6--8 of the Organic Act, has seen fit to d esignate, as one of the DUTIES of the Secretaries, the determination of the competency of their subordinates who are not appointed by the Governor General. (2) The power of general supervision and control of all de partments and bureaus of the government, vested in the Gov ernor-General, was not defeated . by the Legislature when the lattJr provided that the Secretaries may remove all subordinates not appointed by the Governor-General. Why not? Because the Secretaries themselves are appointees of the Governor-Gen eral, enjoying hi s confidence, and removable by him. (3) The power of general supervision and control does not necessarily carry with it the power of removal. The right to dis miss a public official can arise only in two ways : (a) by express

PAGE 33

SUPERVISION AND CONTROL 31 provision of law, and ( b) by implication from the power to appoint. As the Supreme Court of the United States said in the case of In Re He:qnen, 13 Peters, 230, "in the abs ence of all constitutional provision or statutory regulation, it would seem to be a sound and necessary rule to consider the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment." In the present case, the Jones Law has no provision expressly authorizing the Governor-General to remove the officers not appointed by him. (4) Section 64 (c) of the Administrative Code, which is cited by General Wood, merely authorizes the Governor-General to appoint a special investigator to inquire into the conduct o.f any public official, but does not say anything about the power of removal, Therefore, said .section 64 (c) does not empower the Chief Executfve to remove any officer under investigation whose dismissal is vested 1 by law in other authorities. Of course, with regard to officials whom the Governor-General may remove according to the Administrative Code and other Acts of the Legislature, he may, after such special investigation under sgction 64 ( c), decide that such official be " dismissed. In the other cases, . he should after the investigation refer the matter to the proper officer expressly authorized by law to remove the respondent for determination, which should have been done in the Conley case, after the second report of the special inve _stigation committee.

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3. THE EXECUTIVE POWER . One of the main issues in the present controversy between the Department Secretaries and Governor Wood is whether or not the power of removal and reinstatement is impliedly granted to the Chief Executive under the Jones Law. General Wood an. swers in the affirmative and the Filipinos in the negative. As already , shown in the preceding chapter, theJones Law has no express provision for removal of pqblic servants, except in cases of Secretaries of Department and members of tl_ie Legislature. General Wood's contention is that the power of removal and reinstatement is inherent in his office as the Chief Executive of these Islands, for under the Jones Law the "supreme executive power''. is conferred upon him: he is given ''.general supervision and control" of all the departments and bureaus of the Government; anq he is Tesponsib le for the faithful execution of the laws. . Let us examine the validity of this claim. Professor Frank J. Goodnow, one of the foremost authorities on -administrative law in America, says in his book, "The Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States," p. 101: "The grant of the executive power to the governor does no t give him, in and of itself, any power of removal. Such power MUST BE CONFERRED BY EXPRESS PROVISION of the Constitution or statutes." In 29 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, page 1370, the law on the subject is stated thus: "The grant of the executive power to a governor of a state is furthermore NOT REGARDED AS GIVING HIM POWER TO REMOVE AN OFFICER." The leading case on this question is Field vs. The People of Illinois, 3 IlL, 79, where the Supreme Court of Illinois said, among other things: "The injunction, that the governor shall see that the laws are faithfuHy executed, it was also urged, gives him the control, and consequently the power of removal of officers of the exec utive department. This inference is not justified by the premises. It has neither the sanction of authority nor the practice of other executives; both of which are opposed to it . . . 'This power of GENERAL SUPERVISION,' says an able commentator on American law, 'is a duty enjoined on , the federal and state exee-32

PAGE 35

SUPERVISION AND CONTROL 33 utives. It would be dangerous, however, . to treat this clause as conferring any specific power which they would not otherwise posses s . It is to be regarded as a comprehensive description of the duty of the executive to watc h with vigilance over all public interests' (Walker's American Law, 103). The governor is not to execute the law s himself but is to see them executed ... IF; IN CLAIMING THE POWER OF REMOVAL AS AN EXECUTIVE FUNC TION , IT IS MEANT, THAT THIS POWER BELONGS, EX-OFFICIO, TO THE GOVERNOR, THAT IT G;I:WWS OUT OF, AND BELONGS TO, THE OFFICE, THE POSITION IS A LTOGETHER UNTENABLE; the execu tive power under this and every other constitutional govern m e n t , is just such a powe r as the Constitution confers upon him . That is the only sou rce of power. Neither the practice nor the maxims of government can confer upon him any func tions or powers." The above c as e has been followed by many other cases arising in other States of the American Union. It has also been ac cepted in cases d e cided in American Territories with organic acts passed by Congress, similar to the Jones Law, with this difference in -purpose; the Jones Law looks toward national inde penden ce, while the organic acts of the Territories look toward statehood. Hence, greater autonomy is, on the whole, granted by the Jones Law. Two of these latter cases refer to the prerogatives of the Governor of the Territory of New Mexico according to the Acts of Congress. The y are: Territory ex rel. Wade vs. Ashenfelter, 4 N . M., 85, 12 Pac., 879 ( decided in 1887), and Territory ex rel. Hubbel vs . Armijo, 14 N . M., 205, 89 Pac., 267 (decided in 1907). In the first case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico quoted the case of Field vs . The People of Illinois, with approval, and held ~hat the doctrines announced in the Field case were applicable to the Governor of the Territory of New Mexico, APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. In the second case, Territory ex rel. Hubbel vs. Armijo, the Governor of the Territory of New Mexico removed a sheriff from 0ffice, in spite of a law pas s ed by the Legislative Assembly of ' the Territory which took away from the Governor the authority to r e move sheriffs. . In support of the Governor's action it was contended that he had the same power of removal which the President of the United States had under the American Constitution; that the Governor had such ,ri,ght under the organic act of New Mexico, by virtue of his executive power and authority; that Congress must be "supposed to have . preserved . , THROUGH THE EXECUTIVE , a vein of power ascending to the 199223-3

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34 GENERAL WOOD A~D .THE LAW general g over n ment, so protected that it would not be open to .attack and destruction by the people for whose restraint it was made;" and that Congress wou ld "naturally take s u ch a course in the case of territory then but latel y acquired through war, and with a population h o stile to our government." The Supreme CotJrt of New Me:i:dco held tha t such power of removal was no t included in the executive power ve sted in the Governor of New Mexic.o by the Organic Act. The court said in part: "In the Organic Act there is little trace o f any dispositio n to repress or dominate the people of the territory. 'The vein of power ' ascending to the governm en t of the United States-sever al such ve ins , indeed-were preserved. The governor and the judges of the higher court? were to be appointed by the Presid e . n t . The governor was made an essential part of the legi s lative department (Organic Act, section 5), and finally, Congress reserved to itself the rjght, which, as the court said in, National .Bank v's. County of Yankton, 101 U. S., 132, 133, 25 L. Ed;, .1046, it had without reserving it, to annul all le g i s lativ e acts which should }Jot meet with its approval. Orga nic Act, section 7 : BUT THOSE WERE NOT UNUSUAL PROVISIONS IN ESTABLISHING CIVIL GOVE;RNMENT FOR TERRITORIES. Very great liberality was sh . own in the bestowal . of the suffrage on all citizens by the Organic Act. . " 'The . organic law .of a territory takes the place of a Constitu . tion as t:qe fundamental law of the loca l government.' National Bank vs. ankto1.1, s u pra. THE POLITICAL RIGHTS CONFERRED BY rr ARE, I . N LA w, AS SECURE AND SACRED A S THOSE GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, until they are, through legislation, withdrawn by the power which be . stowed them. "Finally~ it :n;:rnst be believed that Congress has had knowledge, actual as well as constructive, of what has transpired inNew Mexico in relation to the matter of the g ov ernor's power to remove from office. The Organic Act (section 7) pro v ides that _ 'all the laws passed by. the legislative a~se mbly a nd governor shall be submitted to the Congress of the United States, and, . if disapproved, shall be null and void.' There has been such a lawgiving the governor the right to remove sheriffs .from office, another taking _away the right so given, and there is now such a law providing for the remov1;1.l of sheriffs by the district courts .in certain cases. A . ll these laws have, presumably, been submitte. d to Congress . . . "Congress could at any time have interfen::ed to annul the ter.ritorial statutes on the subject , or to give the power of removal definitely 'tq th~ G,qvernor. Its failure to act under such cir-

