|
THE WAR AND ITS CAUSES
BY
G. P. GOOCH, M.A.
TOUT COMPRENDRE, CEST TOUT PARDONNER."
PRICE ONE PENNY.
THIRD EDITION.
THE TRANSVAAL COMMITTEE,
ERMINS MANSIONS, WESTMINSTER, S.W.
1900
WK
968.048
201,773
THE TRANSVAAL COMMITTEE,
TO PROTEST AGAINST WAR WITH THE TRANSVAAL.
This Committee has been formed for the purpose of spreading*
accurate information, by means of Lectures, Meetings, the-
circulation of Literature, &c., on the matters at issue between
the two Governments, and to show that there is no question
affecting the honour or interests of the Empire which calls for
War.
The Committee will be glad to send Literature, or to
arrange for Lectures, and they desire the adhesion and sub-
scriptions of those who favour its objects.
ChairmanPASSMORE EDWARDS.
TreasurerDr. G. B. CLARK, M.P.
Hon, SecretaryP. W. CLAYDEN.
Office :St. Ermins Mansions,
Westminster, S.W.
PREFACE.
Though the dogs of war have slipped their 'leash, it is as neces
sary as everperhaps more necessaryto call attention to certain
facts and certain considerations which must be taken into account
in forming- a judgment of the struggle. History has always judged
and will continue to judge the merits of a controversy that ends in
Avar not only nor chiefly by its final stage but by the general
conduct of the dispute.
While these pages were passing through the Press, Mr. Cham-
berlain has from his place in Parliament attempted to defend his
conduct of the negotiations with the Government of the South
African Republic. The most important feature of his speech was
his declaration that the despatch of August 28 was intended as a
qualified acceptance of the proposals of the Transvaal Government
contained in their despatch of August 19. The terrible significance
of this statement lies in the fact that the Transvaal Government, in
common with the entire English Press (the Standard described
the reply as an explicit negative, September 2), treated the reply
as a refusal; and further, in no subsequent despatch was the
slightest attempt made by Mr. Chamberlain to explain to the
Transvaal Government that, in regarding his reply as a refusal,,
they had been labouring under a misconception.
What more crushing impeachment of Mr. Chamberlains diplomacy
is possible than the fact that, although the two Governments had
actually armTed at an agreement as regards at least nine-tenths
of the controversy, and that the remaining tenth was a matter of
form, the Transvaal Government and the English nation were left
in ignorance of the fact until nine days after the commencement of
hostilities ?
A sinister light was also thrown on the conduct of Mr. Cham
berlain in claiming to exercise suzerainty by virtue of the super-
seded Convention of 1881, when Lord Salisbury stated in the House
of Lords that, in order to get the word suzerainty out of the Con-
vention of 1884, Mr. Kruger made considerable territorial and
other sacrifices.
THE WAR AND ITS CAUSES
In the middle of the 17th century the Cape of Good Hope was
occupied by the Dutch East Indian Company as a resting-place on
the long voyage from Holland to the East. During the years that
followed the settlers spread over a large part of what is now Cape
Colony. At the end of the century they were joined by several
hundred Huguenots, who had fled from France on the revocation
of the Edict of Nantes, and quickly blended with the Dutch.
On the outbreak of the Great War France invaded Holland,
expelled the House of Orange, and dragged the country at the
. wheels of her chariot for 20 years. Profiting by the excuse fur-
nished by this alliance, if alliance it can be called, England seized
Dutch colonies all over the world, and at the Peace of Vienna
retained the Cape of Good Hope. Henceforward the Dutch were
treated as a subject race, and deprived of all share in the Govern-
ment. u It is not a pleasant admission for an Englishman to
make, writes Theal, the author of the standard History of South
Africa, but it is the truth, that it would be difficult to find in any
part of the world a people with so much cause to be discontented
as the old inhabitants of Cape Colony. One generation of our
rule was sufficient, and the Boers (farmers) resolved to withdraw
beyond the boundaries of British influence.*
With the Great Trek of 1836 (in which Paul Kruger, then a
little boy of eleven, took part), the modern history of the Dutch in
South Africa begins. The emigrants won a foothold in what are
now the Orange Free Slate, the Transvaal, and Natal. From'the
latter, after four years occupation, they were expelled by British
# Sir Benjamin Durban, Governor of tlie Cape, declared the movement
owing to insecurity of life and property, inadequate compensation for the loss
of the slaves and despair of obtaining recompense for the ruinous losses by the
Kaffirs. (Despatch of July 29, 1837.) The compensation for the abolition of
slavery awarded to the Dutch was three millions. Of this they only received
one-sixth.
6
THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL IN 1877.
troops. In 1848, the British Government proclaimed its authority
over the Orange Fiee State, and defeated the settlers at Boomplats.
The South African Republic and the Orange Free State were finally
recognised as independent in 1852 and 1854 respectively by Earl
Grey.
'For some years the Republics were unmolested; but when
diamonds were discovered about 1870 in the western part of the
Orange Free State, the territory was declared by England to belong
to a Griqua Chief who had ceded his claim to the English. The
Dutch yielded under protest before superior forces, the land was taken,
and Kimberley founded. From that day, wrote Mr. Froude, in
Oceana, no Boer has been able to trust English promises.*
In 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone was sent to Pretoria by Lord
Beaconsfields Government, and choosing a moment when the
Volksraad was not in Session, declared the South African
Republic annexed to the British Crown. For this step, from
which the confusion of the last 20 years has resulted, certain
excuses were given. In the first place it was declared that the
Boers were at the mercy of Sekukuni, a Basuto chief in the North-
East. What had really happened, however, was as follows. In the
previous year, a border quarrel had arisen from the molestation of
Boer wood-cutters. An expedition was sent against the Basutos,
who were strongly entrenched, and, after some severe contests,
withdrew from the country for the winter. Early next year,
Sekukuni sued for peace, paid a fine and was forced to accept
a limitation of his territory. When Shepstone arrived, there-
fore, instead of finding the Boers at the mercy of Sekukuni, he
was greeted by a supplication from Sekukuni to protect him
from the Boers. (Aylwards Transvaal of To-day, 1878.)
It was also said that the Zulus were threatening the very
existence of the Republic. On this it is only necessary to remark
that in the terrible struggles following the Great Trek, the Boers,
though at that time far fewer in numbers, not only drove the Zulus
back but deposed their king Dingaan and set uphis brother Panda; that
for the 34 years preceding the annexation amicable relations had been
maintained; and that the difficult question of boundaries had been
settled by the construction of beacons, in each of which the Zulu
Commissioners had laid the first stone.
* Shortly after, a British Commission reported that Waterboer had never
possessed any rights to the land. President Brand therefore came to England
to obtain redress, but failed, and accepted £90,000 as a solatium.
7
PRETEXTS FOR THE ANNEXATION. \
In the third place, it was asserted that the South African
Republic was bankrupt. Of cash, it is perfectly true, there was and
had always been but little ; but while the farms were so plentifully
stocked with flocks and herds, it was ridiculous to talk of the bank-
ruptcy of the country. Many of the burghers, too, refused to pay
taxes on account of their want of confidence in the President for
the time being, who had lost the faith which was to them so
supremely real. How little truth there was in the assertion was
proved by the fact that, immediately after the annexation, the
Boers raised £1,000 for the purpose of sending a deputation to
England to protest against it. The presidential election was at
hand, and Burgers would have been replaced by a President in
whom the people had confidence and to whom they would pay
taxes.
A final excuse was made at the time and has recently been
repeated by Mr. Fitzpatrick. It was said that a number of the
burghers petitioned in favour of annexation. But Mr. Fitzpatrick
carefully omits to state that the petitions were signed not by the
Butch to whom the country belonged by conquest and treaty but
by English settlers.
The excuses, then, were one and all devoid of foundation. The
Republic was not in danger of annihilation by Basutos or Zulus;
it was not bankrupt; it did not petition for annexation. Indeed,
the more closely that we examine the circumstances, the more clear
does it become that the annexation was a piece of conduct as inde-
fensible as was ever perpetrated by a large State against a small
one. Twenty-five years earlier, England had set her seal on
the Sand River Convention, the first article of which ran as
follows : No encroachment shall be made by the English Govern-
ment on the territory north of the Yaal River. She now showed
what value she attached to her solemnly plighted word. Troops
were massed on the frontier, and Shepstone informed the Executive
that, if he returned to Natal, it would be to make room for the men
of the sword.*
What the burghers thought of it when the news found its way into
the farmhouses was soon shown in an unmistakable manner. Paul
Kruger, who at this moment comes forward as the leader of the
Nationalist party, was at once sent to England to ask the Govern-
ment to allow a plebiscite, that is, an opportunity to express their
* Bishop Colenso wrote, We took possession like a party of filibusters,
partly by trickery, partly by bullying.Coxs Colenso, II. 4S9.
