The aphorisms of the Nyāya philosophy

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The aphorisms of the Nyāya philosophy
Uniform Title:
Gautama (Authority on Nyāyaśāstra)
ViÅ›vanātha Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya
Ballantyne, James Robert, 1813-1864
Place of Publication:
printed at the Presbyterian Mission Press
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2 v. : ;


Subjects / Keywords:
Nyaya -- Early works to 1800 ( lcsh )
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800 ( lcsh )
न्याय दर्शन
Spatial Coverage:
Asia -- India
एशिया -- भारत
21 x 78 ( India )


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Tr. & prefaced by J.R.B. [sc. J.R. Ballantyne].
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VIAF (name authority) : Gautama (Authority on Nyāyaśāstra) : URI
General Note:
VIAF (name authority) : ViÅ›vanātha Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya : URI
General Note:
VIAF (name authority) : Ballantyne, James Robert, 1813-1864 : URI
Statement of Responsibility:
by Gautama ; with illustrative extracts from the commentary by Viśwanātha ...

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SOAS University of London
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Rev. Jos. Warren, Superintendent.

The great body of the Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sets
of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Apho-
risms arc scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much
to communicate the doctrine of the particular school as to aid, by
the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom
the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end
they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the ob-
scurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the un-
instructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.
For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an ac-
curate translation of the Aphorisms with so much of gloss as may
be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in
the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn Eng-
lish, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought
out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of
these men, and, through them, of other learned Brahmans, so
that any errors in the version may have the best chance of be-
ing discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version
as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to de-
termine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of
the East as regards that of the West.
J. R. B.
Benares College, }
5 th January, 1851. 5


M 4 ; ■* ’5
- •: »t r ' V. '■• 1 ;.'■> '

C vC rf â– 


a. [The Nydya-sutra-vritti, or “ Explication of the Aphorisms
of the Nyaya,” commences with the following exordium.]
b. Salutation to the illustrious Ganes'a!
c. May he, the splendour of whose gracefulness of person sur-
passes ten million of Cupids;—who made the joy—and O how
delightful it was !—of the bevies of the dames of Vraja;—whose
body is dark as the teeming rain-cloud, and who haunts no tem-
ple save the mind;—may he, the some one [whom, as the well
known Krishna, I need not name], promote the felicity of the in-
habitants of the three worlds.*
d. In order to produce great good-luck, we meditate on the beau-
ty of the toe-nails of Bhavani, which [beauty], taking an exquisite
aspect as it was associated with the ruddy lustre of the newly ap-
plied lac-dye, seemed a sort of lovely ornament of Siva’s head—
when his head was bowed down [at her feet] to deprecate her
haughty displeasure—eclipsing [—as the beauty of the toe-nails
i vw

then clid—] the resplendent beauty of the twilight Moon* * [which
is the usual ornament of Siva’s head.]
e. I reverence him [—meaning Gautama—], the resplendent,
who has eyes in his feet [as well as in his head—though how, or
to serve what purpose, does not seem to be known—•], by means
of the rays of whose dialectics [—meaning thereby the body of
doctrine which he bequeathed to the world—]the virtuous get
over the whole darkness that was within them.j'
f. We reverence our father, Vidyanivasa [the abode of learn-
ing], who is as it were a combination in one—of the two gods of
wisdom and of justice, the ornament of the globe of the fair earth,
a masculine form as it were of the goddess of eloquence, the pro-
ducer of confident scholarship [in those enjoying the advantage
of being his pupils], in liberality like another Karna incar-
nate, towards the wretched ingenious in his kindness, whose fair
fame prevades the universe.]:
g. I make the dust of my preceptor’s feet my pilot [in the voy-
age on which I am going to adventure—for I am] seeking to
promote skill, and resolved in mind that even the dull-witted
shall [be supplied at all events with the means to] understand—
hshtot: ii ii
*wf*T 7TH II II

without much effort, and the intelligent as mere play,—the
wide [and all-embracing] system of the Nyaya.*
h. May this work of ViswanXtha the son ofVidyXnivasa con-
duce to the gratification of the sage the fine-witted and the un-
i. Now the on-lookers do not engage [in any study offered to
their attention] without having come to feel an interest in the
motive [—i. e. in the end, to the attainment of which the study
is calculated to lead]; therefore the end is to be
[The end proposed is the escaping from liability to transmi-
gration, and the attainment of tranquil and eternally uninter-
rupted beatitude:—and, as the declaration of this end is re-
quisite in order to gain attention at the outset—] therefore,
for the declaration thereof, the venerable one who has eyes
in his feet [—see e.—] aphorises in the first place as follows.§
The end of the proposed enquiry.
Enunciation of the
things, the right no-
tion of which leads to
rnfifaTTT 5rfTrr^T^rTHT^^r5f TfTT
Tri f^! I ^frl WWT
t frsFnw i
H-farTT II < II

No. 1.—Proof [—i. e. the instrument of right notion—
3. a.*—] ; that which [—as having a proof—] is the object of
right notion ; doubt; motive; familiar fact; scholastic tenet;
confutation; ascertainment; disquisition f controversy; cavil;
semblance of a reason; perversion; futility ; and unfitness to be
argued with;------from knowing the truth in regard to these [six-
teen things], there is the attainment of the summum bonum
a. But then [—there is no denying—] the knowledge of truth
is not the immediate cause of Beatitude. Beatitude—to consider
it apart—is of two kinds through the distinction of the ‘ higher’
[attainable only on quitting the body], and the‘lower.’ Of these
the ‘lower/ in the shape of ‘ emancipation while yet in life’ (j£-
vanmulcti), takes place immediately on the attainment of the
knowledge of truth [—the sign of a man’s having attained to
which is his exhibiting a perfect indifference to all that passes
around him]. This, moreover, is attained by him who has ascer-
tained the truth in regard to Soul, whose false notions have
been removed by incessant application, and who is yet experiencing
[—in appearance at least—for, though apparently exposed to hard-
ships, he is generally supposed to feel nothing—the fruit of] past
deeds;—but the ‘higher’ [is attained by him] by certain degrees. To
explain the order thereof is the purpose of the following aphorism.f
The order of the
steps towards Beati- c
tude. W II II
* wn: irtuth ii trfk° n

No. 2.—Pain (du’kha), birth (jawnanh activity (pravritli), fault
(dosha), false notions (mithyd-jnana),—since, on the successive
annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one
next [before] it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of them]
Beatitude (apavarga).
a. [That is to say—] among Pain and the rest [in the forego-
ing list], whichever are subsequent in order [to others in the list],
on the annihilation of these [subsequent ones], since there is the
annihilation of the next one—i. e. of the one immediately next it
and preceding it—, there is [—in the end—when Pain, the last
in the list thus read backwards, has been annihilated,] Beatitude.*
b. Although[—as some one may object—] Beatitude does not
come from the absence of Pain, but is it—still [there is no fault
in the form of expression employed in the aphorism, for] the sense
of the 5th case here is that of indifference^ [—i. e. the absence of
any difference between the what and the whence\.
c. So much—in the f Explication of the Aphorisms’—for the
topic denominated ‘ that relating to the motive’% [for pursuing the
enquiry proposed].
d. [The remembering of the order of the steps, in § 2., may be
facilitated, to some readers, by availing one’s self of the distribu-
tively cumulative form of exposition employed in the nursery tale
of “The House that Jack built.” Thus—
1. Du’kha.—This is the (pain’ that the man had.
2. <7hnma2z.-*-This is the ‘ birth’ [again renewed] that gave
room for the (pain’ that the man had.
* hvhtwt wfe-

