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MILITARY ADMINISTRATION
BURMA

ANNUAL REPORT

by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer on the
British Military Administration of Burma

*During the period 1st January
1944 to 31st December 1944*



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**Report on the British Military Administration of
Burma for the period—1st January 1944 to
31st December 1944.**

CHAPTER I.

Introductory.

1. Proclamation No. 1 of 1944, dated 1st January 1944, reads as follows:—

“ MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

1. I, Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten, GCVO., CB., DSO., ADC., Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, do hereby declare that until further notice I assume for myself and successors full judicial, legislative, executive and administrative responsibilities in regard to all the territories of Burma now or at any future time occupied by the Forces under my command and exclusive jurisdiction over all persons and properties therein.

2. I delegate to the military officer for the time being holding the appointment of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, full authority to conduct on my behalf the military administration of the civil population in the said territories, subject always to any orders and directions which I may issue from time to time. And for this purpose the said Chief Civil Affairs Officer is authorised to delegate sufficient powers to any officers under his command.

(Signed) LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN,
*Supreme Allied Commander,
South East Asia.”*

Dated this 1st day of January 1944.

2. The Burma territories held by Allied Forces on January 1st, 1944, were:—

1. The Kachin Hills north of a line drawn from slightly north of Htawgaw on the Sino-Burma border to Maingkwan in the Hukawng Valley.

2. The Naga Hills and Somra Tract to the west of the Chindwin, south of Shinbuiyang.

3. The Northern half of Kabaw Valley.

4. The Chin Hills, only the Tiddim Subdivision and the western fringe of the rest of the district.

5. The Arakan Hill Tracts north of Paletwa.

6. The Akyab district north of Maungdaw and Buthidaung.

These territories were commonly referred to as “ The Frontier Fringe ”.

3. This is the first report of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer (Burma). (The Controller of Finance and Accounts, Civil Affairs Service (Burma) has submitted a report for the period 15th February 1943 to 31st March 1944.) It appears necessary, therefore, to present as a background to Proclamation No. 1, a brief account of the government and administration of the territories just named during the period from May 20th, 1942—the date on which the

rear-guard of the Army in Burma crossed the Indian border in the Kabaw Valley to 15th February 1943—the date on which the Civil Affairs Service (Burma) was established under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, India, and thereafter to 31st December 1943.

4. Soon after the retreat from Burma, the Governor, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, re-assembled the Government of Burma at Simla. This Government organised the administration of the Burma territories "The Frontier Fringe", not overrun by the Japanese. Part of the Myitkyina District, the Naga Hills District, the Upper Chindwin District and the Chin Hills District were constituted a Frontier Division in charge of a Commissioner. The fringe of the Arakan Division was placed under the administration of a Military Administrator by Eastern Army which incidentally failed to realise for some time that the administrator, although a civil servant, was in effect a military political officer and an agent of the Army and at the same time denied him access to the Government of Burma, although no state of martial law or of military administration was declared. The position was regularised later by an Act of Indemnity (No. XXIV of 1943) passed by the Governor of Burma with effect from 8th December 1941 to 1st September 1943.

5. The Civil Affairs Service, Burma, came into being on 15th February 1943, with the appointment of a senior Burma Government official as the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, with the rank of Major General.* From this date the uninvaded Burma territories named came under the *de facto* control of the Commander-in-Chief, India, although remaining under the *de jure* control of the Governor of Burma. This diarchical control was cumbersome and might have resulted in a breakdown but close liaison between the CCAO (B) and the Government of Burma made it work. In fact, during 1943, the Civil Affairs Service (Burma) had neither the organisation nor the equipment wherewith to discharge the onerous duties and functions laid on it; necessity dictated, therefore, that a considerable amount of the routine work of administration should continue to be done by the Government of Burma. Nevertheless it became manifest that military necessity and "Security" must eventually require the work of civil administration, during and at least immediately after the re-occupation of Burma, to be done by an administration directed and controlled solely by a military administration.

6. During the period May 1942—December 1943 the Kachin Hills were defended by local guerilla forces, the Kachin Levies, raised and led to begin with by Civil Officers. The Chin Hills were defended by a battalion of the Burma Frontier Force assisted by Chin Levies. In the Naga Hills a force known as V-Force operated but had little contact with the Japanese. The Kabaw Valley and North Arakan were defended by the regular forces of Eastern Command.

7. The work of Government of Burma and Civil Affairs Service (Burma) officers in the Kachin Hills was mainly in support of the Kachin Levies. The duties of these officers were to preserve law and order; to compose disputes by means of the customary law of the Hills; to augment local food production including salt; to develop a carrier organisation from the air supply point at Fort Hertz to military depots and civil distribution centres towards the forces operating against the Japanese; to organise mule and bullock cart transport; to recruit labour; to provide food and shelter for refugees from villages overrun by the Japanese or destroyed during operations; to maintain elementary medical and public health services; and to assist in getting

* So far as is known this appointment has never appeared in the "London Gazette".

'Intelligence' out of Japanese occupied Burma. There was no road from India to Fort Hertz; supplies had to be brought by air. Limited air transport facilities for Civil Affairs supplies and the imminence of a Japanese advance to Fort Hertz restricted the scope of civil administration; without the civil administration the military effort of the Levies would have collapsed. To adjust a balance between the provision of the civil personnel and supplies necessary to maintain a base for the Levies and the equipment and supplies for the Levies was always difficult; there was a disposition to develop civil administration beyond the prudent limits dictated by the precariousness of the military situation and the aggregate of means and supplies for civil and Levy personnel. This comment applies also to the Chin Hills during the period.

8. The first task of Civil Officers in the Hukawng Valley after the monsoon of 1942 was the extrication from the Valley of the survivors of the tragic retreat from Burma to India of hundreds of thousands of refugees suffering indescribable privations and making agonising marches through country as inimical to human survival as any in the world. These remnants were the sick and ill-nourished survivors of the tail of a column, weeks long, of hapless humanity who had been marooned in the Valley by monsoon flood waters that converted the Valley into a vast swamp. The construction by USA Forces under General Stilwell of the road from Ledo had meantime advanced towards and into the Valley and at the end of 1943 had reached beyond Shinbwayang carrying heavy motor traffic. Civil Affairs Service and Government of Burma officers contributed to the construction of this road by organising the remaining sparse population of the Valley as labour; at the same time they set about reviving *taunggya* cultivation to eke out precarious food supplies.

9. In the Naga Hills, Civil Officers of the Government of Burma were principally occupied in patrolling the riverine areas to assure the local population that the British administration had not vanished. Later, they were engaged in recruiting labour, in assisting V-Force in 'Intelligence' work and in distributing a bare minimum of necessities such as salt.

10. In the Kabaw Valley, Burma Government and CAS(B) Officers were concerned principally with liaison work and with patrols along the west bank of the Chindwin. The distribution of food, clothing and other necessities and the recruiting of labour required a rudimentary local administration.

11. The Civil Administration had not withdrawn from the Chin Hills when the Army in Burma retreated from Burma in May 1942. All the civil departments continued to function until 1943 when Japanese forces filtered into the hills as a screen for a projected invasion of India, which eventually resulted in the temporary occupation of the District by the Japanese. The Chin Levies were organised and led by civil officers until military officers were appointed to take command. For reasons of 'Security' communication between the Chin Hills and Burma from which, in peace-time, the Hills drew essential supplies, had to be sealed off. The Hills had to draw these supplies from India. There were no roads to India. Supplies had to be brought in by 'country' boat, pack animal and porter *via* Aijal and Champai. An alternative means of communication was by air; there was no place in the Hills extensive and flat enough to accommodate an airstrip; air supply was by 'air drop'. There was a grave shortage of food. In peace-time some 1,000 tons of rice and 100 tons of salt were imported from the plains of Burma. These quantities had to be carried from India. At

the same time the hill-men had to be induced to increase local production and to form porter units to carry rice and salt and other commodities from railhead in India. The strain on the population of the Hills was increased by recruitment for the Chin Levies and for labour to help in making the Chin Hill sector of a new road from Tiddim to Imphal and for an 'intelligence' system penetrating the plains of Burma. The lot of the Chins who had to perform all these duties and at the same time defend their homes, when compared with the lot of hill tribes across the Indian frontier aroused invidious comparisons in the minds of the Chins but the devotion to duty of the civil officers serving in the Chin Hills and their great personal influence and reputation with Chins averted any breakdown.

12. The Arakan Hill Tracts and the fringe of Akyab District were administered by a Military Administrator under the direct control of Eastern Command. On the formation of the CAS(B) the Administrator came under the control of the CCAO (B). The Administrator's functions were similar to those of Civil Affairs Officers in other areas except that the provision of supplies to make good deficiencies in the area was less difficult since the area was self-supporting in rice and moreover communications with Bengal, although difficult, were not inadequate as compared to the almost non-existent communications of the other Burma frontier areas with Assam. Private trade with the inhabitants of Arakan, even in some cases with Arakanese behind the enemy lines, was sufficiently profitable to induce Indian traders to continue it. But this relative advantage was off-set by the ebb and flow of military operations which caused widespread displacements of population and threw many thousands of refugees into the care of the Military Administration. Moreover, communal friction, rooted far back in the history of Arakan, between the Arakanese Moslems and Arakanese Buddhists, had flared into civil war when the Burma Government withdrew and continued until the assumption of control by the Military Administration. Law and order were restored by raising a Police Force from a nucleus of Government of Burma police personnel and by the appointment of local recruits. Tension however remained liable to flare into strife at any time.

13. In this brief review of the administration of the Frontier Fringe it will be noted that the dominant recurring theme is 'civil supplies'. The system of annual shifting cultivation known as *taungya* cultivation practised in most mountain and hill areas in Burma is a precarious system yielding meagre harvests at the best of times. Imported supplies were the staff of life of the administration as were rice, salt, etc., in considerable quantities for the local population. The only route into Fort Hertz and Sumprabum was by air. The air route was the only route practicable for a time after the retreat from Burma for supplies to the Hukawng Valley. To the Naga Hills and the Kabaw Valley from railhead at Dimapur supplies had to follow trails over mountain and valley which for considerable stretches could not carry jeep traffic. The route into the Chin Hills, until towards the end of 1943, when the Imphal-Tiddim road was completed, was by 'country boat' from railhead at Silchar to Aijal and thence by porter to Falam. This life-line could not carry the weight of salt and rice on which the Chin Hills depended. The Government of Burma, therefore, developed another route by 'country boat' and porter from Chittagong *via* Lungleh to the Chin Hills. The Army was grateful to have the use of this new route as also the Government of Assam.

14. The getting of supplies for delivery over these routes was the business of a Directorate of Supply set up at Calcutta by the Government of Burma. This Directorate had agents at Jorhat, Dinapur, Imphal, Aijal and

Chittagong. It obtained its supplies for the most part by local purchase in the open market. The Directorate continued to send supplies to the areas administered by CAS(B) until 1st of November 1943 when the CAS(B) took over the Directorate as a CAS(B) Line of Communication and the purchase of supplies in the open market ceased, the CAS(B) organisation being, except in exceptional cases, limited to the procurement of stores from Army Depots. This ran contrary to the policy accepted by GHQ(I) that Civil Affairs supplies should be moved through Army channels to distributing points inside Burma, but there was in practice no alternative possible.

CHAPTER II.

CAS(B) Organisation and Functions.

15. The promulgation of Proclamation No. 1, dated 1st January 1944, imposed on the Chief Civil Affairs Officer (Burma) Major-General C. F. B. Pearce, CBE, delegated duties, functions and powers which up to the 31st December 1943 had been shared by the Government of Burma and the CCAO(B) as the Civil Affairs Staff Officer of GHQ, India.

16. The primary functions of the CAS(B) Military Administration are to maintain law and order, to maintain the "Security" of military operations, to prevent disease and unrest among the civil population and to provide labour and local resources in furtherance of military operations. Subsidiary to and contributing towards the fulfilment of and without detriment to the primary functions, the CAS must take all possible steps towards the rehabilitation of normal life in all spheres of activity.

17. (1) Immediately on the establishment of the Military Administration a decision had to be made whether the provisions of the law in force in Burma should be deemed to remain in force, subject to such amendments as experience would prove to be necessary, or whether special legislation creating a new substantive law and procedure and special tribunals to administer it should be created. Practical considerations and, in particular, firstly the fact that the criminal law would necessarily have to be administered by officers largely unfamiliar with any system other than that long established in Burma, and secondly that the normal peace time procedure in Criminal Courts had been very considerably abbreviated and expedited by a set of emergency laws passed by the Governor of Burma in May 1943, led to the adoption of the former course. The provisions of the law in force in Burma on the 31st December 1943 were accordingly, by Proclamation No. 2 of 1944 (see Appendix 3), declared to remain in force except in so far as they are suspended, varied or supplemented by that or any subsequent proclamation or by regulations or orders made under the authority of any such Proclamation, but all courts existing on the 31st December 1943 were reconstituted and derived their authority exclusively from the Supreme Allied Commander.

(2) It became necessary for the purpose of the administration of justice to establish throughout Burma uniformity in the rules governing criminal procedure and in the preparation of trial records; and this entailed a modification of the former law which made a distinction between that part of Burma in respect of which legislation could be passed by the Legislative Assembly and the Scheduled Areas (which include the Hill Districts in the north-west and the Shan States) for the administration of which the

Governor had been directly responsible. It was also desirable to simplify and enlarge the provisions relating to summary trials, *i.e.*, trials in which the normal procedure was followed, but an abbreviated record alone was necessary. These objects were achieved by Proclamations 10, 11 and 12 of 1944 (*see* Appendix 3.)

18. The legal Civil Government of Burma as the legatee of the Military Administration of Burma was and continues to be vitally concerned with Burma affairs. Proclamation No. 1 did not and could not mean that the constituted interest of the Government of Burma in invaded and uninvaded Burma territories was eliminated. Indeed, it was essential that the closest liaison should be maintained between the CAS(B) and the Government of Burma at all levels of administration and that the Departments and officers of the Government of Burma engaged in planning the administration and reconstruction of Burma on the termination of Military Administration should prepare their plans in co-operation with the relevant departments and officers of the Civil Affairs Service (Burma). This policy was consequently laid down by SACSEA early in 1944. Co-operative planning and liaison proceeded continuously throughout the year; but it must be confessed that the physical divorce of the Government of Burma planners and CAS(B) planners owing to the impossibility of accommodating both in one place resulted in diminished efficiency and liaison.

19. In early 1944 work started on translating into terms of War Establishments the organisation of the various departments required to administer the civil population of the whole of Burma. The War Establishment of 1943 was only intended to provide for the number of officers immediately required. While CAS(B) HQ consisting as it did of officers of the Burma Government, knew the personnel required in terms of civil administration, the absence of officers with military staff experience made it difficult to translate these into military equivalents. It was also not easy at the time to convince the W. E. Committee consisting entirely of military officers with no civil administration experience of what was a self-evident proposition to a civil administrator. Moreover, the strictly correct War Office policy that posts should carry military ranks according to their responsibilities on a military yard-stick was not always easy to translate into practice when civilian officers with the necessary experience to fill a post had to be lured into the CAS(B) with the offer of what appeared to them and to the Government which was asked to release them, a reasonable military rank. Certain unhappy memories of the evacuation of 1942 when senior civil officers were treated by comparatively junior military officers as their subordinates did not help to make the process easier.

20. Burma with the exception of British Somaliland which had a somewhat elementary form of administration and is not therefore a parallel, was the first British territory to be re-occupied by our armies and the distinction between the re-occupation of a territory belonging to the Crown and the re-occupation of an enemy territory was insufficiently realised at first by the military staff at all levels. In spite of innumerable reiterations of this argument it was not understood that the problem was to re-introduce a British administration from top to bottom and not to introduce a military administration, merely supervisory in its functions, to control an indigenous administration already functioning. Nearly the whole of the European element and a very large proportion of the Indian element of the civil administration had evacuated Burma; of the Burmese element which had remained behind a proportion were not willing to work under new masters, while a large number of those, who from sheer necessity to earn their daily bread were willing, were not acceptable to their new

masters, who were of one political complexion extremely distrustful of any Burman suspected of pro-British sentiments. Therefore to fit an entire civil administration with all its branches with its necessary equipment and tools of its trade into a military strait jacket of WEs and War Equipment Tables not designed for that type of administration was an exceedingly difficult task. Moreover, complete units completely equipped could not be taken into the field because a large proportion of those who were designed to fill many of the posts were still in Burma and would have to be contacted, 'remoralised' and re-equipped before they could be usefully employed.

21. (1) CAS(B) is organised into a HQ and Field Units. The functions of Field Units are discussed later. On January 1st, 1944, CAS(B) HQ organisation was:—

CCAO(B)	1 Major General.
DCCAO Admin.	1 Staff Col.
DCCAO Plans	1 Staff Col.
CFA	1 Brigadier.
	1 SO I.
	3 SO II.
(At Allahabad)	3 SO II.
(At Calcutta)	1 SO III.
(At Hq 14 Army)	1 SO III.
Legal Adviser	1 SO I.
PA to CCAO(B)	1 Junior Comdt.
MS	1 SO III.
Eng. Liaison	1 SO I.
Police	1 Brig (at Simla).
Welfare	1 SO I.
	1 SO II.
CAS(B) Training	1 SO I.
Supplies	1 Col.
	1 SO I.
	1 SO II.

This staff was manifestly inadequate to deal with its dual role of planning for future operations and administering CAS units already in the field but on the one hand the claims of the Government of Burma to its own planning officers and on the other hand the difficulty of obtaining suitable officers by transfer from other branches of the Army did not permit of any sudden increase. The Government of Burma however was able to release to CAS(B) the majority of its staff previously employed on "Frontier Fringe" administration.

(2) The organisation developed during the year and on 31st December 1944 HQ was organised into the following Departments under the control of the CCAO and HQ DCCAO:—

- (1) General Administration.
- (2) CAS(B) Administration, 'A' and 'Q'.
- (3) Public Security:—
 - (a) Judicial.
 - (b) Police.
 - (c) Civil Defence.
 - (d) Intelligence.
 - (e) Prisons.

- (4) (a) Public Health and Medicine.
 - (b) Relief and Labour.
 - (5) Supply and Industry:—
 - (a) Projects.
 - (b) Works.
 - (c) Forests.
 - (d) Agriculture.
 - (e) Veterinary.
 - (f) Transportation.
 - (g) Posts.
 - (h) Signals.
 - (6) Education.
 - (7) Publicity.
 - (8) Finance and Accounts.
22. (1) The General Administration Department deals with the administration of the civil population of Burma through the medium of DCCAOs and SCAOs in the Field. Among its responsibilities are:—
- (1) General Policy of the Military Administration.
 - (2) District Administration (headman, etc.).
 - (3) Town Administration (*e.g.*, Rangoon).
 - (4) Scheduled Areas Administration (*e.g.*, Shan States).
- One of its most important functions is the co-ordination of policy matters with other Departments. G.A. is divided into two sections—Plans and Current Administration.
- (2) CAS(B) Administration Department deals with the administration of the CAS(B). Among its responsibilities are:—
- (1) War Establishments.
 - (2) Manpower.
 - (3) Terms of Service.
 - (4) Discipline.
 - (5) Postings.
 - (6) Promotions.
- (3) The following five departments have co-ordinating functions under the CCAO and DCCAO and are known as co-ordinating departments:—
- (1) Finance and Accounts.
 - (2) Supplies and Industry.
 - (3) Legal.
 - (4) General Administration.
 - (5) CAS(B) Administration.
- (4) Appendices 5-11 set out the internal organisation of HQ CAS(B)—CAS(B) Administration Department “A”; CAS(B) Administration Department “Q”; General Administration Department; Judicial Department; Supplies and Industry Department; Finance and Accounts Department.
- The organisation of other Departments is dealt with in Chapter VIII.
23. HQ had two main tasks during the year—(1) to direct and control the activities of Field Units in accordance with the policies prescribed by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, the G.O.C.-in-C. as advised by the CCAO(B) and Military Commanders in the Field;

(2) to prepare plans for the administration of areas to be re-occupied and to assemble the necessary personnel, equipment and supplies.

24. (1) Much time and labour was spent during the year in preparing the necessary War Establishment and War Equipment Tables and obtaining sanction for them. If officers with Staff experience had been made available to CAS(B) the work would have been expedited and facilitated but they were not available.

(2) In particular the attempt to accomplish in Q Department both provision of supplies for the civil population and provision of equipment for CAS(B) Departments proved an impossible task since it involved the procurement of 2,000 vehicles and equipment for a projected personnel strength of 55,000. Eventually a staff consisting of an AA & QMG with 3 Q and 3 A officers to assist him was set up.

25. Neither in the original CAS(B) War Establishment (Government of India War Department No. 5426/S/W/1, dated the 30th November 1943) nor in the revised CAS(B) Planning and Frontier Administration War Establishment published by SEAC (SEA 9 of 1944) was CAS(B) permitted to produce a War Establishment to deal with the whole of Burma. This meant that CAS(B) was always being overtaken by events and was unable to meet emergencies as they arose. This was particularly the case with senior posts of Lt.-Col. and above and this seriously hampered the procurement of the necessary senior officers.

26. Planning in the Medical Department was in particular seriously hindered by the failure of the War Office to sanction all the posts required which had been approved by the War Establishment Committee of 11th Army Group in July 1944.

27. Another matter which led to delay was the protracted discussion with the War Office on the question whether CAS officers should be commissioned or not. In the absence of a settled policy recruits were unwilling to come forward. An example of this was the refusal of a number of Sub-Assistant Surgeons' servants of the Government of Burma who in January 1944 refused to move to operational areas unless they were granted Commissions with terms of service equivalent to those of the I.A.M.C. As there was a crying need for medical assistance to the civil population in recovered areas in Arakan the CCAO had no alternative but to give these gentlemen his personal assurance that they would eventually be commissioned. On this assurance they agreed to move to operational areas. In spite of the support given to the action of the CCAO by SACSEA and 11 Army Group it was not till November 1944 that the first Sub-Assistant Surgeon was gazetted to a commission.

28. During the year acute 'Manpower' problems in all theatres of war made it exceedingly difficult for CAS(B) to secure essential personnel. GHQ India was unable to release Government of Burma or other personnel ex-Burma save on condition that an officer released by GHQ India be replaced by an officer with equivalent military qualifications and training—a somewhat prohibitive condition. At the same time the competitive demands of Special Branches of the Allied Land Forces and of South East Asia Command and of GHQ India for the services of officers with general and special Burma experience of many kinds deprived the CAS(B) of the services of officers, some of whom could have been more valuably employed in the CAS(B) than in some of the services in which they were locked up.

29. GHQ India failed in the beginning to give CAS(B) its proper status as a Branch of the Staff. Moreover, the accommodation allotted to HQ CAS(B) both at GHQ India and Rear HQ 11 Army Group was inadequate.

Planning and administration had to be carried on with inadequate staff owing to the physical impossibility of providing office accommodation for the required number of officers.

30. When the plan to move Adv HQ ALFSEA forward was made consideration of the accommodation necessary for CAS(B) was omitted. This involved the physical separation of CAS(B) HQ from those of ALFSEA. In fact the CCAO was not made aware of the plans to move until it was too late to place contracts for the construction of the necessary accommodation to enable CAS HQ to move together with the rest of Adv HQ ALFSEA to Barrackpore. From the beginning of November 1944 to the end of March 1945, while events were rapidly moving in Burma, the two HQs were separated by nearly a thousand miles and the presence of half a dozen CAS(B) officers at Adv HQ ALFSEA could do little to remove the obvious disadvantages of uncorrelated planning. It also produced in the minds of CAS(B) officers a sense of frustration and a feeling that their services were not really required by the Army.

31. During the year as in 1943 efforts were made to organise in India a CAS Training School for Burma Civil Affairs Officers. Owing to the difficulties of procuring suitable accommodation and adequate numbers of officers for training the efforts were abortive. The officer who was charged with duties in regard to the organising of the training of Civil Affairs Officers was attached in September-October 1944 to the CAS Training Centre at Wimbledon as a civilian observer with a view to utilising his experience in organising the training of CA officers, but it is doubtful whether this expedient was sufficient to give the necessary background, so far as Burma is concerned, to the officers to be trained there for employment in Burma. The only instructor on the Eastern Wing staff with experience of Burma was an ex-Sessions Judge who retired from Burma some years ago.

32. A.C.I. No. 1426 of 1944 was published and set in motion measures to secure and train officers to supplement the available but inadequate pool of officers and others with Burma experience from which the CAS(B) draws personnel. CAS(B) had no information at the end of the year regarding the numbers and quality of the officers who had offered themselves for CAS(B) service under the terms of the A.C.I.