8
ENGLISII RULE AND BOER OPINION.
wishes in relation to the government of their country. The request
was refused, and, in the following year, Kruger and Joubert returned
to England with a signed memorial from the burghers, protesting
against the annexation of the country without their knowledge.
When this mission also failed, the Boers demanded an interview with
Sir Bartle Frere, the High Commissioner. Sir Bartle listened to their
complaints, which he promised to transmit to the Home Government ,
but informed them that he could give them no hope that their
request would be complied with (Martiueaus Bartle Frere,'
vol. 2). In the last weeks of 1879, a meeting representing the
entire population of the Transvaal was held, at which it was
determined to restore the old Government. As, however, a
change of Ministry seemed imminent in England, it was resolved
to postpone the decisive step. Meanwhile a paper was founded!
for the furtherance of the cause of independence, which, however,
was quickly suppressed. It must be remembered, also, that not
one of the articles of the constitution promised by Sir Theophilus
Shepstone had been carried cut.
The corruption of our rule, again, as revealed in the corres-
pondence between Lord Welby, the present Chairman of the County
Council, on behalf of the Treasury and the Colonial Secretary,
inspires nothing but contempt. Said Lord Welby, Sir Theophilus
Shepstoncs account is of a most unsatisfactory character; vouchers
and details are produced for about one-third only of the payments,
and the small portion that is capable of thorough examination,
contains evidence that the unvouched residue includes several
duplicate charges. ... He has disregarded the elementary rules
which ordinarily govern men in their dealings with money other
than their own. Mr. Leonard Courtney, then Secretary to the
Treasury, drily wrote, My Lords of the Treasury feel sure that
the Secretary of State will not wish to charge the Consolidated
Fund with the cost of Sir Theophilus Shepstones hat, Mr. H. C.
Shepstones hair brushes, Mr. Finneys cricket bat, or Mr. Thirsks
fishing-rod.
In 1880, Mr. Gladstone succeeded Lord Beaconsfield as .Prime-
Minister. He had denounced the annexation as insane, and the-
Boers naturally supposed that on his accession to power it would
be reversed. Mr. Gladstone was, however, informed that the
taxes were being regularly paid, and that so many Englishmen
had settled in the Transvaal since the annexation that to restore
it to the Boers would lead to civil war Accepting these statements
THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.
9
without adequate investigation, Mr. Gladstones Cabinet declared
that it could not comply with the wishes of the Boers. This
deplorable pronouncement removed their last hopes. A farmer
refused to pay taxes, and the Government seized his carts and
oxen. A meeting of burghers was held, the restoration of the old
Government was announced, and a Triumvirate was appointed con-
sisting of Kruger, Joubert, and Pretorius. The British troops
were repulsed by Joubert in an attack on Laings Nek, and Sir
George Colley, hurrying up from Natal, was defeated and killed at
Majuba Hill.
Popular ignorance has swollen Majuba Hill into a battle of
almost legendary proportions. As a matter of fact, 92 English
were killed and one Boer. Popular ignorance will also have it, that,,
on the arrival of the news, Mr. Gladstones Cabinet capitulated in a
moment of panic, and restored the independence of the Transvaal..
What took place was precisely the reverse. Sir Evelyn Wood
hastily collected 12,000 men ; an army, be it said, not only far better-
equipped, but more numerous than the Boer force. Before giving
battle, Sir Evelyn telegraphed home that, humanly speaking, he had,
the Boers at his mercy. The unanimity of the Boers in rebelling
against the foreign yoke had come as a surprise to Mr. Gladstone,,
and informal negotiations had been entered on directly the first,
blood had been shed. The advance on Majuba Hill was undertaken
on Sir George Colleys sole responsibility, and it is difficult to
understand on what grounds we can acquit him of the desire to
snatch the laurels of victory before he could be superseded by his
superior officer Sir Evelyn Wood. Mr. Gladstones Cabinet, there-
fore, decided that as its object was not the shedding of the maximum
quantity of blood, but the attainment of a settlement, the informal
negotiation should not be interrupted by Colleys fool-hardy
exploit.
A Royal Commission was appointed, and the Convention of
Pretoria was drawn up. England was declared the suzerain power,
and retained the direction of the foreign policy of the Transvaal
State, as it. was now called, and the right to move troops through
the country. A Resident was appointed with power to interfere
in certain specified internal affairs. So far from obtaining peace
and independence at the point of the sword, Mr. Kruger, in pre-
senting the treaty to the Volksraad, declared that though not
what he could have wished, he had signed it because better terms
were unobtainable. Though the Boers say, and say truly, that they
a 3
10
THE CONVENTIONS OF 1881 AND 1884.
beat us at Majuba Hill, they entertain no illusion as to the fact that
their Government was restored not by their arms, but by the will
of Mr. Gladstones Cabinet. Mr. Gladstones mistake was not in
restoring the Transvaal in 1881, but in not restoring' it in 1880.
It should also be remembered that his Cabinet included Mr. Chamber-
lain and the Duke of Devonshire, and that the policy of retrocession
was strongly approved by Lord Randolph Churchill on his visit to
South Africa a few years later.* ( Men, Mines, and Animals in
South Africa.)
Towards the end of 1883 Mr. Kruger and two other deputies
were sent to England to discuss the conclusion of a new Conven-
tion. The delegates were received by Lord Derby, the Colonial
Minister, who, after occupying the position of Foreign Minister in
the early years of Lord Beaconsfields Cabinet, rebelled against the
provocative policy it pursued, and accepted office in Mr. Gladstones
Ministry. A new Convention was drawn up. The title of the
South African Republic and the control of foreign relations were
restored, England reserving the right to veto within six months
.any treaty concluded by the Republic with a foreign Power, except
with the Orange Free State, on notifying that such a treaty
'Conflicted with interests of Great Britain (Art. 4). The second
important change was the omission of all reference to suzerainty.
Mr. Chamberlain, indeed, has asserted that the preamble of the
-Convention of 1881 was tacitly retained in 1884 ; but, as Sir Edward
Clarke has said, I do not see how anyone, carefully examining the
history and documents of the case, can come to this conclusion.
If we turn to the Blue-book, we find that Lord Derby, in preparing
the treaty, took a copy of the Convention of 1881, and wrote in
his own hand at the top, Passages enclosed with a black line are
to be omitted. Looking down the page (the facsimile is given in
the Blue-book, C. 9507), we And a line drawn round the whole
preamble and round the only other two references to suzerainty.
In the second place, the new Convention is furnished with a new'
preamble. Has a Convention with two preambles ever been heard
of, any more than of a man with two heads ? In the third place,
* Mr. Balfour professes to have discovered, in a recent speech of Lord
Kimberley, that the settlement of 1881 was dictated by fear. What Lord
Kimberley said was, that if we had attempted to continue to rule the country
against the will of its inhabitants, we should have had the whole Dutch
population of South Africa against us. To guard against this was statesman-
ship, not pure funk.
T1IK DISCOVERY OF GOLD.
11
on the clay on which Lord Derby signed the new Convention, he
telegraphed to South Africa, I have to-day granted to the South
African Republic the same complete internal independence as is
possessed by the Orange Free State. In the fourth place, in
explaining the Treaty in the House of Lords, Lord Derby used the
following words: We have abstained from using the word
suzerainty because it was not capable of legal definition, and be-
cause it seemed a word which was likely to lead to misconception
and misunderstanding. It has been contended, however, that if
the preamble of 1881 is cancelled, the independence of the
Transvaal goes along with it, for there alone is it explicitly men-
tioned. This attitude overlooks the fact that the existence of the
Transvaal State is implied in the first words of the new preamble ;
that this same preamble gives this State a new name, the South
African Republic; and that if the Republic was not a State with
a Government of its own, no Convention could be formed with it.
From the conclusion of the Convention until October, 1897, the word
suzerainty was not once used, nor the Convention of 1881 once
appealed to, in the long series of despatches between the Colonial
Office and South Africa.
In 1886 gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand, and
Johannesburg sprang up as if by magic. To those who believe
that President Kruger has been animated throughout life by
fanatical hostility to the British race it may be a surprise to learn
that from the influx of gold seekers in 1886 until the appearance of
Mr. Rhodes on the scene in 1890 the relations of Johannesburg' and
Pretoria were of a friendly character. The Gold Laws were
recognised as the most favourable in the world. A Sanitary Com-
mittee was instituted, elected by householders, of which the first
chairman was an Englishman. When a crash resulting from over-
speculation came in 1889, and Johannesburg was on the verge of
starvation, the President offered premiums to those who should first
reach the city with stores. Early in 1890 a second Volksraad was
created, in which foreigners could sit and for which they could vote
two years after their arrival. For these and other matters the
President was repeatedly thanked by the mining community.