PAGE 37

SUPERVISION AND CONT .ROL.1 cu:f.dstances :.and,for so long a space of time ; is. strongly . indica:.tfvef,of its acquiescence ,in 'the assumption . by .. the' :;i.ssembly ,.,of the right to provide by legislation for, reniovals
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I _36 GENERAL WOOD AND TlIE LAW Therefore, the decision handed down and the reasons set forth by the Supreme Court of New Mexico are applicable to the .present question in the Philippines. We hope we have shown that the executive power of the Gov ernor-General of the Philippines, which includes his right Of supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus, does not carry with it the power to remove or reinstate officers not appointed by him; and that he cannot disregard the laws passed by the Philippine Legisiature giving the power of removal or reinstatement of such officers -to the Department Secretaries. ) . . . .~ ...

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4. CONSTITUTIONAL .ADVISERS One of the cau ses for the present controversy is the .. firm belief on the part of the Filipinos that General Wood often gives more weight to the opinions of the group of men wi1Jh whfoh he has surrounded himself at the Mal1acafiang Palace than to the \ views of his constitutional advisers-the Secretaries of Departmeruts. This complaint of the Filipinos is based on a series of measures taken by the Governor-General which need not be specified here, for they are matters of common knowledge. The resignation of each and every one of the Filipino Depart ment Heads was the culmination of many acts. of the Chief Ex ecutive showing that he had more confidence in the men constituting a sort of "privy couneil" at the Executive Building than in the Department Secretaries at the Ayuntamiento who are, under the supreme law of the land, the officials to whom the Chief Executive should lend ear. True, in matters falling within the discretion of the Governor-General, and not by law placed under the final authority of the Department Secretaries, the Chief Executive is not expected to be a mere figure-head, approving as a matter of course, each and every recommenda tion of the Department Secretaries. But the fair and reasonable contention of the Filipinos is that in case of conflict between the views of the Malacafiang advisers and tlhose of the Department. Secretaries, the Chief Executive, if he is to take the. advise of !.,anybody at all, should as a rule accept that of the. Cabinet mem bers appointed according to the Organic Act. It is to be observed, in this connection, that the set of advisers at the Mala cafiang are not appointed with the conse11t of the Senate. Some of them are holding positions nG>t provided for by any Act of the Philippine Legislature and have, therefore, been called "ex tra-legal" advisers by Senator Osmefia, in an address delivered by him at Gebu last April. President Quezon in a recent speech said that he had informed the Chief Executive that as far as the Legislature was , concerned, . the opinion of these special ad visers had no value whatsoever. If we are to t have a constitutional government, as is the inten tion of the American Congress, the proper place of the Depart ment Secretaries under the Organic Act must be fully recognized. That. the Chief Executive shouJd approve the policies proposed ; ' . . . . 37

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38 GENERAL WOOD AND THE LAW by the Department Secretaries, rather than the opinions of a private set, is clearly inferred from the provisions of the Jones Law. The following considerations are submitted, in support of our proposition: First, S"ection ?4.; .of , th~ . Q:r;gani~. A4 mak~s . the heads of executive departments the constitutional advisers and assistants dt .the doverncn~ ~ General, J ~o . that. their functions ~an nqt-. be . transferred, ' directly -or indirectly ; by.the Chief Executive to anyather group 6f merL Said section 22 otthe Jones Law rea,ds;-; in .. part as follow ' s : ' . . . ' . . ' . , :, . • ' j ' "That, except as provided ot)1erwise in this Act, the executive d~1fat ttn:ents of the Philippine Government shall continue as now a:"ti,thoriied'.:by 'law u:n.ti1 otherwise ' provid , ed by the . Philippim:( Legisla:ture . . ' When. the Philipp1ne Legislature herein prov1 def shall conv.en:e ,and 'Orgatiize ; "IJ)ie• Philippine . Cominis:Sion, , as s ; ch ; shall cease and d ! etermfne and th~ memoer s thereof shall vicate' their offices ,-_as memb .ers of said commission: Provided, That' the heads ~of . executive , ciepartmerits shall contin u e to exercise . their ' exe~utive fuhctions urttii the heads of departments pro-'. vided by'0the .Philip-pine : Legislatufe pursuant 0to the provisions df tpis ,.A,ct are' an'po111ted anci'qualifie.d. Trre :Philippine Legi~lature may t~erea,fter .iiY i;i.pprbpria:te . legislation increase the' number 'or aboiish . any o('the executive departments or make. s : ~ch changes 'in the; nai:n e s and duties thereof as it may see fit ; and shall prov ide for the ap~o intine .nt and removal of the heads . df the executive departments. by the Governor-General : Provided,: THAT . ALL. :.EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS. OF THE GOYEJ;tNMEN').". MUST BE nfRECTLY. UNDER -rHE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OR WITHiN O~E: OF' THE 'EXECUTIVE' DEPARTMENTS 'UNDER THE SUPE~VISIO~.' AN:D eoNTROI,, o~ THE .GOVERNOR~GENERAL." :;,Tne' fo;regoing l:!eqt1on has created. a Gapinet for the Governor~ Gene;ra1,: c9:rnp9s ed of the ' DepartJneli.t S ecretaries. , It is rea:son~b1e t<;> presume. that' Cotii:ress intended the membets of this Gab . ~net .to be .. 'men of hi:;; confidence, to w horn he could trust g;rave ; ma-fters o:fl, policy : .. They are to share with him th_ e r ~sporisibility for ' ext!cutive ' funotions. . So important' i~ the'. dffice of Departmimt Secretary, that one Department Bead ;s to, be . d . esignated b:ythe : President as Acting Gbvernor ~ Gene r~l in" th(fcase :ofvacancy, removal; resignation, di1lability or absence ' o.f the Governor-General or the Vice~Gov~rnor (section 23). SJjeci~l a:ttention is invited to that' part of section ' 22 of the Jones Law W:hich provides that "ALL, e ~e cutive functions MUST be dir~ctly' under the Goverrior-General or WITHIN ONE OF THE EXECUTIVE r . . , ., .,. -;,1 , • • • I .. . DEPAR-TMEN'i'sunder:the supervision and control of tlhe Governor.:

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SUPERVISION AND CONTROi;, 39 General." Now, the corps of advisers atthe Ma1acafiang _fs not one of the " e xecutiv e departments, " which are, ' accordin g to the Administrative . Code; .. (1) .. the Department .directly _ under the G overnorGeneral; (2) the Depa f tment.:of .t he Interior,. '(3) . the Department of Public Irrstructioi1, . ( 4) the Department .bf Finance, (5) the Department of Justice, (6) the Department.of Agriculture .and N atural. Resources, and (7) the : Department of Commerce and Communications. For administrative purposes , the Bureau of A udits and the Bureau ot Civil Service are di rectly under the G overnor-General as . a Department Head. (Sections 74 and 75, Administ,rative Cod,e.) Only the Legislature can create e xe cutive departments-the. Governor-General . can not do s o ( section 22, Jones Law) . ' Secondly, under the said section 22 of the Jones Law, the Philippine Legislature has power to ." increase , the. numbe r or abolish any of the executive departments, or , make such CHANGES i n the names and DUTlES .tliereof as it may see fit. " A ct i n g under this consti t utional authority, . the Philippine Legislature in February, 1919, has seen fit to pass Act 1':l"o. 2803, de fining the duties of the different Departments. Section 1 of said Act provides: , __ "DEPARTMENT ORGA;t-HZATION.-AH exe . cutive funetions of the P hilipp ine Government shall be directly under the executive depa r tment, subject to the sqpervisiqn and control of the Gov ernor-General in matter of generaJ policy. The . Departments . are established for the proper distribution of the work of the'. Executive, for the performance of the functions expressly assigned to them by law, a:nd in order that each branch of the ad ministration may h_a,ve a chief r . esponsible for its direction a nd policy. E!:J>ch Departm.ent Secretary. shall assum~ the burden and responsibility,_o_f an activities of the Government under: his control and supervision." . Section 2 in part says : .. "Executive orders, regulaJtions; decrees, and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction . of a . Department, the promulgation whereof , is expressly assigped by law to t he Governor-Gener~!, shall, as a general ._rule, be i~sued up e m propositi o n and recommendation by the. respective Depart m . ent." . . This law h as been approved by the Goyernor-Gimeral and reporte~ to Congress, which, not having annulled _ it, . h . as . im pliedly sanctioned it, according to tp.e . doctrine l&id, <_]own .bY the Supreme Court of the United States and of the Philippine . Islands. . (See chapte1 : on "Congress ~nd ,GeneraL Wood."),',

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40 GENERAL WOOD AND THE LAW The Go.vernor-General can not trBat this law as void because he ' can not allege the unconstitutionali t y of an Act o f the Legis.lature after it has been approved by the Chief Executive. (See chapter on "Government of Laws.") Thirdly, the fact that the appointment of the Department . Secretaries by the Governor-General is subject to the approval or disapproval of the Philippine Senate, which is elected by the Filipino people, indicates that the United States Congress ex pected the Governor-General to attach great value and conse quenc to the advise and recommendations of the Secretaries of Department, for they indirectly represent the people through the Senate. These Department Heads embody both the authority of the sovereign power (for tihey are nominated by the Governor-General) and the will of the Filipino people, because their appointment requires the consent of the Philippine Senate. The theory, therefore, that they are responsible to the Governor General alone, is untenable. While on the one hand they are subject to the supervision and control of the Chief Executive, on other they must be men enjoying the Filipino people's con fidenc. Incidentally, we take the liberty to mention the histo rical fact that the struggles for constitutional and popular government everywhere have been closely linked with the en deavors of the people to defeat the powers and influence of irresponsible ministers and advisers of the king, governor or other supreme ruler. This is true, for example, in the constitutional history of England, and in the contest between the original thirteen American colonies and England, and in the efforts of Canada for self-government. Knowing this lesson of human experience, and its intention being to give the Filipinos auton omy, Congress could not have intended that the Department Secretaries should be responsible to the Governor-General alone, or that the Chief Executive could have a group of advisers who have not received the sanction of the people's representatives in the Philippine Senate. It is true iJhat in the Federal Go. vern ment, the Cabinet members are responsible to the President alone. But no analogy can be drawn between the Cabinet of the President of the United States ,and the Cabinet of the Gov ernor-General here, for the American President is elected by the American people, but the Chief Executive of these Islands is not elected by the Filipino people . Lastly, the preamble of the Jones Law reads in part thus: "In order that, by the USE. AND EXERCISE of popular franchise and . GOVERNMENTAL POWERS, they may be tihe better prepared to fully . assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of

PAGE 43

SUPERVISION AND CONTROL 41 complete independence." It will be seen that Congress wanted the Filipino people to be trained not only in the making of laws but also in executive functions, because of the comprehensive phrase "governmental powers." It is, therefore, safe to say that the United States Congress must have . expected the Gov ernor-General, in exercising his right of general supervision and control, to give the largest amount of responsibility, ini tiative, and authority to the Department Secretaries, and to repose the l argest measure of confidence in their ability to grasp the problems of government. Other , wise, the Depart ment Secretaries would be veritable tools or instruments of the Governor-General, with little or no discretion, and the Filipinos would not be schooled in the difficult science of executive organi zation and in the laying down and carrying out of broad and far-reaching governmental policies on finance, development of natural resources, local autonomy, public works, promotion of industrial and commercial enterprises, administration of justice; etc. It is hard to believe that the United States Con gress desired the Filipinos to learn to make wise laws but did not expect them to be trained in government administration, for it is well-known that no matter !how good the laws on the statute book may be, if they are poorly or inefficiently enforced, the public welfare gravely suffers. It must have al s o been in the mind of Congress that by far the most difficult part of government is not to be found in' law-making or in the administration of justice but in the execution of the laws and the management ' of public affairs by the executive department. So, how could the Filipinos be prepared for complete independence, as contemplated' in the preample of the Jones Law, if they are going to be deprived of the opportunity to develop self-reliance in this most important branch of national life? ' Our . conclusion ' is that the Department Secretaries are the only constitutional advisers of the Governor-General, and that he can not, directly or indirectly, transfer their functions to any other set of men . .