Pravritti.—This is ‘ activity’ (—requiring reward—) that led
to the ‘ birth’ (again renewed) that gave room for the ‘ pain’ that
the man had.
4. Dosha.—This is the ‘fault’ (—of ‘ desire’ or ‘ dislike’—
alike to be shunned—or ‘ stupidity’—) which (—in the man who,
if wise, had clone nothing at all,—-) begot the ‘ activity’ (requir-
ing reward) that led to the ‘birth’ (again renewed) that gave
room for the ‘pain’ that the man had.
5. Mithyd-jndna.—This means the ‘ wrong-notions’ (of that man
unversed in the truth-teaching Nyaya Philosophy) which (—since
the man knew no better—) gave rise to the ‘ fault’ (of ‘ desire’ or
‘ dislike’ or ‘ stupidity’) which (—in the man who, if wise, had done
nothing at all—) begot the ‘ activity’ (requiring reward) that led
to the ‘ birth’ (again renewed) that gave room for the ‘ pain’ that
the man had.
6. Apavarga.—This last is ‘ beatitude’—promised as fruit of
the truth-teaching Nyaya Philosophy, which gives us right ones
instead of the ‘ wrong notions/ which gave rise to what Gautama
styles a ‘fault,’ inasmuch as it mischievously begot the ‘ activity’
carefully shunned by the wise—for ‘ activity,’—shaping itself in
acts that are good or bad, and require reward of a like descrip-
tion,—occasions a man to be born again,—and ’twas this same
‘ birth’ that gave room for the ‘ pain’ that the man had.] *
*Mr. Colebrooke, in liis celebrated essay on the Nyaya, (see Essays, vol. 1)
stating concisely the Nyaya view of the attainment of beatitude, describes (at
p. 290) soul as “ not earning fresh merit or demerit by deeds done with desire.”
Here he makes, as Gautama does, the ‘ desire’ (which is one of the three
meant by the technical word doslia ‘ fault’—see the Essay, p. 290. 1. 1.—and the
present work §18. a.—) to be the producer of acts, from which acts, in turn, arise
merit or demerit. But, at p. 289, when he says “From acts proceed faults(dosha);
“including under this designation, passion or extreme desire; aversion or loath ••
“ ing; and error or delusion (moha),” he adopts an order the reverse of that en-
joined in §18.—see Note on §18. b. If the passage in the Essay be correctly
edited, it would seem as if Mr. Colebrooke, when giving to his Essay a final re-
vision after having laid it aside for a time, had been struck With the oddness of
the expression that “ from faults proceed acts,” and had reversed it without ad ■
verting to the technical definition of c faults,’ in the same sentence, as the pas-
sions which give rise to action. Gautama, the votary of Quietism, gives to

d. Now, since a definition will be looked for [of each of the
things enunciated in the aphorism §1] in the order of enunci-
ation, he defines, and divides, Proof—the first enounced.*
The instruments available in prosecuting the enquiry.
What are the in- N x
struments of right no- No. 3 _proofs [—i. e.—see §1—instru-
tion. .
ments of right notion—] are (1) the deliver-
ances of sense; (2) the recognition of signs; (3) the recognition
of likeness; and (4) words.
What is meant by‘right a' There> bY tbe root ®(Pto measure,£
notion’ or knowledge peculiarised by the emphatic prefix pra
Kar e^oxpv' j-—an(j £]1US giving the word pramd—sci-
licet ‘ what takes the very measure of its object’—] there is signi-
fied a notion [—not dubious, or erroneous,—for notions may be
both of these;—but the ‘right notion’ denoted by pramd is a
knowledge'] in the veriest manner determined [—or distinguished
from the bare knowledge that ‘ this is something’—] by the de-
terminate nature of that which [—being the object of the know-
ledge—] possesses such and suchf [determinate nature.—It is,
the passions the name of ‘ faults’ with a significance akin to that which the word
bore in the remark of Talleyrand on the murder of the Due D’Enghien—“ ce
n’etait pas une crime—e’etait une faute—it was an absolute blunder. The
wise man, according to Gautama, is he who avoids the three mistakes of ha-
ving a liking for a thing, and acting accordingly ; or of having a dislike for a
thing, and acting accordingly; or of being stupidly indifferent, and thereupon
acting; instead of being intelligently indifferent, and not acting at all.


in short, the knowledge of a thing as it is,—or, in the words of
“To know what’s what;—and that's as high
'* As metaphysic wit can fly."]
b. That—in virtue of which any thing is the instrument of such
[right notion as has been just defined] —is what constitutes any
thing a Proof* [or instrument of right notion.]
c. And the knowledge intended to be spoken of here is notion
other than memory;—so that this [definition of f Proof' just given]
does not extend [where it ought not] to the instrument of recol-
lection-y [—which we may have to treat of hereafter.]
d. At this point the Explication of the [first] three Aphorisms
is completed.]
e. Now he begins to define, in their order, the [several kinds of
r Proof'which, in the preceding Aphorism, were] divided.§
f. [The four kinds of c Proof' arc usually spoken of as 1Percep-
tion,' f Inference,' c Comparison,’ and‘ Testimony.' We may have
occasion in the sequel to explain why we think proper to depart
from the accustomed from of rendering].
What is meant by x
a deliverance of sense. II 8 II
4.__By a deliverance of sense is meant knowledge which
has arisen from the contact of a sense with its object,— [and this
* TTrfttW II
t Wtefa: mhtwt 11

knowledge may be] indeterminate [—as when one in consequence
perceives ‘this is something’—we know not, or think not, what;
•—but] not erroneous [—for, if erroneous, it would be no ' instru-
ment of right notion—or it may be] determinate [—such a de-
gree of attention having been exerted as to determine that ' this is
so and so’ and not any thing else.]
a. [Now] he defines and divides the ‘recognition of a sign.’*
What is meant by
the recognition of a
siSn' II II
No. 5.—Now the recognition of a sign, which is preceded
thereby [—i. e. is preceded by a deliverance of sensef—§4—
else the recognition of the sign were impossible—] is of three
kinds—(1) having [as the sign] the prior, or (2) having [as the
sign] the posterior, or else (3) [consisting in] the perception of
a. [By c prior’—as explained in our Lecture on the Sankhya
Philosophy, §101, &c.—the author means a ‘ cause,’—from which,
when recognised, its effect may be inferred as about to follow.
So again, by 'posterior’ he means an ‘effect’—from which, when
recognised, one can infer that such and such a cause has been at
work. By the •' perception of homogeneousness’ he means the re-
cognition of the subject as being referable to some class, and as
being thence liable to have predicated of it whatever may be prc-
dicable of the class. The three ' signs’ belong to the three argu-
ments 'a priori,’ xa posteriori,’ and 'from analogy.’]
b. He [now] defines the ' recognition of likeness.’J
* II
t ii

What is meant by the || < l|
recognition of like- t^o. 6.—The ' recognition of likeness* is
the instrument [in the ascertaining] of that
which is to be ascertained through its similarity to something
[previously] well-known,
a. [That is to say] the ‘recognition of likeness* is the instru-
ment [in the ascertaining]—or [—for the Sanskrit term, not
strictly defined, stands for either—] it is the ascertainment itself
of the signification, which we wish to determine, of a word, such
as gavaya for example—through the perception of likeness or si-
milarity to something perfectly well known, i. e. of which we
have previously obtained a right notion,—as a cow for example.
b. [A man is told that the gavaya, or ‘bos gavaeus,* is an ani-
mal like a cow. Going to the forest, he sees an animal like a
cow. By means of the instrumental knowledge above describ-
ed, he arrives at the conviction that ‘this thing is what is meant
by the wordgavaya’']
c. [The term ‘ recognition of likeness*—upamana—is to be em-
ployed throughout to denote the instrument; and the commenta-
tor notices two etymological views, either of which will justify
that employment:—thus] it may denote the instrument, if we
suppose an ellipsis, and that it stands for ‘that from which the
recognition of likeness’ is obtained; or it will be the name of the
instrument, if we suppose the word to be formed by the affix of
instrumentality—viz. lyut [—Panini, III. 3, 117—*] which
marks the instrument of something to be established or effected.]-
d. [Now] he defines a ‘word/i
What is meant by
a ‘word.’ (( ()
* II
I ii

No. 7.—A f word* [/car is the precept [or instructive
assertion] of one worthy [to have his words implicitly accepted as
an authority.]
а. By saying f A word*—he mentions what is to be defined.
It means [—as used here by Gautama—not a mere sound, &c.
but] a word which is an instrument of right notion. ‘The precept
of one worthy’—such is the definition.*
б. Or the expression given as the definition may mean 1 a right
[or fitting] precept [or instructive assertion;]’—that from which
[correct] knowledge ‘verbally communicated’ (sdbda) arises, f
c. He now divides this :—
^^^^171 II II
No. 8.—It is of two kinds, in respect that it may be that
( whereof the matter is seen,’ or that f whereof the matter is un-
a. ‘ It’—i. e. a word that is an instrument of right notion.]:
b. By ‘that whereof the matter is seen’ he means that [word]
the thing declared by which is accessible to instruments of know-
ledge other than words themselves or any instrument [—such as
that spoken of under §6, a.—] dependent thereon§ [—i. e. de-
pendent on words.]
c. By‘ that whereof the matter is unseen’ he means that [word]
t W3T I WBT Wul' I 7T ||
i ii

the thing declared by which is accessible only to words or to in-
struments of investigation dependent thereon.*
d. And thus, through the distinction of ‘ the being that where-
of the matter is seen’ and ‘the being that whereof the matter is
unseen/ there is a twofold character of words that are instruments
of right notion—such is the meaningf [which may be put into
plain English thus ;—Assertions are of two kinds—capable of ve-
rification, and incapable of verification.]
e. Here the topic of the definition of the instruments of right
notion is concluded.]:
f. He next divides and defines the objects which are fitted to
supply right notions.§
The objects about which the enquiry is concerned.
What things furnish
the objects of right no-
tion- ||< ||
No. 9.—But soul, body, sense, sense-object, knowledge, the
mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and beatitude,
are what are fitted to supply right notions.
a, [And it is not to be objected that this enumeration is not
exhaustive] —for the expression ‘fitted to supply right notions/
t 11