In 1890 Mr. Rhodes, wjio had amalgamated the Kimberley
Diamond Mines in 1888, and to whom Lord Salisburys Government
had in 1889 made the inexcusable concession of an immense area
in the Hinterlands of South Africa, became Prime Minister of Cape
Colony. But for the Transvaal, South Africa presented no very
a 4
12
PALL KRUGER AND CECIL RHODES.
formidable obstacle to the realisation of his schemes. From this
time the history of South Africa, in large measure, resolves itself
into a duel between two remarkable personalities and the principles
they represent.
Scarcely had Mr. Kruger created the second Raad for the benefit
of the immigrants than the High Commissioners agent arrived
in Pretoria as the emissary of Mr. Rhodes. In a strain wholly
different from that hitherto pursued in negotiations between English
and Dutch, Lord Loch demanded the surrender of the right of
expansion northwards guaranteed to the Transvaal by the Conven-
tion of 1884. Were this right surrendered the Chartered Company
would be able to pursue its aim unmolested of obtaining all terri-
tory north of the Limpopo and west of Portuguese territory.
Lord Loch also demanded that the Transvaal should enter the
Customs Union, believing that if it did, Natal, which had hitherto
stoutly refused to become a member, would be unable to maintain
its opposition. Unless these demands were at once complied with,,
the consent of the .British Government to occupy Swaziland, a
small territory on the eastern border of the Transvaal, was to be
withdrawn, and Swaziland was to be occupied by a British force.
The Pretoria Government was indignant at this treatment, and a
serious crisis was only averted by Mr. Hofmeyr. The question of
the Customs Union was omitted, and the Convention signed.
The next important contest took place in 1894. The Johannes-
burg traffic being a very profitable affair, Mr. Rhodes did his best
to secure a monopoly for the railways of Cape Colony. The Cape
however, is over 1,000 miles from the Rand, while to Delagoa Bay
and through Natal are scarcely more than a third of the distance.
In the early part of 1894 Mr. Kruger resolved on the extension of
these lines. Mr. Rhodes thereupon demanded the pooling of al!
receipts from the Johannesburg traffic, 50 per cent, to go to Cape-
Colony. The demand that the long route should be guaranteed
the same as the two shorter routes jointly was naturally rejected.
Mr. Rhodes refused to accept his rebuff, and later in the year it
was rumoured that the Chartered Company was endeavouring to-
obtain Delagoa Bay. The inner workings of the episode are not
yet known, but at any rate, Germany, which possessed interests in
the railway, sent a couple of men-of-war to Delagoa Bay, and
persuaded the English Government to maintain thestafas quo.
During the same year took place what Mr. Chamberlain has-
lately described as a breach of the Convention. About 100 British
THE RAID.
13
subjects were commandeered for service against a native chief.
The right of the Government to call out all residents exists in Cape
Colony. The authorities at Pretoria were fully within their legal
rights. By Article 15 of the Convention of 1881, only those who
had established their domicile in 1877-81 were exempted from com-
pulsory military service. Nearly all who were commandeered joined
the expedition and were compensated. A few objected. Lord Loch
proceeded to Pretoria, and exemption was granted to all British
residents.
In 1895 arose the question of the Drifts. The proposed
pooling of the receipts being refused, Mr. Rhodes reduced the rates
on the Cape Colony portion of the line to Johannesburg, in order
to undersell the rival routes. The Transvaal thereupon raised the
rates over its own portion of the line to a level that kept the through
rate at the old price. Mr. Rhodes now determined to avoid the
Transvaal Railway altogether, and to unload the trucks at the
Vaal River, whence goods were to be conveyed by ox-wagons
across the river to Johannesburg. The Transvaal Government
retaliated by closing the drifts or fords to traffic. Mr. Rhodes
Attornej^-General asserted that this constituted a breach of the
London Convention by distinguishing between colonial goods and
over-sea goods, but declared later that he had changed his opinion.
Mr. Rhodes now telegraphed home that the Government of Cape
Colony would share the expense of a war with the Transvaal,
adding in a subsequent telegram that he hoped his previous com-
munication would be regarded as confidential. A threatening note
was sent to Pretoria, and Mr. Kruger withdrew his proclamation,
and promised that he would make no alterations in the rates with-
out consulting the British Government.
A few days later, Mr. Lionel Phillips, as Chairman of the
Johannesburg Chamber of Mines, delivered a speech, hinting at a
coup. It was clear that the threads of a far-reaching conspiracy
were being woven between Johannesburg, Rhodesia, and Cape Town.
Mr. Kruger was urged to take steps to guard against the storm
that was brewing, but replied that the tortoise must put its head
out before it could be chopped off. The head was thrust forth,
as all the world knows, when, on the last day of 1895, Dr. Jameson
crossed the Transvaal frontier from Rhodesia, and chopped off, when
Dr. Jameson was forced by Commander Cronje to surrender near ,
Krugersdorp.
In opposition to the opinion of most of his advisers and of the
u
MI?, chamberlaixs principles in 1896.
vast majority of the burghers, President Kruger determined that
Jameson and his fellows should not be tried in the Transvaal, where
he could not save their lives, but should be sent to England. For
this step he was warmly thanked by the English Government and!
to some extent vindicated in the eyes of his burghers by the
sentences and the plain speaking meted out to the conspirators by
the Lord Chief Justice. The President was convinced that the
shedding of blood, even when authorised by the laws of the
country, would do nothing but harm, and when four of the Reform
Leaders, by whom the plot had been engineered, were sentenced to-
death, he pardoned them.
During the months that followed the Raid, Mr. Chamberlain, in>
a series of speeches in the House of Commons and elsewhere, clearly
explained the principles which he conceived Englands policy in
South Africa should be based. These utterances, it is needless to
say, were made by Mr. Chamberlain with full knowledge of the
Outlanders complaints.
Mr. Chamberlains first principle we may state as, Keep in with
the Dutch. We are constantly reminded of the fact that our
Dutch fellow citizens are In a majority in South Africa, and I may
say for myself as for my predecessors, that we are prepared to go
as far as Dutch sentiment will support us. It is a very serious
thing if we are asked to go to war in opposition to the Dutch senti-
ment. (Feb. 14th, 1896.) His second principle may be sum-
marised as, No bloodshed. The rights of our action under the
Convention [note the singular] are limited to the offering of friendly
counsel, in the rejection of which, if it is not accepted, we must be
quite willing to acquiesce. (Feb. 13th, 1896.) The question is
if President Kruger will consider that our proposals will endanger
the security of the Transvaal Government. If he does, he will be
perfectly justified in rejecting them. In reply to the attack on
these moderate sentiments by Sir Ashmead Bartlett, Mr. Chamber-
lain used the following words : What would be the policy of the
hon. member for Sheffield as Colonial Secretary? We know what
it would be. He would send, in the first place, an ultimatum to
President Kruger, that unless the reforms he was specifying were
granted by a particular date, the British Government would inter-
fere by force. Then I suppose he would come here and ask for a.
vote of £10,000,000 or £20,000,000, and would send an army of
10,000 men at the very least, to force President Kruger to grant
reforms in the State, in regard to which not only this Government,
THE SOUTH AFRICA COMMITTEE.
15
but successive Secretaries of State have pledged themselves re- I
peatedly that they have nothing to do with its internal affairs. |
That is the policy of the lion, gentleman. That is not my policy.
(April 12th, 1896.)
With these sentiments the advocates of peace at this juncture
unreservedly associate themselves. It is contended, however, that
owing to the change of circumstances, the principles laid down in
1896 as the necessary basis of sound policy in South Africa have
become inapplicable in 1899. To the examination of this plea we
now turn.
The man in the street imagines that the suspicion felt by the
Boers towards England is due to the Raid, and to the Raid alone.
No mistake could be greater. It is perfectly true that the Raid
left behind an ineradicable distrust of Mr. Rhodes and of a certain
section of the Oudanders, and determined the Transvaal Govern-
ment to clothe itself with defensive armour. But at the time
there was no sign that the English Government had been in
any way mixed up in the affair, and there was no expectation that
any opposition would be offered to probing the affair to the bottom.
The South Africa Committee, therefore, and the proceedings in
Parliament that followed, came as a rude shock to the Dutch popu-
lation of South Africa. In the first place, the telegrams that were
produced left no doubt as to the nature and purpose of the Raid.
On Dec. 30th, 1895, Mr. Rhodes had wired to Miss Flora Shaw,
The crux is I will win, and South Africa will belong to England.
But other developments were still more sensational. On Dec. 17th,
1895, Flora Shaw, who paid frequent visits to the Colonial Office,
telegraphed to Mr. Rhodes, u Chamberlain sound in case of inter-
ference of European Powers, but have special reason to believe
wishes you must do it immediately. It will be admitted that this
was suspicious ; what effect could the incident of the Hawksley
telegrams have save that of strengthening those suspicions?