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1' • 5. GOVERNMENT_ OF LAWS . In an issue of the MANILA DAILY BULLETIN and under the caption of "The Governor's Position," a report of General Wood's stand was published. That paper stated that it vouched for the source of the information as being "beyond suspicion and in position to state authoritatively th~ events which led up to the break." In said statement of General Wood's stand, the following appeared: "It is important to note that, during the several conferences which took place at the Malacafiang, the Governor-General was inform,ed: first, that the Legislature had t"qe right to change the provisions of the Jones Law~ There fQre, the Conley case is merel'y an incident upon which is based the campaign for these important objectives o( the leaders of the Quezon group. THEIR ERROR LIES IN THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ORGANIC ACT AUTHORIZED BY THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STA'.fES CAN BE MODIFIED BY ANY. OTHER ENTITY THAN THE SOVER-EIGN POWER." . On the other hand, tihe letter of resignation of the members of the Council of State declared: "This series of acts constitutes a clear violation of the fundamental law of the land and other fog al provisons, especially those of Act No. 2803 and of section 2147 of the Administrative Code." . This was followed by a 'statement to the pi ess by President. Quezon wherein he said among other things: "What we are defending is a fundamental principle of government involved in the interference by the . Gov . ernor-General in those cases the responsibility for which is specifically . vested by law in the Secretaries of Departments or chiefs of bureaus. In the Conley ca , se the Governor-General ignored completely the authority and responsibility of the Mayor of the City of Manila and the Secretary of the Interior by reinstating Conley in spite of section 2447 of the Administrative Code." It will be seen, therefore, that one of the main issues in the present controversy is whether or not the Governor-General can disregard any Act passed by the Philippine Legislature if he thinks that such a law is contrary to the provisions of the Or ganic Act. General Wood says he can, but the Filipino people assert that he can not; that so long as Act No. 2803 and section 42

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SUPERVISION AND CONTlWL . 48 !:l~1:7 t9fJh~ Ad,ru_inJtrat i y e Code h~ve -not bee. e9me __ a fupdam,ental pri1:1ciple_ of Ame:r:_ican consti~9:.t!q!l~~ ) .~'\V, ~ .P.P . 4~s'.. b _ een , c,onsideresi .. l!>: Y -!l.11' , ; Amerjcan writei; ,

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44 GENERAL WOOD AND THE LAW as "the 'last and er-owning political growth of ocir Anglo~Saxon civilization." The following words of one of the greatest statesmen in American history, Daniel 'Webster; should make us all ponder: "THE PRESIDENT IS AS 'MUCH BOUND BY THE LAW AS ANY PRIVATE CITIZEN, AND CAN NO MORE CONTEST ITS VALIDITY THAN ANY PRIVATE CITIZEN ... THE PRESIDENT MAY SAY A LAW IS" UNCONSTITUTIONAL, BUT HE IS NOT THE JUDGE. Who is to decide that question? Th Judiciary alone possesses this unquestionable and hitherto unquestioned right." (Quoted in Prof. James Albert Woodburn's book, "The American Republic," page 104.) Prof. Woodburn, in the book just mentioned, which was published in 1903, has this to say upon Wbster's opinion: "Wb ster was also right in asserting that a President shoul'd not' refuse to execute a law merely because in his opinion it is unconstitutional," (p. 105) . Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm, in his authoritative work on "The Government of the Philippine Islands," says on pages 432-33 : . "'A GOVERNMENT OF LAW$ AND NOT OF MEN.'-These words, which Rufus Choate so eloquently said, . should be sp'ared 'in their way very rust' as one 'would spare the general English of the Bible' were placed in the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 as the climax to emphatic negation against one department exercising the powers of ano ther~'to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men.' Here is seen not mBrely beautiful ve1:biage of a famous constitution, not merely the u ,ltimate cause for the separation of the powers, but an axiom of representative governmeRt b come part and parcel of it. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (AND WITH IT THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT) 'as has been often ob served, is a government o f law, and not a government of men.' . . . The humblest citizen must realize that he is protected in his rights from the arbitrary will of the highest official. The powBrful man must realize that he has to bow before the majesty of the law.'' In the case of U. S. vs. Lee, 106 U. S., 196, 220, 27 L. Ed., 171, decided in 1882, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. J'i.Istioe Miller, said: "ALL THE OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, FROM THE HIGHEST TO THE LOWEST, ARE CREATURES OF THE LAW, AND ARE BOUND TO OBEY IT. "IT IS THE ONLY SUPREME POWER IN OUR SYSTEM OF GOVERN MENT AND EVERY MAN WHO; BY ACCEPTING OFFICE PARTICIPATES

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SUPERVISION AND CONTROL 45 IN ITS FUNCTIO~S, IS ONLY THE MORE STRONGLY BOUND TO SUBMIT TO THAT SUPREMACY, and to observe the limitations which it im poses upoh the exercise of the authority which it gives." It remains only for us to add that if General Wood can, on alleged unconstitutionality, set aside any Act passed by the Legislature approved by the Governo1-General and reported to Con. gress, which has 'not repealed it, then he could at any time stop the operation of our laws. He could, for example, alter the election law, change the municipal and provincial codes, declare any tax illegal, abolish any of the executive de,partments, change the definition of crimes laid down by the Philippine Legislature, reduce or amplify, the jurisdiction of courfo of first instance and justices of the peace, modify the appropriatlon law; in short, he could become not only the executor of the law, but also the sole and final lawmaker and law-interpreter. I do not believe he is desirous of assuming powers to such an unlimited extent, but the logical consequence of his stand is that he could, if he chose to do so.

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, , . . ,_ .... -6. THE WOOD-FO RBES MISSION ....•. J :. -Th~ report 'of the Wood~Forbes Mission h~s been jus~ly . critieized by the Filipino people _ for its errqeous findings :against the . capacity of the FilipJnos under the larger ~utonom:y,. grant~. d them during the Demotratic administration frqm 1913 to ' 1920. , Butthough the F1lipino people may fee~ th;tt tpey hav~ r.i_ot been fai:i:ly treated in sai _ d report, the;r
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SUPERVISION AND ' CONTROL . A ! . 7 Ori page 13 of the report, under the headiri ' g of "Present Coh ditfons," the investigators made this finding: "It is the general opinion amongst Filipinos, Americans, and foreigners, that the public services are now in many particulars relativeli inefficient; that there has occurred a slowing-down -in the dispatch. of business and a distinct relapse towards the standards and administrative habits of former days. This is due in part to. bad example, incoinpetent direction, to p91itical infection of t'he services, and above all, to lack of competent supervision and inspection. This has been brought about : by surrei1deririg or failing to employ the executive authority, of the Governor-General and has resulted in undue interference and tacit usurpation by the political leaders of the general supervision .and control or the depar.tmerits and bureaus of the Government, vested by law in the Governor-General." Under the caption of' ' 'Legislation" the Wood-Forbes Mission said: "191'6 to 1921.-With an elected House and Senate, .. the legislation -in this period bei:!omes increasingly radical iii its pater nalism and government interference 'in business-. Some con structive " legisfation is passed but the general trend is towards -inje'dion of , politics into adminisltation and encroachment of the legislature on the e~ecutive ... "Another tendency in recent legislation has been the deliberate effort to take away from the American officersof the Government supervision of the different branches of the Government and put it int<:> the Departmentscontrolled by Filipinos." From the recommendation above referred to and the findings just quoted, it is evident that, much as the investigators dis.. approved of some laws passed by the Philippine Legislature, and although the Mission believed such laws to be contrary to the Organic Act, the report nevertheless, recognized the fact that this legislation passed by our law-making body was valid and in full force and effect, unles s declared unconstitutional by the courts, or repealed by the Legislature, or annulled by the United States Congress. Si1bsequent events, however, made the Chairman of that Mis sion, General Wood, change his attitude towaids the laws of the Philippine Legislature which he thought were an encroachment upon the prerogatives of the Governor-General. He was ap pointed Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The Phil ippine Legislature did not repeal the laws which General Wood deemed unconstitutional. Neither did the President of the United States recommend to Congress the revocation of this

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48 GENERAL WOOD AND THE LAW legislation. And Congress failed to pass any law or resolution annulling such laws . Governor Wood, therefore, decided to take matters in his own hands, and proceeded to treat these laws as void and of no effect whatsoever, thus assuming the judicial power to pass upon the constitutionality of laws enacted by the Legislature, or attempting to exercise the authority of the Philippine Legislature to repeal its own laws, or making use of the power reserved by Congress in section 19 of the Jones Law to annul Philippine legislation. Among the laws referred to are Act No. 2803 and section 244 7 o f the Administrative Code, both cited by the Dep ,artment Secretaries in their letter of resignation. In the chapter on "Government of Laws," and in other chap-ters, we have shown that the Governor-General has no authority to decide the question of whether any Act of the Legislature is constitutional, and that the only time he can raise this question is when a bill passed by both houses of the Legislature is submitted to him for approval. It is indeed unfortunate that Governor Wood should 11ave abandoned his original idea of respecting the laws enacted by the Philippine Legislature, rega rdless of his personal opinion on their constitutionality. This reversal of policy on his part has brought about the present issue between. him and the Filipino people. . '

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) • III THE VETO POWER 199223-4 49

PAGE 52

• ,, ' • , ~.