CHAPTER III.

Operations: Areas coming under Military Administration.

33. During the latter part of 1943, CAS administration centres at Maungdaw in North Akyab, Paletwa, in the Arakan Hill Tracts, Falam and Haka in the Chin Hills and Sumpabum in the Myitkyina District had been lost; administration however was still carried on from Bawle Bazaar and Taung Bazaar in North Akyab, from Tiddim in the Chin Hills and from Fort Hertz (Putao) in Myitkyina. The Japanese advance in the first half of 1944 lost us the whole of the Naga and Chin Hills administration though Civil Affairs Officers remained as 'Formation' officers on the western fringe of the Chin Hills with the Lushai Brigade and Chin Hills Levies. Taung Bazaar was overrun but Bawle Bazaar in Arakan was retained. By 1st May 1944 Civil Affairs were functioning only in the extreme north of the Pruma and Kalapanzin villages of Arakan, and in the Hukawng Valley and northern Kachin Hills of Myitkyina.

34. By the end of 1944 the advance of the allied forces had liberated the northern half of the Akyab District including Maungdaw, the Arakan Hill Tracts, the Chin and Naga Hills, the Upper Chindwin District, the northern portion of the Pakokku District, the Lower Chindwin and Shwebo Districts, most of the Katha and Bhamo Districts and the whole of the Myitkyina district. In all these districts, Territorial formations had been set up and small Territorial teams were ready with Formations to go into the districts further south. The map at Appendix I shows the front line on 1st January 1944, 1st May 1944 and 31st December 1944.

35. The total areas and the populations on 31st December 1944 of Burma territory in which the Civil Affairs Service (Burma) was functioning were approximately as follows:—

	Area.	Population.
Myitkyina and Kachin Hills	30,882 sq. mls.	298,323
Bhamo	4,146 „	129,302
Katha	7,593 „	290,290
Chin Hills	10,675 „	186,405
Upper Chindwin and Naga Hills	19,001 „	209,575
Parts of Pakokku, Shwebo and Lower Chindwin Districts	2,000 „	150,000
Arakan Hill Tracts	1,901 „	34,005
Akyab District (Northern part only)	1,000 „	200,000
Total	77,198 „	1,497,900

CHAPTER IV.


Organisation of Field Units.

36. Field Units consist of “ Formation ” CAOs and “ Territorial ” CAOs and their subordinate staff. “ Formation ” CAOs are attached to military formations down to divisions and sometimes brigades; their duties are to assist the military commander in his relations with the people and to take such measures of Military Government as he may require. Such minor tasks of Civil Administration as may be necessary and possible are carried out by members of the Burma Intelligence Corps attached to brigade and units in accordance with the orders of their commanders.

To “ Territorial ” CAOs is assigned the administration of the civil population in Military Areas and Sub-areas; they are assisted by “ Departmental ” professional and technical CAOs and in general work on the lines of the ordinary civil administration.

In practice it has been found that there is an intermediate stage before L of C areas and sub-areas are constituted. Territorial field units are necessary at centres of administration while these are still within the areas controlled by combatant formations. This has been termed the “ semi-territorial ” stage.

37 The allocation of Territorial and Formation officers during each phase of operations and re-occupation during the year was as follows:—



SCAOs though "Formation" officers discharged semi-territorial functions.

Northern Combat Area Command (American-Chinese forces) was at the beginning of the year in an undefined relation to 14 Army and 11 Army Group. In January the Civil Affairs officers in NCAC were technically subordinate to the DCCAO, 14 Army. The SCAO Hukawng Valley functioned as adviser to the Commanding General in place of a DCCAO. The SCAOs in the Hukawng Valley and Fort Hertz were directly responsible on technical and financial matters to the CCAO who later in the year fulfilled the duties of a Staff Officer to the Commanding General.

In March.—The Japanese offensive in Manipur overran the Naga Hills, Upper Chindwin and the greater part of the Chin Hills. The SCAO Chin Hills came directly under DCCAO 14 Army, and DCCAO 4 Corps and SCAOs, Naga Hills and Upper Chindwin ceased to function.

In May.—33 Corps appeared on the Manipur front and as a small portion of Burma was included in its sphere a "Formation" CAO was posted to 33 Corps.

In July.—Myitkyina was captured. The SCAO Hukawng Valley became semi-territorial SCAO Myitkyina District (excluding Fort Hertz area) as well as SCAO with HQ, NCAC.

In August the counter offensive in Manipur progressed and Burma was re-entered. The CAO with 33 Corps became the semi-territorial SCAO Naga Hills and a SCAO Upper Chindwin was appointed. He acted also as DCCAO 33 Corps. The Chin Hills reverted to the operational sphere of 33 Corps.


In October a separate DCCAO 33 Corps was appointed and in November a DCCAO 4 Corps was re-appointed, while SCAOs designate for Bhamo and Katha districts in NCAC were appointed and posted.

In December 15 Ind Corps came directly under ALFSEA. Operations in Arakan required the appointment of two SCAOs—one semi-"Territorial" and one "Formation" for the Akyab District.

An SCAO Myitkyina was appointed relieving SCAO with HQ, NCAC for full-time staff work on the Commanding General's staff. In January 1945 he was appointed DCCAO NCAC. The SCAO Fort Hertz continued as an independent SCAO under Commander Fort Hertz Area.

38. From August onwards as planning for a major Allied offensive in Burma developed, Formation officers were found for 11 Divisions and three Tank Brigades (in addition to "Formation" officers with Army and Corps) and semi-territorial SCAOs and staff were found for 8 districts.

39. The organisation at the end of the year is shown in the diagram below:—



All SCAOs were still "semi-territorial".

40. The activities of Civil Affairs units under SCAOs are as follows:—

(1) To restore the headquarters administration of each previous Civil District and to set up police stations, hospitals, military courts, and bazaars in important towns in order to administer and care for the civil population whose services and labour are required by the army.

(2) To house and feed the population displaced by the operations of war when these could not be accommodated in existing villages.

(3) To survey the agricultural position in each district including existing stocks of food and cattle and to endeavour to get cultivation restarted in order to make the area as self-supporting as possible.

(4) To reconstitute a civil police force and to restore order to the area, to put down dacoity and robbery which in Burma immediately springs up as soon as control is relaxed or withdrawn.

(5) To recover from the civil population the vast amount of arms that had got into their hands.

(6) In conjunction with Field Security units to place under detention all persons likely to work against the Allied interests, and to bring before military courts all persons guilty of war crimes and of heinous crimes against personnel of the Allied forces or loyal British subjects, as well as offences under the normal criminal law.

(7) To re-employ all previous Government servants who on examination were found not to have exceeded their duties to the usurping power.

(8) To distribute supplies of food and other necessities of life to the civil population to the extent to which these could be introduced into the area through military channels.

(9) To bring to the notice of Military Commanders and to settle claims by the civil population for excesses committed by Allied troops.

(10) To prevent the spread of epidemic diseases.

(11) To assist in the distribution of propaganda and publicity to re-occupied areas.

41. The main difficulties against which the Military Administration had to contend were as follows:—

(1) In no case was any administration set up by the Japanese or the Puppet Government found to be functioning in re-occupied areas. It was the Japanese policy to remove all officials either by force or by playing on their fears that they would be treated harshly by the Allied Forces as Japanese collaborators. Consequently very few officials above the rank of village headmen and subordinates were found by the Civil Affairs Service in re-occupied areas and the administration had to be built up afresh from its foundations.

(2) The shortage of experienced Burmese speaking staff was acute since Civil Affairs in 1944 was allotted a low priority in obtaining such staff from other branches of the Army. While CAS(B) had first call on the available civilian servants of the Government of Burma, only a comparatively small fraction of the previous administrative machine had evacuated from Burma since the majority were Burmese; the Government of Burma itself required for administration and planning part of that fraction. To the extent of its ability the Government of Burma progressively released its servants to CAS(B) throughout the year.

(3) The impossibility of forming a reserve pool of officers in India where they could be equipped and briefed in readiness to be sent forward. The shortage of staff in the field required that each officer as he was made available to CAS(B) had to be sent forward as quickly as possible to avert a breakdown in the field.

(4) The lack of procurement action for equipment and vehicles for C.A. Departments owing to the delay in getting War Establishments on a full scale sanctioned.

(5) The lack of consumer goods for the civil population and the very small allotment of lift along the L of C in view of overriding operational necessity. The lack of goods was mainly due to the inability of India to supply these and to the policy of postponing procurement action in the UK until the estimates preferred by the Young Working Party had been considered. These estimates did not reach India till August 1944 whereas CAS(B) had prepared preliminary estimates in October 1943.

(6) Shortage of clerical staff in the field was acute. Very few were to be found in the "Frontier Fringe" of Burma and those who had evacuated to India from Burma in 1942 were mostly unwilling to serve the Military Administration in the field. It should be remembered that in the absence of conscription for persons domiciled in India and Burma even clerks who were servants of the Government of Burma could not be forced to serve in the Military Administration; they could easily obtain other employment in India, which would have made coercion, even if attempted, infructuous.

42. *Administration in subordinate districts.*—In the northern part of Akyab where the tide of battle swayed backwards and forwards in 1943 and 1944, the main problem was the disposal of displaced persons whose villages had been burnt during operations or who had been evacuated under military orders for reasons either of security or the health of troops. The original centre of administration at Maungdaw was shifted to Bawle Bazaar where

it remained throughout the year. There were subordinate centres at other places in the Pruma and Kalapanzin valleys. Relief camps, hospitals, dispensaries, police stations and a jail were established during the year. Surplus paddy was bought by the administration and distributed to relief camps and to deficit areas, the latter on payment. There was no lack of money in the area as considerable quantities of labour and supplies were required and paid for by the Army. Some consumer goods were brought into the area as there was a considerable trade with India; loads of textiles and other goods were carried in by coolies employed by petty traders. By the end of the year a rough survey of agricultural land had been made with a view to imposing a revenue levy in kind on paddy land where cultivation had not been disturbed by the operations of war.

43. *Arakan Hill Tracts*.—Paletwa, the centre of administration of these Hills, was re-occupied during the year. The Civil Administration had always been of the lightest type in this area and it was not difficult to restore it to the same standard. A dispensary was set up at Paletwa. There was little or no food problem.

44. *Chin Hills*.—Towards the end of 1944 the whole of the Chin Hills with the exception of the Southern Subdivision of Kanpetlet was re-occupied and the Civil Affairs Officers who throughout the year had been working with the Lushai Brigade and the Chin Levies on the western fringes returned to their HQ at Falam and the subordinate HQs of Tiddim and Haka. The main problem was to bring sufficient rice and salt into the area as cultivation had suffered and the area is normally a deficit one. Its main normal source of supply, the Kabaw Valley, had insufficient food for itself. Besides air drops, arrangements were made during the dry season 1944-45 to bring in rice and salt by the Tiddim road to a dump north of the Manipur river whence these would be fetched by the villagers in the Tiddim area, while Falam and Haka were to fetch their supplies from dumps at the foot of the hills established by CAS transport along routes leading from Indainggyi (Kalembo) on the main Imphal-central Burma L of C. Owing to lack of transport little in the nature of consumer goods and textiles could be brought in. Hospitals and dispensaries were established throughout the area.

45. *Naga Hills*.—The Naga Hills of all districts in Burma had the lightest form of administration which was only established shortly before 1942. Two CAOs were all that could be spared for this area in 1944. Supplies of rice and salt and some textiles and soap were brought from Tamu on the main L of C to Sittaung on the Chindwin and then by country boats to the Somra tract which lies in the Chindwin Valley at the foot of the Naga Hills. From this point the villagers fetched their own supplies. A dispensary has been set up at this point. It is known that the old evil custom of the Nagas of raiding each other's villages and taking heads and slaves has revived in these hills from 1942 onwards. The two CAOs are doing their best by persuasion to prevent these recurrences but in the absence of adequate armed forces it is impossible to exact compensation from villages responsible.

46. *Upper Chindwin District*.—The centre of administration was re-established at Tamu in the Kabaw Valley when this was re-occupied and subordinate centres in the Chindwin valley were later re-opened. Towards the end of the year the HQ of the civil administration moved to a point on the Chindwin opposite Kalewa in order to be in the vicinity of Sub-area HQ. Rice and salt were brought into the Kabaw Valley and hospitals and dispensaries established and a police force reconstituted. The population of the Upper Kabaw Valley, amounting to 2,000 persons who were evacuated to India during the Japanese advance of 1944 have now been repatriated.

47. *Pakokku District.*—By the end of 1944 a small Civil Affairs Unit had reached Gangaw and was waiting to move forward to Pakokku which was re-occupied early in 1945. A Police Station, dispensary and subordinate HQ were opened at Gangaw.

48. *Katha District.*—As the civil district of Katha fell within 2 commands—14th Army and NCAC—it was necessary to split the old district into Katha East with HQ at Katha and Katha West with HQ at Kawlin on the dismantled railway line from Shwebo to Myitkyina. This district was re-occupied late in 1944 and dacoity in the plains and raids by Kachins on the plains, villages were of daily occurrence. The re-establishment of the local police force however and the posting of security troops in 1945 has gone a considerable way to restore order. While Katha West has no food shortage Katha East which includes the Ruby Mines town of Mogok on the east bank of the Irrawaddy is a deficit area. Arrangements had been made to bring in supplies from the Shwebo district to Mogok during the dry season of 1945. Hospitals and dispensaries have been set up.

49. *Myitkyina District.*—During 1944 the district remained divided in two parts with a SCAO in charge of each—the Northern Kachin Hills (Fort Hertz-Sumprabum area), and the Hukawng Valley and the rest of the district to the south-west of Myitkyina. Before the fall of Myitkyina in August 1944 administration had been set up on the outskirts of the town with a refugee camp which at one time had over 7,000 persons. For some weeks the civil administration at this place was working under fire. In fact for two days a CAO commanded a locally raised unit of 200 Gurkhas and held under American Command an important position in the firing line. After the fall of Myitkyina subordinate HQs were set up in the railway corridor down to the borders of the Katha District. In the Hukawng Valley food and salt had been imported by road throughout 1944 until the harvest, and food also had been brought by air into the Myitkyina and the Sumprabum areas. While the harvest of December 1944 eased matters it is insufficient throughout the district to maintain the people until the harvest of 1945. Before the end of 1944 the refugee camp had been evacuated and refugees resettled in areas on the outskirts of Myitkyina. This task was rendered more difficult by the inability of NCAC to agree to the introduction of CAS(B) Relief personnel. The staff at Myitkyina had to be kept at an absolute minimum owing to the refusal of NCAC to accept and ration the full establishment of British personnel required in this area.

50. *Bhamo District.*—The first town of the Bhamo District to be occupied by Chinese troops was Shwegu and a CAO accompanied them there and started to set up administration. The major portion of the Civil Affairs Unit however proceeded to Bhamo direct from Myitkyina with the main body of NCAC and by the end of the year it had established itself on the outskirts of Bhamo with a hospital, jail, police station and a supply centre. The food problem at Bhamo though difficult was less acute than in Myitkyina. It was not found necessary to establish a refugee camp and the people of Bhamo who were not allowed to return to the town area were accommodated in surrounding villages. Here as in Myitkyina the main problem was the enmity between the Kachins of the Hills and Shans and Burmans inhabiting the plains.

51. With shortage of staff, clerical assistance, transport and equipment and in the early days at least an imperfect conception on the part of subordinate military commands of the true role and value of Civil Affairs, what is surprising is the amount of solid valuable work done by Civil Affairs units in the field.

CHAPTER V.

State of Agriculture in re-occupied areas and CASB activities to ameliorate conditions.

52. There was no Agricultural Department in the CASB organisation during 1944 but two officers of the Department of the Government of Burma were posted during the year to CAS(R), one at HQ and the other in the Field, filling vacancies in the War Establishment of the S & I Department pending sanction of an Agricultural Department War Establishment.

53. Agriculture is the basic industry of Burma. In areas re-occupied during the year the acreage under cultivation had been reduced radically as compared to pre-war cultivation. Added to the ordinary peace-time vicissitudes of weather and normal depredations of insect, animal and other pests, war factors have been at work. Owing to the deterioration of internal communications consequent on Allied bombing and the operations of Long Range Penetration Troops and to the almost complete cessation of the import of consumer goods during the Japanese occupation and the consequent decrease in the movement of saleable or exchangeable commodities from 'surplus' to 'deficit' areas, the cultivator has not unnaturally been disinclined to produce more than subsistence crops. In the absence of veterinary services and prophylactic sera and vaccines, uncontrolled epidemics of rinderpest, haemorrhagic septicaemia, anthrax, foot-and-mouth and other animal diseases have killed off very large numbers of plough animals. Moreover the Japanese have killed large numbers of cattle for food and have requisitioned great numbers for transport; the numbers of animals available for agricultural operations has therefore been seriously reduced. The Japanese have been ruthless in requisitioning foodstuffs, carts, metals and materials of any kind. This ruthlessness and the bombing of operational areas and lines of communication, and the requisitioning of forced labour have naturally led large numbers of villagers to evade the Japanese and betake themselves away from Lines of Communication and in consequence cultivated areas in danger of bombing, requisitioning and forced labour, have been depleted of men and women. Everywhere large numbers of ploughs, carts and other implements for cultivation have been worn out and materials for repair have not been available.

54. In the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills where the services of the population have been strained by the provision of men for the Levies, for portage and other military work, *taungya* cultivation has suffered, and, moreover widespread damage had been done to such crops as were grown because people were not available to scare wild animals from the crops.

55. It is difficult to particularise conditions and activities up to 31st December 1944. A summary of the normal cropping position in each district re-occupied to that date is stated below together with the apparently existing paddy position then and requirements of cultivators, implements, etc. Generally the overall seed position may be regarded as reasonably satisfactory for main crops though action by SCAOs will be necessary in some areas to prevent seed being used for food purposes. In general however the Burman cultivator does not encroach on his seed reserve unless faced with immediate starvation. Transport of paddy seed from surplus to deficit areas may be difficult.

56. SCAOs were asked to submit demands for special requirements of vegetable seeds for areas where there were shortages and as far as possible their demands have been met.

57. *Akyab District*.—(1) The main crops in Akyab District comprised 705,394 acres of paddy, 738 acres of other cereals, 1,259 acres of beans and pulses, 800 acres of sesamum, 4,271 acres of mustard and some 2,500 acres of miscellaneous food crops. The bovine population numbered 296,000 oxen and 137,000 buffaloes.

(2) Normally the paddy outturn is estimated at 525,000 tons and local requirements at 193,000 tons thus leaving a surplus of 332,000 tons for export. This is equivalent to some 246,000 tons of rice and rice products. Aerial and ground information indicates that in 1944 some 35-40 per cent. of the normal area was cropped, but no exact forecast can yet be made regarding the exportable surplus as the condition of the crop varied very considerably from tract to tract.

(3) A survey of the milling position was made recently and proposals have been put up to attempt the reconditioning of 4 of the 28 mills in Akyab Town and 4 of the 8 small mills in the District. The scheme also proposes the purchase of surplus paddy at several buying stations outside Akyab and its transport to Akyab for milling or for export as paddy.

(4) A census of the cattle position in Akyab carried out by the Veterinary Department indicates a decrease of 51 per cent. of the 1941 figures. Normally, however, Akyab was overstocked with underfed cattle with the result that a pair of work oxen ploughed only some 6 acres or so. With the reduction in numbers it is expected that the surviving animals will be able to cultivate an increased acreage per yoke as they are now well fed and in good condition.

(5) The implements considered necessary for agricultural rehabilitation in the first year of reoccupation are as under—

Country ploughs 6,400; damas 14,800; mamooties 25,700; taywinbauks 2,500; sickles 20,000; Engelberg hullers 50; bar weights 95; and platform weighing machines 70.

These have all been asked for and have been included in the Young Working Party's estimate of agricultural requirements.

(6) Till the end of 1944, however, none had been made available though it is understood that a few damas and mamooties, etc. (numbers not known), had been supplied from other sources.

58. *Arakan Hill Tracts*.—(1) The only crops recorded for this area are 10,782 acres of paddy, 100 acres of cotton, 1,483 acres of tobacco and 83 acres of plantains. The cattle population numbered 2,500 oxen and 125 buffaloes.

(2) On an all Burma estimate of paddy requirements there was normally a small deficit of possibly 2,000 tons a year. From the meagre aerial and ground information available it has been assumed that cultivation has gone down by some 50 per cent. If this is so, and the All-Burma consumption formula is applied, it suggests a possible shortage of up to 3,000 tons of rice in 1945.

(3) In the breakdown for agricultural implements for 1945 the following requirements were asked for and included in the Young Working Party's estimates:

Country ploughs 100; damas 300; mamooties 2,000; taywinbauks 500; bar weights 10.

None of these has yet been received and it is not known that any have been supplied from other sources.

59. *Myitkyina District*.—(1) In 1940 the recorded paddy area extended to 108,949 acres, the maize area to 718 acres, beans of various sorts to about 400 acres, mustard to 527 acres, tobacco to 536 acres, sugarcane to 8,766 acres and vegetables and plantains to about 1,500 acres.

(2) Oxen and buffaloes of all kinds numbered 45,000 and 33,000 respectively.

(3) Under normal conditions the paddy outturn is estimated to be 65,000 tons while local requirements for seed and food amount to 70,000 tons leaving a deficit of 5,000 tons equivalent to some 3,000 odd tons of edible rice.

(4) Aerial and ground information indicates that in 1944 only about 30 per cent. of the normal area was cropped. This would indicate, on a normal requirements basis, a shortage of some 33,000 tons of rice in 1945.

(5) No detailed reports on the cattle position have yet been received though a survey is now being conducted by the Veterinary Department. Both the SCAO and the Senior Deputy Director of Agriculture, Upper Burma, have reported however that there is a very definite shortage of cattle in the district and the latter is of opinion that dearth of work animals will be a limiting factor to cropping in 1945 and will also reflect on the situation for some years to come. His estimate is that numbers have been reduced by about one-third.

(6) The following agricultural implements have been allotted to this district from those included in the Young Working Party's demand for 1945:

Country ploughs 1,100; damas 2,600; mamooties 3,200; taywinbawks 2,500; sickles 3,500; intercultivators 70; bar weights 30.

The Senior Deputy Director of Agriculture, however, estimates that at least 6,000 country ploughs and 7,000 mamooties are urgently required. As satisfactory mamooties cannot be made locally they will have to be imported, but he has taken steps to obtain "Maingthas" from the China border to manufacture ploughshares and such other small implements as can be made locally from scrap. This should help greatly in easing the position.

(7) The sugarcane area formerly extended to some 15,000 acres and supplied cane to the Sahmaw Factory. By the end of 1940, however, this main cash crop had almost completely disappeared. Even with the fullest encouragement it will take some years before complete rehabilitation can be effected. The future of this crop will naturally depend on whether a new factory is erected. It is hoped that it will be, but this is a long term decision.

60. *Bhamo District*.—(1) Pre-evacuation 40,455 acres were sown to paddy, 364 acres to tobacco, 250 acres to vegetables and smaller areas to miscellaneous food crops. There were some 42,000 oxen and 72,000 buffaloes of all sorts. It is estimated that under normal cropping, production in terms of paddy amounted to 21,000 tons, while normal requirements for seed and food totalled 31,000 tons leaving a deficit of 10,000 tons, equivalent to some 7,000 tons of edible rice.

(2) Aerial and ground information indicates that in 1944 only 30 per cent. of the paddy area was cropped. On normal requirements therefore there is an indicated shortage of some 17,000 tons of rice for 1945. Two of the four rice mills are repairable and should be in operation next year. Here again no detailed reports are yet available regarding the cattle position but conditions appear to be very similar to those obtaining in Myitkyina.

(3) The implements considered necessary for agricultural rehabilitation in the first year of re-occupation were included in the Young Working Party's estimates and comprise the following main items:

Country ploughs 1,900; dahs 4,400; mamooties 3,800; taywinbauks sickles 15,000; intercultivators 130; bar weights 30.

None of these was received up to the end of 1944 but the Senior Deputy Director of Agriculture has arranged for the local manufacture of 1,500 ploughshares and 5,000 Kachin dahs by Chinese blacksmiths. Felling axes for "taungya" clearing areas are also urgently required.

(4) Pre-war some 5,000 acres (no accurate acreage figures available) were cropped with potatoes in Bhamo and Myitkyina districts and efforts are being made to obtain up to 300 tons of seed to enable growers to cultivate at least 25 per cent. of that acreage. Unless seed can be obtained from the Northern Shan States, the Kachin Hills or China the only alternative will be to attempt to get supplies from Assam. Enquiries are being made, but transport difficulties may be insurmountable even if supplies are available.