Mr. Jackson, Chairman of the Committee, ordered their production ;
Mr. Hawksley refused to produce them, and they were not pro-
duced. If they were of no importance, as it was asserted, why
were they demanded ? If they were important, why were they
not produced? This deliberate suppression of evidence was bad
enough, but there was worse. The Committee reported as
follows:Whatever justification there might have been for
action on the part of the people in Johannesburg, there was
none for a person in Mr. Rhodes position in subsidising, organising,
16
THE REVIVAL OF T1JE CLAIM TO SUZERAINTY.
and stimulating an armed insurrection. Such a policy once
entered on involved Mi*. Rhodes in gross breaches of duty to
those to whom he owed allegiance. He deceived the High
Commissioner, representing the Imperial Government; con-
cealed his views from his colleagues in the ministry and from the
Board of the South African Company, and led his subordinates
to believe that his plans were approved by his superiors. A few
days, however, after this tremendous sentence had been delivered,
Mr. Chamberlain rose in the House of Commons and declared that
there existed nothing which affected Mr. Rhodes personal
character as a man of honour. (Annual Register, 1897.) All
the officers who took part in the Raid have been replaced in their
positions in the Army. Mr. Rhodes remains a Privy Councillor.
Not a farthing has been paid in compensation for the Raid, either
to the orphaned families of those who took part in repulsing it, or
to the State. It is these facts, still more than the Raid, that are
I responsible for the suspicion with which England, and in particular
I Mr. Chamberlain, were henceforth regarded by the Dutch population
| of South Africa.
Not many weeks after the termination of the above incidents,
Mr. Chamberlain committed, in Sir Edward Clarkes words, a breach
of national faith. The suzerainty had been deliberately laid to rest
by Lord Derby in 1884, and had slept an unbroken sleep for
13 years. In the long series of dispatches which had passed
between England and South Africa during that time, no reference
was made to it nor to the Convention of 1881, in which it had
been contained. In October, 1897, however, Mr. Chamberlain
informed the astonished Government at Pretoria, that Her
Majesty still maintained the preamble of 1881.* That this was
only the first step of a new departure was quickly shown by the
order sent to Englands ambassadors on the Continent not to
recognise Dr. Leyds, the Plenipotentiary of the Transvaal in Europe,
and by ceasing to recognise Mr. Montague White, the Agent of
the Transvaal in London.
In the early months of the present year, a Petition, professedly
signed by 21,000 Outlanders, was sent to the English Govern-
ment. The immediate occasion was declared to be the death of
Edgar. Mr. Chamberlain replied that the British Government
would not turn a deaf ear to the complaints of British subjects.
* Mr. Chamberlain characteristically refused to submit liis claim to
arbitration.
T1IE BLOEMFONTEIN CONFERENCE.
17
The Transvaal crisis began with the refusal of Mr. Kruger to
accept Sir Alfred Milners demand, put forward at Bloemfontein, for
a five years franchise. It seemed to be regarded in many quarters
as a proof of peculiar wickedness that the Boers were unwilling to
revolutionise their old polity. Old-fashioned and unprogressive as
their civilisation was, it was their own, and they were profoundly
attached to it. By the efforts of the Orange Free State and the
Dutch Ministers of Cape Colony, however, Mr. Kruger was induced
to grant the franchise after seven years. To this Mr. Chamberlain
replied by suggesting a Joint Commission into the nature of the
concession. At this point, however, relying on an assertion which
he understood Mr. Conyngham Greene to have made, that his
proposals would be acceptable to the English Government, Mr.
Kruger, obviously acting at the instance of the Executive of the
Orange Free State, drew up his dispatch of Aug. 19th offering more
than Sir Alfred Milner had demanded. A five years franchise, with
a vote for the President and Commander-in-chief, and eight seats
for the gold industry were to be conceded, with a guarantee that
the representation should never fall below one-quarter. In return
no further mention was to be made of the suzerainty (thus
returning to the practice of 1884-97), the present interference in
the internal affairs of the Republic was not to be regarded as
constituting a precedent,* and outstanding disagreements were to
be submitted to arbitration. These conditions were declared
inadmissible by Mr. Chamberlain.
From the Conference of Bloemfontein until the middle of
August negotiations had been slow, but on the whole satisfactory.
By the aid of the natural mediators, the Dutch of the Free State
and Cape Colony, the Transvaal had been brought to successive
reductions of the franchise. However unreasonable Mr. Krugers
refusal at Bloemfontein to cast the Transvaal polity into the
melting pot; however exasperating his disinclination to assist in an
inquiry into the effects of a seven years franchise, he had now
offered terms more favourable than those he had refused some
weeks before. Mr. Chamberlain did not quarrel with the terms,
but with the conditions. These conditions seemed reasonable, not
only, as was natural, to the inhabitants of the Republics, but to the
Dutch throughout Cape Colony, and Mr. Chamberlains refusal to
* A subsequent dispatch of August 21, explicitly stated that the acceptance
of this condition did not affect our right of intervention either under the
Convention of 1884 or under International Law.
A. 5
18
THE CAUSES OF THE ULTIMATUM.
accept them effected a sudden transformation. Till now our
demands had been supported not only by the good-will, but to
some degree by the active influence of our Dutch fellow-subjects.
But it seemed perfectly clear to them that if Mr. Chamberlain
refused these conditions he must have an ulterior motive for his
action, and that motive the deprival of the Transvaal of its inde-
pendence. The Free State now ranged itself on the side of the
Transvaal, and encouraged it to resist further demands. The quid
pro quo being rejected, Mr. Kruger withdrew his offer of the five
years franchise. As, however, the offer had been made after an
express declaration of Sir Alfred Milner, that such a course would
not be regarded as a refusal of the invitation to a Joint Inquiry
into the seven years franchise law, the Transvaal now accepted it.
Despite the express promise to keep the offer open, Mr. Chamberlain
replied that the Government cannot now consent to go back to
this proposal (September 8).
The rejection of both the Transvaal offers brought war within
sight. The final franchise demands put forward by the Cabinet on
September 4, in themselves moderate, were forwarded in a dis-
patch which reasserted the existence of the Convention of 1881,
and found the Boers in the resentful mood into which they had
been thrown by the rejection of their offer of August 19. By a
decision unnecessary, blind, suicidal if you will, but not unnatural,,
it was resolved to reject them. The Duke of Devonshires assur-
ances that no intention existed of attacking internal independence
were inadequate to restore confidence while the patron of Mr.
Rhodes held sway in the Colonial Office and the despatch of troops
went unceasingly forward.
The subsequent history is too recent to need recapitulation.
The English Government declared that it had closed the door to
further proposals on the franchise, and that it would at once pro-
ceed to formulate its terms for a final settlement. Day after day
passed, and the proposals did not appear. Then the Army Corps
was mobilised, the Reserves were called out, and Parliament was
summoned. Much as we may blame the Ultimatum, it can excite no
surprise. What people believing, whether rightly or wrongly,
that their independence was being attacked, would quietly await
the arrival of overwhelming forces ?
The pretexts for the war are the redress of the Outlanders
grievances and the vindication of British supremacy. Let us take'
the grievances first.
FIRST PRETEXT FOR WAR: THE OUTLANDERS GRIEVANCES. 19
It is constantly said that the Outlanders are subject to taxes
from which the Boer is free. If it were so, it would, of course,
constitute a breach of the Convention. But it has never been
pointed out to what tax or taxes this distinction applies, for the
very good reason that no such tax exists.* It is also said that the
Outlanders are overtaxed. But when we talk of overtaxing, we
imply that we possess some standard by which we measure. What
is that standard ? If it is the standard of the countries of Europe
or of America, the residents of the Transvaal have cause to con-
gratulate themselves. The population of Johannesburg largely
consisting of men engaged in the gold mining industry, the gold
laws are of the utmost practical importance. The taxation of the
gold machinery is 50 per cent, lower than in Cape Colony. The
royalty on the value of the output is only a trifle over one-half per
cent., the lowest in the world. In Rhodesia, it is 50 per cent., i.e.r
nearly 100 times as large, and in Canaria 10 per cent. It may
be added that the miners at Klondike petitioned for the introduction
of the Transvaal gold-laws. There is no income-lax. Mr. Leonard,
solicitor to the chief mine-owners, admitted before the South
African Committee that he was making 10,000/. a year, and that
his direct taxes including his license for a solicitor amounted to
100/. a year. In England his income-tax alone would have been
over 300/. By far the greatest part of the revenue is derived from
the tariff, which is 33 per cent, lower than that of Cape Colony.
The Boer only pays less because he buys less.