—like the word f disquisition’ or the like, [see §1—which is
employed'in this work with a sense technically limited—] is spe-
cially appropriated, as a kind of technical term, to these twelve*
[things enumerated in the aphorism.]
b. Among these [twelve things enumerated in the aphorism,]
having named,—as these take the precedence,—the set of six
which are in the shape of causes; the set of six, ‘ fitted to supply
right notion/ which are in the shape of effects, are mentioned
[after these.] On this point [—viz. the order of arrangement to
be observed in enunciation—] they tell us that “ the enunciation
first of each one foremost [in respect of those that follow it] is re-
gulated by its superior dignityf [in comparison with those that
follow it.”]
c. Among these [enounced in §9] he defines the one first
enounced—viz. Soul.
Soul defined.
No. 10.—Desire, Aversion, Volition (prayatna), Pleasure, Pain,
and Knowledge, are the sign of the Soul.
a. Here [—some one may object—] your saying the ‘sign’
(ling a) is incongruous, because the soul [is not inferred by means
of a ‘sign’—but] is intuitively recognised.J [This objection
would be a sound one if the word ‘ sign’ were here employed in
its technical sense, of reicp/ypLov,—the ‘ reason’ in a syllogism j—
i rd- u
uX GX '
i 'ffiW II

but it is not so]—for the word f sign’ (linga} here means [nothing
more than] a ‘characteristic’* (lakshana.)
b. He next defines c body’ [—the topic, among those enunci-
ated in §9—] which presents itself next in order.f
Body defined. VftVIJI II
No. 11.—The body is the site of [muscular] action (cheshta),
of the organs of sensation (indriya), and of the sentiments [of
pain or pleasure experienced by the soul.]
a. And the nature of the [muscular] action (cheshta) is this—
that it is a peculiar species [of action] the constitutive peculiari-
ty of which is its being the result of volition (prayatna).J
b. The word artha [which has been rendered by f sentiment’]
in the expression“ the site of the sentiments of pain or pleasure,”
is not intended [—as it is in §9—] to denote colours and the
like [objects of sense], for then the fact of being the site thereof
[—instead of its being what we intend to speak of—viz. a distinct-
ive characteristic of the body—] would extend, beyond where it
ought, to jars, &c.;—but it is intended to denote pleasure or pain
alternatively. Therefore the Bhashya [or commentary by Vdt-
syayana'} tells us “ In what tabernacle there prevails the consci-
ousness of pleasure and of pain, that is [what we mean by] the
site of these—and that is the body.”§
* I I
t II

c. He divides and defines the organs of sensation (indri*
hhht: i i \ 11
What are the
organs of sense. ^0. 12.—The organs of sensation [originating,
or not differing,] from the Elements [§13], are Smell, Taste,
Sight, Touch, and Hearing.
a. Although the Mind also certainly is [as declared by the
Sankhyas—see Tattwa-samdsa §29—] an forgan’ (indriya), yet,
since we employ the term not as being exclusively applicable to the
Smell, &c., there is no fault [to be found with our employment of
the term.] But, in reality, by ‘organs’ [in this place] we mean
[exclusively] the external organs; and hence there is no incon-
gruousness in [the addition of] the expression “from the Ele-
ments, ”f [—which would be incongruous if we intended to in-
clude Mind].
b. Do the Smell, &c., originate [as held by the Sankhyas—see
Tattwa-samdsa §26 and §27—] from one of the fproducers’?
As there may be an expectation [that this question should be re-
solved,] he says—“ from the Elements.” Hence it is not to be
held that the organs of sensation originate in that productive
agency termed ‘ self-consciousness’ [—see Tattwa-samdsa §54—].
And this will be explained in the 3rd Lecture.!
c. What are the Elements ? As there will naturally be an ex-
pectation [that he should explain what he means by the expres-
* II
t rRifr

sion in question—employed as it is in the definition laid down in
the aphorism §12,—therefore] he says—*
What are the
Hrnfu ii tA ii
No. 13.—Earth, Water, Light (t.ejas)> Air,
Ether,—these are the Elements (bhutaj.
a. He next divides and defines ‘ sense-object’ [—the topic,
among those enunciated in §9,—] which presents itself next in
What are the ob-
jects of the senses.
m: ii v ii
No. 14.—Their ‘objects’ (arthaj are the qualities of Earth, &c.
[see §13,] viz., odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and sound.
a. By the word ‘ their,’ the external organs of sensation [§12,]
are referred to. J
b. To define ‘understanding’ (buddhi), he says—§
Understanding or knowledge. 11 \ H No. 15.—Understanding (buddhi), appre-
liension (upalabdhi), knowledge (jndnaj—these are not different
in meaning.
a. ‘Not different in meaning’—i. e. synonymous.||
b. He next defines the Mind—5T * §
Cx "SI
t 11
i ii
§ ii
II wm* 11
51 II

What is the * fW”. II < < II
Mmd- No. 16.—The sign [—conf. §10, «.—] of the
Mind (manas) is [that habit in virtue of which] it does not give
rise simultaneously to notions [more than one].
a. (Simultaneously’—i. e. at one time. [Of course] you must
supply “ in a single [—if you speak of the mind generical-
ly, and not of an individual mind].
b. The meaning [of the aphorism] is—that the sign—meaning
the characteristic—of Mind is that property, viz., the atomic na-
ture of the intellectual organ, from which it happens that there do
not arise notions] [more than one at once in one and the same
c. He next defines and divides Activity] (prcttirUti).
Energy No. 17.—Activity is that which originates the [ut-
defined. tcrances of the] voice (vakj, the [cognitions of the]
understanding, and the [gestures of the] body.
a. Since the expression ‘ which originates/—heard [in the apho-
rism] immediately after the Dwandwa compound,—is in construc-
tion with each term severally [in the compound], Activity is of
three descriptions, according to the division into ‘ that origina-
ting the [utterances of the] voice/ &c.§ * * * §
* Wd I 1 II
V Cx s'
i vrR n
§ fr
vifn: ii

b. By the word ‘ understanding’ (buddhi) here, the Mind
(manas) is meant;—and the word ‘body’ fsariraj is common to
the hands and other members [as indicative of each and all of
these] in so far as these have the power of muscular action* [—see
§11, «.].
c. Thus [—to explain—] an effort tending to utterance is
[what we mean by] ‘ that which originates the voice’:—an effort
the site of which is the body, or [more properly] which tends to
gesture [or bodily movement] is [what we mean by] ‘ that which
originates the [gesture of the] body’an effort distinct from
both of these is [what we mean by] ‘ that which originates the
[cognitions of the] understanding.’ And this [last one], tending
to [the act of] vision, &c., is accomplished in the mere dawning of
attention]- [—attention alone being required in order that the re-
velations of the external world may flow into the understanding
through the appropriate channels of the senses].
d. He now defines [the failings or weaknesses to which he gives
the name of ] Fault ftZosAaJ.f
| II ||
The passions No. 18.—Faults [or failings] have the character-
what. istjc that they cause Activity.
a. The employment of the plural, in the expression ‘ Faults,’
is intended to make one aware of [not a single species, but of] a
'J Gk
$ II J