61. *Katha District*.—(1) Normally Katha District grew the following main crops:

Paddy 208,500 acres, maize 500 acres; beans and pulses 4,700 acres, sesamum 1,180 acres; groundnut 3,500 acres, chillies 1,750 acres; tea 500 acres; tobacco 2,000 acres and vegetables and plantains above 2,000 acres.

(2) The bovine population comprised about 103,000 oxen and 78,000 buffaloes of all classes.

(3) Production totalled 134,000 tons of paddy while local requirements were 73,000 tons, thus leaving a normal surplus of 61,000 tons.

(4) Aerial and ground information suggest 50 per cent. cropping in 1944 so that on normal consumption there is an indicated shortage of 4,000 tons for 1945.

(5) Most of the rice mills have been severely damaged or burnt down, but it is hoped to get the two or three slightly damaged ones repaired sufficiently to be operable next year.

(6) The following agricultural implements have been allocated in the breakdown of the Young Working Party's estimates for 1945:

Country ploughs 400; damas 800; mamooties 1,300; taywinbauks 1,000; 3,000; sickles 6,000; bar weights 30.

Recent reports, however, indicates that larger numbers of ploughshares, dahs and mamooties will be required and it is hoped that it will be possible to encourage the local manufacture of shares and dahs from scrap. Cart wheel tyres have become scarce also.

(7) No cattle census reports have yet been received, but there are indications of very considerable local shortages, particularly in the paddy tracts.

62. *Upper Chindwin District*.—(1) The main crops in the Upper Chindwin District were 121,660 acres of paddy, 134 acres maize, 16,434 acres of beans and pulses, 663 acres of sesamum, 1,790 acres of tea; 1,077 acres of tobacco and a little over 1,100 acres of vegetables and plantains. Oxen and buffaloes numbered 44,000 and 67,000 respectively. The normal paddy outturn is estimated at 71,000 tons and normal requirements at 70,000 tons, leaving a small surplus of 1,000 tons.

(2) Aerial and ground information indicates that in 1944 only about 30 per cent. of the normal area was cropped. This would suggest, on a normal requirement basis, a shortage of some 33,000 tons of rice in 1945.

(3) Very little first hand information has been received for this district, but no doubt requirements of agricultural implements, etc., are similar to those of adjacent districts. In the Young Working Party's estimates provision has been made for 1,200 country ploughs, 20,000 sickles and 50 bar weights for the first year of re-occupation.

63. *Kachin Hill Tracts.*—(1) No record of the cropped area is available. Generally, however, paddy cultivation is of two kinds, *viz.*, wet in the plains and dry in the hills. Minor crops such as tea, coffee, fruit, beans, tobacco, etc., are also grown where conditions are suitable. The main deterrent to full cultivation was considered by the Senior Deputy Director of Agriculture to be a shortage of tools and implements for taungya clearing and he estimated that to make up for wastage the following were required without delay:

 Dahs 70,000; felling axes 20,000; mamooties 50,000 and double handed and single handed saws 5,000 each.

(2) The quantities procured were so small that full necessary taungya clearing for subsistence requirements has been considerably curtailed.

(3) Local manufacture is being encouraged from scrap metal and this source of supply is being developed to the utmost.

CHAPTER VI.

Attitude of Population of re-occupied areas to Allied Troops and CAOs.

64. British troops have difficulty in distinguishing between Japanese, Chinese, Burmese and Nepalese nationals, who all have a somewhat similar Mongol cast of feature and physical mould. In the first Burma Campaign many unfortunate incidents arose from failure to distinguish races. British and other troops received lectures on Burma and the Burmese people and GHQ India had issued a Directive on the treatment of the inhabitants of Burma. Formations of troops under training for operations in Burma were instructed in many features of Burmese life, work and the country generally. These have borne fruit in relations between the Allied troops and the inhabitants of Burma.

65. The Japanese have not lived up to the correctness of their attitude to the people of Burma expressed by their High Command. Everywhere in the re-occupied areas Civil Affairs Officers have been told the same tale of ruthless requisitioning of men, carts and cattle, of brutal beatings of 'Headmen' and village elders if requisitions or orders were not complied with. Two years of Japanese 'Independence' has generally disposed the people of the re-occupied areas to welcome Allied troops and Civil Affairs Officers, and this despite the fact that in some areas the conduct of some Allied troops has not been such as to endear them to the villagers. Outbreaks of women-hunting and of shooting of village cattle and poultry by Allied Troops have, however, been dealt with speedily and drastically by the Commanders of Military formations. Generally, Japanese habits and ways of life appear to have engendered disgust and contempt in the Burmese villager for the Japanese; their wanton destruction of buildings for their own purposes, the

lighting of fires on the floors of houses and the dismantling of houses merely to build sleeping platforms; their total disregard of the religious susceptibilities of the Buddhist; their occupation of Buddhist shrines and kyaungs and the uses to which they put these shrines have alienated any friendly feelings that may have originally been entertained by the Burmese villager towards the Japanese.

66. There had never been any substantial doubt of the loyalty of the local population in North Arakan, the Kalaw Valley and the Naga Hills and Somra Tract. The unwavering loyalty of the Kachins and Chins save for one or two "Quislings", either now under arrest or dealt with by their own people before the restoration of military control, since the end of the first Burma campaign even in situations when it seemed they had been deserted by the Allies is deserving of signal recognition. There was no conclusive evidence as to the manner in which the Burmese of the plains would receive the Allies on their re-entry into Burma. The two Wingate expeditions reported that with few exceptions they had found the villagers in northern Burma helpful. The withdrawal, however, of the first Wingate expedition, which many of the local inhabitants had regarded as the spearhead of the liberating armies, had shaken the faith of the Burmese in the eventual return of the British Government. It was a reasonable assumption that the reprisals exacted by the Japanese on villages which had assisted the Wingate expeditions would imbue villagers with a wary attitude towards the Allied forces advancing into Burma.

67. The assumption was not without substance in the areas re-occupied by the Allies in the rapid advances towards the end of 1944. The local population were wary of committing themselves until the weight of the Allied advance and the arrival of Civil Affairs Officers gave them reasonable assurance that the chances of war would not yet once again bring the Japanese Kempatai back to exact retribution in their villages. By and large, however, the general attitude of the villager was friendly and co-operative towards the British, Indian and African forces.

68. By the end of 1943, economic conditions in Burma had deteriorated seriously. Japanese protestations regarding "Co-prosperity", "Asia for the Asiatics", and "Self-government for Burma" had materialised in sinister ways. The almost complete breakdown of communications, the acute shortage of clothing, soap, medicines and other essential civil supplies and the maldistribution of rice, cooking oil and other foodstuffs, together with the continuous depreciation in the value of Japanese currency, had caused widespread distress and brought the Japanese into discredit. This was aggravated into something more than discredit by labour conscription and harsh methods of obtaining the 'co-operation' of the local population practised by the Japanese Army.

69. Above all, villagers appeared anxious to have a period of quiet and freedom from interference to enable them to restore village life to more normal conditions. The eventual goodwill of the peasantry towards the Military Administration will be dependent on the degree of success of the administration in restoring law and order, rehabilitating agriculture, controlling prices and establishing supplies (above all clothing) and in providing once more social services such as medical, public health and education, in however rudimentary a form.

70. Relations with the Chinese troops in northern Burma have been less cordial but this was anticipated as the Burmese harboured a strong distrust

of the Chinese during the first Burma campaign and did, in the disorganisation prevailing towards the end, suffer a good deal at the hands of ill-disciplined Chinese troops.

71. In the Laukhang-Litawgaw-Hpimaw Kachin Hills Chinese guerilla forces occupied the country as unwanted protectors and pretenders to the lawful government of the Kachins. The Kachins of these parts pleaded to be relieved of the kindnesses of their protectors and stated that they would prefer Japanese control. Eventually in June 1944 the local home guards, with the assistance of Kachin levies on leave from their formations took the matter into their own hands and drove the intruders out. They have not reappeared.

CHAPTER VII.

Racial and Communal Relationships in re-occupied Areas.

72. The end of 1944 still saw the Moslem and Arakanese Buddhist communities in Arakan separated by the line between the Allies and Japanese, and therefore the communal problem in this area was quiescent but by no means solved.

73. In the Myitkyina and Bhamo Districts a new problem developed towards the end of the year when raids by well armed Kachin bands were made on Shan and Burmese villages in the neighbouring plains. The Kachins alleged that they had suffered reprisals by the Japanese and attacks by armed bands of Burmese during the Japanese occupation on account of information of their pro-Allied activities given by these plains villages. These armed attacks were of the nature of the blood feuds which are firmly rooted in Kachin custom. The situation was met by the appointment of additional *Taungoks* (subordinate Kachin officials) in the affected areas and by intensive touring by CAOs in the course of which they made it clear that the B.M.A. would not tolerate lawlessness in any form and that the pro-Japanese activities of Burmese villages in the areas in question would be carefully investigated and dealt with in accordance with law. The position was quieter at the end of the period under review but still required special attention. In the days of the Burmese Kings Kachin raids on Burmese villages in the plains areas adjacent to the hills were not infrequent and under British Administration there has always been a latent ill-feeling between the Kachins on the one hand and the Shans and Burmese on the other.

CHAPTER VIII.

Reports on Individual Departments.

74. *General Administration*.—(1) A word of explanation is necessary as to the term "General Administration". It is borrowed from the ordinary civil administration; this Department deals with the general administration of the civil population of Burma but not with the administration within CASB of CASB personnel. It works through DCCAOs with Formations and Areas forward to the SCAOs in charge of districts. It is directly concerned

with all matters of policy affecting the civil population, the village administration which is the backbone of all administration in Burma and with all political matters. It co-ordinates to some extent the activities of all other departments such as police, judicial, agriculture, forests, supplies, etc., in as much as the officer in charge of each civil district is ultimately responsible for the whole administration of the civil population within that district.

(2) In the circumstances no separate departmental report is presented. The activities of the General Administration Department are reflected in all sections of this report.

75. *Administration "A" and "Q"*.—The activities of this department, which deals with CASB personnel as distinct from the civil population, are concerned with the equipment, movement, organisation and personnel of each department and the formulation and procurement of sanction for War Establishments and War Equipment Tables. It was formed during 1944 when it was found that the growing bulk of this work interfered with the main duties of the department of General Administration, namely to administer the civil population.

76. *Judicial Department*.—(1) British Burma was a province of British India until the 1st April 1937. On that date it was separated from British India but took over, subject to certain modifications, laws then in force in that country, including the Indian Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Evidence Act. In 1940 the Defence of Burma Act was passed (replacing the Defence of Burma Ordinance, 1939, promulgated on the outbreak of war) which, with the rules made thereunder made wide provision for the issue of emergency orders and the punishment of acts prejudicial to the prosecution of the war. In 1943, after the evacuation, the Governor of Burma enacted certain Acts providing, *inter alia*, for the appointment of Special Judges and the more speedy disposal of criminal trials and certain of these Acts were amended towards the end of the year for the purpose of making punishable in Burma offences which had recently been made punishable in Assam and parts of Bengal by the Military Operational Area (Special Powers) Ordinance (Indian Ordinance XXXVII of 1943). The position was such, therefore, that immediately prior to the establishment of the British Military Administration in Burma, there was in force in British Burma a body of law which made provision for the punishment of a wide range of offences and the establishment of criminal courts of various degrees for the punishment of such offences.

(2) Immediately therefore on the establishment of Military Administration a decision had to be made whether the provisions of the law in force in Burma should be deemed to remain in force, subject to such amendments as experience would prove to be necessary, or whether special legislation creating a new substantive law and procedure and special tribunals to administer it should be created. Practical considerations and, in particular, the fact that the criminal law would necessarily have to be administered by officers largely unfamiliar with any system other than that long established in Burma, led to the adoption of the former course. The provisions of the law in force in Burma on the 31st December 1943, were accordingly, by Proclamation No. 2 of 1944 (see Appendix 3) declared to remain in force except in so far as they are suspended, varied or supplemented by that or any subsequent proclamation or by regulations or orders made under the authority of any such Proclamation, but all courts existing on the 31st December 1943 were reconstituted and derived their jurisdiction and authority from the Supreme Allied Commander.

(3) It became necessary for the purpose of the administration of justice to establish throughout Burma uniformity in the rules governing criminal procedure and in the preparation of trial records; and this entailed a modification of the former law which made a distinction between that part of Burma in respect of which legislation could be passed by the Legislative Assembly and the Scheduled Areas (which include the Hill Districts in the north west and the Shan States) for the administration of which the Governor had directly formerly been responsible. It was also desirable to simplify and enlarge the provisions relating to summary trials, *i.e.*, trials in which the normal procedure was followed, but an abbreviated record alone was necessary. These objects were achieved by Proclamations 10, 11 and 12 of 1944. (See Appendix 3.)

(4) The Proclamations issued during the year 1944 were the following:—
Proclamation No. 1—Military Administration.

2—Maintenance of Order.

3—Laws Amendment (No. 1).

4—The Gazette.

5—Price Control.

6—Subordinate Appointment (General Administration).

7—Laws Amendment (No. 2).

8—Kachin Hill Tracts Pyadas.

9—Maintenance of Order Amendment.

10—Emergency Laws Amendment.

11—Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment).

12—Summary Trials.

13—Civil Affairs Service, Burma, Police Force.

See Appendix 3.

(5) Courts have been established in all parts of liberated Burma. These courts were presided over as far as possible by officers who have had judicial or magisterial experience in Burma. The number of officers appointed to exercise such powers at the end of the year was as follows:—

(i) Powers of a Special Judge and District Magistrate . . .	29
(ii) Powers of a Special Judge and Subdivisional Magistrate . .	16
(iii) District Magistrate	1
(iv) Subdivisional Magistrate	42
(v) Magistrate, of the 1st Class	1

(6) During the year 1944 the greater number of cases disposed of by British Military Administration courts, even though they may have been reviewed by a Senior Civil Affairs Officer, were reviewed in the Legal Adviser's office. This entailed a considerable amount of work, but it was considered important for the two-fold purposes of ensuring, as far as possible, that there had been no miscarriage of justice, and of obtaining an accurate picture of the working of the judicial machinery. For the guidance of the Court a brief note was, where necessary, prepared drawing the court's attention to such defects in procedure as were apparent on an examination of the record.

(7) No appeals were allowed from decisions of the BMA Courts, but any person sentenced by such courts to imprisonment for a term exceeding two years had a right to file a petition against his conviction and/or sentence. Instructions were issued to ensure that this right was brought to the notice of the persons awarded such sentences, and in practically every case the right was exercised.

(8) The type of case tried by Military Administration Courts varied markedly, as one would expect, according to whether the District in which the offence occurred was one which had remained under Allied control or was one which had been recently liberated. In the former, as for example in Akyab District, the majority of offences were of a minor nature consisting largely of petty offences against property and minor assaults. There were also in this area a number of bribery cases, and "black-market" offences and cases of unauthorised possession of military stores were prevalent. A noticeable feature in this area, reminiscent of the times of peace, was the number of petty criminal cases instituted upon the complaint of the aggrieved person. In a large number of these cases the allegations were found to be without substance and the accused was accordingly discharged; and in a number of other cases a charge was framed against the accused, but after hearing the defence evidence the trial resulted in an acquittal. (See Appendix 14.)

(9) In Districts which had only recently been freed from the enemy the Courts were called upon to consider more serious types of crime. A limited number of persons were tried on charges of waging war against the Crown or otherwise collaborating with the enemy. Some instances of cattle theft which in these times is a serious offence, occurred, and convictions were obtained against a number of persons guilty of this offence.

(10) The tendency on the whole has been to impose somewhat lenient sentences, and in two cases the CCAO found it necessary to point out that sentences imposed in respect of serious offences under section 5 (1) of the Defence of Burma Act should be really deterrent. Courts were in many cases reluctant to pass sentences of imprisonment for a term in excess of six months owing to the difficulty of putting such sentences into execution. For the greater part of the year there were no prisons in Burma, and although arrangements were made for confinement in prisons in British India of persons sentenced by the British Military Administration Courts, great difficulty was experienced in providing the requisite transport and escorts to effect their transfer.

(11) During the year 13 death sentences were imposed of which the CCAO confirmed 9. Of these nine cases the offence in one case was murder and in the remainder either waging war against the Crown or doing overt acts in furtherance of an intention to assist the enemy.

(12) In each District the SCAO was responsible generally for the administration of justice. He had usually the powers of a Special Judge, but did not exercise these powers save in exceptional circumstances. He had restricted powers of disposing of petitions and (save in certain classes of cases) could review in the first instance the proceedings of courts in his District.

(13) Each DCCAO had also powers of review save in cases where a sentence of death or of transportation or imprisonment for a term exceeding 7 years had been passed. It was intended that a Deputy Legal Adviser should be attached to the HQ of each DCCAO but owing to the lack of experienced officers it was not found possible to fill these appointments during the year 1944. Two such officers have, however, since been appointed.

(14) For the reasons mentioned in paragraph (2) above it was decided to adopt generally the laws in force in Burma immediately prior to the setting up of the Military Administration. Experience has shown that this decision was unquestionably right, but it has at the same time been the cause of certain difficulties particularly as regards the modification of such laws for the purposes of the Military Administration. It is desirable that a Proclamation should be self-contained and should set out in plain terms what is to

be done, but it was found difficult in some cases to apply this principle in connection with the type of Proclamation which deals with a matter about which (as was not infrequently the case) some legislation was already in existence.

(15) The main difficulty experienced by the Judicial Department during the year was an acute shortage of qualified officers. For some months the Legal Adviser was the only officer at HQ and in the field one Departmental officer only (in Arakan) was available for the whole period. A second officer at HQ was obtained later in the year and a former officer of the Subordinate Judicial Service was subsequently secured and posted to the field.

(16) The sanctioned War Establishment of the Department on 1st January 1944 and 31st December 1944 was as follows:—

	1-1-1944.	31-12-1944.
HQ	2	2
Field Unit	8	8
The actual establishment on these dates was:—		
HQ	1	2
Field Unit	2	2

A new establishment was sanctioned in January 1945.

(17) Appendix 14 contains a statistical record of the activities of the Department.

77. *Police Department.*

I.—GENERAL.

(1) On 1st January 1944 the date of Proclamation No. 1 of 1944 setting up a Military Administration for Burma, the Burma Police (Frontier Administration) became automatically the CAS(B) Police. On 3rd February 1944 the Inspector-General, Burma Police, at the headquarters of the Government of Burma, Simla, was formally appointed Brigadier, Chief of Police, CAS(B) and the Burma Police Officers at his HQ were appointed as follows:—

Assistant Inspector-General of Police	SO I	Police CASB
Superintendent of Police, Supplies	SO II	Police CASB
Assistant Director, Burma Government, Intelligence Bureau	SO II	Police CASB
Assistant Director, Burma Government, Intelligence Bureau	SO II	Police CASB

Nine Burma Police officers operating in Burma under the Burma Government Frontier Administration were formally commissioned in CAS(B) some as CAS(B) Police and others including those attached to Formations as CAS(B) General Administration.

(2) The Burma Police Intelligence Bureau, could not be provided with accommodation at CAS(B) HQ in Delhi until July 1944. The Bureau was transferred to Delhi as CAS(B) Intelligence and was joined on 16th September 1944 by the office of the Inspector-General of Police, Burma, which then became the office of the Chief of Police, CAS(B) in charge of SO I (Police).

(3) During the period 3rd February 1944 to 15th September 1944 the Chief of Police was engaged in preparing special amendments to the Criminal Law of Burma, a W/E for CAS(B) Police, special regulations for CAS(B) Police pay, allowances and conditions of service, in completing indents for Police equipment and stationery, and in organising the administration of

the nucleus CAS(B) Police Force and administering the Burma Police Training Depot established at Hoshiarpur which later was to become the CAS(B) Police Training Depot.

(4) The CAS(B) Police W/E (HQ and Field) was approved on 8th November 1944. Meanwhile, steps had been taken to secure the transfer from other branches of the Army and release from other employ of Burma Police Officers and men, on "surplus leave" since the evacuation of Burma and to arrange (ACI 1426/44) for recruitment of additional officers to fill the depleted cadre of the CASB Police. The Police strength at the end of the year 1944 was as follows:—

(5) (a) *Officers*—

Trained Burma Police Gazetted Officers in CAS(B) Police . . .	21
Trained B.P. Gazetted Officers earmarked in India for CAS(B) Police . . .	13
Trained B.P. Gazetted Officers whose release from other branches of the Army not yet assured . . .	11
Total . . .	45
Trained B.P. Gazetted Officers reported not available for CAS(B) Police . . .	3

A total of 133 "Commissioned" or "Civilian" officers is required. In addition to the 45 trained Burma Police officers available to CASB 27 officers will be recruited under ACI 1426/44 and the remainder will consist of recontacted gazetted officers of the Burma Police (Class II) in Burma. Training of newly recruited officers will take place (a) at the Civil Affairs Centre, Wimbledon, and (b) on the ground in Burma.

(b) *Other Ranks*—

(a) Trained Burma Police "Other Ranks" in CASB Police . . .	840
(b) Trained Burma Police "Other Ranks" in India [additional to (a)] . . .	200

(c) *Clerical Staff*—

In CASB Police . . .	25
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No difficulty is anticipated in finding in Burma trained BP clerical staff for re-employment in Burma.

(6) "Other Ranks" Recruitment.

The majority of the CASB Police Force of 21448 "Other Ranks" will be raised as follows:—

(a) Evacuated to India, re-equipped and re-trained at CASB Police Depot . . .	627
(b) Enlisted in India from Arakanese Refugee Camps . . .	101
(c) To be recruited in Burma from the Burma Police Force of 13,632 'Other Ranks' and from the disbanded Burma Military Police and Burma Frontier Force . . .	20,720
Total . . .	21,448

The training and re-equipping of "Other Ranks" recruited in Burma (natives of Burma only are suitable for recruitment and are not available outside Burma) will be undertaken as in pre-evacuation days at the District Police Training Depot at the HQ of each District.

(7) *Implementation of W/E.*

The full strength of CASB Police provides:—

Commissioned Officers . . .	133
Other Ranks . . .	21,448
Clerical Staff . . .	227

Of this full strength a small section only (representing the re-occupied portion of Burma on 31st December 1944) was sanctioned (S) for implementation (I) by the end of 1944 and was actually implemented as detailed below :—

	Brig.	Col.	Lt. Col.	Maj.	Capt.	Lt.	I.P.	S.I.P.	H.C.	P.C.	Clerks
	S.I.	S.I.	S.I.	S.I.	S.I.	S.I.	S.I.	S.I.	S.I.	S.I.	S.I.
HQ											
General	.	.	1 1	--	1 1	1 -	1 1	--	--	--	16 11
CAS (B)											
Intel.	.	.	--	1 -	--	1 1	1 2	1 -	6 3	5 5	--
Civil Def.	.	.	--	--	1 -	1 -	1 1	--	--	--	5 1
Depot	.	.	--	--	--	1 1	--	2 -	--	--	5 5

S=Sanctioned.

I=Implemented.

(8) The following statement exhibits the policing of re-occupied areas of Burma by the end of the year :—

CASB Police, Field, on 31st December 1944.

District.	Officers		Other Ranks	
	Sanctioned.	Implemented.	Sanctioned.	Implemented.
Akyab	4	2	590	327
Bhamo	1	1	147	126
Katha	3	2	484	62
Upper Chindwin	2	2	300	164
Myitkyina	1	2	215	151

(9) Although complete indents for all Police supplies that is, clothing, equipment, transport and stationery had been submitted by early 1944 to CAS(B) S & I Branch, no supplies had been made available from CAS(B) sources. The small CAS(B) Police Force in the field carried on (but under the greatest difficulties) with the aid of the small balance of police arms and clothing and equipment available from Government of Burma stock at the Police Depot, Hoshiarpur. By the end of the year the scale of clothing and equipment for CAS(B) personnel had not been finally settled.

(10) Owing to lack of printing facilities the Police Proclamation and Conditions of Service and Disciplinary Rules issued thereunder had not, by the end of the year, been issued in the BMA Gazette. For the same reason it was not possible to undertake formal enrolment of personnel in the CAS(B) Police Force.

(11) Special conditions of service and scales of pay for " Other Ranks " had not been settled at the end of the year on account of the necessity for long drawn out triangular discussions between the Burma Government, the Burma Office and the War Office over financial questions, preliminary to the making of decisions. Similar difficulties delayed decision as to pay, allowances and condition of service of clerical staff who, though not liable to conscription, were not attracted by the scales of pay offered. New recruits were found practically impossible to obtain.