Before passing from taxation, we must look at the dynamite
monopoly, in relation to which the most remarkable misapprehen-
sions are prevalent. Like all monopolies the dynamite is sold above
the market value. In 1894, however, Mr. Lionel Phillips had recom-
mended the formation of a dynamite monopoly in which the mining
companies should be shareholders and the price of a case stand at
905,, a sum greater than that of which they were so loudly com-
plaining, till a 10 per cent, dividend had been paid for three years.
Those who denounce the dynamite company should remember also
that if the monopoly was abolished and the royalty raised to the
Canadian and still more to the Rhodesian standard, the mining
industry would pay vastly more than it does at present. It may be1
* The War Tax Law levies a tax on real property owned by persons living
outside the Republic or on Companies, the members of which are not liable to
be commandeered. Without the Law, a Boer farmer would be liable to be
commandeered while the absentee foreigner would neither fight nor pay.
20
CORRUPTIONFREEDOM OF SPEECH AND MEETING.
added that the price is now about 12*. a case lower than at the
time of the Raid.
The Netherlands Railway is another grievance, and it may be
admitted that its charges, like those of all railways in South Africa,
are high. There was not enough money in the State to make the
line, and a Dutch company undertook the risk in return for the
monopoly. Coal, however, is delivered at the mines at the average
cost of 155. per ton, the price which the Cape Government pays on
its railways.
Mr. Chamberlain has said that the Outlanders are not even
allowed municipal rights, and cannot control the drainage of their
own city. This statement is the very reverse of the truth. From
the foundation of Johannesburg a Sanitary Council existed, chosen
by householders, of which the first chairman was an Englishman.
Soon after the Raid the city was provided with a Municipal Council.
Another charge which has been much employed to work up feel-
ing against the Transvaal is the alleged corruption of its officials.
The salaries are in some cases excessive, though the remuneration
of the President £7,000) ought to seem moderate to a nation
which pays the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland £20,000 a year. Presi-
dent Kruger may not possess a nice sense of personal honour, and
it may readily be conceded that, like many others, he is none the
better for a long spell of power. But not one of our states-
men has a cleaner record than General Joubert, Mr. Reitz, or
Mr. Smuts, the State Attorney. And what is the record of some of
those who condemn the Pretoria oligarchy as corrupt ? Was it
not corruption when Mr. Rhodes spent £250,000 in Johannesburg
in fomenting an insurrection? (Evidence of Colonel Frank Rhodes
before the South Africa Committee.)
It is frequently asserted that the Outlanders are muzzled, and
are unable to express their views. On the contrary, nothing can
be more untrue. Whatever the disabilities under which they
labour, they are at least allowed to the full the privilege of com-
plaining of them. Violent anti-Dutch papers like the Star re-
mained unmolested for years, though openly working for the over-
throw of the Government of the country. Our tolerance in England
is never put to such a proof; but there is many an Indian editor
who longs for the permission to attack the English administration by
tongue and pen that is accorded to the residents of the Rand. In
no country on the Continent, except France, is such untrammelled
freedom to grumble to be found.
JUSTICEPERSONAL SAFETY.
21
The Press Law empowers the Executive to prohibit publications
considered by the President dangerous to morals or order. In the
only two cases, however, iu which the Act has been applied, the
High Court set aside the order of the Government. The Aliens
Expulsion Law, passed in consequence of the Paid, has only been
put into operation to expel the alleged murderer of a capitalist.
The Alien Immigration Law was directed not against English-
men but against paupers, and did not affect those who possessed
a passport from their Government or who could show that they
had means of subsistence. Though curiously similar to the scheme
proposed for England by Lord Salisbury, the law was repealed on
representation that it was inconvenient.
We are told also that the Kotze incident has made it impossible
to obtain justice. Let us examine the assertion. Till 1897. it
had been held by every judge, including Kotze, that resolutions
and laws passed by the Volksraad were of equal validity. He now
informed the President that he should no longer recognise the
validity of legislation by resolution; this, of course, threw doubt
on the legality of much of the legislation of the country. The Test
Act was therefore passed by the Volksraad to require the Courts to
recognise legislation by resolution as they had always done before.
Kotze refused, and was dismissed. It was not President Kruger
who set the Constitution at defiance, but the Chief Justice.
Another common assertion is that life and property are unsafe ;
indeed the popular conception seems to be that our fellow-country-
men in Johannesburg go about in fear of their lives. When we
demand proof of this remarkable assertion we are referred to the
Edgar case. Granting for a-moment that the story of the case as
narrated by Mr. Chamberlains supporters is correct, does it not
appear strange that only one case should be brought forward in a
period extending' over so many years ? Is not the stress laid on it
a proof that it is not an ordinary but a unique occurrence ? To
parallel Johannesburg, with its many-nationed throng, we must
look to the cities in the south and the west of the United States.
But who takes any notice when the police of New Orleans or San
Francisco shoot a man engaged in a scrimmage? On the other
hand, there is no evidence to prove Mr. Chamberlains narrative is
correct. According to the evidence of Jones, the policeman, Edgar,
on being' presumably insulted by an Englishman in the street
knocked him down and retreated to his house close by. Jones,
who was not far off, seeing the scuffle and hearing a bystander cry
22
CONTEMPT AND MISUNDERSTANDING.
he has killed him, followed him into his house and strove to
arrest Edgar who resisted with an iron-shod stick. Jones, in fear
of his life, fired and killed Edgar, who lies side by side in the
cemetery with the Englishman whom he had struck.
We often hear, too, that the Boers despise the Outlanders.
In fairness to the Boers, let us remember that the most prominent
of the Outlanders inspire precisely the same feelings in men of our
own race. Here is the impression made on Mr. Julian Ralph,
Special Correspondent of the Daily Mail:
It is disgusting to turn into any one of the Cape Town Hotels
to find yourself surrounded by the rich refugees from Johannesburg,
and to hear them cry like children as they tell you what they will
lose if the British do not hurry up and take the Transvaal before
the Boers destroy Johannesburg. They actually cry in their plates
at dinner, and half strangle themselves by sobbing as they drink
their whiske}7 at bed-time. The grand hotels are all full of these
merchants and millionaires, faring on the fat of the land, idle,
loafing, all and every day, and discussing what per cent, of their
losses the British Government will pay when they put in their claims
at the end of the war. It is enough to make a statue ill to hear
and see them and move among them.
On the other hand, is not the contempt reciprocated ? How
many Englishmen were there in Johannesburg who did not regard
the Boers as an inferior race ? Representatives of different types
of civilisation never fully understand each other. The ordinary
tourist, such as Canon Knox Little, rushes through South Africa in
six weeks, visits Cape Town, Kimberley, and Johannesburg, sees
nothing but English newspapers, frequents English clubs, meets few,
if any, Dutchmen, cannot understand their language, and returns home
and writes a book. The residents in Johannesburg, again, know
nothing of the farmers of whom the country is chiefly composed.
President Kruger and his subordinates do not constitute the nation.
Against the reports of tourists and newspaper correspondents we
may quote one or two testimonials from men whose names com-
mand very different respect. Our great Pro-consul, Sir George
Grey, whose connection began in 1854, declared in 189G, after
, a career of unique experience: I have lived among many
1 nations and in many countries, and I may say this with truthI
j know no people richer in public or private virtues. {The Ilumani-
, tartan, April, 1896.) Sir Bartle Frere wrote in a Despatch in 1879 :
The leaders are, with few exceptions, men who deserve respect
TREATMENT OF THE NATIVES.
2^
and regard for many valuable and amiable qualities (Martineaus.
Bartle Frere, Yol. 2.) The leader of the pioneer expedition to
Rhodesia, Mr. Selous, testifies to their unfailing kindness and
hospitality, and declares that they possess all the qualities required
to build up a great nation. ( Travel and Adventure in South-East
Africa.) But perhaps the most valuable testimonials to the
qualities of the Boers are to be found in the character of
Mr. Schreiners Dutch supporters, and in the Government of the
Orange Free State, which not even the most unscrupulous have
dared to condemn.
We now arrive at a grievance which, though rarely openly
avowed, accounts for much of the hostility of the rich Johannes*
burg mine-owners to Pretoria. The Government limits the employ-
ment of natives, with the result that the mine-owners are compelled
to employ a larger proportion of white labour, wThich demands and
obtains high wages. This is the explanation of the suggestion put
forward by Mr. Chamberlain in the despatch of February, 1896,.
dated on the day of Mr. Rhodes visit to the Colonial Office, that
the Johannesburg district should be cut off from the Transvaal, to*
which it should owe only quasi-allegiance. The Boer Government
once gone, nothing prevents the increase of native labour, and the-
consequent increase of profits.