triad of things to be defined [as faults or failings] —in the shape
of Affection (raga), Aversion (dwesha), and Stolidity (mdha)*—
[each of which is regarded as a fault or defect, inasmuch as—see
§20—it leads to actions, the recompense of which, whether good
or evil, must be received in some birth or state of mundane exis-
tence—to the postponement of the great end of entire emanci-
pation— see §2].
b. The word pravarttand means the being a producer of Ac-
tivity. Those of which just this is the characteristic^ [are what
we mean by Faults].
c. He now defines [our mortal life or the state of] transmi-
gration]: (pretyabhdva).
Wifawn: n 11
Mortal No. 19.—Transmigration means the being produced
hfe- again [and again].
a. The word pretyabhdva is formed out ofcpretya ‘ having died’
and bhava ‘the becoming [born into the world again’]. As, by
the expression “again,” here habitualness is meant to be impli-
ed—there is first a birth, then death, then a birth—thus [the
state of] transmigration, commencing with [one’s first] birth,
t vsfonw i n
Mr. Colebrooke appears to have viewed the term here rendered ‘ the being
a producer of Activity’ as signifying ‘ the being a product of Activity/—for,
with reference to this, Gautama’s definition of ‘ fault’ (dosha), he says (—see
Essays, vol. I. p. 289.—) “ From acts proceed faults (dosha) : including un-
der this designation, passion/’ &c. The word ‘ fault’ (dosha), as technically
.employed by Gautama in the sense assigned to it in §18. a., is not to be con-
founded with adharmma ‘ demerit’ which latter does proceed from acts. See
further in our note on §2. d,

ends [only] with [final] emancipation. And this knowledge is
conducive to the f relinquishment of all passions’ (vairdgya),—
therefore it was not needless [•—as some persons may think, on
reading the aphorism and reflecting that the condition called
pretyabhdva is just the condition of us men, and might as well
have been called bhdva ‘ condition’ simplyit was not needless,
we say,] to add the word pretya ‘ having died’* [—a word sugges-
tive of the fleeting character of this mortal life, and which, com-
bined with the word bhdva, (state,’ gives the compound term
pretyabhava to denote our mundane existence].
b. He next defines Fruits (phalaJ-\—
n o n
Retri- No. 20.—Fruit is that thing which is produced by
bution. Activity and by [the originators of Activity—viz. our
constitutional faults or] Failings—[see §18].
a. And amongst these [fruits] the fruit that is denoted by the
word primarily is the fruition of pleasure or of pain; and so the
Bhcishya tells us “ Fruit is the consciousness of pleasure or of
pain.” And since one’s [unwise] Activity in engaging either in
duties or offences is the causer thereof, and the Failing again
[—whether of passion or mere folly—see §18—J is the cause of
that, therefore he says “ produced by Activity and by [the origi-
I VHH ^frT
Hence Mr. Colebrooke’s definition of pretyabhdva as “ the condition of the
soul after death” (—see Essays, vol. I. p. 290—) while it is literally correct,
may mislead the readei’ if he does not bear it in mind that this, according to
Hindu notions, is the condition of every man now alive—for, as we are all sup-
posed to have lived and died no one knows how often, we are each of us always
in the condition “ after death.”
+ HR! II

naters of Activity—viz. our] Failings.” But the definition, [—if
we regard the nature instead of the origin of Fruits] is ‘ the ex-
periencing of pleasure or pain—one or other? But by f fruit" in
a secondary application of the term, we mean every thing [mun-
dane] beginning with the body.*
b. He next defines Pain (du’kha)-\—
Pain No. 21.—Pain is that which is in the shape of Vexa-
defined. fion.
a. The wordc pain/ in the ‘secondary application"]: of the term, is
employed to denote the body, the senses, and their objects, since
these are the instruments of pain, and to denote pleasure, because
of its being ever closely connected with pain. And only therefore
[i. e. since the one term ‘ pain" implies, the whole of these] is
rpain" referred to, in the aphorism following, by the term fthat."§
b, He now defines emancipation || (apavarga).
* w i Href i w-
I Jhw II
+This is what is to be understood by the varieties of evil which Mr. Cole-
brooke (Essays vol. 1. p. 290) mentions as “primary or secondary.” It is not
degrees of evil that are to be understood as thus referred to; but, the author,
we are told, chooses to employ the word ‘ pain’ technically—in a ‘ transferred
sense’—to denote the causes of pain also, as well as pain itself.
idb ii
|| ’WRj’ ^mqrfrT II

TT^wifwr^T mfr II II
Beatitude No. ~Absolute deliverance from that is Eman-
what. cipation.
a. (That’—i. e. pain [—as understood in its widest accepta-
tion—see §21. a.]
b. ‘ Absolute deliverance'—i. e. the annihilation of the pain
which has the same locus as one’s self, [i. e. one’s own pain], and
[an annihilation thereof ] not synchronous [with the pain that
belongs to each moment of our mundane statej—for each mo-
ment, as it passess, sees the extinction of its own quantum of
pain; but what is so “ devoutly to be wished” is the absolute an-
nihilation of one’s troubles once for all].*
c. Here is completed the topic of the Definition of the things
that furnish the objects of right notionj- [§9].
d. He now defines ‘ doubt’ (sans ay a) which presents itself next
in orderJ [in the list given in §1].
Completing the topic of the pre-requisites of reasoning.
ipsrftih ftnfr ii ii
Doubt ^0‘ —Doubt is a conflicting judgment [in regard to
defined. one and the same object] respecting its distinction [or
precise character;—this conflicting judgment arising] from un-
steadiness in the recognition [of some mark which, if we could
* ftStm: ii
"I" ^1M ^*4! II
I wi ii

make sure of it, -would determine the object to be so and so] or
[from unsteadiness] in the non-recognition [of some mark which,
were we sure of its absence, would determine the object to be
not so and so ;—this state of things, moreover, resulting] from
the recognition [in the object] of [only such] properties [as are]
common [to a variety of things, and therefore not distinctive,] or
of several properties [such as cannot really belong to one and
the same thing,] or from conflicting testimony.
a. “ Doubt—here is the statement of what is to be defined.*
b. “ A conflicting judgment”—-fwmarsAaJ :—here the prefix
vi signifies f confliction/ and the root mris signifies c knowing?
“In regard to a single object”—is to be supplied. So that
Doubt means, in regard to any single object, Knowledge distin-
guished, contradictoriwise, by the [simultaneous] presence and
the absencef [of some given nature].
c. [The commentators are not unanimous in their interpreta-
tion of this aphorism, some holding that there are five kinds of
doubt referred to, and others that there are only three. We have
preferred the latter view. Of the first kind of doubt an exam-
ple is furnished by the case of an object, in the twilight, of which
We can discern nothing more than that its size is that of a man,
—a property which may belong to a post as well as to a man.]:
We have an example of the second kind in the dubious and dis-
puted question whether Sound is a substance or a quality or an
action.§ It cannot be more than one of these, yet it presents * * * §
* 4^ II
+ fqXTvreh i i w
wfa'oftfa TpuM i n?r i wfwft
i =tt ii
\> vj
§ ^4 Ji uf: 11

characters which furnish plausible grounds for contending that it
is each of the three. The third kind of doubt is, of course, such
as arises when, of two witnesses (presumed equally trust-worthy)
the one asserts what the other denies.]
d. He now defines [the fourth in the list §1—viz.] ‘ Motive*
(prayojanaj, which next presents itself.^
|| 8 11
No. 24.—What thing having set before one, one proceeds to
act—that [thing] is the ‘ Motive’ [of the action.]
a. f Having set before one/—i. e. having proposed [to one’s self
—as something to be gained or avoided.] And so what consti-
tutes any thing a Motive is its being the object of desire, which
[desire either of attaining or escaping] is the cause of one’s ac-
b. He now defines [the fifth in the list §1.—viz.] ‘ familiar case
of a fact’ (drishtanta) which next presents itself.|
^Trrnrt ii ii
No. 25.—In regard to [some fact respecting] what thing both
the ordinary man and the acute investigator entertain a same-
ness of opinion, that [thing] is called a ‘ familiar case’ [of the fact
in question.]
a. The ‘ Ordinary man/—-i. e. one to be informed—who has not
attained that superiority of intellect which is the result of conver-
sancy with books;—such is the sense of the term [—among the
* 11
t wi a

various senses that might be given to it—] that will be found of
b. The (acute investigator’—i. e. the informer [of the ordinary-
man §25. a.]—one who bas attained superiority of intellect through
conversancy with books;—such is the sense of the term that will
be found of use.f
c. Here closes the topic of the pre-requisites of Reasoning.£
d. He now defines [the sixth in the list §1—viz.] ‘ Tenet’ (sid-
dhdntaj, which next presents itself. §
Of positions, not familiar, that may be employed in rea-
No. 26.—A f Tenet’ (siddhanta) is that, the steadfastness of
the acceptance of which rests on a treatise [of weight and autho-
a. He next divides || [the f tenets’ thus characterised generally.] * §
^f^rrTTw: ii
t wit wnj^v^nfiTwii
§ II
II twsfHII