(12) The organising of Police Departmental procedure in District Offices and in Police Stations had not been completed nor had the necessary forms and registers been printed. Meanwhile the Police carried on with such arms and ammunition and such scraps of stationery as they were able to salvage on the ground or to secure locally from Army surpluses. Various

circular orders on Organisation and Police Procedure were issued and orders involving adjustment of CAS(B) Police activities to Army administrative activities, *e.g.*, disposal of military offenders, were under reference to HQ ALFSEA at the end of the year.

(13) Emergency arrangements had been made to supply to each SCAO(P) on being posted to the Field a portfolio of such CAS(B) Manuals and Directions, Standing Orders, Administrative Instructions, etc., as had already been issued and of which copies happened to be available in print.

(14) On 1st December 1944 the Burma Police Depot at Hoshiarpur, Punjab, became the CAS(B) Police Depot. By the end of the year the Depot was still lacking necessary transport, rations and supplies from Military sources.

(15) *Crime*.—The areas liberated before the end of the year were in normal times relatively free of crime. After liberation they continued to be so except in the Upper Chindwin District where dacoity was abnormal and in the Katha District where in the Moda-Mohnyin areas, organised gangs of Kachins attacked and looted Shan-Burmese villages as reprisals for the treatment they had received from them during Japanese occupation. In the southern part of the Katha District also there was much dacoity. Prompt measures by the police against the worst offenders reduced dacoity to more normal proportions.

In the Myitkyina and Bhamo Districts, villages suffered from the depredations of Chinese bandits and uncontrolled soldiery. This Chinese problem continues to be an acute one which will require measures beyond the ordinary powers of the Police. Considerable improvement has since been recorded with the provision of armed police in the Bhamo district. In the Myitkyina district, this problem to some extent solved itself with the return to their villages of armed Kachins who had been serving with the British and American forces. It is still difficult, however, to assess how much of the looting which still continues is the work of Chinese bandits or how much that of the Chinese soldiery. When the Chinese Army leaves Burma, it may be taken that any armed Chinese is a bandit and that he may be treated accordingly.

A few dacoit gangs continued to operate in all districts which had been liberated before the close of the year, though, as stated above, considerable improvement towards normal figures of important crime had been achieved.

(16) It was evident, even before the close of the year, that little difficulty would obtain in recruiting to the Police Force of the Military Administration those members of the Burma Police who were still alive and suitable for further service. At first, there was some apprehension as to how their service under the Japanese and Ba Maw administrations would be viewed. When it was seen that normal police service under those governments was not considered reprehensible, police officers, including those recruited during our absence, offered themselves for appointment. Almost without exception police so contacted have given of their very best to assist in Military measures against the enemy and have from time to time been complimented by Commanders in the field.

(17) Despite the disabilities under which the Police worked, a not unsatisfactory record of work is to their credit as reflected in the statistics set out in Appendix 14. Owing to shortage of staff and other factors adequate statistics of police activities could not be maintained and compiled.

(18) *Civil Defence*.—By the end of 1944 this Department had not begun to function.

(19) *Censorship*.—By the end of 1944 this Department had not begun to function.

(II) INTELLIGENCE BRANCH.

78. (1) CASB Intelligence Branch was formed on 25th July 1944 at HQ CASB Delhi from the Intelligence Bureau, Government of Burma, Simla. The strength of all ranks on that date was as follows:—

Officers		Clerks		Executive Officers	
S.O.I.	1	Supdts.	1	I.Ps.	3
S.O.II.	2	Steno.	1	S.I.Ps.	3
		U.D.A.	3		
		L.D.C.	5		

(2) The Intelligence Branch is an HQ Unit only of CASB; it has no staff working in the field. It is a recipient of information regarding Burma from all possible sources and is at the moment mainly a collating agency for information of all kinds from enemy-occupied Burma. It is also a verification agency similar to Provincial IBs in India for Government Departments wishing to employ persons having connections with Burma. The commissioned officers and executive staff are all regular Burma Police Officers.

(3) The Weekly Intelligence Summary containing an account under headings of all information of interest received during each week is circulated widely to official agencies. This report was a fortnightly issue but became a weekly report from 23rd September 1944.

(4) Another important duty of the Bureau has been the maintenance of dossiers for all Burma Districts. Part I of these dossiers consists of an account of the District before evacuation; Part II of the dossier is a description of events in the District that have come to light since evacuation; whilst Part III of the dossier, the most important part, contains names of 'personalities' who have come to light and have been classified according to their activities as 'Black', 'Grey', 'White' or 'Administrative'. These lists are used by Security Intelligence for planning and are reproduced for the use of forward troops when entering Districts.

(5) With the progressive re-occupation of Burma the functions of the Intelligence Branch described above will probably be translated in the organisation of the British Military Administration to those of the Intelligence Branch, C.I.D. Burma before evacuation.

(6) Co-operative relations with other Intelligence agencies, British and American, have been established. The Branch is frequently consulted by the Allied agencies.

(7) Other duties performed by the Bureau included verification of Government servants who had remained in Burma during the Japanese occupation and who were required for service in the CAS(B), assistance in the circulation of news about persons in Burma to the Evacuee Welfare Department, Government of Burma and the provision of any information which was considered likely to be of use to the Government of Burma.

(8) The sanctioned strength on 31st December 1944 was:—

HQ		Sanctioned	Filled
Officers	.	4	4
Police Other ranks	.	24	20

79. *Prisons Department.*—(1) On the 7th October 1944 an officer of the Police Department with experience as Superintendent of a large jail in India since evacuation from Burma was appointed SOCA I (Jails) and set the task of organising a Prisons Department of CAS(B).

The personnel requirements of the Department were 50 Commissioned Officers, 41 Chief Jailors, 242 jailors, 8 Chief warders, 41 Head warders and 2,610 Warders, and a Headquarters Office staff. To fill these appointments there were in India with previous experience in Burma no officers and only 29 Chief Jailors and Jailors and approximately 600 Chief and Head Warders and Warders. In peace time officers in charge of jails in Burma were almost invariably officers of the I.M.S. who could not in war time be spared from medical duties.

(2) The office staff of the Inspector-General of Prisons, Burma, which had evacuated to India was scattered over different offices of the Government of Burma at Simla. Steps had been taken by the Police Department to call up a few Jailors and Warders. On the assumption of the charge, the SOCA I (Jails) called up the whole of the Jailor Staff and 300 warders. The services of 2 clerks and 1 stenographer of the Inspector-General of Prisons staff were procured from the Government of Burma. The Department did not begin to function until the middle of November 1944. Between that date and the end of the year, the following major work was put in hand and completed.

(3) All-Burma indents for stores and equipment were prepared and submitted to the Supply Department. Jail forms and registers which were considered necessary during the period of the Military Administration were drafted and sent for printing. A Manual of Instructions and Procedure for the use and guidance of Jail officers was prepared. The Prisons and Prisoners Acts were amended as required and a draft was submitted to the Chief Judicial Officer to enable him to prepare a Prisons Proclamation. The Prisons Department War Establishment and a statement of case was prepared and submitted to 'A' Branch. Plans for Camp Jails were prepared by the Government Architect in consultation with the SOCA I (Jails). A Jail Training Depot was established under a Superintendent under the control of the Officer Commanding the Police Depot, Hoshiarpur. Possible recruiting grounds were explored and recruiting of officers and jailors was commenced. Jail staffs were assembled to proceed to Arakan and Shwebo.

(4) At the end of the year the Prisons Department had not established any jails in Burma, but the Police Department who were functioning in Arakan and Myitkyina had opened Camp Jails in those areas.

(5) The sanctioned W/Es on 1st January 1944 and 31st December 1944 were—

H. Q.	1	1
Field Unit	2	2

The actual establishments on 1st January 1944 and 31st December 1944 were—

H. Q.	1	1
Field Unit	nil	1

80. *Medical and Public Health Department.*—(1) The medical staff and institutions in the Government of Burma Frontier Administration had up to 1st January 1944 been under the administration of the Inspector-General of Civil Hospitals, Burma in Simla. There were 13 civilian medical officers in the service of the Government of Burma controlling 5 hospitals of 10-30 beds each and 2 dispensaries.

(2) CASB was formed on 15th February 1943 but until 16th February 1944 there was no Medical Staff Officer at HQ although for at least 5 months previously the appointment had been under discussion with the War Office.

On 16th February 1944 a Controller of Medical Services was appointed. He had no staff of any sort. A provisional W/E existed. It provided:—

H. Q.				Field Unit.			
Colonel	1	Lt. Col.	1				
Majors	2	Majors	2				
Staff Cpts.	2	Captains	11				
		Lieuts.	69				
	5		83				

(3) A W/E for all Burma on a Territorial basis was worked out and sanctioned as follows:—

(a) Headquarters Med. CAS(B).							
Admin		Med Stores		Hygiene & Public Health		Nursing	
CMS Col.	1	ADMS Lt. Col.	1	ADH Lt. Col.	1	P. Matron Lt. Col.	1
ADMS Maj	1	DADMS Maj	1	DADH Maj	1		
DADMS Maj	1	Staff Capt.	1	Staff Capt.	1		
Staff Capt.	1			Staff Lt.	1		
Staff Lt.	1						

(a) Field Unit.					
Cols	Lt. Cols	Majors	Cpts	Subalterns	Total
..	17	50	117	488	672
Lady Doctors		Matrons		Lady Nurses	
8		4		399	

The above included personnel for Welfare, Jails and certain Mobile Units. All other personnel were to be civilian employees. No officer of the rank of Lt.-Col. on this W/E could be implemented without War Office sanction; this was the cause of much delay and loss of time in planning in spite of frequent representations.

(4) On 31st December 1944 the personnel situation was as follows:—

	Headquarters		Field	
	Authorised	Filled	Authorised	Filled
Colonel	1	1
Lt. Col.	3	..	17	1
Majors	3	2	50	5
Captains	3	2	117	10
Subalterns	2	..	488	54
TOTAL	12	5	672	70

as against 13 civilian medical officers at the beginning of the year. In addition 209 civilians were employed comprising Nurses 9, Compounders 32 and other subordinate staff 168. ;

Officers at Headquarters				Date of assumption
C.M.S.				16-2-1944.
DADMS				29-3-1944.
DADMS Stores				11-10-1944.
Staff Capt. (Med)				31-10-1944.
Staff Capt. (Stores)				26-12-1944.
I-156			3	4

By the end of 1944 no officer had been posted to the Public Health Section though an urgent demand for the services of an ADH and a DADH had been made.

(5) The areas served by the Medical Department on 31st December 1944 were as follows:—

District	Population	Area
North Akyab	200,000	1,000 sq.m. approx.
Araken Hill Tracts	34,005	1,901 „
Fort Hertz & Myitkyina Dist	298,323	30,882 „
Chin Hills	186,405	10,675 „
Upper Chindwin Dist. and Naga Hills.	209,575	19,001 „
	928,308	63,459

(6) The total number of medical units in the Field on 31st December 1944 was:—

- 1 Hospital of 120 Beds.
- 2 „ 100 „
- 14 „ 10-40 „
- 12 Dispensaries.
- 2 M. I. Rooms.

Total 31 Units with a total bed strength of 600 beds as against 7 units under the control of the Government of Burma at the end of 1943.

(7) Statistics of patients treated have been maintained since June 1944. Under the conditions prevailing they could only be approximate and are less than the actual numbers of patients treated—

(a) Total number of IN patients	15,848
(b) „ OUT „	121,430
(c) Total of (a) and (b)	137,278

(8) In the re-occupied areas malnutrition was general and of various degrees of seriousness. Food and essential commodities had been deficient. Even in areas where there had been no shortage of rice, shortage of salt and vegetable oils and other essential ingredients of a balanced diet contributed to malnutrition. A general lowering of standard of living, scarcity of clothing and the breakdown of public health administration had contributed to lowered resistance to infection. Small-pox epidemics were reported in several areas, attributable to the conditions described above and to the low vaccination rate of the population, no vaccinations having been done since 1941. Mass vaccinations were carried out in all areas. Cholera appeared in epidemic form in North Arakan and Myitkyina. In April-May 1944 there were 106 cases and 61 deaths. As in the case of small-pox, mass inoculations were resorted to.

The chief diseases which were endemic were malaria, scabies, bowel diseases, chiefly dysentery and worms.

Malaria has always been, in large parts of the re-occupied areas, a serious problem. The Japanese occupation saw the almost complete disappearance of quinine and other anti-malarial drugs for the treatment of the people. The incidence of malaria in the re-occupied areas was found to have increased seriously and will call for intense medical and public health work when adequate supplies and staff to deal with the problem become available.

Lack of soap, the scarcity of clothing and lowered standards of living have contributed to create a high incidence of scabies and other skin diseases.

Dysentery as was anticipated was prevalent and due to all the factors already discussed.

Reports indicate that the incidence of venereal diseases is high. The causes are not far to seek: warbred laxity, and lack of drugs and medical men to administer treatment.

In general the Japanese have shown no concern with the health of their subject peoples except to safeguard the health of their own troops.

(9) No ADH had been posted to these HQ because War Office sanction to this post could not be obtained and planning on the Public Health side was much delayed.

In the Field medical officers have assumed Public Health and Sanitation duties in addition to their other duties.

(10) In all areas re-occupied in 1944 pre-war hospital buildings had been 100 per cent. destroyed; temporary mat and thatch buildings had to be erected.

(11) *Medical Stores and Equipment.*—A demand for medical stores on an all Burma basis had been submitted in 1943 but in view of the intention to apply the Young Working Party Estimates to CAS(B) Medical Department only a portion of the total All-Burma demand was accepted, *i.e.*, what is known as Q. 60 which covered only the Frontier Fringe Zone was sanctioned. Great delay was experienced in getting copies of the Young Working Party estimates and CAD lists without which demands could not be placed. These were however submitted complete in November 1944.

(12) The system of medical supply in January 1944 was through the Burma Supply organisation of the Civil Government of Burma. This has been changed to supply through the normal Army channels through ALPSFA medical stores. Owing to general shortage, difficulty in obtaining initial non-expendable items of medical stores was experienced. Maintenance of expendable drugs and dressings has been ample; also the supply of sera and vaccines.

(13) Ordnance stores have also been difficult to supply in required quantities in time.

(14) The activities reviewed were confined to the Frontier Fringe areas of Burma, all mountainous districts where the population consists of scattered hill people and where destitution has been marked and where small medical units and travelling dispensaries are the need rather than large static installations; hence results have not been striking.

The medical and public health problems of the populous plains loom large. Up to the end of the year 1944 no information had been received of the arrival of Young Working Party stocks from the United Kingdom. The medical stores position is causing grave concern.

81. *Relief and Labour Department.*—(1) At the beginning of the year the Welfare Department had an establishment of 1 SO I and 1 clerk. The SO I had been Director of the Civil Evacuation of Burma in 1941-42. In May 1943 in anticipation of civil distress occasioned by operations it was proposed that a Welfare organisation should be developed and the Director received orders to make plans. In June however GHQ India ruled that there would be no need to start recruitment of 'Welfare' personnel or to

open a school to train such personnel for at least a year. Thereupon the CAS(B) Welfare Department was temporarily placed in abeyance and the SO I proceeded to the Lushai Hills on supply duties.

(2) The SO I Welfare was recalled to HQ CAS(B) in October 1943 and in view of anticipated refugee and other welfare problems in Arakan, the Chin Hills and the Hukawng valley, sanction to recruit 66 officers and 120 subordinates was sought. Variations of this cadre were discussed till the end of December 1943 and no authority had been issued to enable the Welfare organisation to take concrete action. Moreover, operational forecasts on which to base Welfare plans were inadequate. Apart from information given in December 1943 regarding the immediate future in the Frontier Fringe, the only information received was to the effect that the information already given regarding the Frontier Fringe was valid till 31st December 1944 and that it was unlikely that the population beyond Kamaing in the Myitkyina District would have to be catered for before the spring of 1945 at the earliest.

Towards the end of December 1943 14 Army criticised CASB for failing to have welfare staff on the ground in the area. It was fortunate that the Welfare Department had during November and December interviewed prospective staff in various places in India. It was thus possible to assemble at short notice a party of suitable officers and subordinates who were sent to Bawle Bazaar in the first week of February 1944 for relief work.

In February 1944 the Welfare Department War Establishment which had been submitted in July 1943 was sanctioned but 'implementation' was limited to 80 per cent. of the sanctioned establishment. This W/E was in respect of the Frontier Fringe only. Experience in the field and consultation with officers in forward areas stressed the necessity for organising and training an all-Burma Welfare establishment of adequate proportions. Accordingly an all-Burma W/E of 246 officers was formulated. In August it was proposed to increase the number of officers already at work in the field to deal with two relief 'Zones'. This involved an increase in 40 officers over the all-Burma W/E of 246 officers proposed earlier. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining suitable officers financial sanction could be obtained to the recruitment of 43 officers only, the remaining posts to be filled by subordinates. As a result of the Director's visit to the UK, Italy and the Middle East a better balanced picture of what was required was apprehended and proposals were put forward for an increase to a total of 281 officers. Sanction to this was not received before the end of the year.

The War Establishment operative on 31st December 1944 was that in respect of the Frontier Fringe, namely 66 officers and 66 subordinates. The Department was however renamed Relief and Labour Department.

(3) *Welfare Training School.*—The establishment of a Training School was examined in May 1943. The proposal hung fire until February 1944 and financial sanction was given in April 1944. GHQ India however would not make suitable accommodation available, but in July His Highness the Nawab of Rampur State kindly offered his country palace at Benazeer Gardens, Rampur. The building required repairs and additions. This project was graded Priority III and there was considerable delay in the procurement of materials. The first course could not start till January 1945. Even at that date the work had not been completed nor had all essential stores been provided.

In the meantime, however, a School of Training had been improvised in Arakan where a large staff had been concentrated, and lectures were given to the staff by CASB 'General Administration' officers and by military officers.

(4) *Relief Operations.—(a) Arakan.*—On the 21st January 1944 15 Corps asked for Relief and Labour staff to deal with (a) the removal from the operational area of approximately 23,400 people, (b) the accommodation in camps of 10,000 Muslims whose villages had been burnt by the Japanese and (c) the accommodation of 1,000 Arakanese Buddhist refugees. This forecast was upset by the Japanese attack in February. By March 1944 the main problem was the accommodation in camps of evacuees from (a) the Maungdaw area, including the villages to the south, (b) the Bawle Bazaar area, which had been cleared for reasons of military security and health and (c) the Kalapanzin Valley. The Maungdaw refugees, numbering about 17,000 were accommodated at Balukhali; materials were supplied to the refugees who built their own houses on a camp plan laid down by the Relief and Labour staff. The Bawle Bazaar refugees numbering 9,000 were accommodated at a similar camp at Mromigyaung. The Kalapanzin refugees numbering about 2,500 were at first accommodated at Taung Bazaar, but the camp had to be dispersed owing to the rapid approach of the enemy. A small staging camp was set up at Goppe Bazaar for refugees coming from the Kalapanzin Valley. Paddy was requisitioned from neighbouring villages and rice supplies were obtained from Civil Affairs Supplies at Chittagong and the refugees were fed on a rationed scale. Steps were taken to find employment for the refugees to make themselves self-supporting, and by the end of the year only 1,049 remained in camps as a Relief commitment. The Relief and Labour staff released by the employment of refugees were transferred to other operational theatres or were held in readiness for operational moves on Akayab and Ramree. In addition to these camp operations, the Relief and Labour staff made a census of the population in surrounding villages, controlled stocks of grain in the area, made a census of paddy held by the villagers and sold rations to deserving persons. This Department also did valuable work in recruiting labour for 15 Corps.

(b) *14th Army.*—In February 1944, the Department was asked to deal with the evacuation of villagers from Tamu and the neighbouring villages and from Thaukdut State for operational reasons and to distribute relief supplies. Staff was sent forward and assisted in the evacuation of 930 villagers from the Tamu area. These villagers were accommodated in camps of the Government of India Refugee Organisation in Manipur assisted by CAS(B) Relief and Labour Staff. When the Japanese advanced on Imphal these refugees had to be moved to Assam. After the advance of 14 Army in October Welfare Staff moved into the Chin Hills and had set up Headquarters at Tamu; during the remaining months of the year this staff distributed food-stuffs to surrounding villages. At the end of December there were 7 Distribution Points in this area. Officers were also employed on the Tamu-Tonhe and Ahlaw-Yuwa road projects and as Supplies Officers sending supplies forward at Kohima and at the 82nd Mile Tiddim Road while other Welfare officers were in charge of convoys.

The supplies issued from Distribution Points were rice, salt, blankets, 'Peik', white yarn, coloured yarn, khaki shirts, gunnies, matches, needles, thread, loongvis for males, loongvis for females, cotton blankets.

(c) *NCAC Operational Area.*—Although there was occasion in the opinion of CASB HQ for the services of Relief and Labour officers in this area, the Commanding General did not agree to call forward personnel of the Department. The reason given was that it was undesirable to increase the number of CAS personnel in the area. Later when it was found that the work of caring for refugees was too great for the existing General Administration staff of CASB in the area, the Commanding General agreed to the calling

forward of six Supplies and Labour Officers. A curious and inexplicable inhibition over the terms "Welfare" or "Relief" appeared to exist in the mind of the Commanding General. These six officers were supplied by the Relief and Labour Department and took much of the burden off the shoulders of the overworked CASB General Administration Officers.

(5) *Women's Welfare Unit.*—The formation of a Women's Unit for welfare camps was first considered in May 1943, but nothing materialised until March 1944 when a proposal for a Burma Red Cross Unit to be attached to the Welfare Branch was canvassed. In May at a meeting in Simla with the Burma Red Cross and the Joint War Organization of the Indian Red Cross and St. John it was proposed that a Burma Red Cross Unit should be organised and financed by a loan from the Indian Red Cross Society. The Indian Joint War Organisation however was unable to lend the necessary funds to the Burma Red Cross Society but South East Asia Command sanctioned financing of the Unit under the management of the Indian Red Cross Society, the Burma Red Cross Society not being in a position to provide immediate management and control. At the end of the year 7 recruits had offered themselves for training as members of the Unit. The reason for the paucity of recruits appeared to be that Burma women in India are not disposed to submit themselves to control by the Indian Red Cross Society. Owing to delay in establishing the Welfare Training Centre at Rampur training had not started by the end of 1944.

(6) It must be stressed that the R & L Department had in many ways the most difficult task of any Department of CASB. The only previous experience in civil administration was that of the evacuation in 1942 of half a million persons from Burma. This naturally coloured the views of those officers who had directed this operation and were responsible for planning for the re-occupation of Burma. On the other hand the authority both in GHQ I and II Army Group which sanctioned CAS War establishments undoubtedly took too restricted a view of the problem awaiting the CASB. In addition the military command in the field did not give sufficient warning of the size of the problem which its operations would undoubtedly raise. This, coupled with the inability of GHQ I to make available the necessary training installation in time, prevented the Department of Relief and Labour from ever having a sufficient reserve of trained personnel to deal with an emergency for which that Department is in no way to blame.

(7) It has to be kept in mind that the Burmese villager can find in the forests and jungles of Burma all the materials for re-building his house and in an emergency most of the materials for his domestic implements and utensils and a considerable amount of equipment required for agricultural operations. Moreover, Burma, if completely isolated from the rest of the world and provided that internal communications by boat and cart were maintained, could in a relatively short time become entirely self-supporting in all the basic needs of life and work except iron and not excepting salt; that is to say provided rice, food oils and salt could be moved from surplus areas to deficit areas and provided time were given for an increase in the production of cotton, the population would become self-supporting. These considerations must therefore condition plans for relief of displaced populations. The Burman is a resilient and versatile person and it is therefore not unreasonable to assume that relief measures will only be temporary and that he will return to his normal life and occupation as soon as conditions permit. Relief problems may arise in regard to Indian and other non-Burmese communities

who may have to be accommodated and fed for considerable periods until employment is found for them. The planning of the R & L Department was not therefore susceptible of any hard and fast definition.

(8) This table shows the officer and subordinate staff sanctioned and on the ground during the year.

				Sanctioned		Actuals	
Staff				1-1-44	31-12-44	1-1-44	31-12-44
HQ .	SO I	.	.	1	1	1	1
	SO II	.	.	2*	2*	1	2*
	SO III	.	.	1	1	1	1
Field	Majors	.	.	1	1	1	1
	Capt.	.	.	1	18*	6	6*
	Licut.	.	.	25	47	39	38
Total officers				31	71	49	49
Subordinates				44	66	60	66

* Includes one Labour Officer.