In connection with the foregoing there is another point at
which, though not a matter concerning the Outlanders, we must
glance. Among the charges used to inflame English opinion
against the Boers is their treatment of the native races. Nobody
asserts that the relation of the Dutch to the natives has been
satisfactory; but not a shadow of evidence is forthcoming to*
prove that their conduct is worse than ours.* This was the-
judgment of Sir George Grey, and it is the judgment of Mr*
Selous, one of the few men who know the Boer in his home*
Indeed, Saul Solomon, perhaps the staunchest political friend
the Kaffirs have had, and Bishop Colenso, who, alone of
Englishmen, earned the complete confidence of the Zulus, always-
declared that the view of Boer cruelty was unfounded. On tho
other hand, in our new colony of Rhodesia, there is something
very nearly approaching the revival of slavery. In the report
which Sir Richard Martin was sent out by Mr. Chamberlain to*
make, occurs the following passage : Compulsory labour does,
* Where in Boer annals do we find an episode blacker than our treatment
of- Langalibalele ? See Coxs Life of Colenso, II., 313-87.
24
EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE.
undoubtedly exist in ^Matabeleland, if not in Mashonaland. The
native commissioners in the first place endeavour to obtain labour
through the Indunas, but failing* in this they procure it by force.
(Report printed as Appendix to Proceedings of S. A. Committee.)
The opponents of military intervention do not base their
opposition on the contention that no grievances exist, but on the
ground that the grievances complained of are not worth a war;
being in part chimerical, and in part exaggerated. To the latter
class belongs the non-recognition of the English language. Two
wrongs do not make a right, but in fairness to the Boers, it
should be remembered that for 10 years after the introduction
of responsible Government into Cape Colony in 1872, the Dutch
language was forbidden in the Assembly and in all public offices,
and that during the annexation of 1877-81, it was systematically
tabooed. That a language is the chief sj^mbol of nationality
to a small community in a distant land hardly needs to be pointed
out ; and when the independence of that community has more
than once been placed in jeopardy, its jealous adherence to its
tongue cannot excite surprise. Except in the Yolksraads, however,
English is widely used. In connection with education, it is little
known that under a law of 1896 there are five schools in the gold-
fields where English is the medium of education. In the lower
standards no Dutch book is used, and in the higher the maximum
government capitation grant is made where five hours per week
are devoted to Dutch. In no other country does the education of
foreigners receive so much assistance from the Government. If
the study of Dutch appears a hardship, it should be remembered
that all members of the public service in Cape Colony are compelled
to be proficient in both languages. Remember, too, that all languages
except Magyar are forbidden in Hungary, that Polish is forbidden
in Poland, German in the Baltic Provinces, and Danish in Schleswig-
Holstein.
The second point to which we referred is that of the franchise.
The early history of the subject is, of course, out of date, since the
reduction of the period of naturalisation from 14 to 7 years; but as
the exclusion of the Outlanders from political rights has bulked so
largely in the indictment agaiust the Transvaal, we must ask
ourselves how the matter stood. In the first place, it is clear
on reading the Convention of 1884 that no reference, explicit
or implicit, is made to the concession of political rights.
Article 14 runs as follows: All persons conforming themselves
THE FRANCHISE,
25
to the laws of the Republic can enter, travel or reside there,
hire or possess houses, &c., carry on commerce, and not be
subject to any taxes other than those imposed on citizens of
the Republic. If political rights had been intended, it seems un-
likely that they would have been omitted, while matters of pre-
sumably minor importance were inserted. That successive changes,
were made iu the franchise laws without protest from the British
Government conclusively proves that the Convention was not con-
sidered to have any relation with the matter. In the second place it
must be remembered that the Boers entertained a very natural aver-
sion to have their polity turned upside down by the intrusion of men
representing a state of civilisation, which, whether better or worse*
was utterly different from their own. In the third place early
immigrants came solely to dig for gold, with the determination to
return home directly they had made their money. That it was the
opportunity to make money rather than the franchise which the
Outlanders desired is proved by the remarkable letter of Mr. Lionel
Phillips to his friend and colleague, Mr. Beit, dated June 16, 1894.
I may say here that, as you of course know, I had no desire for
political rights, and believe, as a whole, that the community is not'
ambitious in this respect. (App. to the Cape Colony Report of the
Select Com. on the Jameson Raid, A. 2913, 5/96.) After the first
years, it is true, some arrived who were desirous of making the
Transvaal their homes. But before they reached any large number
the friction between the Transvaal and Mr. Rhodes, which has been
sketched above, had beguuand increased the disinclination to extend
the franchise to his countrymen. And, further, it must be remem-
bered that though the Outlanders have clamoured for the franchise,
they have been unwilling to accept the conditions on which it is
granted, not only in the Transvaal but in other countries. An oath
of allegiance is demanded in every country, and the wording of the
oath in the Transvaal was copied from that in use in the United
States. In all countries where universal military service exists,
the naturalised alien takes his share in the military duties of his
new home. As Mr. Hofmeyr said some years ago, I must frankly
say that I cannot see why men expect to be made voting citizens in
any country without transferring their full allegiance to it. There
must be no more trying to sit on two stools. Disfranchisement*
we must in the last place remember, exists in countries where re-
presentation is nominally (o be found. In Prussia, for instance*
where the Socialists are numerically the strongest party, they are-
23 SECOND PRETEXT FOR AVAR : AN AFRICANDER CONSPIRACY.
prevented from securing the return of a single member, owing to
franchise laws framed for the special purpose of excluding them.
In the German Empire, again, though the constitution of 1871
divides the country into constituencies of 100,000, and orders that
redistribution shall keep pace with the growth or decline of popu-
lation, no such redistribution has ever taken place. In this way
many county members are returned by 50,000, and many town
members by 250,000, As the former are nearly all Ministerial, and
the latter nearly all Opposition, a redistribution, demanded alike by
law and justice, is refused by the Government, whose majority
would be jeopardised. The German artisan is an Outlander. Is
Pretoria more unjust than Berlin ?
This rapid review has been attempted in no sense with a desire
to explain away the grievances of which we have heard so much.
To exaggerate them, however, is no whit less blameworthy than to
deny their existence. IIow many of those who have swallowed
day by day the messages from the South African correspondents
of our Ministerial Press have fulfilled the elementary duty of
taking the trouble to discover how much is true, and how much is
false ?
Nobody maintains that the Government of the Transvaal is
satisfactory. Its shortcomings are deprecated by none more
strongly than by the Progressive Boers. But nothing has ever
been adduced, either by Mr. Fitzpatrick or anybody else, to show
that anything exists which constitutes a serious obstacle to the
attainment to wealth and well-being by the immigrant population.
The second pretext is that we have to suppress an Africander con-
spiracy. The first argument that is brought forward in justification of
this assertion is the military equipment of the Transvaal. If it could
be shown that the Transvaal had piled up huge armaments before its
independence had been threatened, it might have been fairly said
that they had an offensive not a defensive object. We possess,
however, precise evidence that the armaments of the Transvaal
date from the Paid. In the first place, the war budget which
stood at £19,000 in 1893 and £28,000 in 1894, rose to £80,000 in
1895, when a revolution was being organised, and leaped to
£495,000 in 1896, as a consequence of the Raid. In the second
place, we possess the report of Major White, who was sent by Mr.
Rhodes in the autumn of 1895 to investigate the military resources
of the Transvaal, that he found about a dozen guns, none of them
fit for much work. (Cape Report on the Raid.) Further we find
THE ARMAMENTS OF THE TRANSVAAL.
27
that General Joubert was taken to task for allowing the defences j
of the State to be so inadequate, and we have the authority of Captaiu 1
Younghusband, who was sent out as Special Commissioner of the
Times soon after the Raid, that the Transvaal was nearly caught
napping.,, That iufamous piece of brigandage convinced the South
African Republic that, without defensive armour, its life as a separate !
State was not worth many months purchase. The Transvaal
Government acted as every wise householder acts when his
premises have been broken into and the burglar remains at large.