3Trr II ^X3 II
No. 27.—[‘Tenets* are divided into the species that are de-
scribed in the succeeding aphorisms] through the difference be-
tween a f Dogma of all the schools/ a ‘ Dogma peculiar to some
school/ a ‘ Hypothetical Dogma/ and a^‘ Dogmatic corollary/
a. It is of four kinds—such is the remainder [required to sup-
ply the ellipsis in the aphorism]. The meaning is this that it is
so through the difference of its owing its steadfastness to all
the schools [or to only one,] &c.*
b. He now defines a ‘ Dogma of all the schools’ (sarwatantra-
No. 28.—That [position or tenet] which is not in opposition
to any of the schools, and which is claimed [as a tenet] by [at
least] some one school, is [what we mean by] a ‘ Dogma of all the
a. He next defines a f Dogma peculiar to some school’ (prati-
No. 29.—That [position] which is [held] established in the same
school, and which in another school is [regarded as] not esta-
blished, is [what we mean by] a ‘ Dogma peculiar to some school?
* cfrT | I
t ||
i vfri||

a. The word 1 same’ [in the expression 1 established in the same
school’] means ‘ one? So the sense is f established in one school?
The complete sense is ‘ established in its own school? So the
sense in which we shall find it useful to employ the term [—since,
in a controversy, we may imagine each school to be represented
by a single partisan—] is this, that whatever is assented to by
only one-or other of two disputants is the peculiar dogma of that
' one of the two,—as, for example, the eternity of sound is [a pe-
culiar dogma] of the followers of the Mimansa school.*
b. [Thus the pratitantra-siddhanta is what supplies the materi-
al for the argumentum ad hominem in the disputations of the
c. He next defines a f Hypothetical Dogma’ (adhikarana-sid-
No. 30.—That, if which be [held] established, there is the es-
tablishing of another point, is [what we mean by] a ‘ Hypotheti-
cal Dogma?
a. The meaning is this—that, that position [—for which no evi-
dence is offered in the first instance—] is a hypothetical dogma
[or a hypothesis] only on the establishment of which taking place
{—by being conceded—] does the establishment take place of
another proposition under consideration.]:
* vspt: i stn
^f?T Hffe rTT^I W


1Z/U A < <5^-^ rAy'- 7 L,
b. He next defines a?‘ Dogmatic corollary/
No. 31.— [Dogmatic corollary’ is the mention of a particu-
lar fact in regard any thing, not expressly declared in an apho-
rism, [our knowledge the fact coming so immediately] from
what is recognised, [by the\naker of the aphorisms, as to render
a demonstration superfluous e fact being thus entitled to rank
not as a deduction but as a dog\a.]

a. "Not expressly declared in an aphorism”—such is here the
meaning of the term aparikshita.*
b. “ The mention of a particular fact”—such is here the mean-
ing of the expression visesha-parikshana.-\
c. And thus a ‘ Dogmatic corollary’ [or an implied dogma] is
what is received as a tenet [or first principle] without being ex-
pressly laid down in an aphorism,—as, for example, [the tenet]
that the Mind is an organ J [of the Soul,—which is recognised as
7 X £ ' one °f ^e tenets of the Nyaya, although nowhere expressly as-
fl _________A-J 1-rr. T
serted by Gautama.]
Here ends the topic of the definition of the scholastic tenets
that take their place in argumentation^
1 He next divides, with a view to defining, the members [of a
k’ ■'
k X ~ " XXV ^V.AX, X>, ------------o, ---------- L„ -
y X £ ' demonstration] which present themselves next in order || [among

* II
t fsrai^vpS^^ppr ii
i fiW ^T^T^’^fTrnW’TJIHT OTHiRtHflnT: I WT
J § H’HM 5?TRn^f^lnra^^nTWfT^I’T II
II jwmn^r^wf^ fwsra ii

The method of argumentative exposition.
(X x Si
â–  J
No. 32.—The members [of a demonstration] are (1) the Pro-
position, (2) the Reason, (3) the Example, (4) the Application, x
and (5) the Conclusion.
a. He defines the Proposition* [to be proved.] •
vf^T ii ii
No. 33.—The Proposition is the declaration of what is to be
established. ]
a. Of what is to be established—the declaration—this is the
• . . ...
Proposition :—and “ what is to be established” is this, that such *
a thing as a hill is possessed, for instance, of fire.\
b. He defines, and 4hen, by two subsequent Aphorisms divides,
the Reason, which presents itself next in order]: [—of those enu-
merated in § 32].
rTRT II 8 || c
No. 34.—The Reason is the means for the establishing of
tvhat is, to be established; [and, this it, is] through the Example]®
having fche-nature, or in like manner through its having tho we-
verso-of-tho nature, [implied in the Reason-;—in-other words—*■
* Ufrl^t rF II
t rt falpj: r i Rfe-

through the Reason’s being distributed, affirmatively or nega-
tively, in the Major Premiss],
a. Here the generic definition is this—that “ The Reason is
the means for the establishing of what is to be established.” By
“the means for [the establishing of] what is to be established,”
is meant [not exclusively the assigned Reason itself but] that
[second member out of the five—see §3.2—] which informs us
[by its use of the 5th case-affix] that such and such has the pow-
er of giving information leading to the establishing of what is to
be established.* [Foi’ example, when we say, ‘ The hill is fiery—
because there is smoke’,—the ‘ smoke’ is the Reason of our
knowing that the hill is fiery, but the whole clause * because there
is smoke’ is also technically called the Reason].
b. He declares that it is of two sorts when he says “ through
the example’s having the nature, or in like manner through its
having the reverse of the nature [implied in the Reason].” By
the possession of the same nature is meant [what is elsewhere
spoken of as] f agreement’ (anwaya), and by the possession of
the reverse of the nature is meant [what is elsewhere spoken of
as] ‘ contrariety’ (vyatirekaj. The meaning that will prove ser-
viceable [when we speak of this agreement and contrariety] is
that of ‘ invariable attendedness’ (vyapti) of the one or the other
description, f [Thus when we speak of the ‘ agreement’ of fire with
smoke—the smoke being adduced as the Reason for holding that
there is fire, we mean to speak of the invariableness of smoke’s
being attended by fire :—and when we speak of the contrariety
oifire and a lake—the lake being adduced as the Reason for
holding that the vapour rising from the place is not smoke, we
+ ’TO I tvWTfffrr I

mean to speak of the invariableness of a lake’s being devoid of
c. He now defines the Example, which presents itself next in
order* [—of those enumerated in §32—].
No. 35.—The Example is soma.‘ familiar case of the fact —/ /
[see §25—], which, through t [suggestion of the reason s] mva-
riable attendedness by what is to established, causes that na-
ture [or property] to be [admitted to be
to the subject] which
is to be established [as belonging to the sub]

c. The definition [—expressed generally—] is this—viz. “ The
Example is some familiar case of the fact.” Here the [elliptical]
expression f familiar case of the fact’ means that Member [of the
five-membered exposition—see §32—] which is appropriated to
the mention of the familiar case of the fact:—hence there is no
harm if, seeing that some familiar case of a fact is only tempora-
rily so [—i. e. employed as an Example—], it is not invariably
sof [—the terms not being co-extensive in their application, for
a fact remains a fact even when not cited as an Example—].
b. [But the Example is of two kinds—see §34 b.—so,] to com-
plete this [definition in §35] we must add that it is the Example
where we have a case of invariable attendedness* [that we are
here speaking of].
* u
sr ^rfk: ii

c. He next defines the Example where we have a case of in-
variable abandonedness.*
rrf^q-^^T faqxtrT II II
No. 3G.—Or inversely [—as regards the ‘ invariable attended-
ness’ spoken of in §35—] the Example, oa the nontrary, may be
PS ci£ a <.
one where Wehave a case.or.invariable abandonedness., A
a. [As when we argue—see §34, b.—that the vapour seen ri-
sing from a lake is not smoke, because a lake is invariably devoid
of fire.]
b. He next defines the Application, which presents itself next
in orderf [—of those enumerated in §32—.]
rT^fTT =TT || ||
No. 37.—The Application is the collecting [or bringing under
simultaneous view] with respect to the Example, what is to be
established as being so, or not^o.
a. And the Application is of two kinds, through the distinction
of (1) that where we have [in the Example—] a case of invariable
attendedness, and (2) that where we have a case of invariable
abandonedness. “ So” [—or “ in like manner”—] such is the
expression when the Application involves a case of invariable at-
tendedness. “ Not so” is the expression when the Application
involves a case of invariable abandonedness. J [In other words—
“ and so is this” (tatha-chayam) is the form of expression when
t ii
t TptTT’FTT f^fdVT I 7T^f?T TTRZ^T-
w^TTT I h rraf?r