A revised W/E was issued in February 1945 as follows:—

HQ	Col.	.	.	1	Field	Lt. Cols.	.	.	4
	SO I	.	.	2		Majors	.	.	16
	SO II	.	.	2		Cpts.	.	.	24
	SO III	.	.	4		Lts.	.	.	226
				11					270
									Subordinates 298.

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT.

82. There was no Education Department in CASB during the year 1st January 1944 to 31st December 1944. Educational work done in re-occupied areas was done on the initiative of DCCAOs and SCAOs under no settled policy. It is perhaps to be recorded that GHQ(I) issued orders in 1943 that the CASB would not provide any Education during the period of Military Administration. This order has been superseded by orders and plans for the provision of educational facilities during the period of Military Administration.

PUBLICITY DEPARTMENT.

83. The CASB Publicity Department was set up as part of CCAOB's headquarters on 1st September 1944. The staff and office of the Burma Government Propaganda Office were taken over as the Information Section and then loaned to Psychological Warfare Division, Forward Base SEAC. This section combined the production of psychological warfare material with translation and similar work for re-occupied areas. The Burmese weekly news-sheet "Lay Nat Tha" produced by this Section and printed and distributed (air drop being in the neighbourhood of 1,00,000 a month) by P. W. Division continued to be a conspicuous success, and many intelligence reports have been received on its popularity in occupied areas. A considerable number were also distributed by hand in liberated areas.

HQ staff worked on the preparation of War Establishments and equipment indents. Some publicity material was supplied to officers in occupied areas. During this period SO I (Publicity) divided his time between P. W. Division Forward Base in Calcutta and CAS(B) HQ in Delhi which resulted in

his being unable to do justice to both, and the activities of the Department were more directed towards propaganda to areas still occupied by the Japanese than to work in re-occupied areas. During the period under review relations with P. W. Division SEAC were close and cordial.

SUPPLIES AND INDUSTRIES DEPARTMENT.

84. *General.*—(1) The activities of this department during the year under review can be described generally as planning for the future when the whole of Burma is liberated and meeting immediate commitments as regards the northern fringe of Burma as districts became liberated during the year.

(2) As the general plan for the rehabilitation of Burma took shape, it became apparent that the tasks of the Supplies and Industries Department would comprise the importation and distribution of relief supplies of all kinds for the civil population and, possibly, the rehabilitation of certain vital industries which would be required to function during the period of Military Administration. The planning problem facing the department, therefore, became one of evolving an organisation which could perform these functions.

(3) From the outset there were certain factors to be considered which influenced the type of organisation to be set up. These were:—

(a) During the period of military administration the only method of procuring, importing and moving within Burma the large amount of relief supplies required was through military channels.

(b) It was laid down by the War Office that the responsibility for the rehabilitation of Burma rested with the Government of Burma, and that, during the period of Military Administration, the Supreme Allied Commander must limit rehabilitation activities to what was necessary for the prevention of disease and unrest amongst the civil population or for furthering the military plan.

(c) It was decided by the War Office that all organisations of the Civil Affairs Service (Burma) must form part of the Order of Battle as military units and must be organised in accordance with War Establishment and War Equipment Tables.

(4) Taking into consideration the above tasks and factors it became apparent that the Supplies and Industries Department must contain a military organisation, operating on military lines, for the import and movement within the country of relief supplies and, side by side with this, a number of civil organisation or agencies for the re-establishment of vital industries and the retail distribution of supplies to the civil population. Although for technical reasons the latter tasks required civilian organisations to handle them, these organisations would have to be based on a military War Establishment, although the personnel borne on that establishment would not necessarily hold military rank. It was on this basis that planning for the future was undertaken.

(5) Meanwhile, various areas on the northern fringe of Burma were liberated by our troops, and the immediate problem arose of supplying the civil population in these areas. Irrespective of what the plans being prepared would eventually produce, an *ad hoc* organisation was required at once to make these immediate demands. This was set up with headquarters Calcutta, and transport for its use was obtained from Army. Further details about this organisation are given below.

(6) *Relief Supplies.*—As stated, the immediate problem of supplying the civil population in what became known as the Frontier Fringe had to be undertaken early irrespective of any planning for the future. This Frontier Fringe consisted of, at first, Fort Hertz Area, the Hukawng Valley, the northern half of Myitkyina District, the Naga Hills, the Chin Hills north of Tiddim and the Kabaw Valley as far south as the line Tamu/Sittaung. In Arakan, the area for which CASB were initially responsible was the Arakan Hill Tracts and the northern part of Akyab District.

By the end of the year, this area had expanded to include, in addition to the above, the districts of Bhamo and Katha, the Upper Chindwin Valley, as far south as Kalewa and the southern part of the Chin Hills.

What was required, therefore, was an organisation capable of procuring supplies in India, moving them forward and distributing them to the population in the areas described above.

(7) The first requirement was to decide what articles were immediately and urgently required by the civil population and to make arrangements for their procurement in India. The items eventually decided upon were:—

Rice	Atta	Dhall
Salt	Milk	Cooking oil
Kerosene oil	Matches	Cloth
Blankets	Dahs	Mamooties
Umbrellas	Thread	Needles
Yarn	Vests	Soap
Iron Bars (for the manufacture of implements)		

The minimum scale per head for these commodities was decided upon by the CCAOB. This scale is shown at Appendix 15.

(8) Demands for these commodities, based on the population of areas already liberated and those which it was expected to liberate during 1944-45 were prepared and placed on GHQ(I). Amounts demanded, the issues made and the balances remaining at the end of 1944 to be carried forward to the following year are shown in tabulated form in Appendix 16.

(9) A line of communications unit was then formed with HQ at Calcutta, consisting of 33 officers, 10 senior subordinates, 6 junior subordinates and 112 clerks, etc. This unit was placed under the command of an officer of Lt.-Col.'s rank who had had previous commercial experience in Burma. The personnel of his unit consisted largely of those with similar experience. This unit established godowns in the areas concerned and also along the L of C, distributing personnel to these godowns and the focal points throughout Assam and the Frontier Fringe, and collected such transport as could be made immediately available from Army sources. The whole organisation thus formed a chain of supply from Calcutta forward. It was, in fact, a CASB, L of C organisation superimposed on the Army L of C.

(10) The officer commanding this unit was given a monthly allotment of tonnage on the L of C as arranged by CASB with the staff at 11 Army Group HQ. He then called forward commodities from Army Depots and arranged their movement forward on the L of C within the tonnage allotted to him. His officers in charge of forward godowns then distributed the supplies to the civil population either through village headmen or Welfare camps, these details being worked out in accordance with instructions received from the formations concerned. In addition to calling forward supplies from Army Depots the L of C Field Unit carried out local purchases as required from time to time in Calcutta, the commodities purchased being sent forward in the normal way within the tonnage allotment. In addition this unit took on many other tasks of an agency nature and became a very useful Civil Affairs Service link in Calcutta for anything passing through.

(11) Meanwhile, planning for the future continued at headquarters. As in the case of the immediate problem of the Frontier Fringe, it was first necessary to decide what commodities were required by the civil population of Burma.

(12) An organisation known as the Burma Supply Council was therefore set up in 1943. It consisted of a Principal Commercial Officer, a representative of the Burma Chamber of Commerce, a senior member of one of the chief importing firms in Burma, and, to assist the Council in dealing with military matters, an AQMG with the rank of Colonel. With the exception of the latter the members of the Council retained their civilian status. The functions of the Burma Supply Council were to act as a Commercial Adviser to the CCAO and in particular:—

(a) to decide what commodities were required as Relief supplies for the population of Burma in order to prevent disease and unrest; this task was completed in November 1943,

(b) to plan the retail distribution of supplies in Burma on commercial lines, and to decide what organisation was required for this and how it should be set up,

(c) to advise the CCAOB through the Supplies and Industries Department regarding all commercial and industrial matters. It was proposed, after re-occupation of Burma, that the Burma Supply Council should continue in being, expanded by the addition of representatives of the S & I Department and should continue its functions of advice and co-ordination on all industrial and commercial activities.

(13) Two events now occurred which entailed a change in the machinery of planning. Firstly, a ruling was received from the War Office to the effect that plans for the rehabilitation of Burma were to be drawn up by the Government of Burma and not the Civil Affairs Service, the latter being responsible only for implementing such portion of the Government's plans as was essential for the prevention of disease and unrest during the period of military administration. Secondly, the Report of the Young Working Party which was received only in August 1944 gave details of the entire range of supplies required as relief for the civil population of Burma. These two events thus caused the Burma Supply Council to become redundant, planning having been relegated to the Burma Government and the Report of the Young Working Party having laid down what commodities were required.

(14) The Report of the Young Working Party was accepted by the War Office as the immediate relief required for the prevention of disease and unrest during the period of military administration. The Report thus became a basis for all further planning as regards relief supplies. It covered the whole range of items considered necessary for the civil population, including agricultural implements, military machinery, food, clothing and footwear, household requirements, articles for repair to houses, fishing tackle medical supplies and veterinary supplies, etc. In this very extensive range the number of individual items ran into thousands and the tonnage required to be imported during the first six months of occupation amounted to 250,000 tons. The whole of this had now to be processed throughout as a military procurement. It had been arranged that the War Office would take advance procurement action as a result of the acceptance of the Young Working Party estimates with amendments by SACSEA and the War Office. This meant that covering demands had to be submitted through staff channels to PAO SACSEA who in turn passed the demands to PAO India who in turn would place the demands on the War Office.

Commodities had then to be called forward through the services concerned, imported into Burma and distributed to the civil population and the various agencies requiring them.

(15) The immediate problem was, therefore, to set up an organisation to carry out the procedure described above. As Army Supply channels were to be used throughout, it was obvious that a military organisation was required. After discussions with the Staff and Heads of Services at 11 Army Group HQ it was decided that the CAS(B) should provide a military staff at that HQ working in close liaison with the corresponding branch of the 11 Army Group Staff, and that it should also provide representatives with a suitable subordinate staff to work with the head of each service at 11 Army Group HQ. To handle the movement of supplies up to terminals on the L of C and the bulk distribution from those terminals CASB provided officers with the necessary staff at certain military Ordnance and Supply Depots to assist the Senior Civil Affairs Officers in forward areas to deal with their local supply problems. To provide the above personnel War Establishments were prepared and sanctioned for staff at the HQ of 11 Army Group and Field Units comprising two pools of officers and subordinate personnel which could be used as required on the L of C and in forward areas.

(16) The organisation described above covered the movement of supplies as far as terminals or, in certain cases, intermediate points on the L of C. Detailed distribution to the population in advance of these points was another problem. It can be divided into three elements.

(a) The distribution direct to the civil population in the initial stages of the comparatively few items of essential relief supplies which it had been decided to provide for the Frontier Fringe.

(b) The distribution of the much larger range of items imported in accordance with the Young Working Party's Report, either through retail shops or direct to village headmen.

(c) The distribution of technical items such as tractors, agricultural implements, veterinary stores, etc.

(17) To meet the first of the above, CASB officers placed with SCAOs in forward areas and in charge of CASB godowns at or near terminal points on the L of C proved adequate for the task as long as the items they had to deal with did not exceed the emergency relief items provided for the Frontier Fringe. For the distribution by retail sale or other methods of the far larger range of items authorised by the Young Working Party, it was decided that a civil organisation was required, and, as such, should be planned by the Government of Burma. More detailed mention of this organisation is made subsequently. The distribution of technical stores can be handled only by the civil departments concerned, *i.e.*, agriculture, veterinary, etc., and these departments were informed of what their responsibilities would be under this head.

(18) *Transport*.—When it became necessary to provide relief supplies to the population of the Frontier Fringe one of the first requirements was obviously transport. Great difficulty was experienced in obtaining this. No provision had been made for any special CASB transport and the operational requirements of the higher command made it extremely difficult for them to provide vehicles. Eventually a miscellaneous collection of load-carrying vehicles was received from the Army in March 1944 but of these 225 were withdrawn for operational reasons in May. The remaining 85 vehicles had to provide for requirements in the whole of the Frontier Fringe until very nearly the end of the year. They formed part of the L of C Field Unit described above.

(19) As it was apparent normal L of C transport could not provide transport for the distribution of relief supplies off the L of C it was decided to form special transport units as part of the Civil Affairs Service. An establishment was worked out comprising a Headquarters, 3 General Transport Companies each containing 120 load-carrying vehicles, and three Workshop Sections, one of which was to be responsible for the 2nd line maintenance of each company. This establishment was sanctioned in July and the raising of the Transport Group began, recruits being found from amongst Burmese evacuees in Calcutta and its surroundings, supplemented by local Indians. No vehicles for this Transport Group became available until November 1944. It was then possible to complete the first Transport Company for duty in forward areas and this was employed in the 14th Army area. No further companies were completed before the end of the year.

(20) Meanwhile, detailed estimates were worked out to discover the total amount of load-carrying transport that would be required both for the distribution of relief supplies throughout Burma and for the movement of indigenous products from surplus to deficit areas. This estimate amounted to a total of 3,360 load-carrying vehicles mostly of 3-ton capacity, although a small proportion of jeeps and 15-cwt. trucks was included for rough country. It became obvious, therefore, that not one but a number of CAS(B) Transport Groups would have to be raised and it was decided to raise 28 companies organised into 9 Groups. Of these it was anticipated 6 companies would be required for the Frontier Fringe and could be recruited and raised in Calcutta. Sanction to raise a 2nd Group of HQ and 3 companies was therefore obtained and recruiting began in November. It was decided that the remaining companies should be raised in Burma on a phased programme to meet requirements and, for this purpose, an establishment for an MT Training Centre and Depot was drawn up. This had not yet come into being at the end of 1944.

(21) The number and types of vehicles held by CASB for the distribution of civil supplies at the close of the year is shown at Appendix 17.

(22) *The Rehabilitation of Industries and Retail Distribution of Supplies.*—When planning was transferred to the Government of Burma various meetings were held between officials of that Government and officers of the CAS(B). As a result, the Government of Burma decided to prepare Projects for the rehabilitation of the following industries:—

Rice	Timber	Vegetables oils
Pulses	Cotton	Salt
Sugar	Hides	

(23) In addition it was agreed that the Government of Burma should set up a civil supplies agency for the retail distribution of relief supplies on a commercial basis. The Government proposed to do this by means of a consortium of firms selected on the advice of the Burma Chamber of Commerce.

(24) To handle the above Projects the Government of Burma proposed to appoint Directors whose duty it was to prepare a Project for each industry, covering a long term period of rehabilitation by the Government. The procedure agreed to was that each Project when prepared should be submitted to CCAOB who, if he decided that it was one which should be implemented during the period of military administration in the interests of preventing disease and unrest or furthering the military plan, submitted his recommendations to II Army Group HQ who in turn obtained the sanction or otherwise of the Supreme Allied Commander.

(25) In the case of those Projects accepted as a military responsibility, the Government of Burma agreed to appoint Project officers who would be military officers on the staff of the Supplies and Industries Department, charged with the task of implementing the Project during the period of military administration, under the direction of the CCAOB. This was to be done by setting up as units of the Civil Affairs Service, Agencies the personnel forming which were to be drawn from firms previously engaged in the trade concerned and selected on the advice of the Burma Chamber of Commerce. The Project Officer responsible for the retail distribution of civil supplies would be similarly charged with setting up a consortium of firms to carry out these tasks.

(26) Owing to the delays consequent on the Government of Burma having to submit many of their proposals to London for approval, very slow progress was made in setting up the Project Organisations described above. By the close of the year a number of Projects had been submitted to SEAC for approval, the only one on which a decision had been given being the Timber Project which had been rejected as not justifiable during the period of military administration. At the end of the year no Project Officers had become available and it had been impossible either to draw up the establishment for, or set up, any of the Agencies proposed.

(27) *Conclusion.*—Achievements during the year may be summed up as follows:—

(a) An organisation has been set up for the importation and movement within Burma of relief supplies and for detailed distribution to the population of the small number of emergency items decided upon for the Frontier Fringe.

(b) A beginning has been made with raising and organising transport required for the movement of supplies, and plans have been completed for future progress.

(c) Although nothing concrete has been achieved with regard to the setting up of industries and the retail distribution of supplies, it can be said that all initial planning for this aspect has been completed.

(28) Statement of Personnel at 31st December 1944.

	Officers.	BORs.	Civilian employees.
HQ	8	4	<i>nil</i>
Field Units:—			
L of C Field Unit	33	<i>nil</i>	103
Transport Unit	24	<i>nil</i>	704

FOREST DEPARTMENT.

85. (1) At the beginning of the year there was no Forest Department of CASB though there were three posts (one each of SO I, SO II and SO III) for 'Timber and Forests' in the HQ Unit under the "Supplies and Industries" Department and three posts (one SO II and two SO IIIs) under 'Forests' in the Field Unit.

(2) The SSOCA, S & I Dept. was a senior officer of the Burma Govt. Forest Dept. It was assumed that he would act as an SO 'Forests' but press of other work allowed him no time to do more than deal with occasional enquiries concerning timber and connected matters.

(3) A SO I 'Timber & Forests' was appointed on 1st August 1944 for 2 months when it was decided that a Forest Department of CASB should be formed to prepare for Forest Administration and extraction by local agencies

as distinct from exploitation on a major scale which remained the concern of the S & I Department on whom was placed the onus of foster-fathering a 'Timber Project'. This split resulted in the appointment from 1st October 1944 of a SO I (Timber) and the former SO I (Timber & Forests) was appointed SO II (Forests) against the post of that grade in the HQ Unit. This report deals purely with the Forest Administration side.

(4) The preparation of a W/E was delayed by consideration of what policy the Army Engineering Service wished to be adopted for Forest extraction. The paramount need for officers to fill general administration posts, for which the Forest officers previously serving the Burma Government were well fitted also contributed to the delay in establishing the CASB Forest Department. The W/E was not sanctioned before the close of the year.

(5) One Forest officer was obtained and posted as Forest Adviser to C.E. 15 Corps and SCAO (Forests) North Arakan, on 14th November 1944 but otherwise the re-employment of Forest personnel and the re-organisation of Forest Administration had to be left to already over-burdened G.A. SCAOs.

(6) In HQ a very considerable amount of work resulted from sundry enquiries about forests, timber and connected matters and SEAC was supplied with maps and notes of pre-evacuation timber depots, rafting stations, etc., to assist air photographic reconnaissance of these with a view to finding out something about the working and extraction of timber in areas under Japanese control. Formation CAOs and military formations have frequently received valuable assistance and co-operation from Forest Department personnel coming once more into the sphere of influence of the CASB.

AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT.

86. The activities of the Agricultural Department are embodied in Chapter V of this Report.

POSTAL DEPARTMENT.

87. This Department came into being on the 1st November 1944 and the period between 1st November 1944 and the end of the year was spent in working out the W/E and in arranging for the supply of technical equipment and books and forms necessary for CAS(B) Post Offices.

FINANCE AND ACCOUNTS.

88. The Controller of Finance and Accounts, Civil Affairs Service, Burma, submits a separate report to the Under Secretary of State for War (F. 5) War Office, London. The first report of the CFA, CAS(B) covers the period 15th February 1943—31st March 1944. The second report will cover the period April 1944—31st March 1945. The financial year dictates the period to be covered.

CHAPTER IX.

Conclusion.

89. For several reasons the formation of the Civil Affairs Staff Burma as part of GHQ India gave it an unfortunate start in life. CASB was not regarded as an integral part of the military staff of GHQ, but was rather looked on as an hermaphroditic prodigy compounded of opposing elements of Civil and Military. The dual control of Burma by the Government of

Burma *de jure*, and by the C.-in-C. India *de facto*, did much to contribute to this view. It is admitted however that at the time this dual control was inescapable; to have reversed the separation policy of the Act of 1935 by placing Burma entirely under an authority answerable to the Government of India, even though that control was exercised as a matter of military necessity through the C.-in-C. India, would have been a major political blunder. It was not until the creation of SEAC that this very controversial issue could be satisfactorily resolved. But the fact remains that, although this dual control worked for some months without getting into an administrative impasse, it entirely obscured the proper position of the Civil Affairs Staff as the British Military Administration of Burma and, as such, part of the Order of Battle of the forces operating in Burma.

90. It was doubtless this nebulous aspect of Civil Affairs which prevented GHQ India from providing experienced military officers with staff training to guide the first footsteps of Civil Affairs in A and Q matters down the right staff channels, so that it could be organised domestically in all respects as part of the military machine. The alternative devised of setting up a section, MO 7, in GHQ did not assist but rather tended to push Civil Affairs Staff officers (then entirely recruited from civilians) further into the cold as uninitiates. This is shown by the fact that the CCAO was never asked to attend the daily conferences on operations at GHQ, and he could only obtain a knowledge of what was happening in the field by inquiries which at times appeared to be unwelcome.

91. Another factor which contributed to the anomalous position of CASB was the long deferred decision of the War Office on the question whether civilians brought into CASB were to be commissioned or not, and the cognate question of what type of commission they should hold. Nearly all the servants of the Government of Burma worked in CASB in uniform without being commissioned for several months; some for as long as 21 months. The CCAO himself, whose appointment as a Major General was sanctioned by the War Office by name on February 15th 1943, was not gazetted to a commission in the ABRO until November 1944. (It was as well that the source of pay of these officers was not through normal Military channels!) This not only created a feeling of frustration but made these officers feel that they were not really part of the military machine.

92. Not enough was done to bring home to all combatant formations the fact that CASB was a military service. Two incidents prove this. As late as February 1944 a Corps Commander was asking in no unmeasured terms why the Government of Burma had not provided a proper civil medical staff in a forward area with proper supplies of medical equipment and stores, while at the other end of Burma in November 1944 a divisional commander asked what the Government of Burma was doing to send in civil administrators when temporary shortage of CAS officers occurred in the rear portion of his divisional area. There is thus less blame for the point of view of the platoon commander in Arakan into whose lines a junior Anglo-Burman CAS officer managed to escape, clad only in a vest and shorts when overrun by the Japanese in Taung Bazaar. The CASB officer explained who he was, to be told "Civil Affairs? Never heard of them. If you are a civilian what are you doing in the front line? I have a good mind to shoot you as a spy." This in fact very nearly happened.

93. It is to be recorded however that during 1944 a very considerable change, which was most marked after ALFSEA took over, occurred. Both in ALFSEA HQ and in commands in the field it was recognised that the

presence of CAS officers was essential during operations, whatever might have been the grade of priority allotted to the provision of such officers by SEAC allocation committee. CA Staff Officers were kept fully in the picture of their Commanders' intentions and were consulted on all matters affecting the civil population. Co-operation with other branches of the staff was also vastly improved as those branches learnt of the very extensive assistance that CAS could give them and to an increasing extent those branches rendered assistance to CASB.

94. Such success as has been achieved in Civil Affairs in Burma is due largely to the unremitting hard work of Civil Affairs Officers in the field, and also at HQ. With insufficient equipment and clerical assistance, with very little regular transport they have endeavoured to do all in their power not only to assist the military effort but also to do all that was humanly possible for the peoples of Burma. Both were their plain duty, but this duty was rendered under very severe handicaps; it is to their credit that these handicaps were cheerfully borne without discouragement.

! (Sd.) C. F. B. PEARCE,
Major-General.

Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma.

Adv. HQ. ALFSEA;
10th May 1945.

APPENDIX 2.

Brief Note on Burma.

I.—PHYSIOGRAPHY.

(1) Burma is bounded by the Bay of Bengal, Bengal and Assam on the west, Tibet on the north and Yunnan, French Indo-China and Thailand on the east. It is part of the sub-continent of Indo-China. This sub-continent comprises a series of great river valleys, notably the Mekong, the Salween and the Irrawaddy all running approximately north-south and separated from one another by mountain ranges and plateaux. In Burma the most notable river apart from the Irrawaddy (with its main tributary the Chindwin) and the Salween is the Sittang.

(2) The Irrawaddy Valley constitutes Burma proper. This river whose headwaters, the Mali and the N'Mai, rise in the mountains of Tibet and form their confluence 26 miles north of Myitkyina, flows south to the neighbourhood of Mandalay and then bears westwards and again south, being shortly joined by the Chindwin, which flows south from the Hukawng Valley. Between the upper Irrawaddy and the Chindwin is a region of wooded hills in the north and of open, scrubby, rolling country further south in the Shwebo District. The lower Irrawaddy pursues its way southwards to form the vast delta below Henzada. East of the lower Irrawaddy the Sittang, rising in the Shan Hills south-east of Mandalay, carries the original line of the upper Irrawaddy, and flows parallel to the lower Irrawaddy to the sea in the Gulf of Martaban. Between the lower Irrawaddy and the Sittang are, to the north, open country, and farther south the wooded hills known as the Pegu Yoma which in their descent to the sea form the laterite ridge, at the southern extremity of which stands Rangoon, the capital and chief port of the country.