No conspiracy to overturn British rule, supposing such an idea
to have been entertained by the Transvaal, could have had the
smallest prospect of success unless the Dutch throughout South
Africa were partners to it. It is, therefore, of vital importance to
determine whether the conduct of the Free State and Cape Colony
affords any such presumption. Taking first the case of the Free
State, we may point out that its national revenue has never exceeded
£500,000, a large part of which has been spent on public works in
Bloemfontein and elsewhere, that it has never purchased guns, and
that its capital is virtually unfortified. In the second place, the
friendliness of the State towards Great Britain, despite the theft of
the Kimberley diamond fields, has been unvarying and indeed pro-
verbial. A couple of illustrations will suffice. President Brand
received a knighthood, the first time such a distinction had ever
been conferred on a man who was neither an Englishman nor a
subject of the Queen. When Mr. Reitz, again, the State Secretary f
of the Transvaal, was elected President of the Free State, he refused
to accept the post until it had been offered to his intimate friend,
Sir George Grey. Further, the Free State possesses a Government
founded on equal rights for all white men, and which even the most
unscrupulous have never ventured to disparage. True, the Free
State concluded a defensive alliance with the Transvaal when the
ndependence of the latter had been treacherously assailed, but that
this step had not deflected the policy of the country from its traditional
course was shown by the entrance of the State immediately
afterwards into the South African Customs Union. Finally, the
exertions of President Steyn and Mr. Fischer to obtain concessions
from Mr. Kruger during the critical period of the negotiations are
too recent to need more than a reference. It was only when the
proposals of August 19 were rejected, and the English Government
withdrew its invitation to the Commissioner on the seven years
franchise law, which Sir Alfred Milner had expressly held open,
28
THE FREE STATE AND CAFE COLONY.
that the Free State became convinced that Mr. Chamberlain was
playing for war, and threw in its lot with the Sister Republic. Who
will say that President Steyn and his burghers were wrong in
doubting that with the anuexation of the Transvaal the independence
of the Free State would be secure? As the President remarked,
if a valuable goldfield were discovered in the Free State, how long
do you suppose we should keep our independence ?
The record of Cape Colony is equally free from reproach. If a
conspiracy against British rule existed, it must have dated either
from before or after the Raid. But if before, Mr. Rhodes must
have been in it, for Mr. Rhodes was returned to power in 1890 by
Dutch votes and kept in power by Dutch votes until the Raid.
It must date, therefore, from a period subsequent to the Raid.
What, then, are the notable events in the history of Cape Colony
during the last 3 years? In the first place, a Ministry was
returned to power by Dutch votes of which only one man of pure
i Dutch blood is a member. This Ministry offered unanimously and
spontaneouslyand unconditionally, £30,000 a year towards the
expenses of the Imperial Navy. But, it may be said what of the
Bond? The Bond is not a huge secret society for the overthrow
of British rule, but an association with a comparatively small
number of members, some of whom are Englishmen. Its founder
and leader, Mr. Hofmeyr, has distinguished himself beyond all
other colonial subjects of the Queen in his endeavours to draw the
parts of the Empire closer together. To him we owe the suggestion
of the Colonial Conference of 1887; to him we owe the proposal of
an Imperial Zollverein; from him came the project of an All-British
Cable.
Deeds like these are more eloquent than words; but words arc
not wanting. Sir Alfred Milner in seeking for evidence of disloyalty
can only adduce two obscure provincial newspapers. Mr. Chamber-
lain declared in 1896 that there were tens of thousands of Dutch-
men in Cape Colony just as loyal to the throne and the British
connections as our French Canadian fellow-subjects. (April 22.)
On May 18 of the past year, Mr. Goschen cordially acknowledged
the contribution of the Schreiner Ministry towards the Navy, arid
suggested to the representatives of other Colonies that they
should imitate the patriotic action of Cape Colony. Still later, on
July 24, Sir David Tennant, Speaker for 22 years of the Cape
Parliament and now Agent-General in London, declared that the
Bond was thoroughly loyal at heart, and that the cables
ALTERNATIVES TO WAR.
2d
antagonistic to this view were sent for party purposes and
financial objects. True, the policy of coercion on which the Govern-
ment have entered inspire universal grief and indignation and
subject the loyalty of the Dutch subjects of the Queen to a strain
which we can but faintly realise. It remains true, however, that,
in Mr. Bryces words, such irritation as there is to-day is due to
the methods of British policy during the last few months.
What, however, more than anything else was making a race
struggle in South Africa unnecessary is not a matter of politics at alL
From the Ministerial Press we might gather that the two populations
live side by side without mixing. Nothing could be less true. The
Chief Justices of the two Republics, President Steyn, and Mr.
Fischer, to name no others, are married to English wives. If
the Dutch were the dogs that Mr. Swinburne has lately dubbed
them on the strength of unconfirmed reports, what are our English
brothers and sisters doing ? Would they freely link their lives with
the cruel and ignorant monsters who are paraded before our eyes
in the columns of the Yellow Press?*
It has been asked, what alternatives to war were possible? One
alternative was to wait till President Kruger, an old man of 75,
should die. In the Transvaal, as in all other places, there were two-
parties, the Conservative and Liberal. In the presidential election
before the Raid, Joubert polled scarcely fewer votes than the
successful candidate, and a progressive majority was lately returned
to the Yolksraad. If Mr. Chamberlain did not care to accept the
conditions offered with the proposal of the five years franchise,
why could he not have accepted > the seven years franchise as an
instalment ? Who is there who would venture to assert that a new
President and a Colonial Secretary with a better record than Mr.
Chamberlain (and for these in the ordinary course of things there
could not be long to wait) would not be able to effect a settlement ?
If, however, we were unable to wait, a second alternative pre-
sented itself. Might not the nation whose representative proposed
the Court of Arbitration at the Hague Conference, have set the
example of making' use of it ? The Times declares that arbitration
* The good qualities of the Boers are at last beginning to bo recognised.
Lieutenant Kinalians letter from Pretoria (Daily News, December 28) is typical
of many. All that you read about the Boers in England is absolutely false.
In reference to the white flag neither side is free from reproach. According to-
otir own correspondents, Colonel Bullocks party fired on 3 Boers who came to
them with a white flag, at the Tugela, killing 2.
30
VICTORY CANNOT BRING SETTLEMENT
is inadmissible where the honour or interests of a country are
at stake. If this is indeed so, the Court will not be overburdened
with work. When the Venezuela dispute arose, the Times argued
as hotly against arbitration as it does to-day, and declared that we
could not surrender our rights to the hazards of arbitration.
Despite the Times, arbitration has taken place, resulting in a verdict
highly favourable to England. If, however, false pride prevented
us from accepting foreign arbitration, what was there to prevent
the appointment of arbitrators drawn from the ranks of the con-
tending parties ? Would it not have been better, assuming that
Mr. Chamberlain was sincerely desirous of peace, to appoint
such a body of men after the Bloemfontein Conference, instead of
rousing the passions of both parties by the publication of Sir Alfred
Milners communication of May 4, and by the dispatch of troops
during negotiations ? So far from a display of force tending to
secure the acceptance of our proposals, its effect was to transform
the discussion from one of franchise to one of nationality.
We have heard much of Mr. Chamberlains long-suffering
patience. Before he had been four months in the Colonial Office,
he was discussing with Mr. Rhodes the invasion of the Transvaal
on the question of the drifts. Within a week of the Raid, he tele-
graphed to Sir Hercules Robinson, I am considering, in concert
with my colleagues, the propriety of immediately sending a large
force, including cavalry and artillery, to the Cape, to provide for
all eventualities (January 7), but was dissuaded by Sir Hercules
Robinson. When President Kruger refused to fall in with his pro-
posal (February 4) to make Johannesburg independent of the
Pretoria Government, and declared that the condition of South
Africa rendered it impossible for him to accept Mr. Chamberlains
invitation to visit London, Mr. Chamberlain sent a communication
possessing almost the character or significance of an Ultimatum,
which drew strong protests from the Ministers of Natal and the
Members of the Cape Legislature. (C. 8063 and 8423.)
The Boers will yield to overwhelming numbers. Our armies
will make a solitude and our statesmen will call it peace. But
of the future it is, of course, impossible to speak with certainty.
Mr. Chamberlains opinion, however, is well known. A war
in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars that
could possibly be waged. It would be in the nature of ia
civil war; it would be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly
war, and it would leave behind it the embers of a strife which I
TIIE DUTCH MAJORITY.
31
believe generations would hardly be long enough to extinguish.
(May 8, 1896.)
The first part of the prophecy has come terribly true; and there
seems unfortunately no reason to believe that the second will be
less accurately fulfilled. To those who declare that the relations
could not be worse than before the war, we reply that intermarriage
was frequent, that intimate friendships were very general, that the
races mixed in the schools, in the legislatures, in society.
Mr. Balfour has declared his conviction that the Boers will soon
learn to regard as a blessing the war in which their fathers
and brothers and husbands were slain, and by which the independ-
ence which they prize next to life itself was wrenched from them.
He relies on the merits of our prospective administration to
obliterate the torturing memories of the war; bub it is surely a
very superficial view of the dynamics of human nature to imagine
that the elemental passions of the vanquished, the love of family
and of nationality, can be conjured away by the insertion of some
new wheels in the political machine. The remedy is tragically
incommensurate with the disease.