the Minor Premiss is affirmative; while “ and not so is this”
(na-chayan tatkdj is the form of expression when the Minor Pre-
miss is negative.]
b. He next defines the conclusion.*
The conclusion c r-
defined. faWW II ^ ||
No. 38.—The conclusion is the re-stating of the Proposition
because of the mention of the Reason [whidi now authorizes us
to prefix the illative 1 Therefore'].
a. Here concludes the topic of the form of demonstration.!
b. He now defines Confutation, which presents itself next in
Concluding the topic of demonstration.
pJ II ^<11
No. 39.—Confutation—[which is intended]
Confutation, or reductio - ., , . . ~ ., , ,. . . ,
. . for the assertammg of the truth m regard to
ad absurduni. ° °
a question, the truth in regard to which is
not accurately apprehended—is reasoning from the supposition
of [the cessation of] the cause [to the cessation of the effect—•
for, on the admitted cessation of the cause, the observed result-
ing phenomenon ought of course to cease also].
a. [In other words, confutation consists in our directing a per-
son, who does not apprehend the force of the argument as first
* faiHR rf II
! II
| sfiWUni II

presented to him, to look at it from an opposite point of view.
For example—to take a simple case, which, simple as it is, cor-
rectly represents the generic form to which all the logical errors
of man are reducible—suppose a person admits that there is
smoke in the hill, but denies that there is fire,—having previous-
ly granted that where there is smoke there is fire, we confute
him—and put him in the way of coming to a eright notion*—by
remarking of the hill that] if it were without fire, it would be
without smoke.*
b. He now defines Ascertainment, which presents itself next in
order, t

Certainty arrived at
by hearing both sides.
No. 40.—Ascertainment is the determina-
tion of a question by [hearing] both what is
to be said for and against it, after having been in doubt.
a. Here closes the topic [—see § 25. c.—] of the latter divi-
sion of Keasoning.J
b. So much for the first diurnal portion of the first Lecture of
the commentary composed on the Aphorisms of the Nyaya, by
the venerable Viswanatha Bhattacharyya.§
t ^nrnr "fcrcM 11
i ii

Definition of a
fair discussion.
c. He now defines Discussion.*
No. 41. Discussion is the undertaking [—by two parties res-
pectively—] of the one side and the other in regard to what [con-
clusion] has been arrived at by means of the five-membered [pro-
cess of demonstration already explained—see §32—; this proce-
dure] consisting in the defending [of the proposition] by proofs
[on the part of the one disputant] and the assailing it by objec-
tions [on the part of the other,—the discussion being conducted
on both sides] without discordance in respect of the tenets [or
principles on which the conclusion is to depend].
a. [Such is the discussion that takes place between a preceptor
and his pupil, when the latter brings forward objections, which
the other, having a clearer view of the matter, is able to remove
—there being no dispute between the two in regard to the data].
b. The persons competent for [this honest
The prime requisite , , . ,, , „
style of discussion are those who are really
m an honest disputant.
desirous to get at the truth —and it is not
necessary that there should be a Moderator in such a discussion,
because the debate is here conducted without passionj [or shab-
by ambition of victory].
* ||

c. He defines wrangling.*
ti « u
Definition of N°* 42*~WranSlin^ consisting in the defence or
wrangling. attack Eof a proposition] by means of frauds [see
§50], futilities [see §58], and what procedures de-
serve [nothing but an indignant] rebuke [see §59], is what
takes place after the procedure aforesaid [—that is to say, after a
fair course of argumentation,—supposing this to have failed to
bring the disputants to an agreement].
„ «• By the expression “ frauds,” &c. it is inti-
The aim of the , ,, , .
wrangler mated that this kind of talk [viz. wrangling] is
that of the person who is desirous of victory, for
it is the man desirous of victory [instead of being desirous of
truth], that makes use of frauds, &c. And so the meaning is
this, that Wrangling is the discourse of him who aims only at
victory, [he being quite indifferent] whether this [discourse of
his] establishes either side of the questionf [provided only he can
make out a pretext for bragging that he has said something to
the point].
b. He now defines Cavilling, which next presents itself. J
fiw il M II
Definition of No- 43—That [—viz. Wrangling, §42,—], when
Cavilling, devoid of [any attempt made for] the establishing of
the opposite side of the question, is Cavilling.
a. [The man shabbily eager for the semblance of a victory,
sometimes, see §42, a., attempts to prove something by disinge-
* ii
i ftwt SiHWT ||

nuous artifices. He is then, said to wrangle. If he attempts to
establish nothing, hut confines himself to carping disingenuously
at the arguments of the other party, he is said to cavil].
b. Here the topic of controversy is concluded.*
c. He now defines and divides the Semblances of a reason,
which next present themselves.f
Of fallacies, or what only look like reasons, by means
Enumeration of the No. 44.—The Semblances of a reason are (1)
Fallacies. f]ie Erratic, (2) the Contradictory, (3) the Equal-
ly available on both sides, (4) that which is In the same case with
what is to be proved, and (5) the Mistimed.
a. He now defines the Erratic]: [semblance of a reason.]
n y n
The argument that No. 45.—That [semblance of a reason] is
proves too much. Erratic which arrives at more ends than the
one [required.]
a. Eoi’ example [suppose one were to argue that] Sound is
eternal, for it is not the object of touch §—[—the reason alleged
would bring us to more conclusions than we want; because the * * * §
* n
§ i ii

quality of Conjunction or of Disjunction for example, is not the
object of touch, yet no one argues for its eternity.]
b. He now defines the Contradictory [semblance of a reason]
which presents itself next in order.*
No. 46.—That [semblance of a reason] is
the Contradictory which is repugnant to what
The argument that
proves the reverse.
is proposed as that which is to be established.
a. c Which is to be established/—such is the meaning here of
the term siddhdnta.X
b. And so the meaning, as it may be most profitably regarded,
is this, viz.—after having proposed, or stated, that which is to be
established, [a Contradictory reason is] one employed which is
opposed thereto, or invariably attended by the negation of what
is to be established; as, for instance, [if one were to argue],
e This is fiery, because it is a body of water/J
c. He now defines that [semblance of a reason] which is Equal-
ly available on both sides—this next presenting itself. §
« boh
No. 47. That from which a question may
The argument that aiase as f0 whether the case stands this
tells equally both ways. . .
way or the other way, if employed with the
view of determining the state of the case, is [a mere semblance
* tovth ii
t II

of a reason—being] equally available for both sides [of the dis-
pute] .
a. [According to the commentator]—That reason employed,
or adduced, for the ascertainment of one’s own proposition or the
negation of the other’s proposition, is called f the same for both
sides :’—but which reason ?—with regard to this he says-—f from
which a question’; i. e. from which two opposite views may arise;
—such is the account given in the Bliashya.*
b. [For example—suppose a man argues that Sound is eternal
because it is audible, the reason here alleged will just provoke
the question whether audibleness is any proof of eternity, and the
opponent may with equal propriety argue that Sound, because it
is audible, is not eternal].
c. He now defines that [semblance of a reason] which is in the
same case with what is to be proved,—this presenting itself next
in order.f
11 y 11
The argument that stands No. 48. And it [the alleged leason]
itself in need of proof. hi the same case with what is to be
proved, if, in standing itself in need of proof, it does not differ
from that which is to be proved.
a. [As the commentator remarks]—for if the reason stands in
need of being proved too, just as the proposition stands in need
of being proved, then it is said to be ‘in the same case with what
is to be proved;’ and therefore the expression ‘unestablished’
* %rr:
1 sfiHVThT II