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1.. THE VETO POWER Governor-General Wood claims that his veto power under the Jones Law is unrestricted. Therefore, last year he vetoed six ~ teen bills passe . d by the Philippine Legislature, and thi~ x . e~r six: bills, all in all twenty:-two legislative measures during the last two sessions of our . law-maki;ng J;>ody. Not on~ . of these bills . has any provision "impairing the e~ercise of the rights of sove:r;~ eignty by the pe . ople . of the United .States," to use the words of the preamble of the Jones Law. On th~ contra ry, theit all refer to . domestic affairs. I shall mention some of them by way or illustration. Last year General Wood vetoed, among other bills, th0se empowering municipalities to purchase articles in small ' .. amounts without -the. i _ nt~rveI).ticm Qf the Bureau . of Supply; establishing requisite~ . :(or w;;tr!:!houses. for_ P!Oducts of the c _ oun. try:; .authorizing the Secretary of Public Instruction to establish; central agricultural schools for the training in the cultivation of certain regional products; amending _the Act separating the Prov ince of . Carnarines Norte . from that of Ambos Camarines; appropriating 'P'l8,0QO,OOO for. the University of . the Philippines; and , reg.Iating the . use of . Go_vernment autornobiles. This yea'r, among the bills vetoed w~re those prdviding simpler methods of appeal to the Supreme _ Court; permitting the use of certain carts on the public roaqs; _ prohib.iting the.a.et of fishing in the. Abra River; and appropriating l"i00,000 . for public calamity relief. It is clear from the foregoing enumeration _that Governor W.ood has. wielded hjs . veto power to defeat. tli~ ~ill pf the Fjlipino people expressed through their constitutional representatives in. th:e Legisbitur~ as to . th. e man~g~~ertt .of affairs: of purely local and .. domestit . conce:i,:n. The Filipino people have cited, as one of .their _ gri~y . ances against G.eI?,eral Wood, this unlimited use of the veto . power, whereby he has overthrown the paramo 'unt object of the Ameri~an . people through. the United States Con~ gress in prov.iding mor . e autonomous form of .government' as a training for coniplete ihdependence. . .. we shall now s:vecificany ' stat~ sorhe bf the reasons for this .. . ' .. stand of the Filipino people. : Two of these . reasons have already been set. forth in the chapters on ' . 'The Preamble" and "Auton~ . omy." . ,For. the: sake .of clearness, we shali . summarize said two chapters: besides adv~rt'cing ~ n additiohal gro ' tih ' d fin~ tli~ pbsi-. tion we take. 51

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52 GENERAL WOOD AND THE LAW First, we said in the chapter on "The Preamble" that General Wood's construction of his veto power nullifies the main object of the Jones Law which is that the Filipino people, in the words of the preamble, "may be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities ana' enjoy all the privileges of complete inde pendence." . :How _can the representatives of the Filipino people learn to make. wise laws, as contemplated by Congress, if the Governor-General uses his veto power to tlle extent of disapproving any bill which he thinks is not . good for the country,_ . even though it may .not affect American sovereignty? We cited cases decided by the Supreme Court .of the United States and other courts' as well as other' authorities to show that the preamble is a key tp the unerstanding of a statute. s~ondly; in the chapter on ."Autonomy" we proved hy quotations from decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of .the Territory of New Mexico that it has always been the policy ,of Go:ngress in providing, for government of territories 11. ewly acquired, to leaye . domestic affairs to the locai legislative l ;>0dy: We ,have also .cited decisions of our own Supreme Court to show that the . Philippine Legislature organized under the J.ones Law has general ~nd comprehensive legislative powers. Therefore, we concluded, the unrestrained use of the veto power is ;not in keeping with the establi'shed policy of Congress in dealing with territories , including the Philippines. . , Thirdly .. (and this is ou~ additional reason), the unrestricted us. e of the veto power by General Wood places the Filipino people in a WORSE POSITION,.as far as autonomy is concerned, than they were before. th!:l passage of ,the Jones iaw . . This ' is manifestly destructive. of. the clear intent of the United States Congress in the new Organic Act. It will be. remembered that from October, 1913, to the. passage of the J9nes L~w _in August, 1~16, that is, for a period of nearly three years, b _oth Houses of the Philippine Legislatu~e were in the hands of the Filipinos, AND THERE WAS NO VE'.1'0 POWER Of THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, und_er the old Organic Act of July .l, l902 . . During those _ _ three y~rs the PhilippinE; Assembly was composed wholly of Filjpinos and. the Philippine Commission, or Upper. Hous~, ha_ d a majority Qf Filipinos. The Governor-General, who was then . also the. Presid~nt of the . I>hilippin. e Commissiop., had :p.o power. to veto any bill passed by the fhilippi~e Assembly and the Philippine Commission . . The only
PAGE 55

THE VETO PO'wER .. .5.3 . reserved the power and the authority to' annul all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands . ( This provision is re-enacted in-the Jones Law.) In announcing the decision . to give control of the Philippine Commission to the Filipinos, Pres ident Wilson sai d in his message to the inhabitants of the Philippines: "Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that inde pendence. And we hope to move toward that end as rapidly as the safety and the permanent interests of the Islands will permit. After each step -taken e x perience will guide us to the next. "The administration will take one step at once, and will give the native citizens of the Islands a majority in the appointive Commission, and thus in the upper as well as in the lower hous . e of the Legislature a majority representation w.ill be secured to them." Now, then, this stage of development of Filipino autonomy was known to the United ' States Congress when in 1916 it passed the. Jones Law, whose title reads thus: "An Act to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide A MORE AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT for those Islands." Hence, . no great mental exertion is necessary to understand that the intention of the United States Congress in giving the veto power to the Governor-General was. not to' destroy the legislative control which had already been enjoyed by the Filipino people for three years, but simply to reserve the authority of the United States through the Governor-General to annul bills passed in extreme .and extraoidinary cases-which might arise where . such bills . attempt to challenge, destroy, or impair American sovereignty . . It was never intended to be used in ordinary legislation which regulates domestic affairs. and which does hot. affect Am~rican sovereignty. And yet General Wood's interpretation of his veto power has made this government LESS AUTONOMOUS than before the passage of the Jones Law because the legislative control of the Filipinos from 1913 to 1916 is virtually transferred into his hands, inasmuch as he has disapproved bills in his free and un. trammelled discretion, thus practically reducing . the Philippine Legislature into a mere :ADVISORY BODY, and he can accept or reject its ~dvise ' as he pleases. He has thus by his -strict interpretation of the Jones Law nullified the evident and unm~stakable object of Congress in establishing "more autonomous . govern~ n;ient" .for these Island131 by _making it actll~ll y wnd: ~ .eaUY.LESS AUTONOMOUS.