But there is another matter to consider. We are fighting, we
learn, for equal rights for all white men and for British supremacy
throughout South Africa. But how are these ideals related to each
other ? The answer turns on the vital question as to the relative
numbers of the rival races. Good government is only one of the
reasons why the French Canadians acquiesce in our rule ; the other
is that they constitute but a small fraction of the Dominion. The
Dutch are to-day in a considerable majority throughout South
Africa.* Will they remain so ? There is a widespread impression
that the English will enter South Africa in vast numbers and
rapidly out-number the Dutch. They may indeed enter the country;
but what will they do there ? The Transvaal laws have hitherto
secured employment for ten thousand English miners; but when the
limitation imposed on the use of native labour is removed, does
anyone imagine that the mine-owners will employ white labour on
the Witwatersrand any more than they do now at Kimberley and
in Rhodesia ? In the next place, is it likely that our emigrants will
turn farmers ? They have never done so yet, and technical equip-
ment and capital are even more essential in South Africa than in
England, owing to the sterility of the soil, cattle-plague, horse
.diseases, and the like. Being excluded, then, from the mines. by
# About 4 to 3.
32
EQUAL RIGHTS VERSUS SUPREMACY.
the competition of black labour, and from the land by the want of
aptitude for a farmers life, the English will remain, as hitherto, the
professional and the shop-keeping classes, for whom the demand is
everywhere limited. Nobody who knows the condition of Rhodesia
would describe it as the safety-valve of the British steam-engine*
Its land is held by syndicates and its mines are worked by Kaffirs.
The South African Dutch, on the other hand, are not a dying
nation, but one of the most prolific races in the world, and families
of a dozen or more are common. As a Natal newspaper frankly
declares (Times, Dec. 9), nothing short of extermination will alter
the Dutch majority. The mines, again, cannot last for ever. It is con-
sidered bjr experts that, in a generation or two, they will be either
exhausted or will be too deep to make it profitable to work them.
And what would Kimberley and Johannesburg be without their mines?
And now what of equal rights and British supremacy ? It is
obvious that, if the Dutch remain in the majority and hold together,
both very probable assumptions, a deadlock may occur at any
moment, the gravity of which would be greater in the Federation
to which we are instructed to look forward. There is no halting-
place between the complete self-government of Canada, in which
the representative of the Crown is a social, not a political personage,
and administration from Downing Street. So clear is this that the
Natal journals are already discussing schemes for depriving the
Dutch of their majority. ( Times, Dec. 9.)
The champions of equal rights, however, are careful to point
out that these luxuries are neither for to-day nor for to-morrow.
The Dutch republics are to make the acquaintance of British rule as
'Crown Colonies, and are to be coerced into loyalty by an army
of occupation. How large that army is to be is a matter of dispute.
Sir Gordon Sprigg puts it at thirty thousand men; in any case,
judging by our total failure to implant the love of British rule in
Boer bosoms during the annexation of the Transvaal, the mainten-
ance of British supremacy in South Africa will probably demand
the presence of a very considerable force. How long the period
will extend before the Boers are deemed sufficiently loyal to be
entrusted with 61 equal rights remains to be seen.
In short, one of the most tragic aspects of this war is that the
numerical superiority of the Dutch seems to preclude the possibility
of a settlement. The government of the more numerous race as a
Crown Colon}will satisfy neither them nor ourselves; and when
equal political rights are granted, there is nothing to prevent the
THE PEACE PAR IT.
33
election of a Dutch majority, and nothing to prevent that majority
kicking against the English connection. If they do, we must choose
between British supremacy and equal rights; and if we choose the
former we shall be undertaking a task too great even for the giant
strength of our Empire, namely, that of ruling the majority of the
white population of South Africa in opposition to their will.
A few words are necessary in reply to the charge that the
Peace Party have caused the war. In the first place, let it be
clearly understood that, so far from counselling President Kruger
to resist, they strenuously urged him to accept the English proposals
of September 4, despite the rejection of his own offers of August
19, and that, at the eleventh hour, they wired the Duke of Devon-
shire's speech, adding that his assurances could be implicitly
accepted. If it be said, however, that it was useless to press the
acceptance of reforms while at the same time declaring that they
would not support the demand by arms, and that their conduct led
the Boers to believe that no force would be used, the reply is that
it has been throughout made perfectly clear to Mr. Kruger, not
only by his own Consul-General, Mr. Montague White, but by his
personal friends in England, and by the Peace Party, that, though
there was a very deep and wide-spread indignation at Mr. Cham-
berlains policy, this could not hinder the despatch of a single
soldier. Are we not to raise our voices against a policy that leads
inevitably to war, against the commission of what we think to be a
blunder and a crime, before it is too late ? The New Diplomacy
brings us war, and the New Fatalism declares it inevitable. We
have protested, and shall continue to protest, against both the one
and the other. Bright, Cobden, and their scanty following of
friends did their utmost to prevent the Crimean War, and after
incurring precisely the same reproaches as are levelled at us
to-day, find their justification at last in the universal con-
demnation with which that war is regarded. Who knows but
that we may have to wait a shorter time for a no less complete
vindication ?* It is often said, I am an Englishman, not a
# Those who console themselves for the unanimous hostility of the Continent
by attributing its attitude to jealousy would do well to explain why our conduct
meets with as severe animadversions from Italy and Switzerland as from Trance,
Germany, Austria, and Russia. In regard to the United States, it must be
remembered that all our newspaper correspondents who inform us that
America approves our action write from the same place, New York; and even
in New York, the City Council, with 1 dissentient, adopted a resolution in
favour of the Boers, December 26. A similar resolution was passed by the
Common Council of Boston unanimously. Were they all Irish ?
u
THE TRIBUNAL OF HISTORY.
Dutchman,'nor an Armenian, nOr a Cretan ; and I am going to stand,
by my country. Is it not precisely this attitude from which war-
springs? Were it not for the presence of a certain number of men;
in every nation who endeavour to put themselves in the position of
the. other party and to understand its point of view, wars would be;
far more frequent than they are. The South African war is a war
of ignorance; and the least of us cannot escape the responsibility
before history of doing or leaving undone what in us lay to dispel
it in ourselves and others.
APPENDIX.
The following passages are from the Times report of two debates in the
House of Commons :
On October 19th, speaking on Mr. Stanhopes amendment to the Address,
Sib Edwabd Clarke referred to the Boers offer of the five years franchise,
and said:
The extraordinary incident that has marked the proceedings of this
evening has been the statement of the Colonial Secretary that the answer to
that proposal might have been taken as an acceptance. I should like to know,
was that answer intended as an acceptance ?
Mr. Chamberlain : At that time we thought the proposal of the Transvaal
extremely promising. We intended to send a most conciliatory answer, accept-
ing, as far as it was humanly possible for us to do so, their proposal, and, as the
only point of difference was the internal intervention, I thought myself it would
be accepted.
Sir E. Clarke : Then I take it that it was intended to be an acceptance.
Now, Mr. Speaker, if that were soif, in fact, the Colonial Secretary intended
to accept the proposals of the Transvaal, then undoubtedly this amendment ia
proved up to the hilt.
Mr. Chamberlain, again intervening later on, said:
The hon. member harps upon the word acceptance. He must remember
he asked me the question whether we intended to accept. I myself should
have thought that the Boers would have taken it as an acceptance. But I
suppose it may be properly described as a qualified acceptance. We did not
accept everything, but we accepted at least nine-tenths of the whole.
Sir E. Clarke : Really, this becomes more and more sad. It is dreadful
to think of a country of this kind entering upon a war, a crime against civilisa-
tion, when this sort of thing has been going on. Why, in the very next
sentence [i.e., of the Despatch of September 8£7/.] the right hon. gentleman
says: It is on this ground that Her Majestys Government have been com-
pelled to regard the last proposal of the Government of the South African
[Republic as unacceptable in the form in which it has been presented.
Mr. Chamberlain : In the form.
Sir E. Clarke : Is it a matter of form ?
Mr. Chamberlain : Yes.
Referring to these statements in a later debate on October 25th,
Mr. Courtney said : The next point is the rights of the Outlanders, and
here we have got a five years Franchise promised; at first, seven years, and then
five years, subject to conditions, to which my right hon. friend sent an answer
intended to be received as an acceptance. (An hon. member dissented.)
My right hon. friend is quite equal to denying my statement if it is wrong.
Mr. Chamberlain : Oh, well then, I do deny it. I did not think it
worth while to interrupt my right hon. friend, because he knows I have said
oter and over again a qualified acceptance, and he always omits the
adjective.
Mr. Courtney : You said nine-tenths. Is the one-tenth worth war ?
Tell us what the one-tenth is ?
Mr. Chamberlain : I do not think it was worth war.
Mr. Courtney : Tell us what the one-tenth is.
Mr. Chamberlain : Why did not President Kruger give way ?
Mr. Courtney : Because he did not understand the despatch : it was never
explained to him. Are we going to fight for the tenth point ? As to that,
Mr. Speaker, history, I think, will judge.
[Mr. Chamberlain did not intervene further in the course of Mr. Courtneys
speech.]
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