(asiddha) is employed [in speaking of such a reason] ; and this
[r unestablishedness^ or unreality] is of three sorts, through the
distinction of the unreality of the locality [or subject of the al-
leged property], the unreality of the character [as regards the
subject whereof it is assumed to be predicable], and the unreali-
ty the universality* [assumed in the major premiss. Exam-
ples of these are given in our Lecture on the Tarka-sangraha\.
b. He now defines the Mistimed [semblance of a reason] which
next presents
n «< n
The argument that is op- No. 49.—That [semblance of a reason]
Senses^ evi^ence the is Mistimed which is adduced when the
time is not [that when it might have
a. [For example,—suppose one argues that] Fire does not con-
tain heat, because it is factitious,]; [his argument is mistimed if
we have already ascertained, by the superior evidence of the sens-
es, that fire does contain heat].
b. Here concludes the topic of the Semblance of a reason. §
c. He now defines Fraud [or unfairness] which next presents
itself. || * * * §
* W Tim I
-j 'j
fi II
I ii
II wnKW^^frrii

Of the tricks employed by the dishonest disputant
Wilfully unfair ^0.—Unfairness [in disputation] is the
objections. opposing of what is propounded by means of as-
suming a different sense [from that which the objector well knows
the propounder intended his terms to convey].
a. For example—in such a case of argument as this, that ‘ The
man has come from Nepaul, because he has a new (navaj blan-
ket [such as.the country of Nepaul supplies]/—the declaring
that this is not established, on the assumption that the meaning
was nine* [blankets, instead of a new blanket,—the word nava
meaning both new and nine,—is unfair].
He now divides Fraud, which he has just defined.f
No. 51.—It is of three kinds, (1) Fraud in respect of a term,
(2) Fraud in respect of a genus, and (3) Fraud in respect of a
a. Of these he now defines the ‘ Fraud in respect of a term/J
t II
t TT^r II

=1T Tr
The fraudulent
of a term.
No. 52.—‘ Fraud in respect of a term’ is the
assuming a meaning other than [the objector
well knows] was intended by the speaker when
he named the thing by a term that happened to be ambiguous.
a. [An example of this has been given under §50. a.].
b. He next defines ‘ Fraud in respect of a genus,’*
The fraudulent over- No- 53.—f Fraud in resPect of a genus' is
straining of an assertion the assuming that something is spoken of in
which was obviously not . ' . .
meant of the whole ge- respect whereof the thing asserted is impos-
nus- sible, because [forsooth] this happens to be
the same in kind with that of which the thing asserted is possible.
a. For example, on some one’s saying, f This is a Brahman,—
he must be possessed of learning and conduct’;—the other, as-
suming that he here deduces the possession of learning and con-
duct from the fact of being a Brahman, says—‘ How can that
be?—for, the possession of learning and conduct, if deducible
from the fact of being a Brahman, would be found, where it can-
not, in his childhood.’^ [The other, of course, meant, as the ob-
jector very well knows, to speak of a Brahman who has lived
* II
t W WRT $4 fejT-

long enough in the world to render it possible for him to study,
in which case the probability is that he will have studied].
b. He now defines f Fraud in respect of a trope?*
II 4.8 II
, , No. 54.—f Fraud in respect of a trope’ is
The fraudulent ac- . , . , 1
ceptance of the meta- the denial of the truth of the matter, when
phoncal literally, and the assertion was made in one or other of the
vice versa.
modes, [viz. literal or metaphorical,—which
it suits the purpose of the objector to invert],
a. For example, in the case of such an assertion as ‘ The scaf-
folds cry out’ [—somewhat analogous to the English phraseology
‘ The pit and gallery applauded’—] ; or ‘The jar is blue’; [a dis-
honest opponent will say,] ‘It is only those standing on the scaf-
folds that cry out, but not the scaffolds’;—and, in like manner,
[he will say,] ‘ How can a jar be the same thing as blue—which is
[not a substance but] a colour ?’f [In these cases the objector
knows perfectly well that the assertion was not meant literally
of the scaffolds, and that the jar was not asserted to be the co-
lour blue, but a blue substance].
b. So too [conversely] it is a fraud in respect of a trope, when
the assertion ‘ I am eternal’ has been employed literally, to ob-
ject ' How canst thou be eternal that was born of so and so?’|
nh i ii

[Here the objector is supposed to know very well that the speak-
er employed the term ‘F to denote, what is regarded as the di-
rect object of its denotation, the eternal spirit within him, and
not his body, which he can only metaphorically call himself, and
which, as the temporary prison-house of his soul, very possibly
was born of so and so].
e. [If you ask why it is exactly that] a Fraud [such as has
been described in §51, &c.] is not a valid reply, [it is] because it
does not assail what the speaker meant to say.* [In the phrase-
ology of European logic, it is a wilful ignoratio elenchi or miscon-
ception of what it is that is to be opposed].
d. And it must not be said that it is the speaker who is to
blame for employing terms with a double meaning or with a me-
taphorical application; because the speaker is not to blame in
employing a term that is notoriously understood as expressive of
this or that meaning; else there would be an end put to every
thing like reasoning by such objections as the following—viz.,
when a man says ‘ The mountain is fiery/ [the opponent, choos-
ing to suppose that the term employed was not vahnimdn ‘ fiery/
but a-vahniman ‘not fiery’—the form, by the rules of euphonic
combination in Sanskrit, being here the same in either case,
might say] ‘ How is it that [you say] this mountain is not
e. He next takes a prima facie or incorrect view of Fraud
* rrrWTIII

[ as it is one that is likely to occur to some readers, and one
that may as well be disposed of] whilst we are on the subject.*
rT^firjjvTrr II T'k II
The varieties of Fraud
not to be confounded
because they partially
No. 55.—Fraud in respect of a trope [§54
—some one may fancy at first sight—] is
just Fraud in respect of a term [§52], for it
does not differ therefrom.
a. The meaning of this doubt is, that Fraud is only of two
kinds, but not of three kinds; for Fraud in respect of a trope is
just Fraud in respect of a term, seeing that these do not differ in
being the assumption of a word’s being used in another sensef
[than that in which it was well enough known that the speaker
did use it].
b. [This doubt] he clears up J [as follows].
Things, though par- No’ 56'~It is oot s0 C~as ™pposed in
tially agreeing, may §55—] because they do differ [although, it may
yet differ. be, agreejng jn respect just mentioned].
a. Since they may agree in some respect or other, even while
they differ through the characters abovementioned [in §52—54]
which have led to their being treated as separate, there would be
no distinction anywhere [if we were to adopt the principle which
would remove the distinction here], because there is everywhere
* ^T^rfall
I wnrffn

no difference so far as regards a character common to the things
severally* [—a man and a monkey, for example, or ajar and a
web, being alike in so far as regards their being substances, but
still requiring to be distinguished in respect of that in which
they differ].
b. So, with the intention of showing that the opposite view in-
volves an absurdity [such as has been noticed in §56. a.], he saysj*
[as follows].
No. 57.—Or if there were no distinction where there is any si-
milarity of character, we should have but one kind of Fraud.
a. That is to say—if no distinction is to result from any pro-
perty whatever provided there be some similarity of nature, then
Fraud, inasmuch as each variety thereof has a common charac-
ter so far forth as each is a Fraud &c., would not be even of two
sorts as you imagine [—see §55 a.], but of only one.^
b. Here concludes the topic of Fraud [in disputation.] §
c. He now defines Futility, which next presents itself. || * §
n ^nf^frr u
t n
wra hr: ii
§ II
II wutht ^rrfW n

Of futile objections and hopeless stupidity.
*nfrr: n 4^ 11
No. 58.—Futility consists in the offering of
objLtMMb what. objections founded on [some mere] similarity
or difference of character [—without regard to
the question whether the fact asserted bears any invariable rela-
tion to that character],
a. The expression (founded on similarity or difference of cha-
racter’ is a definite one [—intended to convey just so much, and
to exclude everything beyond—] ; therefore the meaning is this,
that Futility consists in objecting, or taking exception, on the
ground of a similarity or difference of character without respect
to invariableness of association or dissociation* [between the cha-
racter and that whereof it is taken as a sign of the presence or
the absence. For example, if it were propounded that ‘ The man
is unfit to travel, because he has a fever,’ it would be futile to
object that ‘ The man is fit to travel, because he is a soldier’—
there being no invariableness of connection between the being a
soldier and the being fit to travel].
b. [As a syllogism with the Major premiss not universal but
particular has no force at all]—so, [in consideration of the want
of universality referred to in §58. «.,] it is implied that the futile
reply—differing from a Fraud [§50]—is one that is powerless as
an objection, [—whereas the objection, in the case of ignoratio
elenchi, has power against the ‘ man of straw’ which is fraudulent-