(3) On the west, north and east of the Irrawaddy and the Sittang Valleys are ranges of hills; on the west the Arakan Yoma, the Chin Hills, and the Naga Hills whose ranges vary from about 3,000 to 8,000 feet above sea level with occasional peaks of 10,000 or so; on the north the mountains of Tibet, where even the passes are well over 10,000 feet; on the east the Kachin Hills and the plateau of the Shan States and Karenni, averaging 3,000 feet above the sea level. The whole mountain system, consisting of north-south offshoots of the Tibetan mountain-mass, forms a horse-shoe of hills isolating Burma proper from its neighbours.

The Shan plateau is grooved by the Salween river, which enters the sea below Moulmein; the Shan States of Burma extend east of the Salween, and the Mekong forms their boundary with French Indo-China.

(4) West of the Arakan Yoma the coastland along the Bay of Bengal known as Arakan, is politically and racially part of Burma; and south of the Salween estuary Burma includes also a narrow strip of coast, 400 miles long, between the sea and the Thai frontier, ending at Victoria Point at the mouth of the Pakchan River. Both Arakan and Tenasserim are difficult of access from the Irrawaddy Valley.

(5) The total area of the country is about 260,000 square miles.

II.—CLIMATE.

(6) Burma is for the greater part within the tropics, lying roughly between the 28th and 10th degrees of latitude; it lies between the 93rd and 103rd degrees of longitude. There is a well-defined rainy season, from the middle of May to the middle of October, when the south-west monsoon blows; rain at other seasons is rare. The coastal regions of Arakan and Tenasserim and the mountains of the extreme north have a rainfall of about 200 inches a year; the Irrawaddy delta has about 100 inches; the hills of the west and east average about 80. The Arakan Yoma cuts off central Burma from the monsoon and this area, known as the Dry Zone, has only from 25 to 45 inches.

(7) The hottest season comes immediately before the rain begins; a shade temperature of about 100 degrees may then be expected in the Irrawaddy delta while the Dry Zone runs to a few degrees over 100. In the coolest months, December and January, the temperature in Southern Burma may fall to the neighbourhood of 60 degrees minimum, and in the Dry Zone to less than 50. In the hills temperatures are lower and ground frost occurs in the cold weather.

(8) The delta and the coastlands are extremely humid at all times of year.

III.—POPULATION.

(9) The total population in 1941 of nearly 17,000,000 gives Burma the fourth place among the units of the British Commonwealth of Nations in regard to population, only India, the United Kingdom and Nigeria numbering more. The population is however, sparse; the average density is only 65 per square mile as compared with 295 in India; even the most crowded districts—Maubin, Henzada and Hanthawaddy, the rice-lands of the Irrawaddy delta—had in 1931 a density of only 226, 220 and 212 persons per square mile; while five districts had less than 20, viz., the Chin Hills 17, Myitkyina 14, Upper Chindwin 14, Karenni 13, and the Arakan Hill Tracts 11.

(10) The mass of population is rural. Rangoon with a population of half a million, was by far the largest town; the next largest, Mandalay, had only 163,000 in 1941. No other town had as many as 70,000 inhabitants and in only 14 were there over 20,000 in 1931.

(11) In religion Buddhism predominates, 84 per cent. of the total population in 1931 being Buddhists; the next highest group is the Animists; no other religion could claim more than 600,000 adherents. The Christians the majority of whom were Karens by race and Baptist by sect, totalled a little over 300,000.

(12) Roughly half the male population of Burma in 1931 was literate and about 14 per cent. of the female population; these rates compare favourably with those of the provinces of India, the highest rate among which is only 1·8 per cent. for men and 0·32 per cent. for women in the case of Bengal. The rate of literacy in English is, however, a good deal lower. Literacy for Census purposes implies ability to read and write a letter.

(13) By tradition every Buddhist youth should spend a period in a *kyaung* learning not only Buddhist scriptures but also reading and writing in Burmese and arithmetic. In practice the period spent in the *kyaung* now-a-days is for many only nominal and education is sought by them in secular schools, but the *pongyi kyaung* remains the source of education of the mass of the rural population. Schools in Burma fell into three types, English, Anglo-Vernacular and Vernacular. English and Anglo-Vernacular Schools were either Government maintained or Government aided. The latter included the Mission Schools and the National Schools which were set up twenty years ago, to counter the westernising influence of Government and Mission Schools but which in fact pursued the same forms of instruction. Vernacular education was controlled by District School Boards which made grants to aided schools and maintained also their own schools. All schools in receipt of public funds were subject to inspection by the Education Department.

(14) Although the degree of literacy is theoretically high, the standard of education is low. This is due to the withdrawal of pupils as soon as they become old enough to be useful in some form of employment; thus in 1933-34 there were 258,941 pupils in the lowest standard of vernacular schools but only 69,856 in the second standard and a rapidly decreasing number in the higher standards. The number of literates among the hill peoples is particularly low. Literacy in English is a rare accomplishment.

(15) Higher education was provided at the University of Rangoon, which had four constituent colleges in Rangoon, viz., University College, Judson College, Teachers' Training College and Medical College as well as an Agricultural College at Mandalay. The number of students was about 2,000.

(16) About 70 per cent. of the indigenous population speak Burmese or one of the other languages of the Burma Group as the mother tongue, while about 70 per cent. of the remaining indigenous inhabitants speak Burmese with facility.

IV.—RACES AND RELIGION.

(17) *Burmese*.—The Burmese proper, who in 1931 numbered 8,506,031 settled in the Dry Zone of Central Burma in the ninth century, and there may be found the sites of their former capitals—Pagan, Ava, Amarapura, Mandalay. In the eleventh century independent Burmese states were welded into one kingdom by King Anawratha (1044-57) whose capital was Pagan. Anawratha extended his control over the Irrawaddy delta and the Tharion district as well as over the hills east of the Sittang Valley and was responsible for the introduction into Central Burma of the Hinayana form of Buddhism in place of the Mahayana which is regarded by the Burmese as less pure. Pagan, to-day one of the famous ruined cities of the world, remained the capital till the thirteenth century when the Mongols over-threw the kingdom occupying Pagan itself in 1287. Burma then disintegrated into small principalities until in the

sixteenth century the kings Tabinshwehti (1531-50) and Bayinnaung (1550-81) re-established unity which lasted generally till the early eighteenth century. Then the Mons of the Irrawaddy delta regained their independence and also overcame much of the Dry Zone, till Alaungpaya chief of the Shwabo area, rallied the Burmese, and in the years 1752-53 re-established a united kingdom. His dynasty lasted till 1855. During the first part of this period the kingdom reached its widest extent and came to include the whole of modern Burma together with Manipur and a part of Assam. War with the British in 1824, 1852 and 1885 resulted in the piecemeal annexation of the kingdom.

(18) The Dry Zone remains the true home of the Burman. In 1931 of 8½ million Burmans 4½ lived in the Magwe, Mandalay and Sagaing Divisions. The increase in the number of Burmans in Lower Burma is a development of the last hundred years, consequent on the development of the large scale rice industry.

(19) By religion the Burmese are almost exclusively Buddhist. Officially Buddhism teaches that it is a misfortune to be born and to live in the world at all. The object of life is to store up merit by good living, so that a man will not be reborn in this world or in any of the spirit worlds but will attain to Nirvana, where self-consciousness ceases. The Buddha, who lived five hundred years before Christ, was moved by the suffering he saw in the world; and taught that the suffering was caused by desire, greed, lust, selfishness and attachment, and that to become free from it man must follow the eight-fold path of right views, right aims, right speech, right behaviour, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration. This highly moral teaching is also summed up in the five great precepts binding on all Buddhists; not to take any life not to commit any sexual crime, no to steal, not to lie, not to drink any intoxicating liquor.

(20) Buddhists do not believe in a God, nor do they believe in the existence of a soul in man. There is therefore no practice of worship among them. The image of Buddha in a Pagoda is not worshipped; the Buddhist fixes his eye on it only as an aid to meditation.

(21) Belief in re-incarnation is very strong among Burma Buddhists, and it is commonly believed that by killing an animal or insect a man may be killing a friend or relative from a previous life.

(22) Many Burmans combine Buddhism with a belief in Animism and take care to propitiate spirits or nats. They also fear the ghosts of the dead. It is common to see shrines placed in exceptionally large trees for the benefit of the *nats* of the tree.

(23) In theory, then, the Burman is a teetotaler and vegetarian, but in practice the villager drinks liquor, especially the fermented juice of the toddy-palm or rice-spirit, and the townsman drinks western spirits if he can afford them; and though rice is the staple food ngapi or salted fish is normally eaten with it, and mutton or chicken not uncommonly. There is an aversion to eating beef and in former days to eat it was a serious crime. This arises from the circumstance that Buddhism is an offshoot of Hinduism. Tobacco is universally smoked; opium is used in the hill areas as a preventive of malaria, but its use is condemned by Burmans generally.

(24) The Burman is devoted to his religion, and the *phongyi* or monk is a highly influential person. Unfortunately the attitude of neutrality in matters of religion adopted by the British Government has destroyed the control formerly exercised through the *Thathanabaing* (or 'Archbishop') over the church, and indiscipline has crept into the *sangha* or order of monks. Many laymen assume the yellow robe and shaven head who are not entitled to do so and some of the *kyauungs* or monasteries had become refuges for criminals, who were sure of finding shelter there and of receiving food from the pious. Of late years not a few of the younger *pongyis* had shown a disposition to take to politics, though it is generally held that the Buddhist law forbids this. The great majority of *pongyis* were and are pious and virtuous members of their order and deserve the respect which is accorded them. Generally the pseudo-*pongyis* are to be found in the towns, especially Rangoon and Mandalay and are but rarely met in the villages.

(25) Although Buddhism is an offshoot of Hinduism, it does not admit the principle of caste, and caste distinctions are unknown to the Burman, although it is true that in former days the class of pagoda slaves were outside the pale of normal Burmese life, and fishermen as takers of life, are still today regarded as inferior human beings. There is almost a complete absence of class consciousness among Burmans.

(26) In character the Burman is as a rule easy-going, generous and impulsive. He is commonly regarded as lazy, but actually he works hard when necessary; the circumstances of his agricultural life, which requires intensive efforts during and immediately after the rainy season and make cultivation impossible at other seasons.

accounts for his reputation. His impulsiveness and the universal habit of carrying a *dah* or large knife, which is really an essential tool but which can also be a weapon, account for the high incidence of violent crime.

(27) The Burman is a firm believer in magic, and is convinced that invulnerability against wounds can be conferred by magical rites, notably by certain patterns of tattooing.

(28) The mass of people had little interest in political and party conflicts. Not a few tended to regard the politician as an upstart. There was a lingering nostalgia for the days of the kings, which vented itself in the past in the support given freely to any *minlaung* (pretender king) who raised a claim, as happened every few years.

(29) Agriculture is the primary industry and the Burmese are essentially a rural people, living in the villages and jungles, and the majority have the simple unsophisticated outlook of those who live close to the soil.

(30) The Burmese costume consists of a *longyi* or skirt, an *ringyi* or jacket, and for the men a *gawngbaung* or turban. The dress of the women is similar to that of men except that the jacket is more tightly fitting and the longyi is tied in a different manner. The *longyi* and *gawngbaung* are, on gala days of bright coloured silks. Educated Burmans of late years tended to adopt European costume. Formerly the air was worn long by men and was fastened in a knot on the top; now-a-days this hair style becomes less and less common.

(31) The normal Burmese house is of timber or bamboo, raised on piles as a protection against floods and animals; the space beneath is used as a store house or a cattle shed. Furniture is simple; a low platform serves as a sleeping place for the whole household, and as a rule everyone sits on the floor.

(32) *Arakanese* are closely related to the Burmese proper, though their form of the Burmese language varies from the language of the Irrawaddy Valley, notably in the retention of the 'R' sound which in Burmese proper has been replaced by 'Y'. There is probably a good deal of Bengali blood in the Arakanese. By religion they are Buddhists.

In the hills of Arakan live a variety of races—Chins, Dainjets, Mro, Taungtha, Kami, most of Tibeto-Burma stock—somewhat primitive in their way of life.

(33) *Tavoyans* and *Merguense* numbering 156,507 and 95,453 respectively in 1931, are Burmese who, owing to their isolation in the valleys of Tenasserim speak a definite dialect. There is probably an admixture of Siamese blood in them. In the south of Tenasserim are found also a small number of Malays and Salons, or sea gypsies, who are related to the Malays.

(34) *Mons*.—The Mons, or the Talaings as the Burmese call them, are the principal Burma branch of the mon-Khmer. They settled in the Irrawaddy delta and what are now known as the Thaton and Amherst Districts. They struggled for many centuries to maintain their independence against the Burmese and were not finally overcome till the time of Alaungpaya. After the British occupation of Tenasserim in 1824-36, many Mons fled there, leaving the Irrawaddy delta almost depopulated. Like the Burmese, the Mons are Buddhists and the great Shwe Dagon Pagoda of Rangoon was originally built by them. They have now been largely absorbed by the Burmese and are not in practice distinguishable from them.

(35) *Shans*.—The Shan States of Burma occupy principally the plateau east of the Irrawaddy and Sittang Valleys, south of the Bhamo District and north of Karenni. Their total area is about 56,000 sq. miles and their population in 1941 was 1,616,971, giving 28 to the sq. mile. The Shans are, however, scattered all over northern Burma and are found in some numbers in the Tenasserim Division. There are two small Shan States, ruled by their own chiefs, in the Upper Chindwin Valley, viz., Thaungdut and Singkaling Hkamti and a group of eight states, known collectively as Hkamti Long, in the Putao region. The major group of states number thirty-two, varying in size from states such as Kyong of 24 sq. miles, to Kengtung with 12,000 sq. miles. These states were formed into a Federation in 1922, with a Commissioner at its head directly answerable to the Governor. They lay outside the sphere of the Legislature and Ministry of Burma proper. The Federal Council of Chiefs advised the Commissioner who administered the principal Departments of Government, such as Forests and Public Works; otherwise each chief administered his own state according to customary law.

These States are legally British territory and their relation to the British Government is not, as in the case of the Indian States dependent on treaty; but the ancient method of government by chiefs has been maintained. The chiefs rank in three

grades, those with greatest powers being known as Sawbwas, the middle grade as Myosas and those with the least power as Ngwegunhmus. On accession each chief is given a Sanad or order of appointment and his position is dependent on good government and behaviour.

The Shans entered Burma in the thirteenth century. Being a branch of the Thai race, they call themselves Thai (meaning perhaps free). This race spread over northern Burma and into Assam where they found the Ahom in 1929; they also occupied Siam (Thailand). The names Shan, Assam, Siam are etymologically connected. A close connection subsists today between one of the Southern Shan States and Thailand; thus members of the family of the Kengtung Sawbwa have been educated at Bangkok.

Like the Burmese, the Shans are essentially rural and agricultural and are also Buddhists. They have a distinctive costume, the men wearing loose trousers, called baung-bis, an eingyi and a gaungbaung which is much bigger than the Burmese turban. Often a broad brimmed hat of bamboo is worn. The Shan women dress much as Burmese women do.

The Shans are hospitable and friendly folk, great hunters and gamblers and are easy to deal with. In 1931 the number of Shans proper, as distinct from other Thai, was 900,204.

The Shan States are not inhabited exclusively by Shans. Among the minor peoples who are found there are representatives of the Tibeto-Burman and Mon-Khmer stocks as well as of the Tai. There are such interesting races as the Mon-Khmer Padaungs, whose home borders on Karenni and whose women wear the brass rings which give them giraffe-like necks; the Palaungs, also Mon-Khmer and closely related to the Wa, who are found in the Northern Shan States, principally in Tawngpeng, and whose women wear blue jackets, skirts, and gaiters, with red collars and cane hoops round the waist, a costume supposed to represent the appearance of their dragon ancestor; the Intha, the leg-rowers of Inle lake who are closely related to the Burmese; the Tai Chinese, Taungthus, whose women wear black clothes and turbans adorned with silver ornaments; the Hkun, the Leu and the Lem of Kengtung state who are of Tai stock; the Kaw Lahu and Musho of Lolo stock who also live in Kengtung. A number of the Shan Sawbwas belong to these subsidiary races; thus the Kengtung Chief is a Hkun, the Tawngpeng chief a Palaung. In the north-east of the Shan States, the Kokang area is inhabited almost exclusively by Chinese who have their own Myosa.

(36) *Karens* of Tai Chinese origin fall into two main groups, the Pwo, generally found in Tenasserim and much mixed with the Mons, and the Sgaw found in Karenni and the Irrawaddy delta. Those of Karenni are known as Red Karens, hence the name of their hills. Karenni consists of three states, Bawlake, Kantarawadi and Kyebogyi, each ruled by a Myosa; their total area is about 4,000 sq. miles. These three states are not British territory but stand in treaty relationship with the Crown. The great majority of Karens have spread from the hills into the Irrawaddy delta and the Tenasserim Division. They form one of the most important minorities in Burma and communal tension between them and the Burmans is not unknown. By religion the Karen of the hills are mostly Animists but those of the plains are, in the majority, Buddhists; Christianity has made some progress among them, partly owing to their tradition, perhaps derived ultimately from an Hebraic source, that Y'Wa, the Creator, entrusted to His youngest son, a white man, a silver and gold book to be taken to His eldest son, the Karen; the book is identified by many with the Bible.

In Karenni and the neighbouring hills as in the Shan States is a great variety of races, mainly of Mon-Khmer stock, such as Bre(k), Bwe, Padaung, Yimbaw, Yintale and the curious Banyok of whom only six families remain owing to their marked distaste for marriage to which they submit only under official compulsion.

(37) *Kachins*.—The original name of the race known as Kachins is Jinghpaw. The word Jinghpaw is probably of Tibetan origin (sin-po—a cannibal) and this name was probably given by the civilised Tibetans to the wild, semi-nomadic border tribes who when on the war path may have in those remote days practised cannibalism. The name, given originally as a reproach by a higher tribe, assumed the dignity of a generic term and racial designation. The opprobrious name Kachin—said to be derived by the Burmans from the Chinese Ye jein (wild man)—is now gradually accepted by Europeans as a generic term describing the Jinghpaws. Jinghpaw is the racial name for the tribes known as the Hkakhkus, Gauris, Lashis, Marus, Atsis and Nungs as well as the Jinghpaws proper.

The Jinghpaws according to their own history, descended from the Central Tibetan Plateau about 1,200 years ago by way of the N'Mai and Mali Valleys. They have now descended as far down as the Kengtung state though they are mainly concentrated

in the hills of Myitkyina, Bhamo and Katha Districts and in the Northern Shan States. The Jinghpaws practise shifting cultivation which is bound up with their Animism and customs. A small percentage of the race is Christian but in the main a form of Animism prevails amongst the people.

The five parent tribes of the Jinghpaws are generally recognised as the Lahpai, Lahtawng, Marip, Maran and M'Hkum. These tribes are not usually found in particular areas as they are scattered through the hills; but there are considerable groups of Lahpais in the South Triangle, of Marips in the Kamaing and Hukawng Valley tracts, and of N'Hkums in the North Triangle. The Triangle is the country between the Mali and the N'Mai rivers.

The true Jinghpaws far outnumber all other members of the group (*i.e.*, Marus, Lashis, etc.), and are both morally and intellectually the more advanced at the present time. It is true, however, that the Lashis and the Nungs are both making very rapid progress towards a standard much higher than that achieved by the Jinghpaws. These two groups are more industrious than the innately lazy Jinghpaws and their efforts are likely to place them foremost in the group. The whole of the Jinghpaw group, as would be expected from its disturbed and aggressive past, takes readily to army service and fights well. Jinghpaws have in the present war shown themselves equal as fighting men to any of the other groups in the army. Feuds are still carried on in the northern hills though slavery generally prevalent up to 1927, has now been suppressed.

The Jinghpaws have never in the past had a written language though they have in common with Karens and other hill tribes, a vague tradition regarding a 'Parchment Book' lost long ago. Various officials and missionaries have in the past fifty years built up a written language.

Jinghpaw itself belongs to the Turanian class of languages and its grammar agrees in the main with the dialects of the Burman family; but it does not bear the close similarity to Burmese of the Atsi, Lashi, Maru and Nung dialects.

In the hill tracts of Putao and Htawgaw areas the Yawyin or Lisu tribe is found. Some Jinghpaws claim the Lisus as distant relatives; but the Lisus regard themselves as an offshoot from the Chinese. The Lisu language is entirely dissimilar to those of the Burmese group; and their customs are undoubtedly Chinese. They practise shifting cultivation and are skilled in the use of the cross-bow with poisoned arrows.

All the Jinghpaw tribes are ruled by chiefs or headman in their customary manner. A form of indirect rule, carried out by chiefs and headmen in accordance with the ancient institutions of the tribes has operated very successfully in the hills of northern Burma.

(38) *Nagas*.—The Nagas, who are related to the Chins and the Kachins, inhabit the hills of the north-east of Burma, around the Hukawng Valley and west of the Chindwin River. This is almost the wildest of all the regions of Burma and most of it was brought under administration only in 1940: the practices of head-hunting and human sacrifice are still pursued by some of the tribes. The Nagas live by the usual shifting hillside cultivation, but the production of paddy is scarcely sufficient for their needs; maize and vegetables are also grown; cows and buffaloes are scarce and even fowls are limited in number.

The villages are built, for security on hill-tops, and water has often to be brought long distances to them from the valleys.

Every village has a Love House, in which the young couples foregather; pregnancy is always followed by a public admission of marriage. There is also in each village a Men's Club used as a Council Chamber by the elders of the village. Entrance of outsiders into either of these houses is a grievous offence.

In religion the Nagas are Animists, and sacrificial ceremonies play a large part in their economy; these ceremonies are necessary principally at the opening of the season of cultivation about September when the crops are coming up and at harvest time. Sacrifices of animals and in some cases of human beings are made at these times, and also at other times so as to ward off sickness. At these times visitors are unwelcome and a branch of a tree is placed at the entrance of the village as a warning not to approach. Naga weapons are spears and bows and arrows, often poisoned. 'Panjis' or bamboo spikes hardened by fire and capable of penetrating the sole of a boot, and often poisoned are sunk in the ground near villages; and stone shutes are erected over narrow paths and are let loose on approaching enemies.

Feuds between villages are common.

Many Nagas, living close to civilization have adopted a variety of Shan costume, but in remote villages little is worn except a blanket.

(39) *Chins*.—The principal Chin clans of the Tiddim area are the Thado, Kamhow, Sakte and Siyin. The Thado however are more numerous, across the Assam border where they are known as the Kukis.

The Falam Chins are the Hsentang Zhotung, Lawhtu, Vamtu, Haka, Yokwa, Klang Klang, Bwal and Kwalingtlang.

The Siyin Chins are the most highly civilised of the groups.

A wide variety of languages and dialects is spoken and the language of one village may be unintelligible to a village a few miles away. In general, Kamhow is understood in the north, Laizo in the centre and Lai in the south.

The clans are governed by their own chiefs under supervision.

In the hills behind Pakokku are the Chin Boks, who fall into four clans, the Nedu, Men, Hneyun and Ra. The Chin Bok women have tattooed faces. In the true Chin Hills villages are large, as many as 500 houses in some cases; the Chin Bok villages run to only fifteen or twenty houses; and whereas in the Chin Hills clans are ruled by chiefs the Chin Bok village as a rule comprises one family whose head is the headman of the village.

(40) *Was*.—The Was are found on the frontier between the Shan States and Yunnan, principally in the area known as the Wa States, an extremely hilly district bordered on the west by the Salween River and the Shan State of Manglun. The Was are of Mon-Khmer origin but are the most primitive of the people of Burma. Head hunting is regarded as necessary for their fertility rites at ploughing time and in an average year sixty to a hundred heads will be taken in the area. Village feuds are common. The people are suspicious and unfriendly to strangers but at certain places there are bazaars every five days and these are treated as neutral ground. The Was are experts at building stockades and using booby traps and panjis. Rows of skulls are placed in avenues near their villages.

In the same area live the Loi-La among other groups. They are probably of the same stock; some of them are Buddhists but most are Animists who have replaced human sacrifice by animal sacrifice.

Was who have settled in Manglun and Kengtung are known as Tamo Was; they have abandoned head-hunting.