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54 GENER!\L WOOD AND 'I:HE LAW . Jn this-.conhection, it : is , illurri.in .ating to refer to pha:pter _ 5 of . the splendid wprk by Mr. Justice Mal~olm of. our Supreme Court on "The Government . of the: PhHippi;n~ !~lands." . Said ch~pt~ _ r is erit}tled, "Government Steps under the America1_1 Adminis~ration/' .and_ he describes therein the general steps taken. by the American government from the military rule in i89~ to the passage of: the Jones Law )n: 1916, in harmony with the con sistent American policy o:f _granting step by step larger gov . erninental participation -t.o .the • Filipinos looldng toward:. final independence. He says that the word STEP "epitomizes : Amer ican-Philippine policy." In a footnote to section 76 of his book, he quotes the utterances of Taft, Roosevelt, G::trrison, and Wilson . Thus, President Roosevelt, whom General Wood so justly . . ad mires, said in his message of 1906, referring to the .future _ Phil1 ippine Assembly: "We are constantly increasing the measure of liberty accorded the Islanders, and next spring, if conditions warrant, we shall take a 'GREAT STRIDE.forward in. -testing _ their ca:pacity for self-govern.ment by summoning the _ first }filipino . legislative assembly." It re!llains only for us to cite one rule of statutory constru . ction _ w.hich supports our contention. -_ Vol. 36, Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, page 1137: "For the. purpose of removing ambiguities in the language of a statute, it must be read with reference to all _the facts and circumstances, such as THE HISTORY OF THE TIMES,.THE'STATE OF THE EXISTING LAW, and the evils to be remedied by the new act." _ 25 Ruling Case Law, page 1038.; "Where the language of a statute is in any manner obscure or of doubtful meaning, the court in . construing such . statute may with propriety : recur to the .~ISTbRY OF THE TIMES when :it. was . passed .and of .the:act itself, in order. to as~ertain the reason as-well. as the meaning of. pa. rtic:ular provisions in it." _ . . In the chapter on !'The Preamble" we have shown that there is room for doubt as to the extent to which the, Governor-General should use his v . eto power. Therefore, under the rule of con sfructfon just cited, we are warranted in referring to the history -of the times when the Jones Law was passed. It is a historical . ,fact that from 1913 to 1916, the Filipinos already had control of 'the 1legislative : powet, 'and" that .there was no executive ' veto. ;Therefore, when fo 19i6 tlie United states Congress enact'ed . tlie Jones Law, whose title reads thatThi"object is to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the 'future : politicaLst:itus o.f-. th~ peeple :of -the Ph11ippirie : . 1s1inas::and "to .,. . . ., . . ,.. '"' , -,.,, , .....

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THE VETO POWER 55 provide a MORE AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT," the American Con gress did not mean to diminish the legislative control already vested in the Filipino people before 1916, but its intention was to enlarge such control. Hence, the veto power was not -intended by Congress to be wielded to reject legi~lation regulating matters of domestic concern, stl~h as the b'ills '\,vhich General Wood has . already disapproved. e ( •• .r. •. .. ..

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. . l , 2 . . SOVEREIGNTY In the chapter on "The Veto Power" we . contended that such prerogative of the Governor-General was intended by Congress to be a reservation of the authority of the United States through the Chief Executive to annul bills passed in e~treme and extraordinary cases which might arise where such bills attempt to challenge, destroy, or impair American sovereignty, and that said veto power was never meant to be used in ordinary legislation which regulates domestic affairs and which does not affect the sovereignty of the American people. We wish.in the present chapter to explain this proposition further, with special reference to the proviso in the preamble of the Jones Law to the effect that control of the FiliP,ino people of their domestic affairs should not impair "the exercise of the rights of SOVEREIGNTY by t he people of the United Sta.tes." The title and the preamble of the Jones Law read as follows: "An Act to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide a MORE AUTONOMOUS GOVERN MENT for the islands. "Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established1therein; and "Whereas for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philip pines AS LARGE A CONTROL OF THEIR DOMESTIC AFFAIRS AS CAN BE GIVEN THEM, WITHOUT IN THE MEANTIME, IMPAIRING THE EXER CISE OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY BY THE PEOPLE OF THE] UNITED STATES, in order that, by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the BETTER PREPARED TO FULLY ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND ENJOY ALL THE PRIVILEGES OF COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE." The phrase "without, in the meantime, impairing the exer cise of the rights of SOVEREIGNTY by the people of the United States" is clearly intended as a limitation upon the Filipino people's control of their domestic affairs. How, then, should this clause be construed in connection with the veto power of 56

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THE VETO POWER . the Governor ~ Geh eral? Does it, authorize the Governor"'General to veto bills of domestic character which in his personal opinion are h asty , unwise ' , or ill-advised , although they are not mani festly unconstitutional and do not affect the sovereignty of the United States? We answer in the negative. In the fir s t place, an affirmative reply to the above question would destroy the establishment of a "more autonomous government" and the g1:ant to, the Filipino people of "a large con trol of their domestic affairs." It is one of the canons of statutor y construction that provisos and exceptions should never defe a t the main object of the law . . Sutherland, in his standard work on "Statufory Construction," says in section 352: "Where it (a proviso) follows and restricts an enacting clause generally in its scope and language , it is to be STRICTLY CONSTRUED and limited to objects fairly. within its ter ms ." The Supreme Court of the United States ha s held that "When t he enacting clause i s general in its language and objects, and a proviso is afterwards introduced, that proviso is strictly construed, and takes no case out of the enacting clause which does not fall FULLY ' WITHIN ITS TERMS." (U. s. vs. Dickson, 15 Pet. , 141, 10 L. Ed., 689.) The law' on this point is also stated in vol. 36, Cyclopedia of Law and P r ocedure , page 1162, thus: "The enacting clause is of course the principal part of the statUJte, and, as its terms may be presumed tohave embodied the main object of the act, the proviso should be STRICTLY CONSTRUED." In Ruling Case Law , vol. 25, page 986, we read: "And since the office of a proviso is not to repeal the main pt'ovisions of the act but to limit their applic a tion , no proviso should be so construed as to DESTROY THOSE PROVISIONS. A construction of a proviso whkh would make it plainly repugnant to the body of the act should be rejected ; if possible." The Supreme Court of the Philippines, in the case of Bor romeo vs. Mariano ; XIX Off. Gaz., 301 (clecided in January 1921), held that a _ proviso "should not be construed so as to repeal or destroy the main provisions of the statute. " Applying the foregoing principles to the present question it is to be observed that the establishment of a "more autonomous gov .ernment" and the placing in the hands of the Filipinos of a "large control of their domestic affairs" are the main provi. sions, while the clause, "without, in the meantime, impairing the exercise of the rights of ' sovereignty by the people of tlie United States'' is in the nature of a proviso or exception. ' This