ly substituted for the argument of the opposite party—], or it is
a reply that is self-destructive.*
c. He now defines Unfitness to be argued with—the topic
which presents itself next in order.f
u u < n
The limit at which it be- No- 59.—Unfitness to be argued with
comes useless to argue fur- consists in one’s [stupidly] misunder-
standing, or not understanding at all.
a. The term here rendered f Unfitness to be argued with’ sig-
nifies literally the place, i. e. the suggester, of censure or re-
buke [—for if a man stupidly misunderstands you or does not
understand you at all, and yet still persists in trying to make a
show of opposition, then the matter has come to that point where
there is nothing left for it but to rebuke him as a blockhead, and
to turn him out or quit his company].
b. In order to prevent the mistake, [into which some might fall,
of supposing] that there is no subdivision of Futility and Unfit-
ness to be reasoned with, [—the subdivisions of which will be
stated in their proper place—] he says,§ [as follows].
n < © 11
No. 60.—Since they are of various kinds, there are many * §
t fairwin ii
I fauw ii
§ ^TfrrfalT^T^Tl^UiT ^TT ii

sorts of Futility and Unfitness to be reasoned with [—see §59.
a. [But as other questions are more pressing] their subdivision
is not made at present;—such is the import *[of the apho-
b. [Here ends the First Book of the commented Aphorisms
of the Nyaya.]
* -felrr ^frr HUT: !l

a. Before going further, let us bestow a re-
Review of Gau- , . , & /. T .
, , _. strospective glance on this Lecture in which
tama s 1st Lecture. ,
Gautama lays down the plan ot the whole Nya-
ya system; and let us enquire whether Gautama’s exposition is
obnoxious to such a charge as is brought against it, for example,
by Dr. Ritter, who says, (at p. 366, Vol. IV. of
th^Ny^libelled tlie English version of his History of Philoso-
in Europe. phy), “ In its exposition the Nyaya is tedious,
loose, and unmethodical. Indeed the whole form of this Philoso-
phy is a proof of the incapacity of its expositors to enter into
the intrinsic development of ideas, whatever knowledge they may
have possessed of the external laws of composition.” Setting
aside the latter of these sentences, which has possibly been mis-
translated, we venture to say that the Nyaya—up to the point
that we have here reached in Gautama’s exposition of it—can be
Reasons why it is libelled. tedious only to him who does not understand it or who has no taste for philosophical enqui- ries ; that it can appear loose to any one only
as the chain cable heaped upon the deck of a man of war appears
loose in the eyes of the landsman who never saw it stretched;
and that it can appear unmethodical only to him who has failed
to discern its method. We blame no one for having failed to
discern its method, but we do blame those, including Dr. Ritter,

who, having failed to discern it, take upon them to deny its ex-
Attempt to Show j8tenCe’ The ™thod in Gautama’s exposition
why it ought not is, one might think, sufficiently clear. Let us
to be so libelled. try to make it if possible clearer. Aiming at
this, we shall now give our Synopsis of Gautama’s method, noting,
as we go along, the Aphorism to which our statements have re-
Estimate of Gau-
tama’s order of pro-
b. Gautama starts with the grand question
of all questions—the enquiry as to how we
shall attain the summurn bonum,—the f chief
end of man/ as the Westminster Catechism literally represents
the Sanskrit paramapurushartha. The general answer to this he
states in his first aphorism—where he lays down further the posi-
tion that deliverance from evil can be reached only through know-
ledge of the truth, [see §1].
c. Few are likely to dispute this first position [—those few be-
ing such as are to be remitted to the category noticed under §59],
and the next question is,—have we instruments adapted to
the acquisition of a knowledge of the truth ? According to Gau-
tama we are furnished with four instruments adapted to this pur-
pose. [These he enumerates in §3, and describes severally in
d. But, if we have instruments, let us know what are the objects,
in regard to which it is worth while obtaining a correct know-
ledge by means of the appropriate instruments. [These he enu-
merates in §9, and he defines them severally in §10—22].
e. But the bare enunciation and definiton of these Objects does
not ensure a correct and believing knowledge of them. [The
state intermediate between hearing and believing, viz. Doubt, he
defines in §23].
f. But how is a man to get out of doubt ? He will be content
to remain in doubt if there be no motive for enquiring further.

[Here—§24—he takes occasion to explain wliat constitutes a
g. But; in every enquiry, to reach the unknown we must start
from the known;—there must be data. The knowledge which,
in any enquiry, we may treat as requiring no demonstration, is
either popular—being that on which the unlearned and the
learned are at one—the only ground available in dealing with
the unlearned, [see §25]; or it is scientific—belonging to the
schools, [see §26]. This latter, again, is divisible into four—viz.,
tenets received in every school [§ 27]; tenets peculiar to particu-
lar schools, and furnishing the grounds of argument a ad hominem
only [§29]; tenets postulated, and available only where the
hypothesis is conceded [§30]; and tenets which, though not ex-
pressly laid down by the founders of the schools, are yet so
clearly implied as to require no special demonstration, being in-
evitable Corollaries [§31].
h. The data being determined, it is proper to determine the
order of procedure in demonstrating thereby something not
granted. [This order of procedure is intimated in §32 and ex-
plicated in §33—38].
i. But, thus far, we have been shown an arrangement for hear-
ing only one side of the question,* and how can we be sure that
the opposite side is not the right one ? [Before making up our
minds we must hear both sides—§39—40].
j. But an honest enquirer may have heard both sides and still
be in perplexity. Is he to be turned adrift ? Not at all. Honest
discussion, with one who holds the same first principles, is open
to him [§41].
k. There are yet others, besides honest enquirers, that are not
utterly to be rejected. A person, not hopelessly irreclaimable,
* Prov. XVIII, 17.

may shabbily wrangle for the sake of a seeming victory. [Here,
therefore, he defines wrangling, §42].
l. A person, not perhaps hopelessly irreclaimable, may descend
to even a lower depth of shabbiness than the wrangler, and may
carp at others without undertaking to settle any thing himself.
[Here, therefore, he defines cavilling, §43].
m. Wranglers and cavillers, in default of good reasons, must
take up with bad ones—with what look like reasons; and even
an honest enquirer may mislead himself by taking the semblance
of a reason for a real one. [The various possible semblances of
a reason he, therefore, defines and divides §44—19].
n. But, whilst there are fallacies by which a man may deceive
himself as well as others, there are other frauds which are em-
ployed only dishonestly for the deception of others. [These
frauds he defines and divides, §50—57].
o. Descending a stage lower, an opponent may employ objec-
tions so futile as to be capable of deceiving no one. It is well
to know in what consists the futility of such objections. [This
he shows—§ 58.]
p. Finally, an opponent, sinking even below the former one,
(who knew what he was opposing though he could make none but
a futile opposition), may be unable to understand the proposition
[§59—60]. Here Gautama's patience is exhausted, but not before.
Against everything but that invincible combination of the spirit
of contradiction with stupidity, he seeks to arm himself at all
points. An objection the most frivolous—or even futile—provi-
ded it be tendered by one who understands the proposition—he
TT . _ does not refuse to deal with. The obi ection
How it happens that . _
very frivolous objec- might perplex some honest enquirer, and
t’ons are gravely treat- therefore Gautama, or the follower who has
ed in the INyaya.
imbibed his spirit, does not consider himself
entitled to consult his own ease by scouting it, though he himself

may see its futility plainly enough. It is fair to remember this
when we meet with ludicrously frivolous objections gravely treat-
ed in a Nyaya work. The author is not to be supposed to have
invented the objection. It was offered to him—offered very pos-
sibly for the purpose of vexatiously puzzling and perplexing,—and
the Naiyayika will not allow himself to be puzzled and perplexed.
The most cavilling opponent is not to be allowed the semblance
of a victoiy j he shall not be allowed to boast even of having put
the philosopher out of temper. This single triumph—such as it
is—is reserved for the absolute blockhead.
q. Now, we should like to learn from the undervaluers of the
method of the Nyaya, how could that method be much improved ?
The undervaluers of
the Nyaya invited to
state where the order
of procedure is mis-
arranged, or what im-
portant matter there
is for which the sys-
tem provides no place.
misarranges the order of procedure. We have explained his or-
der of procedure, according to our own view of it. The enquiry
whether there is any thing within the range of conception, for
which his system does not furnish its appropriate place, we re-
serve for a separate essay.
You are not to imagine that you have answer-
ed this question when you have shown that
there are some important matters not here no-
ticed by Gautama. You must be able to show
either that there are important matters for
which his system provides no place, or that he