The frontier between China and Burma in this region remained undetermined until attempts to investigate mineral potentialities led to clashes, not so much with the Was as with bandits from Yunnan. The Iselin Commission of the League of Nations determined the boundary, though agreed between H.M.G. and the Chinese Government it has not been demarcated. The Wa States were brought under administration after the Commission's award was made.

(41) *Indo-Burmans*.—The Census term—Indo-Burman—includes the Zerbadis, Arakan Muslims, Arakan Kamans and the Myedus. The Zerbadis are the offspring of marriages between Indian Muslims and Burmese women; most of them are Muslims. The Arakan Muslims found mainly in Akyab district are the descendants of Chittagonian Muslims and Arakanese women; they are known in Burma as Yakhaing Kala (Arakan Indian). Arakan Kamans profess to be descendants of the followers of Shah Shuja brother of Aurangzeb, who fled to Arakan in 1660. The Myedus are descendants of Indian Muslims who were taken prisoner at various times and were settled at Myedu in Shwabo District.

In Arakan are also found the Maghs, who were descendants of Arakanese men and Chittagonian women; they are invariably Buddhists. The term Magh (or Mug) is somewhat misleading as in Chittagong it is used in reference to Arakanese Buddhists. In the Census return it invariably is used in the sense common in Burma and the Maghs are entered under Indians.

(42) Full statistics regarding Population, Trade and Industries produce and finance of Burma will be found in the 'Burma Handbook' published in 1943 by the Government District.

APPENDIX 3.

Text of Proclamations.

PROCLAMATION No. 1 OF 1944.

MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

1. I, Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten, GCVO., CB., DSO., ADC., Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, do hereby declare that until further notice I assume for myself and successors full judicial, legislative, executive and administration responsibilities in regard to all the territories of Burma now or at any time occupied by the Forces under my command and exclusive jurisdiction over all persons and properties therein.

2. I delegate to the military officer for the time being holding the appointment of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, full authority to conduct on my behalf the military administration of the civil population in the said territories, subject always to any orders and directions which I may issue from time to time. And for this purpose the said Chief Civil Affairs Officer is authorised to delegate sufficient powers to any officers under his command.

(Signed) LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN,
Supreme Allied Commander,
South East Asia.

Dated this 1st day of January 1944.

PROCLAMATION No. 2 OF 1944.

Maintenance of Order.

I, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, in exercise of the authority vested in me by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, hereby PROCLAIM:

ARTICLE 1.

Laws.—The provisions of all laws in force in Burma on the 31st day of December, 1943, shall be deemed to remain in force except in so far as they may be suspended, varied or supplemented by this or any subsequent Proclamation or by Regulations or Orders made under the authority of any such Proclamation.

ARTICLE 2.

Courts.—All courts and tribunals existing on the 31st day of December, 1943, shall cease to exercise the jurisdiction and powers then vested in them, and except as I may otherwise from time to time direct, jurisdiction and powers of a like kind thereto shall, as from the 1st day of January, 1944, be exercised by corresponding courts and tribunals hereby established by me.

All such courts and tribunals shall have jurisdiction over all offences under any Proclamation, Regulation or Order.

No person shall act as judge or magistrate or otherwise exercise judicial powers in any capacity unless appointed by me or under my authority.

ARTICLE 3.

Jurisdiction.—The jurisdiction of any court or tribunal shall not extend over members of the British or Allied Forces or over those persons of enemy nationality who, if captured, would be entitled to be treated as prisoners of war:

Provided that any person who is employed by, or is in the service of, or is accompanying any part of the said Forces, shall be tried for any offence under any Proclamation, Regulation or Order by a court or tribunal established under this Proclamation, unless the local commander by general or special order directs that he be tried by court-martial.

ARTICLE 4.

Confirmation of Death Sentences.—No sentence of death imposed by any court or tribunal for any offence shall be put into execution unless and until it be confirmed in writing by me or by an officer authorised by me in that behalf.

ARTICLE 5.

Petition and Review.—There shall be no appeal from the decision of any court or tribunal.

Any person sentenced to death or transportation or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years may lodge with the court or tribunal, within 15 days of his conviction a petition addressed to me against his conviction or sentence or both.

A Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, a Civil Affairs Officer in charge of a district or the Legal Adviser may at any time call for the record of any case for the purpose of review.

ARTICLE 6.

Proceedings.—The record in every case which results in a sentence of death shall forthwith be transmitted to me or as I may direct.

The record in every other case in which is filed any such petition as is mentioned in Article 5 shall, together with such petition, forthwith be transmitted to me or as I may direct.

Upon a consideration of the record and of such petition (if any) as is mentioned in Article 5, an order may be made confirming the finding and sentence, or quashing the conviction, or reducing, enhancing or varying the sentence, or ordering retrial by another court or tribunal.

ARTICLE 7.

Proceedings to be Public.—The proceedings of every court and tribunal shall be public except when, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the court or tribunal orders otherwise in the interest of justice or of military security.

ARTICLE 8.

Administrative Provisions.—All persons who, in Burma, on the 31st day of December, 1943, were lawfully exercising and discharging administrative powers and duties under the authority of the Governor of Burma shall, subject to such directions as may from time to time be given by me or under my authority, continue to exercise and discharge the administrative powers and duties with which they were then entrusted.

C. F. B. PEARCE,

MAJOR-GENERAL,

Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma.

Dated this 1st day of January 1944.

PROCLAMATION No. 3 of 1944.

LAWS AMENDMENT (No. 1).

I, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, in exercise of the authority vested in me by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, hereby PROCLAIM:

ARTICLE 1.

This Proclamation may be cited as the Laws Amendment (No. 1) Proclamation, 1944.

ARTICLE 2.

The operation of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Rule 24A of the Defence of Burma Rules shall be deemed to be suspended.

C. F. B. PEARCE,

MAJOR-GENERAL,

Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma.

Dated this 8th day of March 1944.

PROCLAMATION No. 4 of 1944.

THE GAZETTE.

I, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, in exercise of the authority vested in me by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, hereby PROCLAIM:

ARTICLE 1.

Short Title.—This Proclamation may be cited as *The Gazette Proclamation, 1944.*

ARTICLE 2.

Establishment of the Gazette.—A publication to be known as *The Gazette* shall be issued from time to time and shall contain copies of all Proclamations, Regulations and Orders relating to Burma issued by or under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, and of such public notices and other documents as may be thought fit.

ARTICLE 3.

(1) *The Gazette to be Prima Facie Evidence.*—The production of a copy of *The Gazette* containing any Proclamation, Regulation, Order or other document purporting to be published by or under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, shall be *prima facie* evidence in all Courts and Tribunals and for all purposes of the due making and contents of such Proclamation, Regulation, Order, or other document.

(2) *Publication in the Gazette to Constitute Notice.*—All persons in the territories of Burma now or at any future time occupied by the Forces under the Command of the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, shall be deemed to have notice of all documents published in *The Gazette*.

C. F. B. PEARCE,

MAJOR-GENERAL,

Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma.

Dated this 11th day of March 1944.

PROCLAMATION No. 5 of 1944.

PRICE CONTROL.

I, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, in exercise of the authority vested in me by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, hereby PROCLAIM:

ARTICLE 1.

Short Title.—This Proclamation may be cited as the Price Control Proclamation, 1944.

ARTICLE 2.

Interpretation.—In this Proclamation

(a) "authorised officer" means

(1) an officer appointed by me as Controller of Prices, and

(2) any other officer designated by me or under my authority as an authorised officer for the purposes of this Proclamation;

(b) "person" shall include any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not;

(c) "dealer" means a person who carries on the business of selling goods whether as his principal means of livelihood or as incidental to any other occupation.

ARTICLE 3.

Maximum Quantities and Prices.—Any authorised officer may, with reference either to the whole of Burma or to any part or parts thereof—

- (a) fix the maximum quantity of goods which may at any one time be possessed by or in the charge of any person or class of persons;
- (b) fix the maximum quantity of goods which may in any one transaction be sold to any person;
- (c) fix the maximum price or rate which may be charged for goods sold, for property hired, or for services performed;
- (d) prohibit or restrict the sale or hire of any description of goods or property.

ARTICLE 4.

Restrictions on possession and sale.—No person shall except with the written permission or license of an authorised officer—

- (a) have in his possession or charge at any time a quantity of goods in excess of the maximum fixed under Article 3 (a); or
- (b) sell in any one transaction a quantity of goods of any one kind in excess of the maximum fixed under Article 3 (b); or
- (c) sell any goods, hire out any property, or perform any service for a price or at a rate in excess of the maximum fixed under Article 3 (c); or
- (d) sell or hire any goods or property in contravention of any prohibition or restriction imposed under Article 3 (d).

ARTICLE 5.

Excess stocks to be declared.—Any person having in his possession or charge a quantity of any goods in excess of that fixed under Article 3 (a) shall forthwith report the fact to a Civil Affairs Officer and shall take such action as to storage, distribution or disposal of the excess as the Civil Affairs Officer may direct.

ARTICLE 6.

Refusal to sell.—No dealer shall, except with the written permission of an authorised officer, refuse without sufficient cause to sell to any person any goods within the limits of quantity fixed under Article 3 (b).

ARTICLE 7.

Receipts to be given.—Every dealer when selling any goods for cash shall, if requested by the purchaser, give the purchaser a receipt containing full particulars of the goods sold and the price paid therefor.

ARTICLE 8.

Marking of prices.—(1) An authorised officer may direct any dealer or class of dealers to mark goods exposed or intended for sale with the sale price or to exhibit at the place of sale a price list of goods held for sale.

(2) No dealer shall without authority destroy, efface or alter any such mark or price list.

ARTICLE 9.

Powers of officers.—An authorised officer may—

- (a) direct a dealer or class of dealers to maintain records of all sale and purchase transactions;
- (b) direct a dealer or class of dealers to furnish a declaration of stocks held;
- (c) direct a dealer to furnish such information as he may possess as to his own business or the business of any other dealer;
- (d) inspect or seize, or cause to be inspected or seized, any books or other documents belonging to or under the control of any dealer;
- (e) enter and search or authorise any person to enter and search any premises;
- (f) seize or authorise the seizure of any article in respect of which he suspects that an offence under this Proclamation or any regulation or order made thereunder has been committed and thereafter take all measures necessary for securing the production of the article in a Court.

ARTICLE 10.

Penalties.—(1) Whoever contravenes any of the provisions of this Proclamation or of any regulation or order made thereunder shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or with fine or with both.

(2) A Court convicting any person of an offence punishable under this Proclamation or of any regulation or order made thereunder may direct that any goods, in respect of which the offence was committed, be forfeited.

C. F. B. PEARCE,

MAJOR-GENERAL,

Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma.

Dated this 4th day of April 1944.

PROCLAMATION No. 6 OF 1944.

SUBORDINATE APPOINTMENTS (GENERAL ADMINISTRATION).

I, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, in exercise of the authority vested in me by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, hereby PROCLAIM:

ARTICLE 1.

This Proclamation may be cited as the Subordinate Appointments (General Administration) Proclamation, 1944.

ARTICLE 2.

A Senior Civil Affairs Officer may, within the area of which he is in charge, appoint Taungok or Headman shall, within the area committed to his charge, exercise, subject or remove from his appointment any such Township Officer, Assistant Township Officer, Taungok or Headman.

ARTICLE 3.

Every person so appointed as a Township Officer, Assistant Township Officer, Taungok or Headman shall, within the area committed to his charge, exercise, subject to the provisions of Proclamation 2 of 1944 and to my further orders, all the powers with which a Township Officer, Assistant Township Officer, Taungok or Headman respectively was invested by the law in force in that area on the 31st day of December 1943.

ARTICLE 4.

No appointment of a Township Officer or Assistant Township Officer under this Proclamation shall be valid for a period exceeding twelve months from the date of appointment unless the period of appointment is extended by me or under my authority.

ARTICLE 5.

All orders made under this Proclamation appointing, or suspending or removing from his appointment, any Township Officer, Assistant Township Officer or Taungok shall take effect forthwith but shall be subjected to confirmation by the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer to whom the Senior Civil Affairs Officer making the order is then immediately subordinate.

ARTICLE 6.

The number of Township Officers, Assistant Township Officers and Taungoks who may be appointed under this Proclamation in any District shall not exceed such number as is from time to time sanctioned by me.

ARTICLE 7.

Taungoks will be appointed only in Districts in which it was customary to appoint Taungoks prior to the 8th day of December 1941.

ARTICLE 8.

Every order of appointment made under this Proclamation shall define the local limits of the jurisdiction of the appointee; and shall be in such form as may be prescribed.

ARTICLE 9.

(1) The local limits of the jurisdiction of a Headman appointed under this Proclamation will normally be the local limits constituting the jurisdiction of a Headman prior to the 8th day of December 1941. An alteration in such local limits, whether at the time of appointment under this Proclamation or subsequent thereto, will be made only in exceptional circumstances and for very strong reasons and, in the case of Headmen in the areas to which the Kachin Hill Tribes Regulation, 1895, or the Chin Hills Regulation, 1896, applies, any such alteration shall be subject to confirmation by the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer to whom the Senior Civil Affairs Officer responsible therefor is immediately subordinate.

(2) (a) The local limits of the jurisdiction of a Taungok appointed under this Proclamation will normally be the local limits constituting the jurisdiction of a Taungok prior to the 8th day of December 1941.

(b) The local limits of the jurisdiction of a Township Officer or Assistant Township Officer appointed under this Proclamation may be co-terminous with the area of which a Senior Civil Affairs Officer making the appointment is from time to time in charge, or may be so restricted as the said Senior Civil Affairs Officer thinks fit. When so restricted, the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Township Officer or Assistant Township Officer will normally be the local limits of an administrative area which was in the charge of a Township Officer on the 8th day of December 1941.

(c) Any alteration in the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Township Officer, Assistant Township Officer or Taungok made subsequent to his appointment under this Proclamation shall be subject to confirmation by the Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer to whom the senior Civil Affairs Officer is immediately subordinate.

(3) An alteration in the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Township Officer, Assistant Township Officer, Taungok or Headman shall not render necessary the issue of a new order of appointment to the official concerned.

ARTICLE 10.

The provisions of law hereinafter mentioned shall be deemed not to be in force, namely—

- The Kachin Hill-Tribes Regulation, 1895, section 4;
- The Chin Hills Regulation, 1896, section 5;
- The Village Act, section 5, sub-sections (1) and (2);
- The Emergency Provision Act, 1943, section 3;
- The Scheduled Areas (Emergency Provisions) Regulation, 1943, section 4.

C. F. B. PEARCE,

MAJOR-GENERAL,

Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma.

Dated this 22nd day of July 1944.

PROCLAMATION No. 7 of 1944.

LAWS AMENDMENT (No. 2).

I, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, in exercise of the authority vested in me by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, hereby PROCLAIM:

ARTICLE 1.

This Proclamation may be cited as the Laws Amendment (No. 2) Proclamation, 1944.

ARTICLE 2.

In all enactments in force in Burma on the 31st day of December 1943, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,

(1) "Act" or "Law" shall be deemed to include all Proclamations, and all Regulations and Orders made under the authority of a Proclamation, and

(2) "Offence" shall be deemed to include any act or omission made punishable by any such Proclamation, Regulation or Order.

ARTICLE 3.

Whoever attempts to commit, or abets or attempts to abet, the commission of any offence shall be punishable with the punishment provided for such offence.

ARTICLE 4.

Any person sentenced to transportation or imprisonment may be confined in a prison in British India.

ARTICLE 5.

Rule 7 of the Rules made under clause (j) of section 14 of the Courts (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1943, shall have effect as if it read as follows:—

"7 (i) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under these rules shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it, nor shall any such statement be used as evidence except at the trial of that person for an offence in the course of the investigation of which the statement was made.

Provided that when any witness whose statement has been recorded as aforesaid is called at any enquiry or trial the Court shall, on the request of the prosecution or the defence, refer to such writing and may then direct that the accused be furnished with a copy thereof, and such statement may be used by the prosecution or the defence for the purpose of contradicting the witness or impeaching his credit as provided by section 145 and section 155 of the Evidence Act.

Provided further that if the Court is of opinion that the disclosure of any part of any such statement to the accused is not essential in the interests of justice and is inexpedient in the public interest, it shall record such opinion (but not the reasons therefor) and shall exclude such part from the copy of the statement furnished to the accused.

(ii) Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect the operation of section 26 of the Evidence Act or to apply to any statement falling within the provisions of section 27 and section 32, clause (i), of that Act."

ARTICLE 6.

Sub-section (1) (r) of section 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall have effect as if for the words "under any law for the time being in force to practise in such Court" were substituted the words "to practise in such Court by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, or by such officer as he may empower in this behalf, or by the Civil Affairs Officer in charge of the district in which such Court is situate."

ARTICLE 7.

The operation of sub-section (1) of section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall be deemed to be suspended.

ARTICLE 8.

Sub-section (1) of section 562 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall have effect as if the words "and no previous conviction is proved against the offender" were omitted.

ARTICLE 9.

Every police lock-up shall be deemed to be a prison within the meaning of the Prisoners Act.

ARTICLE 10.

Sub-rule (1) of Rule 50A of the Defence of Burma Rules shall have effect as if for the words "the Government of Burma" there were substituted the words "the Crown in Burma or by any local authority".

C. F. B. PEARCE,

Major-General,

Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma.

Dated this 22nd day of July 1944.

PROCLAMATION No. 8 of 1944.

KACHIN HILL TRACTS PYADAS.

I, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, in exercise of the authority vested in me by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, hereby PROCLAIM:

ARTICLE 1.

Short Title.—This Proclamation may be cited as the Pyadas Proclamation, 1944.

ARTICLE 2.

Extent.—It shall apply to the Kachin Hill Tracts of the Myitkyina, Bhamo and Katha Districts.

ARTICLE 3.

Appointment of Pyadas.—A Senior Civil Affairs Officer may, within the District of which he is in charge, appoint Pyadas of such grades and of such number as are from time to time sanctioned by me.

ARTICLE 4.

Conditions of Service.—Pyadas shall be employed on such conditions of service, and shall be subject to such disciplinary rules, as may from time to time be sanctioned by me.

ARTICLE 5.

Duties of Pyadas.—It shall be the duty of every Pyada—

- (i) to assist Civil Affairs Officers, Taungoks and Headmen in the execution of their duties;
- (ii) to take such measures as may be necessary to resist any unlawful attack made upon any village or on any person in his charge;
- (iii) to report at once to a Civil Affairs Officer, Taungok or Headman any matter likely to cause a breach of the peace.

ARTICLE 6.

Arrest.—(1) A Pyada may arrest—

- (a) any person whom he has reason to believe to have been concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any of the following offences:—

- (i) murder,
- (ii) culpable homicide not amounting to murder,
- (iii) dacoity,
- (iv) robbery,
- (v) any other offence prescribed by the Senior Civil Affairs Officer in charge of the District in which he is employed.

- (b) any person who cannot give a satisfactory account of himself.

2. (a) A Pyada shall make over as soon as possible to a Civil Affairs Officer or Taungok or to the nearest police station or outpost, any person arrested by him, or made over to his custody, together with any article likely to be used as evidence against such person.

(b) Any Civil Affairs Officer, Taungok or Officer in charge of a police station or outpost to whom has been made over any person arrested under sub-section (1) (a) shall report the fact forthwith to the Senior Civil Affairs Officer in charge of the District.

ARTICLE 7.

Amendment of the Scheduled Areas (Emergency Provisions) Regulation, 1943.

The provisions of section 12 of the Scheduled Areas (Emergency Provisions) Regulations, 1943, shall be deemed not to be in force.

C. F. B. PEARCE,
MAJOR-GENERAL,
Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma.

Dated this 6th day of October 1944.

PROCLAMATION No. 9 of 1944.

MAINTENANCE OF ORDER AMENDMENT.

I, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, in exercise of the authority vested in me by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, hereby PROCLAIM:

ARTICLE 1.

This Proclamation may be cited as the Maintenance of Order Amendment Proclamation, 1944.

ARTICLE 2.

In the third paragraph of Article 6 of Proclamation No. 2 of 1944, after the word "sentence," where it first appears, the words "or, except in the case of an acquittal, altering the finding" shall be inserted.

C. F. B. PEARCE,

Major-General,
Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma.

Dated this 24th day of November 1944.

PROCLAMATION No. 10 of 1944.

EMERGENCY LAWS AMENDMENT.

I, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, in exercise of the authority vested in me by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, hereby PROCLAIM:

ARTICLE 1.

Short Title.—This Proclamation may be cited as the Emergency Laws Amendment Proclamation, 1944.

ARTICLE 2.

Extension of application of certain Acts.—The provisions of the following Acts, namely—

The Special Judges Act, 1943,

The Courts (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1943,

The Emergency Provisions Act, 1943,

shall be deemed to extend to the whole of Burma, and shall remain in force until otherwise direct.

ARTICLE 3.

Amendment of the Scheduled Areas (Emergency Provisions) Regulation, 1943.—Section 10 of the Scheduled Areas (Emergency Provisions) Regulation, 1943, shall be deemed not to be in force.

C. F. B. PEARCE,

MAJOR-GENERAL,
Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma.

Dated this 7th day of December 1944.

PROCLAMATION No. 11 of 1944.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (AMENDMENT).

I, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, in exercise of the authority vested in me by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, hereby PROCLAIM:

ARTICLE 1.

Short Title.—This Proclamation may be cited as the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Proclamation, 1944.

ARTICLE 2.

Code of Criminal Procedure.—The Code of Criminal Procedure shall have effect as hereinafter appears.

ARTICLE 3.

Amendment of section 34.—Section 34 of the Code shall have effect as if the word “District” were inserted before the word “Magistrate” and the words “specially empowered under section 30” were omitted.

ARTICLE 4.

Amendment of section 144.—(1) Sub-section (1) of section 144 shall have effect as if—
 (a) for the words “of any other magistrate (not being a Magistrate of the third class) specially empowered by the Governor or the District Magistrate to act under this section” were substituted the words “a Magistrate of the first class”, and
 (b) for the words “abstain from” were substituted the words “do or abstain from doing.”
 (2) Sub-section (3) of section 144 shall have effect as if the words “when frequenting or visiting a particular place” were omitted.
 (3) Sub-section (6) of section 144 shall have effect as if—
 (a) for the word “two” were substituted the word “six”, and
 (b) the words “by notification in the Gazette” were omitted.

ARTICLE 5.

Amendment of section 145.—(1) Sub-section (1) of section 145 shall have effect as if—
 (a) the words “stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and” were omitted, and
 (b) after the word “and” where it last appears there were inserted the words “if he so directs.”
 (2) Sub-section (4) of section 145 shall have effect as if—
 (a) for the words “peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them respectively” were substituted the words “peruse such statements (if any) as he has so directed to be put in, hear the parties, record a memorandum of the substance of all such evidence as may be produced by them respectively” and
 (b) for the word “two” in the proviso to this sub-section were substituted the word “six.”

ARTICLE 6.

Amendment of Chapter XXII.—Chapter XXII shall have effect as if it read as follows:—

“CHAPTER XII OF SUMMARY TRIALS

260. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, any Magistrate, or Bench of Magistrates, specially empowered under this Chapter by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, may, if he or they think fit, try in a summary way all or any of the following offences:—

- (a) offences not punishable with death, transportation or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
- (b) theft, under section 379, 380 or 381 of the Penal Code, where the value of the property stolen does not exceed rupees one hundred.
- (c) dishonest misappropriation of property under section 403, and criminal breach of trust under section 406, of the same Code, where the value of the property misappropriated or converted does not exceed rupees one hundred;
- (d) receiving or retaining stolen property under section 411, and assisting in the concealment or disposal of stolen property under section 414, of the same Code, where the value of such property does not exceed rupees one hundred;
- (e) mischief under section 427 of the same Code,
- (f) offences under section 451, 453, 454, 456 and 457 of the same Code;
- (g) insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace under section 504, and criminal intimidation under section 506, of the same Code;

- (h) abetment of any of the foregoing offences;
- (i) attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences, when such attempt is an offence;
- (j) offences under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act.

(2) When in the course of a summary trial it appears to the Magistrate or Bench that the case is one which is of a character which renders it undesirable that it should be tried summarily, the Magistrate or Bench shall recall any witnesses who may have been examined and proceed to re-hear the case in manner provided by this Code.

261. * * * * *

262. (1) In trials under this Chapter, the procedure prescribed for summons-cases shall be followed in summons-cases, and the procedure prescribed for warrant-cases shall be followed in warrant-cases, except as hereinafter mentioned.