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GENERAL .WOOD. AND THE LAW clause : should . therefpre be strictly construed and should never beso '.interpr~tei as to destr-oy., the main object of Congress, .. . ; . . ' . . . . . . . . . . ... . ' . . . . k ' . , . ' which is to provide a "more autonomous .government" and to grant to the Filipino people of a "large. control of their domes tic affairs : " . However, General W , ood's action in vetoing such bills as, for instance, ' those regarding the estabiishment of farm . schools, regulating the use of government automobiles, and others of p~rely local and domestic concern, simply because in his opin ion such . bills are unwise or inadvi~able, defeats the principal . declaration . conferring autonomy to the Filipino people . . If he can disapprove or reject any . bill in' his unconfined discretion, self-government of the Philippines, which . fo the main purpose of the Jones Law, becomes ineffectual and impossible. To up ho~d _ General w oo.d's view wo~id . b . e tantamount to saying that Congress granted to the_ Filipino people powers which at the same time it denied . . In the second place, the object of the United States Con gress in estabiishing a m9re autonomous government for ~the Filipino people is unequivocably formulated in the preamble thus: "In order that, by the use . a:n.'d, exercise of popula r franc _ hise anq governmental poweis ; they may be . the BETTER : PRE PARED to , fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the . privileges of COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE.' 1 ,viiat, in the ' min . d of Congress, was ' the . way in . ~hich . the Filipino people . could be . Prepared to become in~epenaent: bY, having a free hand in domestic legislation or by being under the close surveillance of the . Chief Executive, who CQ: uld accept or: reject any bill that he thought was undesirable? . It goes without . saying that the former i , s the ~ethoct'evid_ently con."te~platEld ~:y Congress. . Such 1bJ:!l~ ~s pennfWng the -~Jr~c{ Pt.1rch1:J.se ~tgoods)!J.: sp:i_aH: q _ ua _ nti ties by muni~ipalit~es, prov _ih(~~PP.i: n _ e_:a~~ii5~,: Nor was it to

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THE VETO POWE R 59 :gI:ve .an .. opportunity .to American officials to work out theirowl). i,et theories of administration, or their own , p . e.culiar idea&. as to what constitutes wise legislation. It was, rather, to give a chance . to the Filipinos to demonstrate their ability .for self determination, in. order that the American people might _ deter~ mine .at any given time whether the independence of the Phil ippines should be granted. Having seen that the reservation of the exercise of trie rights of sovereignty in the Jones Law does not _ warrant an unre strained use of the veto power of the Governor ... General, let us '.as 'certain what bill he may dhiapprove, according to the intent of tne Organic Act. We may divide such bills into four classes: (1) those bills which .are manifestly ~ nconstitutional: (2) those which are in violation of any treaty of the United States with (other nation&; (3) tliose which di _ scriminate against the citizens or subjects of other nations; and (4) those which attempt to challenge or diminish American spv:ereignty over these Islands. All these bills he may veto. The first class of bills may be disapproved by the Chief Execu tive, for certainly he is not obliged to sign a bill. which mani festly violates the supreme law of the land. The right to reject bills which are clearly unconstitutional is part of the veto powe r of 'State Governors and the President of the United States . . (.25 Ruling case Law, 888 ; Woodburn, American Republic, p. 149.) Underthis heading would come, in the Philippines, for example, any attempt to legislafe _ on matters already regulated by an -Act of Congress; any bill curtailing any . of the individual rights and liberties, or diminishing the prerogatives of the Chief Executive under the J'ones Law~ or anY: proposed measure which is contra ry to the brganic Act. But it should be distinctly understood that the only time he can set up the unconstitutionality of an Act of the Legislature is when the same is submitted to hi:tn for approval or disapproval. After the law has been approved by him, neither he nor any of his successors can ques tion its validity, so long as it has not been annulled by the Philippine Legislature, by Congress, or by the courts. The unfortunate mistake of General Wood in the Conley case was when he undert. ook to decide the constitutionality of Act No. 2803 and section 2447 of the Administrative Code, both of which had been approved by the former Governor-General. (See the chapter on "Government of Laws".) The second class of bills that may be disapprcved by the Governor-General needs but little explanation. The Philippine Legislature can not pass any law which would impair any treaty

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60 GENERAL.WOOD AND .THE LAW :agreement which has beeri entered.into by the United States w ith any foreign . nation. As for the third class, .let us mention one or two examples. Suppose the Legislature should pass a law forbidding the Chi nese from engaging in the r etail business, or imposing a higher Tate. of . .taxation on foreign merchants. than on c.itizens of the Philippines, such bills could be disapproved by the Governor.:. General, because they affect. the relations of the United States with other -countries. Las~ly, as to the fourth kind of bills,-those challenging or impairing American sovereignty-t}:ie .following may be cited as illustrations: Suppose the Philippine Legislature should pass a law declaring the independence of the Philippines, or forbidding any citizen of the Philippine Islands from enlisting in the United States Army or Navy, or prohibiting any unit of the United States Army from being stationed in the City of Manila-these bills . wo:uld be repugnant to the sovereignty of the United States, and the Governor-General would have an un questionable right to veto . them. We submit that with the Governor-General's power to reject any of the four kinds of bills jusit described, American sover eignty over these Islands would be amply and adequately safeguarded and respected, and at the .. same time, the main object of the United States Congr _ ess in granting autonomy to the Filipino people would be faithfully carried out. The ~ exercise of the veto power by General Wood . having gone beyond _the scope above set 'forth, .we believe he has transcended his author ity and contravened the clear intent of the Organic Act passed by the Congress . of the United States.

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. . 3. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS In previous chapters we have contended that the . Governor General can not veto bills passed by the Philippine Legislature which deal with mabters of dome -stic concern1 Further reasons for this proposition are submitted herein. Section 19 of the Jones Law provides in part as follows: "Every bill and joint resolution which shall have passed both houses shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Gov ernor-General. If he approve the same, he shall ' sign it;. but If not, he SHALL RETURN IT WITH HIS OBJECTIONS to that hou , se in whi~h it shall have originated which SHALL enter t 'he objections at large on its journal and PROCEED TO RECONSIDER IT. If, after such r . econsideration, two-thirds of the members elected to that house shaH agree to pass the same, it SHA~L BE SENT, together witlr the objections to the other house, 'by which it SHALL likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the members elected to that house it SHALL BE SENT to the Governor-General who, in cwse he shall then not approve, SHALL TRANSMIT THE SAME TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. The vote of each house shall be by the the. yeas and nays, and the names . of the members 'voting for and against shall be entered on the journal, IF. 'rH;E PRESIDENT . OF THE UNITED . STATES APPROVE TJIE SAME :f!E SHALL SIGN IT AND IT SHALL BECOME A LAW. lf he shall not approve same, he shali return it to the Governor-General, so stating, and J.t. shaU nqt become a law." . It will be noted (1) that the apove section requires the Governor-General to state his reason _ s for disapproving any bill; (2) rthat in case the Governor-General should insist upon his veto, after a bill has been considered for the second time by the Legislature and passed by a two-thirds vote of the elective members of that body, the mattel,' must be submitted to the Pres ident of the United States for decision; and (3) that this appeal to the Pr_esident mu_st necessarily take : pla~e, should . a bill be repassed by the required vote of the Legislature and re vetoed by the Chief Executive. These three constitutional restraints, taken separ~tely and togethe~ • .. strqngly indicate the intenti<;m of Congre~s that the veto power of the Governor General i:ihall not 'rest absolutely ' upon his ctiscreti.on and that there are certain ~lasses ~f bil1s whi~h are b~yond the re~ch of , .• • I : , ; . • ;, 1 , • •. ' • ' , • , I , \ , , / , 1 , ,. ' \ such power. ' ; . ,. . . . . . . . ., ,. .. 61.