(2) No sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding six months shall be passed in the case of any conviction under this Chapter.

263. The Magistrate or Bench of Magistrates need not record the evidence of the witnesses or frame a formal charge; but he or they shall enter in such form as may be prescribed the following particulars:—

- (a) the serial number,
- (b) the date of the commission of the offence;
- (c) the date of the report or complaint;
- (d) the name of the complaint (if any);
- (e) the name, parentage, residence, nationality, religion, occupation and age of the accused;
- (f) the offence complained of and the offence (if any) proved, and in cases coming under clause (b), clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 260 the value of the property in respect of which the offence has been committed;
- (g) the plea of the accused and his examination (if any);
- (h) the finding, and a brief statement of the reasons therefor;
- (i) the sentence or other final order; and
- (j) the date on which the proceedings terminated.

264. In every case tried summarily under this Chapter in which the Magistrate or Bench passes a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one month, or of whipping, such Magistrate or Bench shall in addition to entering in the prescribed form the particulars mentioned in section 263, record a judgment embodying the substance of the evidence.

265. (1) Records made under section 263 and judgments recorded under section 264 shall be written or prepared by the Magistrate, either in English or in the language of the Court, and shall be signed by him.

(2) The Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, may authorise any Bench of Magistrates empowered to try offences summarily to prepare the aforesaid record or judgment by means of an officer appointed in this behalf by the District Magistrate, and the record or judgment so prepared shall be signed by each member of the Bench present and taking part in the proceedings.

(3) If no such authorisation is given, the record prepared by any member of the Bench and signed as aforesaid shall be the proper record.

(4) If the members of the Bench differ in opinion, any dissentient member may write a separate judgment."

ARTICLE 7.

Amendment of Section 355.—Sub-section (1) of section 355 shall have effect as if the words "and in cases of the offences mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 260, clauses (b) to (m), both inclusive, when tried by a Magistrate of the first or second class" were omitted therefrom.

C. F. B. PEARCE,
MAJOR-GENERAL,
Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma.

Dated this 7th day of December 1944.

PROCLAMATION No. 12 of 1944.

SUMMARY TRIALS.

I, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, in exercise of the authority vested in me by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, hereby PROCLAIM:

ARTICLE 1.

Short Title.—This Proclamation may be cited as the Summary Trials Proclamation, 1944.

ARTICLE 2.

Interpretation.—In this Proclamation,
 “The Code” means the Criminal Procedure Code,
 “Magistrate” includes an officer invested by me with any of the powers of a magistrate under the Code.
 All other words and expressions used in this Proclamation shall have the same meanings as they have in the Code.

ARTICLE 3.

Power to Try Summarily.—(1) A Magistrate specially empowered by me under this Proclamation may, if he thinks fit, try any offence in a summary way.
 (2) When in the course of a summary trial it appears to the Magistrate that the case is one which is of a character which renders it undesirable that it should be tried summarily, the Magistrate shall recall any witnesses who may have been examined and proceed to re-hear the case in manner provided by the Code.

ARTICLE 4.

Sentences which may be passed.—(1) A Magistrate specially empowered under this Proclamation may pass the following sentences, namely:—

- (a) Officers invested with the powers of a District Magistrate. Imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years; Fine not exceeding one thousand rupees; Whipping.
 - (b) Officers invested with the powers of a Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class. Imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; Fine not exceeding one thousand rupees; Whipping.
- (2) A Magistrate specially empowered under this Proclamation may pass any authorised sentence combining any of the sentences which he is authorised to pass under this Proclamation.

ARTICLE 5.

Sentence in default of payment of fine.—(1) A Magistrate specially empowered under this Proclamation may award such term of imprisonment in default of payment of fine as is authorised by the Penal Code in case of such default;

PROVIDED that—

- (a) the term is not in excess of the Magistrate's powers under this Proclamation;
 - (b) in any case decided by a Magistrate where imprisonment has been awarded as part of the substantive sentence, the period of imprisonment awarded in default of payment of the fine shall not exceed one-fourth of the period of imprisonment which such Magistrate is competent to inflict as punishment for the offence otherwise than as imprisonment in default of payment of the fine.
- (2) The imprisonment awarded under this Article may be in addition to a substantive sentence of imprisonment for the maximum term awardable by the Magistrate under Article 4.

ARTICLE 6.

Procedure.—In trials under this Proclamation, the procedure prescribed for summons-cases shall be followed in summons-cases, and the procedure prescribed for warrant-cases shall be followed in warrant-cases, except as hereinafter mentioned.

ARTICLE 7.

Record in minor cases.—In a summons-case, and in any other case in which the Magistrate does not pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term in excess of six months, the Magistrate need not record the evidence of the witnesses or frame a formal charge and the record of the trial shall consist of the particulars mentioned in section 263 of the Code.

ARTICLE 8.

Record in other cases.—In any trial under this Proclamation to which the provisions of Article 7 do not apply, the record of the trial shall consist of—

- (a) a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness for the prosecution,
- (b) the examination of the accused,
- (c) the charge (if any) and the accused's plea thereto,
- (d) a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness (if any) for the defence,
- (e) a concise judgment.

C. F. B. PEARCE,

MAJOR-GENERAL,

Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma.

Dated this 7th day of December 1944.

PROCLAMATION No. 13 of 1944.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SERVICE, BURMA, POLICE FORCE.

I, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma, in exercise of the authority vested in me by the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, hereby PROCLAIM:

ARTICLE 1.

Short Title.—This Proclamation may be cited as The Police Proclamation, 1944.

ARTICLE 2.

Establishment of a Police Force.—There shall be established in Burma a Police Force to be known as the Civil Affairs Service, Burma, Police Force, hereinafter referred to as "the Force".

ARTICLE 3.

Constitution of the Force.—The Force shall be under the Control of a Chief of Police to be appointed by me; and shall consist of such officers of the Civil Affairs Service, Burma, and other ranks as the Chief of Police shall from time to time, subject to my approval, direct.

ARTICLE 4.

Powers of the Chief of Police.—The Chief of Police shall be charged with the superintendence, administration and disposition of the Force and shall, subject always to any orders and directions which I may issue from time to time, exercise all the powers which are vested in the Inspector-General of Police under the Police Act and in the Commissioner of Police under the Rangoon Police Act.

ARTICLE 5.

Conditions of Service.—The conditions of service of members of the Force other than officers, shall be as may from time to time be prescribed by me.

ARTICLE 6.

Rules.—The Chief of Police may by order make, subject to my approval, rules governing—

- (a) the enrolment and attestation of members of the Force other than officers;
- (b) discipline, leave and promotion of members of the Force other than officers;

- (c) the organisation, classification and distribution of the Force;
- (d) the places at which members of the Force shall reside, and the particular services to be performed by them;
- (e) the collection and communication of information;
- (f) any matter which he may deem expedient for preventing abuse or neglect of duty and for rendering the Force efficient in the discharge of its duties.

ARTICLE 7.

Duties of the Force.—It shall be the duty of every member of the Force to enforce in Burma obedience to all Proclamations issued by or under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, and to all Regulations and Orders made thereunder.

ARTICLE 8.

Powers of Members of the Force.—(1) Every member of the Force shall be deemed to be a police officer within the meaning of any law in force in Burma on the 31st day of December 1943.

(2) The Chief of Police may by general or special order direct that any of the powers conferred on a police officer by any of the said laws as amended from time to time by or under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command, shall be exercised by such member or members of the Force as the Chief of Police may designate in the said order; and the Chief of Police may delegate to any officer of the Force authority to direct that any member of the Force serving under the command of such officer shall exercise the powers conferred by any of the said laws as so amended on an officer in charge of a police station.

ARTICLE 9.

Certificate.—Every member of the Force, other than an officer, shall receive on enrolment a certificate in the form annexed to this Proclamation under the seal of the Chief of Police or such officer as the Chief of Police shall direct.

ARTICLE 10.

The Police Act and the Rangoon Police Act.—(1) The provisions of the Police Act and of the Rangoon Police Act shall be deemed to remain in force only to the extent that they are not repugnant to the provisions of this Proclamation or to any Regulation, Order or Rule made thereunder; provided that no person who is not a member of the Force shall exercise any of the powers or functions or be entitled to the benefit of any of the privileges of a police officer.

(2) The Police Act shall extend to the whole of Burma and shall apply to all persons therein; and in the said Act the word "Burma" shall be deemed to be substituted for the expression "British Burma" wherever the latter appears.

(3) (a) The provisions of Section 9 and 20 of the Police Act and of Section 17 of the Rangoon Police Act shall be deemed not to be in force;

(b) Section 29 of the Police Act shall have effect as if—

(i) the words "or, without having given previous notice for the period of two months" were omitted;

(ii) for the words "to a penalty not exceeding three months' pay, or to imprisonment with or without hard labour, for a period not exceeding three months, or to both" were substituted the words "to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or to fine, or to both";

(c) Section 20 of the Rangoon Police Act shall have effect as if—

(i) for the words "contrary to the provisions of section 17" were substituted the words "without permission";

(ii) for the words "to imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or to a fine not exceeding three months' pay or to both", were substituted the words "to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or to a fine or to both".

(d) Every offence under Section 29 of the Police Act and Section 20 of the Rangoon Police Act shall be deemed to be an offence for which a police officer may arrest without warrant.

ANNEXURE.

(ARTICLE 9)

British Military Administration, Burma.

Certificate

No.....

No.....Rank.....has been appointed a member of the Civil Affairs Service, Burma, Police Force, and is vested with the powers, functions and privileges of a member of that Force.

Civil Affairs Service, Burma, Police Force,

C. F. B. PEARCE,

MAJOR-GENERAL,

Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Burma.

Dated this 7th day of December 1944.

APPENDIX 4.

GRADE I OFFICERS IN CAS(B) ON 1ST JANUARY 1944.

Headquarters.		Field.	
1. Maj. Gen. C. F. B. Pearce, CBE . . .	CCAO.	1. Brig. R. S. Wilkie	DCCAO.
2. Brig. F. S. V. Donnison, CBE . . .	DCCAO.	2. Brig. L. B. Naylor, CBE	do.
3. Lt. Col. K. J. H. Lindop, OBE, MC . .	SO I (Admin).	3. Brig. D. C. P. Phelps, OBE	do.
4. Col. D. J. Atkinson, OBE	SO I (T & I).	4. Lt. Col. E. G. S. Apedaile	SCAO.
5. Lt. Col. E. R. Mackay	SO I (Sup).	5. Lt. Col. G. D. I. Thomas, MBE	do.
6. Lt. Col. O. H. Mootham	SO I (Leg).	6. Lt. Col. H. N. C. Stevenson, OBE	do.
7. Lt. Col. T. H. Clarke, MBE	SO I (Works).	7. Lt. Col. A. W. H. Breakey	do.
8. Lt. Col. Sir A. Campbell, MC	SO I (Training).	8. Lt. Col. R. H. S. Healey	SO I " Legal ".
9. Brig. A. K. Potter	CFA.	9. Lt. Col. H. Marsh	SO I " Supplies ".
10. Lt. Col. R. A. Lygon	SO I (Accts).		
11. Lt. Col. J. S. Vorley, CBE	SO I (Welfare).		

GRADE I OFFICERS IN CAS(B) ON 31ST DECEMBER 1944.


Headquarters.		Field units.	
1. Maj. Gen. C. F. B. Pearce, CBE . . .	CCAO.	1. Brig. K. J. H. Lindop, OBE, MC . . .	DCCAO.
2. Brig. R. G. B. Prescott, CMG, OBE . .	DCCAO.	2. Col. F. S. V. Donnison, CBE	do.
3. Col. W. I. J. Wallace, OBE	GA.	3. Col. D. C. P. Phelps, OBE	do.
4. Lt. Col. M. H. Rossington	SO I GA.	4. Col. J. A. Liddell	do.
5. Lt. Col. R. R. Langham-Carter	SO I GA.	5. Wing/Commndr. J. B. G. Bradley	do.
6. Col. H. C. S. Minchin	AAG.	6. Lt. Col. V. G. Robert, MBE, MC . . .	SCAO.
7. Col. D. Q. H. Agnew	S & I.	7. Lt. Col. J. W. Leedham	do.
8. Lt. Col. F. Allsop	SO I (Forests).	8. Lt. Col. I. C. Byrne, MC	do.
9. Lt. Col. J. E. Gouldbourn	SO I (S & I).	9. Lt. Col. G. D. I. Thomas, MBE	do.
10. Lt. Col. L. F. Cantley	SO I (S & I).	10. Lt. Col. J. M. G. Fann	do.
11. Lt. Col. O. H. Mootham	CJO.	11. Lt. Col. L. F. Edgerley	do.
12. Lt. Col. T. H. Clarke, MBE	Works.	12. Lt. Col. E. C. S. Apedaile	do.
13. Lt. Col. L. C. Glass	Publicity.	13. Lt. Col. R. S. Wilkie	do.
14. Brig. A. K. Potter	CFA.	14. Lt. Col. C. F. Gracie	do.

APPENDIX 4—contd.

GRADE I OFFICERS IN CAS(B) ON 31ST DECEMBER 1944—contd.

Headquarters.		Field units.	
15. Lt. Col. F. George	SO I (Rev).	15. Lt. Col. A. W. H. Breakey	SCAO.
16. Lt. Col. R. A. Lygon	SO I (Accts).	16. Lt. Col. G. E. E. Webster	do.
17. Lt. Col. U. Thein, OBE, KSM, ATM	Posts.	17. Lt. Col. W. J. Landells	do.
18. Lt. Col. R. Barker	Jails.	18. Lt. Col. H. H. Keeley	do.
19. Brig. G. Chettle, OBE	Ch. of Police.	19. Lt. Col. N. W. Kelly, OBE	do.
20. Lt. Col. W. Marsh	SO I (Pol).	20. Lt. Col. C. J. Richards	do.
21. Lt. Col. W. A. Tozer	SO I, Civil Def.	21. Lt. Col. G. E. Rollins	do.
22. Col. G. M. Moffatt, OBE	CMS.	22. Lt. Col. A. A. Donald, OBE, MC	do. (P).
23. Lt. Col. W. K. Cooper	SO I (Med. Stores).	23. Lt. Col. L. T. Wilson	do. „
24. Lt. Col. J. S. Vorley, CBE	Welfare.	24. Lt. Col. E. Jennings	do. „
		25. Lt. Col. D. K. L. Lindsay, OBE	SO I (Med).
		26. Lt. Col. A. E. Kingston	do.
		27. Lt. Col. A. Gledhill	DCJO (Fd).
		28. Lt. Col. M. C. Raymond, CIE, MO	Condt.
		29. Lt. Col. H. Marsh, ED	SO I Supl. St. Pool.
		30. Lt. Col. D. King	SO I Inf. Gp.

APPENDIX 5.
DIAGRAM OF LAY-OUT OF CAS (B) HQ.




APPENDIX 6.

DIAGRAM OF CAS (B) ADMIN. DEPT. ("A" SIDE).


B (i)

M. S. deals direct with CCAO on M. S. questions only.



APPENDIX 7.
DIAGRAM OF CAS(B) ADMN. DEPT. ("Q" SIDE).

B (ii)




15

APPENDIX 8.

6

DIAGRAM OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DEPT.




General Administration Department deals with :—

- (a) general policy relating to the administration of Burma,
- (b) implementation of that policy through DCCAO's and SCAO's in the field, who are in general control of all Departments of the British Military Administration within their respective jurisdictions, and
- (c) co-ordination at CCAO's headquarters on all matters affecting the administration of Burma.

APPENDIX 9.

D


DIAGRAM OF JUDICIAL DEPÔT.



22

APPENDIX 10.
DIAGRAM OF SUPPLIES AND INDUSTRIES DEPT.


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APPENDIX 11.

F

DIAGRAM OF FINANCE & ACCOUNTS DEPT.



APPENDIX 12.

STATEMENT SHOWING ACTUAL STRENGTH OF OFFICERS SERVING IN CAS(B) ON 1 JAN 1944.

HEADQUARTERS.

DEPARTMENT.	W. E. No.	EFFECTIVE DATE.	SANCTIONED STRENGTH.	IMPLEMENTED ON 1-1-44.
CCAO { CCAO PA to CCAO DCCAO }	SEA 9/1944	1 Dec. 43	3	3
GEN. ADM. . . .	Do.	Do.	9	3
TRADE & IND. . .	Do.	Do.	12	3
LEGAL ADVISER .	Do.	Do.	2	1
WORKS	Do.	Do.	4	1
PUBLICITY	Do.	Do.	3	1
F & A	Do.	Do.	12	12
P & T	Do.	Do.	2	—
VETERINARY . .	Do.	Do.	1	—
JAILS	Do.	Do.	1	1
POLICE	Do.	Do.	8	—
MEDICAL	Do.	Do.	4	—
WELFARE	Do.	Do.	4	2
TRANSPORTATION .	Do.	Do.	6	—

TOTAL . 27

FIELD UNITS.

GEN. ADM. . . .	SEA 9/1944.	1 Dec. 43	72	48
LEGAL	Do.	Do.	8	2
FIN. & ACCOUNTS .	Do.	Do.	9	8
FORESTS	Do.	Do.	3	2
JAILS	Do.	Do.	2	—
POLICE	Do.	Do.	7	3
MEDICAL	Do.	Do.	83	21
WELFARE	Do.	Do.	66	25
L of C	Do.	Do.	33	24
LABOUR	Do.	Do.	1	—

TOTAL . 133

APPENDIX 13.

STATEMENT SHOWING ACTUAL STRENGTH OF OFFICERS SERVING IN CAS (B).
On 31st December 1944.

HEADQUARTERS.			FIELD UNITS.		
Department.	Sanctioned Strength.	Imple-mented Strength on 31-12-44.	Department.	Sanctioned Strength.	Imple-mented Strength on 31-12-44.
CCAO { CCAO	1	1	Gen. Administration	259	96
PA to CCAO	1	1	Police	121	20
DCCAO	1	1	Medical	672	73
Planning and Frontier Admin. { Gen. Admin.	6	6	Legal	8	3
A. & M. S.	18	10	F. & A.	9	9
Supplies and Industries	26	11	Forests	3	1
Legal	2	1	Jails	2	1
Works	4	2	Welfare Training Centre	10	7
Publicity	6	4	Labour	1	1
Finance and Accounts	18	16	Welfare	66	42
Posts and Telegraphs	2	2	L. of C.	33	32
Veterinary	1	1	Transport Group	26	23
Jails	1	1			
Police	12	10			
Medical	15	5			
Welfare	4	4			
Transportation	6	4			
Totals	124	79	Totals	1,210	368

NATIONALITY OF OFFICERS IN CAS(B).

	On 1-1-44.	Percentage.	On 31-12-44.	Percentage.
British origin	78	50	162	42
Anglo-Indian origin	45	28	104	27
Anglo-Burmese origin				
Burmese origin	13	8	34	10
Indian origin	23	14	87	21
Total	160		387	

APPENDIX 14.

JUDICIAL STATISTICS.

I. Trials—		
Persons tried		882
Persons convicted		668
Persons acquitted		137
Persons discharged		77
<hr/>		
II. Offences.	<i>Persons Charged.</i>	<i>Persons Convicted.</i>
Serious offences against the State	53	41
Other offences against the State	15	12
Murder	6	3
Unauthorised possession of military stores	83	78
Breach of curfew orders	4	4
Breach of orders relating to prohibited areas	20	20
Breach of orders regulating prices and the movement of commodities	143	134
Bribery	32	32
Assaults	56	31
Cattle theft	16	11
Other offences against property	197	130
Miscellaneous Minor offences	180	172
<hr/>		
III. Sentences.		
(i) (a) Death Sentences passed	13	...
(b) Death Sentences confirmed	9	...
(NOTE.—2 death sentences passed in 1944 were confirmed in January 1945.)		
(ii) Persons sentenced to transportation for life	4	
(iii) Imprisonment for—		
(a) Over 7 years	0	
(b) Over 5 but under 7 years	4	
(c) Over 2 but under 5 years	12	
(d) Under 2 years	166	
(iv) Fine	345	
(v) Whipping	99	
(vi) Furnish security for good behaviour	40	

APPENDIX 15.

REFUGEE RATION SCALE—1945 (*See* NOTE A).

ALLOCATION PER HEAD OF POPULATION.

<i>Serial.</i>	<i>Commodity.</i>	<i>Basic Daily Ration.</i>	<i>Basic Monthly Ration.</i>
<i>A. Foodstuffs & Soap.</i>			
1.	Rice	1 lb.	...
2.	Atta (<i>See</i> Note B)
3.	Dhall (<i>See</i> Note C)
4.	Cooking Oil	4 Ozs.
5.	Salt	7 "
6.	Tinned Milk (<i>See</i> note D)	1½ Ozs.	...
7.	Soap	2 Ozs.
<i>B. Clothing & Textiles.</i>			
8.	Material (<i>See</i> Note E)	4 yds. per capita per annum.	
9.	Cotton Yarns	2½ ozs. per capita per annum.	
10.	Cotton Vests	1 vest to every two of male population.	
11.	Blankets	1 blanket to every 16 people.	
12.	Thread	5 per cent. of total weight of material.	
<i>C. Sundry Items.</i>			
13.	Burmese Dahs	To be a special demand for a special commitment.	
14.	Mamooties	To be a special demand for a special commitment.	
15.	Iron Bars	To be provided as required ex-salvage or by special demand.	
16.	Needles	2 to every 3 persons.	
17.	Kerosene	½ gallon monthly to every 5 of population in towns of over 10,000.	
18.	Matches	½ box per head per month to every 5 of population.	
19.	Umbrellas	To be a special demand for a special commitment.	

NOTES.—(A) All foodstuff estimates should in principle be based upon provision of a minimum overall basic ration from *local produce* and import.

Estimates of other items should take account of:—

1. Local production or manufacture.
2. Existence of Stocks (*i.e.*, scrap metal and wastage of war).
3. Numbers totally destitute and without any possessions whatsoever.
4. Numbers requiring partial provision.

(B) Issued as alternative to, or in conjunction with, rice; basis of provision to be determined by DCCAO.

(C) To be a special demand for a special commitment. Basis of provision to be decided by DCCAO.

(D) Issued only to females in towns of over 10,000 population. Villagers normally do not consume milk.

(E) Materials consist of loongyis, longcloth or white cloth, and blackcloth. The latter for issue in North Burma and Hill regions only.

APPENDIX 16.
FRONTIER FRINGE PROVISION.


Commodity.	Unit.	Demanded From GHQ (I).	Issued to CAS (B).	Balance at 31-12-44.
Rice	Tons	6,003	6,003	
Atta	"	360	360	
Dhall	"	344	344	
Salt	"	1,680	405	1,275
Oil Cooking	Gals	118,510	Nil	118,510
Milk	Tons	160	19½	140½
Kerosene	"	40	1	39
Matches	Cases	350	35	315
Long Cloth	Yds	2,949,400	2,719,764	229,636
Black Cloth	"	200,000	200,000	Nil
Yarn	Lbs	112,500	77,640	34,860
Vests	Nos	80,000	55,797	24,203
Blankets	"	57,440	31,476	25,964
Thread	"	27,320	23,860	3,460
Soap	"	114,000	82,875	31,125
Dahs	"	7,350	Nil	7,350
Mamooties	"	5,000	942	4,058
Needles	Gross	655	Nil	655
Umbrellas	Nos	5,000	2,996	2,004
Iron Bars	Tons	31·5	23·8	7·7

APPENDIX 17.

VEHICLES EMPLOYED BY CAS (B) FOR CIVIL SUPPLIES DURING 1944.

At the close of each quarter	M/C Solo	Sta Wagon	Trucks G. S. 15 cwt. 4x4	Lorries G. S. 3 Ton 4x2	Jeps	Trailers 2 Wheeled Water	Lorries 3 Ton W/Shop	Lorries 3 Ton B/Down	Trucks G. S. 15 cwt. 4x2
Ending March	310 vehicles of different types		
Ending June	50	35
Ending Sept	50	35
Ending Dec	46	4	149	28	35	8	2	2	27

35



APPENDIX I

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

MAP OF BURMA showing Divisions and Districts.

Scale: 1 inch to 80 Miles.

Miles 0 20 40 60 80

REFERENCES.

- International Boundary.....
- Divisional Boundary.....
- District Boundary.....
- District Headquarters.....
- Principal Towns.....
- Railways completed with stations.....
- Metalled Roads.....
- Unmetalled Roads (Laterite, Gravel or Delong).....
- Unmetalled Roads.....
- Light-House.....

Corrections to earlier editions supplied by Chief Engineer, P.W.D. Burma Govt. (Sept. 1943).