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62 GENERAL WOOD AND THE LAW If the veto pewer is unlimited, why should the Jones Law make it the duty of the Chief Executive to specify his objections in case he should reject a bill? If it should be true that his discretion in the matter of approv.ing or disapproving a bill is beyond q . uestion , there would be no reason for requiring .him to state his grounds~ in order that such grounds may be sub jected to a careful analysis and consideration not on)y by the Ph. ilippine Legislature but also by the public opinion of tl:J.is country. It is a well-known principle that when. an offi..cial has a finai and absolute discretion to take action in any matter, it. is not necessary for him to explain such action before any govern. ment official, or body. . As for the appeal to the President, it should be plain to any body that if Congress had intended that the veto power of the Governor-General is to be unrestrained and that it is excl _ u sively within the discretion and judgment of the Chief Executive of the Philippines to determine what bills are to be approved and what fo be disapproved, then why was the appeal to the . President provided \for? That such a remedy was. established in order to hav~ the Gov ernor-General's veto in each instance reviewed and passed upon by the President of the United States is proof positive that the United States Congress has foreseen the possibility of the veto power being unduly or improperly wi~lded . ,by the GovernorGeneral-a possibility which has, indeed, become a living ac tuality in the case of General Wood. To provide a safeguard hgainst such a serious curtailment of. the autonomy of the Filipino people, which is the main object of the Jones Law, the United States Congress has created this method pf submitting each bill disapproved to the President of the United States. Lastly, it is an important. fact that the question of whether or not the appeal to the President should be taken has not been left to . the discretion of the Legislature. Whenever a bill is vetoed by the Governor-General, the house in which it shall have originated, "shall proceed to reconsider it;" if two-thirds of the elective members re-enact the same, it. "shall be sent" to the other house; if the latter approves it again by a two-thirds vote of all the elective members, .the bill "SHALL be sent to the Governor-General who, in case he shall then not approve, SHALL TRANSMIT the same to the President of the United States." It will be observed that the language of the Organic Act' on this . point is mandatory a-nd imperative. It does not say that .the Legislature "may" reconsider the bill, or that the Governor,. Gener~! "may" transmit the same to the President, .but -the word ''shall" i s invariably used. Now, what doe s this mean?

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THE VETO POWER 6 3 That in the thought and c ontemplation of Congress, the • disapproval by the Governor-General of a bill passed .by the Legis.: lature which ha' s been cre a ted by that hotly and-to which Con gress has delegated general legislative powers, should not be treated as a trivial matter, but as something serious and ,of farreaching significance , for the expression of the will of the Fili pino people on their own affairs is . thereby nullified. In such a grave question, the,refore, the determi nation -of the President of the United State s _ is required. Incidentally, it is to'. be re gretted' that the -Legislature; believing "that the taking--of the appeal to the President is discretionary, has failed to take steps to submit the rejected bil1s to the Chi'ef Executive of the Amer ican Nation. It is hoped that in the future, ail bills disapproved by : the Governor-General will be forwarded to the President of the. United States for decision. Having shown that the discretion of the Governor-General in the approval or disapproval of bills is not absolute or unrestrained, we wish to add iri corroboration of ou r opiriion, that t h e idea C>f an unquestionabie veto povyer upon colonial legisla tionfinds no sanction in American political' thought, if we can take the Declaration of Independence as embodying the basic political faith of the American people. That document which f~rever stands as a noble vindication of human rights and liberties, in specifying the grievances of the American colonies against the king .of England, mentioned the abuse of the veto power as the first : of all such . grievances, placing it at the, head of the enumeration. The Declaration of Independence read::i in part thus: " .The history of the present king of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries arid usurpations, ali having in direct object .the esfablishinent of ari ~ absoiutely tyrany over these States. To prove this, 'Jet factsbe ' admitted to a candid world. ' "HE HAS RE . FUSED HIS ASSENT TO LAWS the most wholesome and necessary for the public ' good. "He has borbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance," unless ' suspended in their operation till his assent should . be obtained; and; when so suspended, he has. utterly. neglected t0 attend to them. . .. "HE HAS REFUSED TO PASS OTHER LAWS FOR THE ACCOMMODATION OF LARGE DiSTRICTS OF PEOPLE,' unles s those people wouid relinquish the right of representation in the legislature'; 'a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only." When the drafter, Thomas '(J\fferson, with the approval of the other signers, began to particularize the "repeated injuries and usurpations" which led to the Declaration of Independence ,

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64 GENERAL WOOD AND : TME LAW the first tyrannical policy that_ came to hi.s: mi _nd wa~ the i mproper use of the vetopo ~er. It stands to rea:,;on then that t his must have been orie of the most serious grievances . of the colonists. . Prof. Oliver Morton Dickerson, in his work on "American Colonial Government, " gives a very interesting exposition of t he "Treatment of Colonial Legislation" (Chapter V). He states that, among the kinds of colonial laws disaJlowed were the fol lowing: (1) Those encroaching upon the royal prerogative, such as the laws regulating the time 9f meeting of the legisJative assem blies, or modifying the ch.arters of towns incorporated by char-ters direct from the king. . (2) Those contrary to religious policies, su~h as laws reducing the revenues of minister$ of the Church of England, or discriminating against certain denominations. (3) Laws that were inimical to the material interests of the Grown, such as the so-called, "quit rent" law~ . (4) Those incon~istent with the laws of England, such as the judiciary act of Massachusetts, or laws governing descent of property. (5') Laws regulating commerce, both externa,l and inte:r' colonial. ( 6) Those affecting credit transactions such as bankrupcy laws, legal tender acts, statutes oflimitations, -and usury laws. (7) Laws concerning land titles, such as those regulating the recording of deeds. It will be se~n from this list of some of the laws disapproved by the king that the autonomy of the American colonies was destroyed : by the tyrannical use of the veto power. No wonder then that the men who signed the Declaration of Inde pendence mentioned this grievance before all others. _ The: abhorr~nce of 1:mrestr _ aine.d veto power on laws passed by legislative assemblies of colonies 0r dependent countries is therefore , deeply ingr ained in the: political : philosophy of America. Hence, it is-but natural that the United States--Congre s s in regulating t~e veto power of_ the Govern . or-General i n section ' 19 of the Jones Law, . should have used _ languag e which, as alrea dy show:q, clearly points out to t he intention o f C ongress that such power shall not be unlimited, and shall : not be so used as to : diminish the autonomy of the Filipino people. . ' ' '' sdA~: (ieRARY i j -e . E) ; .. •' I;